Roman Catholic Opposition to Papal Infallibility/Chapter 2

by William John Sparrow Simpson

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF THE FATHERS

Roman writers have differed greatly in their view of the Patristic evidence for Papal Infallibility. Some have found very little definite statement in the Fathers, upon which they thought it wise, at any rate in controversy, to rely.

Cardinal Bellarmine^[1] makes but scanty appeal for this doctrine to the Age of the Fathers. He contents himself with asserting first that the Patriarchal Churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch have been presided over by heretics, whereas Rome has been exempt from this calamity;^[2] and secondly, he observes that Popes have passed judgment on heresies apart from any Council, and that their decisions have been accepted. This asserted exemption of the Roman Church from heresy he claims as identical with impossibility of heresy; and this acceptance of decisions as an acknowledgment of Infallibility. Bellarmine's meagre use of the Patristic period to prove the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is strikingly contrasted with his ample use of the same to prove the primacy or the authority of the Roman See. And this difference of appeal in the two cases means a capacity to distinguish between authority and Infallibility.

Other writers have seen Infallibility implied in every recognition of authority or primacy; in every judicial sentence of the Roman See.

A third section of Roman theologians has been definitely unable to discover the doctrine anywhere in the Patristic period. Among the more critical and historically-minded of recent Roman writers there is a belief in the doctrine, independent of any evidence for it in the Age of the Fathers; indeed often coupled with an acknowledgment that the period does not yield to their scrutiny instances either of its recognition as a principle, or of its exercise as a fact. Advancing to the Patristic times with the definition of Infallibility as given in the Vatican Decree, they affirm that one essential condition of its exercise is deliberate intention to instruct the Universal Church. All instruction not given with that express intention is entirely outside the range of Infallibility. Evidently the great mass of judicial decisions, appeals to Rome, recognitions of its authority, praises of its impartiality and rectitude, assertions of the danger of disobedience to its words, have nothing to do with the doctrine of Infallibility; and are acknowledged by this school of Roman writers to be no proof of the doctrine's existence. This recent Roman attitude involves an entirely different estimate of Patristic evidence from that formerly prevalent among the Ultramontanes. It brings the Ultramontane curiously round to agreement with the opposite school as to the actual contents of the Patristic period. There is far less readiness to-day than formerly to assume that inferences which appear to a modern Ultramontane necessarily obviously involved in a statement or a claim, were really actually seen and understood and accepted among the primitive writers by whom the statement or claim was made. This is a sign of a more historic spirit, and therefore exceedingly hopeful.

Of course the doctrine's recognition as a theory is separable from its exercise as a fact. Many Roman Catholic writers have not only maintained that during the Age of the Fathers no case occurs of its exercise; but that the principles advocated demonstrate that it was not even recognised as a theory, since by those very principles it is actually excluded. Roman opponents of the doctrine have also pointed out that no profession of belief in the infallibility of the Church can be adduced to prove belief in the infallibility of the Pope for the simple reason that many Roman theologians who believed the former have rejected the latter.

All that can be done in a limited space is to select the chief examples of the Patristic teaching; and then to show how the Ultramontanes and their opponents employed them.

1. A crucial instance is the famous language of St Irenæus:—

 

"It is within the power of all, who may wish to see the truth, to contemplate clearly the tradition of the Apostles manifested throughout the world in every Church; and we are able to enumerate those whom the Apostles appointed to be Bishops in the churches, and their successors, quite down to our time, who neither taught nor knew anything like what these [heretics] rave about. Yet surely if the Apostles had known any hidden mysteries, which they were in the habit of teaching to the perfect apart and privily from the rest, they would have taken special care to deliver them to those to whom they were also committing the churches themselves. … But because it would be too long in such a volume as this, to enumerate the successions of all the churches, we point to the tradition of the very great and very ancient and universally known Church which was founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul;—we point, I say, to the tradition which this Church has from the Apostles, and to her faith proclaimed to man, which comes down to our time through the succession of her Bishops. … For to this Church, on account of its more influential pre-eminence, it is necessary that every church should resort—that is to say, the faithful who are from all quarters; and in this Church the tradition, which comes from the Apostles, has ever been preserved by those who are from all quarters."^[3]

