Rowan and Harris v. Runnels

by Roger B. Taney

United States Supreme Court

46 U.S. 134

Rowan and Harris  v.  Runnels

THESE cases were brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. Rowan and Harris were citizens of Virginia, and Runnels was a citizen of Mississippi.

Both cases depended upon the same principle, and differed only in this, that, in one, Runnels executed to Rowan & Harris his own note, and, in the other, indorsed over to them a promissory note executed by George W. Adams. Both notes were due on the 1st of March, 1840, one being for $2,950.70, and the other for $8,671.33. At maturity the notes were protested for non-payment, and suits brought upon them.

At the trial, the defendant offered in evidence a transcript of the record of a suit pending in the Supreme Court of Chancery of the State of Mississippi, wherein Rowan & Harris were complainants, and George W. Adams and others, defendants, one object of which was to show that the consideration for the notes was a sale of slaves by Rowan & Harris to Runnels. Whereupon the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury, that if they believed, from the evidence, that the original consideration of the note sued on was the sale by plaintiffs to defendant of slaves introduced into the State of Mississippi for sale and as merchandise by plaintiffs, since the 1st day of May, 1833, that then said note was void, and they should find for the defendant. Which instruction the court gave to the jury as moved for by the defendant. To the giving of which instruction the plaintiffs excepted, and upon this exception the case came up to this court.

Mr. Nelson, for the plaintiffs in error, contended that the case was entirely covered by the decision of this court in 15 Pet., 449.

Mr. Bibb, for appellees.

These cases grew out of that provision of the constitution of the State of Mississippi which is in these words:-'The introduction of slaves into this State as merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the first day of May, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three.

The decision of this court, at the January term, 1841, upon the construction of that clause of the constitution of the State of Mississippi, in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 449, was, that the constitution of the State of Mississippi referred the subject of the prohibition to the legislature as a duty to be performed by that body, and that there was no prohibition until the legislature should act.

That decision is a precedent, not binding upon the appellees in these two cases, because they were not parties to that case, neither are they privies. They have a right to avail themselves of the benefit of all the additional lights and after circumstances.

The principle is well settled and firmly established by the decisions of this court, again and again repeated and exemplified, that the construction which the courts of the several States have given to their own constitutions and statutes, respectively, ought to control the decisions of this court upon questions of right growing out of State constitutions and State statutes, unless they come in conflict with the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The decision in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 449, alludes to this principle; but, in the opinion of the court, it is said:-'The case chiefly relied upon is that of Glidewell and others v. Hite and Fitzpatrick, a newspaper report of which has been furnished to the court. It was a bill in equity filed some time in the year 1839, since the commencement of the suit now before this court, and the decree of the chancellor affirmed in the Court of Appeals by the divided court, since the judgment was obtained in this cause. But if we look into that case, and the points there discussed, and the diversity of opinion entertained by the judges, we cannot consider it as settling the construction of the constitution.'

As the case of Groves v. Slaughter itself was decided by a 'divided court,' as there was a 'diversity of opinion entertained by the judges,' as it was a case of first impression, deciding upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of the State of Mississippi, which the decisions of the courts of that State had not then settled, as the court then said; and as Mr. Justice Barbour died before the decision, and Mr. Justice Catron did not sit in the case from indisposition, and as Justices Story and McKinley dissented from the opinion delivered, it is submitted, with great deference, that the opinion in Groves v. Slaughter is open to argument upon these two points:--

1st. The imperative obligation upon this court to adopt the construction given by the courts of Mississippi to their constitution, when settled.

2dly. That decisions of the courts of the State of Mississippi have now settled the construction contrary to the decision in Groves v. Slaughter.

1. The imperative obligation upon this court to adopt the construction given by the courts of the State of Mississippi to their constitution, when settled by such decisions.

Out of a very great number of precepts and examples given by this court upon that subject, a single decision will suffice.

In the case of Elmendorff v. Taylor, 10 Wheat., 159, the opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, declares:-'This court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases depending on the laws of a particular State, to adopt the construction which the courts of the State have given to those laws. This course is founded on the principle, supposed to be universally recognized, that the judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Thus, no court in the universe, which professed to be governed by principle, would, we presume, undertake to say, that the courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of any other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes; and therefore erect itself into a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding. We receive the construction given by the courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction, than to depart from the words of the statute. On this principle the construction given by this court to the constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction; and, on the same principle, the construction given by the courts of the several States to the legislative acts of those States is received as true, unless they come in conflict with the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. If, then, this question has been settled in Kentucky, we must suppose it to be rightly settled.'

This case is the more impressive, because this court adopted the construction given by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to a statute enacted by the State of Virginia, and conformed to the three last decisions of that court, which conflicted with nine former decisions of the court by the former judges, which former decisions were in a degree fortified by the opinion of this court in the case of Wilson v. Mason, 1 Cranch, 100 (that the particular descriptions in a certificate of survey, before a copy could be demanded as of right, and when it could only be inspected by the courtesy of the surveyor, could not be used by a locator to help out his entry and communicate the necessary notoriety). This court did, notwithstanding, in the case of Elmendorff v. Taylor, say, 'We must consider the construction as settled finally by the courts of the State; and this court ought to adopt the same rule, should we even doubt its correctness.' 10 Wheat., 165.

The reasoning just quoted is so clearly demonstrative and convincing that the citations of the other decisions of this court would be superfluous.

2. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi have now settled the construction of the constitution of that State relating to the point involved in these cases.

The cases decided by the court of Mississippi, as reported in 5 How. (Miss.), 100, 110, 769, and 7 Ib., 15, are referred to as having settled the construction of the clause of their constitution now under consideration.

The courts of Louisiana have, in questions growing out of the prohibition in the constitution of Mississippi before quoted, conformed to the decisions of the court of Mississippi, of which an example is to be found in 6 Rob. (La.), 115. And the courts of Tennessee have in like manner conformed; but as the book of reports, containing the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, has been taken out of the library of the court, I am not able to cite the particular case, nor do I deem it material; the decisions of the court of Mississippi being the proper standard to which all other courts should conform upon such a question.

It would be highly inconvenient that one construction of the organic law of the State of Mississippi should prevail in the courts of that State and of the adjoining States, and that another and different construction of the same instrument should prevail in the federal courts.

The decision in Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 449, was by 'a divided court'; two justices were absent, in a case of the first impression, and when the construction fixed by the judiciary department of the government of Mississippi had not settled the proper construction.

Now that it is settled by the courts of that State, this court is bound to adopt it as the proper and true construction.

According to the principles decided by this court between Elmendorff v. Taylor, 10 Wheat., 165, and various others too tedious to mention, this court is no more at liberty to depart from the construction of the State constitution, so settled by the judicial department of the State of Mississippi, than the courts of that State would be to depart from the construction of the constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, as settled by this Supreme Court of the United States.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

Notes