Providence New York Steam-Ship Company v. Hill Manufacturing Company/Dissent Field

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

109 U.S. 578

Providence New York Steam-Ship Company  v.  Hill Manufacturing Company

FIELD, J., dissenting.

I am not able to agree with the court in its disposition of this case. As I construe the act of 1851 to limit the liability of ship-owners, the liability of the steam-ship company for the loss by fire of the goods of the plaintiff below, the Hill Manufacturing Company, rests upon the first section. In my judgment that section is not qualified nor in any respect affected by the rest of the act; nor is an action to recover for losses by fire, caused by the design or neglect of the owner of the vessels, controlled by proceedings taken by him to limit his liability for losses from other causes. The opinion of the court proceeds on the assumption that cases of loss and damage by fire are within the provisions of the third section of the act; it so states expressly. Yet this assumption necessarily involves the conclusion that a fire, caused by the design or neglect of the owner, may occur without his privity or knowledge; which appears to me to be nothing less than saying that contradictory and inconsistent terms may be appropriately applied to the same transaction. The object of the act was to change the rule of the common law as to the liability of the owners of vessels for losses and injuries to which they did not contribute, either designedly or by their neglect, but which were attributable entirely to the acts or omissions of their officers or employes. The common law placed a burdensome responsibility upon the owners for the acts or omissions of their agents or servants without their knowledge or assent; and to lighten this responsibility the statute in question was passed. It was not its purpose to limit the responsibility of the owners for the consequences of their own wrongful acts or omissions. The first section exempts them from all liability for loss or damage by fire of goods shipped on board their vessels, unless such fire is caused by their design or neglect. When the fire is thus caused the common-law rule of liability remains as before, and that extends to the whole value of the property, if entirely lost, or to the extent to which it may be damaged, if only partially destroyed. The concluding provision of the section is equivalent to a declaration that the exemption provided in the preceding part shall not exist when the fire originated from the wrongful acts or omissions of the owners. The third section prescribes a limited liability of the owners for losses from a great variety of acts. It does not exempt them from all liability, but restricts it in the cases mentioned to the value of the r interest in the vessels and freight then pending. It is as follows:

'That the liability of the owner or owners of any ship or vessel for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by the master, officers, mariners, passengers, or any other person or persons, of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board such ship or vessel; or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision; or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners,-shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner or owners respectively in such ship or vessel, and her freight then pending.'

The fourth section refers to the acts mentioned in the third, and declares that if any such embezzlement, loss, or destruction shall be suffered by several freighters or owners of goods on the same voyage, and the whole value of the ship and freight shall not be sufficient to make compensation to each of them, they shall receive compensation from the owner in proportion to their respective losses; and for that purpose the freighters and owners of the property and the owner of the ship, or any of them, may take proceedings in any court for the purpose of apportioning the sum for which he may be liable among the parties thereto; and the owner may transfer his interest in the ship and freight, for the benefit of the claimants, to a trustee, to be appointed by any court of competent jurisdiction, to act as such for the persons entitled thereto, after which transfer all claims and proceedings against him shall cease.

It seems clear that the various cases of damages and losses enumerated in section 3 are not intended to embrace losses by fire. This section first speaks of the liability of the owner for embezzlement, loss, or destruction, by the master, officers, mariners, passengers, or other persons, of property shipped on board the vessel. It then speaks of his liability for any loss, damage, or injury by collision; and, lastly, for any loss by any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred without his privity or knowledge. It is conceded that the language of the first and second parts of the section does not include losses by fire, and the language of the concluding clause does not necessarily include them. It may be applied to other cases; and as losses by fire are specifically embraced by the first section, it must receive such application as will give to each section full force. This is a settled rule of construction. Besides, it cannot be contended that an act done by the design of the owner could have been done without his privity or knowledge. It must necessarily have been done with both; and if the fire was caused by the neglect of the owner it must be presumed to have been caused with his knowledge. Where one is bound to do a thing, or to see that certain things are done, he is presumed to know the direct consequence of his carelessness and neglect in those respects. Especially is this so where his doing the thing, or seeing that it is done, is necessary to the safety of life or property. He cannot shield himself from responsibility by saying that he did not know what would be the consequence of his carelessness and neglect. The law presumes that he does know it and intends it. The act speaks of neglect by the owner, not by any subordinate officer or agent. It is therefore personal neglect which is meant: and it would be unreasonable to hold that the owner was ignorant of that which necessarily followed from his own personal conduct. Not only would this be unreasonable, but there is an inconsistency in holding that the first section exempts the owner from all liability in cases of fire happening without his design or neglect, if by the third section a liability is fastened upon him to the extent of the value of the ship and freight in case of a fire occurring without his privity or knowledge. And yet, according to the position of the court the owner is exempted by the first section from all liability if a fire occur without his knowledge and privity, and by the third section is subjected to liability to the extent of the value of the ship.

As stated by counsel of the plaintiff below, there can be no public policy in absolving common carriers by water from their full liability to others for property which has been intrusted to their care, and has been lost by their design or neglect. It certainly would require language, as he observes, so clear and plain that no subtlety of criticism can escape from the conclusion, before such a purpose can be ascribed to congress. It would be establishing a limitation of liability against public policy, common right, and the universal feeling of justice. It would make the law one to protect wrong-doers, and to punish the innocent who had been injured by them while thus protected. If, then, the first section is not affected by the other sections of the act, the liability of the owner of a vessel, in case of fire caused by his design or neglect, exists, as it always has existed, at the common law; and that liability may be enforced in any court, state or federal, having jurisdiction of the parties. The other provisions by which the owner may seek to relieve himself from liability by surrendering his vessel and the freight earned, have no application to such a case. It follows that the defense of a liability limited, as asserted by the district court, goes to the ground.

There is also another consideration which leads to the same conclusion. By section 9 of the judiciary act of 1789, re-enacted in section 563, cl. 8, of the Revised Statutes, a common-law remedy is expressly reserved to suitors in all cases where the admiralty has jurisdiction, provided the common law also gives a remedy; and that the common law gives a remedy in cases of losses by fire, where goods are intrusted to common carriers by water, there can be no doubt. Of such common-law remedy the state courts have exclusive jurisdiction when the parties are citizens of the same state, and concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts when parties are citizens of different states. The state court, therefore, had jurisdiction of this case. It is a suit in personam, and even if a federal court might also take jurisdiction, that of the state court, having first attached, could not be subsequently defeated. Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583; Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curt. 178. The federal court could not issue an injunction against the parties which would affect the jurisdiction of the state court. The act of congress of 1793 forbids any injunction from a federal court to restrain the prosecution of a suit in a state court; and this act has never been repealed, either expressly or by implication, except as to proceedings in bankruptcy. Rev. St. § 720; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 625; Taylor v. Carryl, supra; McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279; Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U.S. 254; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U.S. 340.

For these reasons, I am of opinion that the judgment of the state court should be affirmed, and I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice GRAY concurs with me in this conclusion.