 

This classic passage, says a Roman writer,^[4] proves how universal was the belief in the Sovereign Pontiffs Infallibility. It does not merely state a fact: it enunciates a principle. Accordance with the traditional doctrine of the Church of Rome is here stated to be the duty of all churches. But how could this be so, unless the Pope was the infallible organ of Apostolic teaching? The holy martyr calls, says another, the faithful of the entire Christian world to the Roman Church, that they may drink in the Apostolic truth without fear of error or misleading.^[5] What else is this but infallible authority?^[6]

On the other side a Roman historian of dogmas writes:—

 

"Irenæus was not contemplating the case of contradictions between churches founded by the Apostles. … There existed at that period complete agreement in faith and doctrine. Consequently, the Fathers had no cause to consider a case of disagreement between Apostolic churches."^[7]

 

According to the French Bishop Maret,^[8] the principle laid down by Irenæus is an appeal to tradition manifested in all the Apostolic churches. He considers that truth is to be found in the tradition manifested in all the Apostolic foundations. But for the sake of brevity it is enough to consult the tradition of the Roman Church. Maret acknowledges a primacy in the Roman Church, but cannot believe that Irenæus would disallow the rightfulness of consulting the tradition of the Universal Church in which Irenaeus himself considers the Truth is found.

Gratry, in his famous letters during the Vatican Council, goes further than this, for he quotes the sequel to the passage of Irenæus, and underlines the statement which shows that the principle which this primitive writer considers Catholic is an appeal to the ancient Churches (plural) and by no means exclusive appeal to one.

 

"… It is not then necessary to seek elsewhere the truth, since it is easily found in the Church, the Apostles having made of the Church a rich bank, in which they have amassed all the treasures of truth; so that every man, whosoever will, can draw from her the water of life. … Thus if a dispute should arise relative to a detail of tradition, should we not have recourse to the most ancient Churches (nonne oporteret in antiquissimas recurrere Ecclesias, in quibus Apostoli conversati sunt) in which the Apostles themselves have lived, and learn from them immediately what is certain and clear upon the question?"^[9]

 

Upon his passage Gratry observes:—

 

"The reader has here before him the whole doctrine of St Irenæus upon this subject. This doctrine is perfectly clear. It is almost the same as that of Tertullian, who says: 'Run over the Apostolic Churches, in which are found the chairs of the Apostles, upon which are seated the Bishops who succeeded them, in which are still read their authentic letters, each echoing the voice and representing the face of its author. Is Achaia near to thee? Thou hast Corinth. Art thou near Macedonia? Thou hast Philippi thou hast the Thessalonians. If thou canst travel into Asia, thou hast Ephesus. If thou art near to Italy, thou hast Rome, where we can find also authority at hand.'"

 

The thesis of St Irenæus, adds Gratry, is this: We must bring back heretics "to the tradition of the Apostles, which, by their successors, is preserved in the Churches." And "when there is any doubt, we must have recourse to the Ancient Churches."

 

2. In the case of St Cyprian (A.D. 250) special difficulties arise owing to controversies on the actual text. We can only set down the chief passage and afterwards indicate the use made of his principles by Roman opponents of Infallibility.

