Russian Realities and Problems/The Representative System in Russia

by Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov

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THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM
IN RUSSIA

"The Duma is dead; long live the Duma!"

I wonder whether you know, ladies and gentlemen, just when this historic phrase was pronounced by the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Some members of the first Russian Legislative Assembly had just come to London in July, 1906, as representatives attending the Inter-parliamentary Union for Arbitration, when they learnt that the assembly they represented was dissolved. The Duma—the first Russian Duma—was dead. It died while attempting to regenerate the political and social life of Russia on a completely new and largely democratic basis. Autocracy and landed nobility, the two chief agencies of historical Russian life, though decaying, had proved too strong for the newly born national representation. The conflict between the new and the old did not even last long. The important work performed by the first Duma was done by it in an existence of only seventy-three days. Then the Government, in order to have a more subservient chamber, used all their power in influencing the elections for the second Duma. The result was just the opposite of what they expected. Instead of a strongly constitutional Duma, with a constitutional-democratic majority, a socialistic and revolutionary Duma was returned with no majority at all for the Government. If you will look at these figures which show the composition of the first and second Duma, you will see the difference exactly. In the first Duma

Table I
Parties	The 1st Duma	The 2nd Duma
Right	?[1]	63
Moderate right	38	34
Constitutional democrats ("cadets")	187	123
Poles	32	39
Left wing ("Labour group")	85	97
Socialists	26	83
Independent	112	22

the so-called Cadets or constitutional democrats numbered 187, and in the second Duma the representatives of socialism, in both its forms of agrarian and urban socialism, formed the majority of 180. This Duma knew its weakness very well, and tried to keep clear of any direct conflict with the Government. But it was useless : this chamber, too, was dissolved, after 103 days of existence.

It was a dramatic struggle, that struggle which was carried on by those two Dumas, and it was observed with keen sympathy and followed with the closest attention by the whole civilised world. The Duma was dead again. But—"Long live the Duma!" The memorable greeting of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, while it acknowledged the crisis through which the young Russian representative institutions were passing, expressed at the same time the firm belief that the Russian constitution could not be destroyed either by the whim of single persons or even by the mistakes of its own political inexperience. The Duma has lived on. But the first, the "heroic" age of its life, was really at an end. Thenceforward the Duma was to live in obscurity. After a few months of meteoric splendour, there followed long years of a very modest existence. I should call the second age of the Duma's life that of political mimicry. The Duma with its changed composition tried to adapt itself to its political environment. The new majority renounced bold schemes for the general reform of Russia and devoted themselves to the rather ungrateful task of self-preservation. The Duma was still interesting to observe at close quarters, but it was much more difficult to admire and indeed was thought negligible as an agent in Russian politics. I suppose that is why the Russian Duma since 1907 has been nearly lost sight of by the world.

I am going to speak to you about this—the unknown Duma of the last ten years, which include the action of the third Duma from 1907 to 1912, and the fourth Duma, which was elected in 1912 and will expire in 1917. I shall try to explain to you just why the Russian Duma was unable to take a more prominent place in Russian political life, just what it lacks in order to become, a real and strong representative of the people. At the same time you will see, I hope, that in spite of all drawbacks and deficiencies, the Duma has contrived to make itself an indispensable engine in the national life, that it soon struck root in the country, and that it retains the vital essence inherent in the very principle of national representation.

What is the chief difference between the two first and the two second Dumas, and what is the precise reason of this difference? First and foremost, it was the change in the electoral Law that opened a chasm between these two groups of Dumas. At the time of the dissolution of the second Duma on June 16, 1907, an edict was issued contrary to a fundamental law, that is to say, without the approval of the Duma itself, which entirely changed the composition of that body. The political parties which had built up the majority in the first two Dumas were proclaimed "illegal" on the alleged pretext that their program was to fortify the constitution by "revolutionary" means. The settled composition of the Duma was curtailed in parts which were considered to be "unreliable"; thus the number of Polish deputies was diminished and the Asiatic provinces were deprived of all representation. Then—and this is the chief point—the political centre of gravity was transferred from the democratic groups of population to the higher social classes which were

Table II
Social Composition of the Duma
	Before 1907 Per cent.	After 1907 Per cent.
Landed gentry	34	51
Peasants	43	22·4
Citizens	23	24·2
Working men	3·4	2·3

believed to be more reliable. Look at the figures which show the social composition of the Duma before and after 1907. These two sets of figures explain everything. You see that in the first two Dumas the relative majority of 43 per cent, was composed of peasants, but that 51 per cent.—that is to say an absolute majority—consisted of the landed gentry in the second two Dumas. That, as I say, explains everything. Before 1907, it was the peasants who were favoured by the electoral, reform. They were supposed to represent the Conservative and traditional basis of the national life; the gentry were regarded at that time as exponents of modern Liberal tendencies, owing to their foreign education. But when the first and second Dumas proved that the peasants were strongly inclined to agrarian revolution, the Government transferred their confidence to the small but influential group of reactionary landlords who succeeded in organising themselves under the name of the "United Nobility." I have used an English word, "gentry," but I must point out the difference which exists between the Russian gentry and the English. Our gentry are much more dependent upon the Government, having been liable in ancient times to military service, and having received their lands as recompense. After the reforms of Peter the Great, the same class entered the Civil Service; and here too they depended on the Government for promotion from grade to grade, from chin to chin as we say in Russia; and hence they are called chinovniks, "men of the grades."

