Rogers Park Water Company v. Fergus/Dissent White

United States Supreme Court

180 U.S. 624

Rogers Park Water Company  v.  Fergus

 Argued: and Submitted October 31, 1900. --- Decided: March 25, 1901

Mr. Justice White, with whom concurs Mr. Justice Brewer, Mr. Justice Brown and Mr. Justice Peckham, dissenting:

This case, in my opinion, should be controlled by the same principles which, it seemed to me, should have been applied in the case of the Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, just decided, 180 U.S. 587, post, p. 493, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493. The only difference of fact between that and the present one is this: In the Freeport Case the matter involved was the power of the city to contract and to fix the rates to be paid for a supply of water for public use during the designated period. Here the question is whether the city of Rogers Park had power to contract for the construction and maintenance of waterworks, and in such contract to fix the rates to be charged for the water to be supplied to private consumers during the contract period.

The authority under which the contract in question was made was the two acts of the legislature of the state of Illinois considered in the Freeport Case, that is to say, the acts of April 9, 1872, and April 10, 1872. There is this difference, however: The act of April 9, 1872, was amended on June 26, 1885 (Public Laws of Illinois, 1885, p. 64), so as to authorize contracts for a supply of water as therein stated to be made with private individuals as well as private corporations. Thus authority existed to contract with individuals under both acts. The ordinance passed by the city of Rogers Park and the contract made, as fully recited in the opinion of the court, was for the erection, maintenance, and operation of waterworks, the extension of the system as might be required, the payment of an annual rental by the city for public hydrants, and the establishment of the rates to be paid by private consumers during the contract period.

The language of the legislative act conferring authority to fix the rates, it seems to me, clearly sanctions the establishment by contract of the rates for private use, as it did those to be paid for the public supply. The fixing of rates is plainly generic, and of necessity embraced those rates which were to be paid for the supply of water which the statute authorized the city to contract for. So far as the power of the legislature to authorize a contract for designated rates for a stipulated time is concerned, I can see no difference between fixing the rates for the public and those for the private supply during the authorized time. This in my judgment is conclusively settled by the authorities to which reference was made in my dissent in the Freeport Case. Especially is this shown by the ruling of the court in Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. 177 U.S. 569, 44 L. ed. 892, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736, where it was, in effect, decided that a contract, made by a municipality with a water company, that existing rates to private consumers should not be reduced during the life of the contract, was a valid stipulation, provided that the action of the city was previously sanctioned or was subsequently ratified by legislative authority.

The only question, then, remaining to be examined, seems to me to be whether the particular contract made by the city of Rogers Park, considered in this case, fixed the rates for private consumers for the period of the contract. And this only involves an examination of the contract for the purpose of determining its import. Of course, it is conceded, under the rule of construction stated by me in my dissent in the Freeport Case, that if doubt arises from an analysis of the provisions of the contract, that doubt must be solved against the water company and in favor of the municipality. But it is submitted that there can be no doubt, from a consideration of the text of the contract, that it fixed the rates to be paid by private consumers during the life of the contract. The ordinance established in detail a tariff of specific water rates for private purposes, embracing an enumeration which would seem to include every variety of use. It conferred upon the contractor the right, if he did not choose to charge these rates, to insert in the connection a water meter, and to charge for the water supplied at meter rates, instead of at the aggregate sum otherwise fixed. The opening clause of § 12 read as follows: 'The said grantee or assigns shall charge the following annual water rates to consumers of water during the existence of this franchise, and they shall have the right at any time to insert a water meter into the service pipe of any consumer, and to charge and to collect from them at meter rates, provided that in such case the minimum annual rate paid by any one consumer shall be $5.' As I understand this language, it without doubt embodies the rates, whether fixed by the purpose for which the water was taken or by the meter measurement, and explicitly stipulates that these rates may be charged during the life of the contract. Indeed, it seems to me impossible to conceive that the contract for the construction, maintenance, and supply would have been entered into without such agreement. Can it in reason be said, in view of the terms of the contract, that if the water company had wished to charge more than the contract price, on the ground that an unreasonably low sum had been fixed in the contract, that it would have had a right at once to ignore the contract stipulation and exact higher rates? If it cannot be, how can it be held that the city had the right at its pleasure to disregard the rates fixed in the contract? Was not the obligation of one the correlative of the right of the other? To say that the provisions of the contract constitute the language of command, and not the language of contract, does not weaken or obliterate the unambiguous provisions of the agreement into which the parties entered. They were indeed, in my judgment, commands, arising from the express authority conferred upon the municipality by the legislature of the state of Illinois, sanctioned by the agreement of the parties, and protected from impairment by the Constitution of the United States.

Notes