 

"And although after His resurrection He assigns equal power to all His Apostles, … nevertheless, in order to make the unity manifest, He established one Chair and by His own authority appointed the origin of that same unity beginning from one. Certainly the rest of the Apostles were that which Peter also was, endued with equal partnership, both of honour and office, but the beginning sets out from unity, and Primacy is given to Peter, that one Church of Christ and one Chair may be pointed out; and all are pastors and one flock is shown, to be fed by all the Apostles with one-hearted accord, that one Church of Christ may be pointed out. … He that holds not this unity of the Church, does he believe that he holds the faith? He, who strives and rebels against the Church, he who deserts the Chair of Peter on which the Church was founded, does he trust that he is in the Church?"^[10]

 

Whether the passages underlined are Cyprian's or unauthorised interpolations, is the critical difficulty. They appear in the earlier printed editions, not, however, without editorial misgivings. But the modern critical text^[11] omits them. Many Roman theologians do the same. Leo XIII. himself omits them in his Encyclical on the unity of the Church. On the other hand, their genuineness is still asserted by certain Protestant and Roman writers. In any case all that they affirm is a Primacy. No modern Romanist of the historical school would quote them as affirming infallibility. Under these circumstances perhaps it will be best to confine attention to words whose genuineness no one disputes. The Ultramontane emphasised Cyprian's statements on the Primacy: the opposing school, his statements on Episcopal equality. The former quoted "the principal Church, whence sacerdotal unity arose"; the latter "the episcopate is one, it is a whole, in which each enjoys full possession"; and again, "the rest of the Apostles were that which Peter was, endowed with equal partnership, both of honour and office."

Minority Bishops asserted in the Vatican Council, on the ground of these two passages, that Ecclesiastical power was divinely entrusted to Peter and to the other Apostles; and that it was derived from them to their successors by Divine institution. Accordingly the minority complained that the exclusive consideration of Papal authority was irreconcilable with Catholic truth and Cyprianic principles. The equal authority of the episcopate deserved and required an equal exposition.^[12] Cyprian's inference from St Matt. xvi. 18 was that "the Church should be built upon the Bishops, and that every act of the Church should be guided by them as presidents."^[13]

And this is the principle upon which Cyprian acts. After assembling the local Bishops and forming their own decision, Cyprian wrote to Stephen, Bishop of Rome, in the following terms:—

 

"These considerations, dear brother, we bring home to your conscience out of regard to the office we hold in common, and to the simple love we bear you. We believe that you, too, from the reality of your religious feeling and faith, approve what is religious as well as true. Nevertheless, we know there are those who cannot readily part with principles once imbibed, or easily alter a view of their own, but who, without hurting the bond of peace and concord between colleagues, hold to special practices once adopted among them, and herein we do no violence to any one and impose no law. For, in the administration of the Church each several prelate has the free discretion of his own will having to account to the Lord for his action."^[14]

 

Quoting Cyprian's own words St Augustine repeats the passage from a letter:—

 

"For neither did Peter whom the Lord chose first, and on whom He built His Church, when Paul afterwards disputed with him about circumcision, claim or assume anything and arrogantly to himself, so as to say that he held the primacy, and should rather be obeyed by newcomers. Nor did he despise Paul because he had before been a persecutor of the Church, but he admitted the counsel of truth, and readily assented to the legitimate grounds which Paul maintained; giving us thereby a pattern of concord and patience, that we should not pertinaciously love our own opinions, but should rather account as our own any true and rightful suggestions of our brethren and colleagues for the common health and weal."^[15]

 

Upon this Augustine's comment is:—

 

"Here is a passage in which Cyprian records what we also learn in Holy Scripture, that the Apostle Peter, in whom the primacy of the Apostles shines with such exceeding grace, was corrected by the later Apostle Paul, when he adopted a custom in the matter of circumcision at variance with the demand of truth.  …^[16]

"Wherefore the holy Cyprian, whose dignity is only increased by his humility, who so loves the pattern set by Peter as to use the words; 'giving us thereby a pattern of concord and patience, that we should not pertinaciously love our own opinions, but should rather account as our own any true and rightful suggestions of our brethren and colleagues for the common health and weal'—he, I say, abundantly shows that he was most willing to correct his own opinion, if any one should prove to him that it is as certain that the baptism of Christ can be given by those who have strayed from the fold, as that it could not be lost when they strayed. … Nor should we ourselves venture to assert anything of the kind were we not supported by the unanimous authority of the whole Church to which he himself would unquestionably have yielded, if at that time the truth of this question had been placed beyond dispute by the investigation and decree of a General Council. For if he quotes Peter as an example for his allowing himself quietly and peacefully to be corrected by one junior colleague, how much more readily would he himself, with the Council of his Province, have yielded to the authority of the whole world, when the truth had been thus brought to light? For, indeed, so holy and peaceful a soul would have been more ready to assent to the arguments of any single person who could prove to him the truth ; and perhaps he even did so, though we have no knowledge of the fact."^[17]

 

To Cardinal Bellarmine, Jesuit of the sixteenth century, the persistent refusal of Cyprian to accept the Pope's teachings appeared very grave indeed. Cyprian, says Bellarmine, was not a heretic, because those who say that the Pope can err are not even yet considered manifestly heretics. But whether Cyprian did not commit a mortal sin in disobeying the Pope, Bellarmine is not sure. On the one hand, Cyprian sinned in ignorance. Thinking the Pope in serious error, he was obliged to disobey; for no man ought to go against his conscience—and a Council of eighty Bishops agreed with him. On the other hand, he appears to have mortally sinned, for he disobeyed an apostolic precept, and refused to submit to the judgment of his superior.

Archbishop Kenrick's dogmatic inference from these facts in the Vatican Council was as follows:—

 

"When Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, held mistaken views as to the rebaptism of heretics upon their return to the Church, and had strenuously defended them against the Roman Pontiff Stephen, Augustine considered him to be justified: because the matter in question had not yet been elucidated by the authority of a General Council. Thus Augustine did not regard as decisive the Roman Pontiff's opinion which had already condemned this error, and by which, according to my opponents, the dispute had been already infallibly determined. Augustine therefore was ignorant of the doctrine of Pontifical Infallibility. Had he acknowledged it, it must have followed that Cyprian was not only indefensible for his conduct, but had actually incurred condemnation for heresy."

 

3. From the writings of St Augustine probably no phrase has been more often quoted in behalf of papal inerrancy than that in which, referring to the Pelagian controversy, he says:—

 

"Already on this matter two Councils have sent to the Apostolic See, whence also answers have been received. The cause is finished, would that the error were also finished."^[18]

 

In other words, says a Roman writer,^[19] Pope Innocent I. has determined the matter. The Pontifical Decree has settled that the truth is on Augustine's side. Could it do so unless it were infallible? To another writer this inference is indisputably clear.^[20]

It is, however, more than questionable whether this exposition would satisfy Roman critical writers of to-day. For they do not claim Pope Innocent's reply to the African Bishops as an exercise of Infallibility. Thus Augustine's criticism is no evidence of his belief in Innocent's inerrancy.

 

"St Augustine and all his century," says a Bishop of the Roman Church, "like the centuries before him, placed the supreme authority, the authority which cannot fail, not in the Pope alone, but in the Pope and the Episcopate."^[21]

 

Nevertheless, the passage was appealed to by the Ultramontanes in the Vatican struggle. They assigned to St Augustine the statement: "Rome has spoken, the cause is finished." This was the form in which Augustine's sentiments were commonly quoted for centuries. Gratry's criticism upon it represents the opposition.

"Rome has spoken, the cause is finished. It is certain that this formula of St Augustine possesses something decisive and absolute about it like an axiom. It says everything. 'Rome has spoken, the cause is finished.' Rome has spoken; all is said, the rest is of no consequence.

"But the objection to this is that St Augustine never said that at all."

 

Gratry then quotes the passage as it actually occurs. To Gratry's mind the real words do not even imply that the judgment of Rome by itself is everything ; while the misquoted formula does.^[22]

 

4. Constantly appealed to again are the words of St Jerome.

 

"I know that the Roman faith praised by the Apostle's voice does not accept suggestion of such a kind. Although an angel taught otherwise than that which has been once proclaimed, strengthened by the authority of St Paul, it could not change."^[23]

 

"Upon this rock I know that the Church is builded. I entreat you, authorise me by your letters either to assert or not to assert three substances. I shall not fear to assert three substances if you order me."^[24]

 

Here, then, St Jerome is found affirming that the Roman Church cannot fail, and that he who accepts its instruction cannot be misguided.^[25]

On the other hand, Bishop Bossuet appeals to Jerome's own account of Pope Liberius that he was induced to endorse heresy, and that, overcome by the weariness of exile, he subscribed to heretical error.^[26] The question, therefore, arises whether Jerome would not have feared to follow an example which he so describes. Can he who so describes Liberius have believed that he who accepts papal instruction cannot be misguided?

 

5. Another example is the striking utterance of Pope Gelasius.

 

"This it is against which the Apostolic See is greatly on its guard, that the glorious confession of the Apostle, since it is the security of the world, should not be defiled by the least error or contagion.^[27] For if—which God avert, and we trust cannot happen—such a misfortune should occur, how could we venture to resist any error, or how should we be able to correct the wandering?"

 

Gelasius teaches here, said Bellarmine, that the Apostolic See cannot err. For since the security of the world depends upon its utterances, if it were to err the whole world would be in error with it.^[28]

Bossuet, on the other hand, replied as follows: A Roman Synod addressed to Bishops the question: How could they correct the error of the people if they were in error themselves? This was not an encouragement to think themselves infallible, but a warning to take precautions against being deceived. Similarly Gelasius claims that consciousness of the disastrous results which would attend its deception has deepened the cautiousness of the Roman See. To infer, however, from the character of the results, the impossibility of the occurrence is, says Bossuet, the utterly illogical conclusion that what ought not will not be. The dangerous character of the results which would follow from deception of the Roman See do not prove the impossibility of its occurrence. All they prove is the urgent necessity for care and deliberation. And this is what Gelasius implies. For his language is—"which God avert, we trust it cannot happen." But this is the language of prayer and piety; it is not the certainty of a truth revealed. Gelasius has every hope that, contingently on compliance with the necessary conditions, this disaster will not be permitted to take place. But we may not transpose hope into fact. Tested by history, urges Bossuet, individual occupants of the Roman See have grievously misled the Church. Liberius and Honorius, as far as in them lay, did actually deceive the world. Yet the world was not deceived: for other remedies exist against calamities such as these. The language of Gelasius is one of the most magnificent from the Roman See. But it is the language of a pious confidence, not a dogma of the immutable faith.

 

6. The classic expression of the proper method, according to the Ancient Church, for distinguishing Catholic Faith from falsehood, is the famous Canon of St Vincent of Lerins. We propose to summarise his principles, and then to record their controversial use within the Roman Communion.

 

"Moreover, in the Catholic Church itself all possible care must be taken that we hold that faith which has been believed everywherealways by all. For that is truly and in the strictest sense Catholic, which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare, comprehends all universally.

"This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity, consent. We shall follow universality if we confess that one faith to be true, which the whole Church throughout the world confesses; antiquity, if we in no wise depart from those interpretations which it is manifest were notoriously held by our holy ancestors and fathers; consent, in like manner, if in antiquity itself we adhere to the consentient definitions and determinations of all, or at least of almost all priests and doctors."^[29]

 

Vincent's famous Canon states the appeal to tradition in a triple form: in relation to place and time and persons. The test of a doctrine's apostolic character is its universality in place and time. That which commands a consent virtually coextensive with the Church's existence, across the entire world geographically, and across the entire Christian ages historically, constitutes the Catholic Faith.

Vincent's application of this test to several instances shows alike its clearness and its use.

 

i. First Case—If the Local oppose the Universal.

"What, then, will a Catholic Christian do if a small portion of the Church have cut itself off from the communion of the universal faith?

"What, surely, but prefer the soundness of the whole body to the unsoundness of a pestilent and corrupt member?"

 

ii. Second Case—If the Modern oppose the Ancient.

"What if some novel contagion seek to infect not merely an insignificant portion of the Church, but the whole?

"Then it will be his care to cleave to antiquity, which at this day cannot possibly be seduced by any fraud of novelty.

"To preach any doctrine therefore to Catholic Christians other than what they have received never was lawful, never is lawful, never will be lawful."

Thus according to Vincent the Christian obligation is to keep that deposit of doctrine which is committed to our trust. And this obligation rests in general on the Universal Church, and in particular on the whole body of pastors whose duty it is to possess and communicate to others a complete knowledge of religion. Vincent considers the transmission of the Faith in its integrity the function not exclusively of the pastors, but also of the entire community of the Universal Church. His famous often quoted words must be quoted once again, for it would be impossible to express his theory in better terms than his own.

 

"Keep the Deposit. What is the Deposit? That which has been entrusted to thee, not that which thou hast thyself devised: a matter not of wit but of learning; not of private adoption but of public tradition; a matter brought to thee, not put forth by thee, wherein thou art bound to be not an author but a keeper, not a teacher but a disciple, not a leader but a follower. … Let that which formerly was believed, though imperfectly apprehended, as expounded by thee be clearly understood. Let posterity welcome, understood through thy exposition, what antiquity venerated without understanding. Yet teach still the same truths which thou hast learned, so that while thou speakest newly, thou speakest not what is new."

 

Nothing can be stronger than St Vincent's sense of the substantial immutability of the Faith. Nor is there any finer exposition than his of the principle of identity. What is perhaps even more remarkable, considering the period when he wrote, is his recognition that the principle of immutability requires to be balanced by the principle of progress. We have in his pages the earliest statement of the principles of theological development, drawn with a wonderful insight into its nature and limitations.

"But some one will say, perhaps—Shall there then be no progress in the Christian Church? Certainly all possible progress… Yet on condition that it be real progress, not alteration of the Faith. For progress requires that the subject be enlarged in itself, alteration that it be transformed into something else. The intelligence, then, the knowledge, the wisdom, as well of individual as of all, as well of one man as of the whole Church, ought in the course of ages and centuries, to increase and make much and vigorous progress; but yet only in its own kind; i.e., in the same doctrine, in the same sense, and in the same meaning."

Thus, according to Vincent, there may be all possible progress consistent with substantial identity. And the method by which the progress of the Church of the present day is safeguarded and controlled is perpetual reversion to the primitive type; any substantial deviation from which is a sign of variation from the truth.

The Romanist opponent of Papal Infallibility laid the greatest stress on St Vincent's principle, while the Ultramontane attempted a distinction between implicit and explicit truth. Grant that the Catholic faith must be contained in the original deposit of Revelation, must its recognition have been explicit from the first?^[30] The Canon of St Vincent was asserted to be true in an affirmative sense, but not in a negative. Whatever satisfies the test of universality was undoubtedly part of the Catholic faith; but it did not follow that a doctrine which failed to fulfil this test was therefore uncatholic.

This distinction carried no conviction to a very large minority in the Roman Church, partly because the doctrine in question did not satisfy the test of universality, even in the nineteenth century, and partly because of the doctrine's intrinsic character. They failed to see how a doctrine which explicitly affirmed the Pope's independence of the Church's consent could be a legitimate outcome of, and implicitly contained within, the principle of consent, which is the negative of that independence. Vincent placed the whole stress on universality and consent. The Ultramontane considered the Pope's utterance infallible without that universality and consent. To the Roman opponents of the Vatican view these two theories seemed mutually exclusive. They could not reconcile the Vincentian Canon with the Vatican claim, nor reject St Vincent's demand that progress must retain substantial identity. They remembered how Bishop Bossuet, intellectually the head of the seventeenth-century Church in France, had claimed for the Roman Catholic Church the distinctive glory of immutability—the quod semper of St Vincent—as contrasted with the variations of Protestantism.^[31]

In the Vatican Council itself the Bishops appealed repeatedly to the Canon of St Vincent as a proof that the Infallibility doctrine formed no portion of the Catholic faith. Bishop Maret had already affirmed in the treatise which he sent to all the members of the Council that the principles of St Vincent can never legitimately issue in a system of absolute Infallibility and monarchy of each individual Pope. Bishop Hefele said that

 

"when differences on matters of faith arose in the primitive Church appeal was made to the Apostolic Churches, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch; and that only was dogmatically propounded to the faithful, which was universally believed. None of the ancients ever imagined that an infallible decision of controversies could be obtained by any shorter method at the hands of any single individual. On the contrary, Vincent said, let us follow universality, antiquity, consent."^[32]

 

Another Bishop urged that according to the principle of St Vincent no definition could be made without moral unanimity. We have no proof, said another Bishop, least of all from the first five centuries. And if nothing can ever be defined except that which has been believed always everywhere and by all, by what right can we defend the Papal Infallibility? None but the Bishops, said another, can testify whether a doctrine is held always everywhere and by all. Consequently, he, and others with him, demurred to the opinion that a Pope's utterance could be infallible without the consent of the episcopate.

More emphatic still was the statement of the American Archbishop Kenrick:—

 

"The famous writer, Vincent of Lerins, in his golden treatise the Commonitorium, which has been highly esteemed for the last fourteen centuries … gives the rule by which a believer should guide himself when conflicting opinions arise among the Bishops: namely, that nothing is to be considered of Catholic faith which has not been acknowledged always everywhere and by all. When the Bishops disagree Vincent affirms that antiquity and universality are to be followed. He makes no reference to the Roman Pontiff whose opinion, according to the Pontifical Party, instantly determines all controversies of faith. This theory assuredly Vincent never heard of. And his contemporaries entirely agreed with him."

 

The authors of Janus made an equally strong appeal to St Vincent of Lerins.

 

"If the view of Roman Infallibility had existed anywhere in the Church at that time, it could not have been possibly passed over in a book exclusively concerned with the question of the means for ascertaining the genuine Christian doctrine. But the author keeps to the three notes of universality, permanence, and consent, and to the Ecumenical Councils."^[33]

 

7. What was the true relation of the Pope and the Council to each other? How was it understood in primitive times? Did the Collective Episcopate regard itself as subordinated, with no independent judgment of its own, to decisions of the Roman authority? Or was the Council conscious of possessing power to accept or refuse the papal utterances brought before it?^[34] Bossuet maintained that the treatment of Papal Letters by the early General Councils afforded convincing proof against their belief in any theory of papal inerrancy. The famous letter of Leo to Flavian was laid before the Council of Chalcedon in the following terms:—"Let the Bishops say whether the teaching of the 318 Fathers [the Council of Nicea] or that of the 150 [Constantinople] agrees with the letter of Leo." Nor was Leo's letter accepted until its agreement with the standards of the former Ecumenical Councils had been ascertained.

The very signatures of the subscribing Bishops bear this out—"The letter of Leo agrees," says one, "with the Creed of the 318 Fathers and of the 150 Fathers, and with the decisions at Ephesus under St Cyril. Wherefore I assent and willingly subscribe."^[35] Thus the act of the Episcopate at Chalcedon was one of critical investigation and authoritative judgment, not of blind submission to an infallible voice. The theologian, Bellarmine, and the historian, Baronius, both strong advocates of the papal authority, contradict one another on this point. Baronius asserts that the Bishops regarded the letter of Leo as the rule and guide in faith which all churches must accept. Bellarmine, however, perplexed by the episcopal investigation which undeniably the letter endured, suggested that Leo's letter to the Council was not intended as a final definition, but as a general advice for the Bishops' assistance.

Bossuet points out that this happy solution is refuted by the simple fact that Leo wrote to Flavian before any Council was even thought of.^[36] It illustrates Bellarmine's uncritical ingenuity. And since Baronius acknowledges the authoritative character of Leo's letter, and Bellarmine the reality of its scrutiny by the Bishops, the obvious conclusion is that both the papal authority and the consent of the Universal Council are elements in producing a dogma of the Faith. Accordingly, the Pope's decision, taken by itself apart from the consent of the Church, is not infallible. Bossuet claims that Leo's own teaching endorses this, for he wrote the following words: "The things which God had formerly defined by our ministry, He confirmed by the irreversible consent of the entire brotherhood."

To sum up the procedure of the early Church in a question of faith: Bishop Flavian first declared what was of faith as the local Bishop. Leo at Rome endorsed it and gave his definition. After this definition came the examination of the question in the General Council, and judgment was ultimately given. After the definition had been approved by the judgment of the Bishops no further room for doubt or dispute remained.^[37]

The impression made upon a Roman writer by Roman research for proof of Infallibility in the writings of the Fathers may be gathered from the following significant passage:

 

"To sum up. The defenders of the dogma of Infallibility discover valuable hints in history. But they also encounter difficulties. After systematising against the Gallican School the grounds of their belief, they endeavoured to meet the difficulties which required to be solved. These difficulties came from many sources. They came from Councils which on various occasions constituted themselves judges of teaching sent from Rome. They came from certain teachers who opposed other works to the doctrinal decisions of Popes. But they came, above all, from Popes themselves who were not always at the level required of their mission, and at times allowed themselves to be ensnared with error."^[38]

 

Primitive evidence for Papal Infallibility is then admitted by some Roman writers to be meagre and disappointing.^[39] A curious instance of this is found in the theologian, Melchior Cano. He says that the quotations given by St Thomas from St Cyril of Alexandria afford a much clearer evidence for this doctrine than that in any other patristic writer. But when he sought for the original passages they were not to be found. "This is the work of the heretics," he exclaims indignantly. "They have mutilated the writings, and erased everything that concerned pontifical authority." So Melchior Cano. To-day, however, it is universally acknowledged that these passages were interpolations by which St Thomas Aquinas was deceived. Thus Melchior Cano's clearest evidence is nothing else than a simple forgery.

1. See Controv.
2. Cf. Turmel, Hist. Theol. Positive, p. 303.
3. St Irenæus, III. iii. pp. 1–2, trans. F. Puller, p. 20.
4. Botalla, i. p. 79.
5. Perrone, p. 38.
6. Cf. Bellarmine, p. 267.
7. Schwane, Histoire du Dogme, i. p. 667.
8. Maret, Du Concile Général, ii, p. 110.
9. Gratry's second letter.
10. Cyprian, De Unit. 4.
11. Text of the Vienna Corpus, ed. Hartel.
12. Friedrich, Documenta.
13. Ep. xxxiii.
14. Ep. xlvii. 3.
15. Cyprian, Ep. lxxi.
16. Augustine, De Baptismo, II. i. 2.
17. Augustine, De Baptismo, II. iv. p. 5.
18. St Aug. Serm. cxxii. Gaume, v. 930
19. Botalla, i. p. 77.
20. Perrone, p. 43.
21. Maret, i. p. 161.
22. Second letter.
23. Ad Rufinum, ii.
24. Ep. ad Damasum, ii. p. 131.
25. Perrone, p. 42.
26. Bossuet, xxii. p. 227. Jerome, De Script. Eccles. and Chronicon.
27. Bossuet, xxii. p. 277.
28. Works, ii. p. 83.
29. Commonitorium, ii.
30. Franzelin. De Trad. p. 295.
31. Bossuet, Premier Avertisement aux Protestants.
32. Friedrich, Documenta, ii. p. 121.
33. Janus, p. 89
34. Bossuet, Defence, i. p. 80.
35. Ibid. ii. p. 38.
36. Bossuet, Defence, i. p. 81.
37. Ibid. ii. p. 41.
38. Turmel, Hist. Théol. Positive, p. 309.
39. Melchior Cano, Op. lib. v. cap. v.