Now, if you consider the social position of the different political parties in the third Duma, you will see at once which of the parties was thought to be most dependent on the Government and therefore most reliable. It was that party which contained the largest number of the landed gentry.

Table III

Social composition^[2] of different Parties in the Third Duma

Parties	Gentry	Peasants	Priests
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Poles (from the Czardom of Poland)	82	18	—
Poles (from the Western Russian provinces)	66	17	17
Octobrists	57	11	1
Nationalists	48	25	13
Right	44	21	28
Oppositionary groups
Progressives	33·3	3	15
Constitutional democrats	32·8	1	15
Socialist democrats	14	64	15
Labour party	14	71	—

I shall leave out the Polish deputies, of whom in the third Duma 82 per cent, were nobles. The Poles, whatever their views on social questions, belong to the opposition, because the Government would not yield to them on the matter which chiefly interests them, i.e. the future organisation of Poland. But let me draw your attention to three groups—the Octobrists, named from the manifesto which granted the constitution in October, 1905, the Nationalists, and the "Rights." In these three groups, the landed nobility form 57, 48, and 44 per cent, respectively ; and these are the groups most favoured by the Government in the two later Dumas. We must take a brief survey of their characteristics.

The Octobrists claim to be constitutionalists. But the Nationalists and particularly the Right group are unwilling to admit that autocracy has ever been limited by the constitution, and their extreme wing even strives for the restoration, if necessary by violent means, of the autocratic form of government which existed previous to the October manifesto. The Octobrists are chiefly the party of former bureaucrats and functionaries; by their previous avocations they are much better prepared for legislative work, and at the same time they are much more subservient to the Government, whilst both the Nationalists and the Right group include more democratic elements—peasants and priests together with the gentry, and are less ready to be led and less prepared to lead in matters of politics. After the dissolution of the second Duma, the Cabinet with the late premier Stolypin at their head were inclined, at first and by way of transition, to lean on the Octobrists. But political agencies behind the Cabinet, together with the powerful ring of the so-called "United Nobihty," would have preferred to join forces immediately and openly with the avowed partisans of autocracy. The whole internal policy of Russia, as well as the internal history of the Duma, during the last decade, reflected the struggle between these two tendencies. With the Government's aid the Octobrists prevailed at the elections to the third Duma, at which the edict of June 16, 1907, was first applied. In this Chamber the Government used its influence, much increased by means of the edict, on the one hand to paralyse the opposition, and on the other to keep up a steady control over the extreme Right element, the uncompromising "revolutionaries of reaction." The Right and the Nationalists did not exist at all as political parties in the country. It was only after the elections, within the Duma itself, that they took shape. The general result of the elections on the basis of the electoral edict of June i6, 1907, is shown in this Table.

Table IV

Parties in the Third, and, Fourth Duma

Right wing	3rd		4th
Right	52		65
Nationalists	93		88
	145		153
Centre
New (Nationalist) "centre"	—		32
Octobrists	133		98
	133		130
Left wing
Poles and Mussulmans	26		21
Progressives	39		48
Constitutional Democrats	53		59
Labour group	14		9
Socialist democrats	14		15
	146		152

As you see, the result did not quite correspond with the Government designs. The "illegal" parties of the opposition were present to the rather significant numbers of 146 and 152. This opposition had to sustain various attacks on the part of the Right groups, particularly during the first year of the Chamber. Nevertheless the opposition succeeded in keeping its head above water; then it quickly mastered the situation, and soon the Octobrists and Central group, in order to secure a majority, found themselves bound to go with the opposition in many cases, in committee work, in budget questions, in international questions, in questions of popular education, in a number of religious issues, and sometimes even on constitutional points. The result was that in the second half of the life of the third Duma the Government turned their backs on the Octobrists. Mr Stolypin now tried to approach the Nationalists, the more Conservative group. By that time, rumours were rife again that a coup d'état was in preparation. The third Duma, however, was permitted to live up to the end undestroyed. But at the election for the fourth Duma fresh exertions were made by the Government in order to defeat the Octobrists, and it now became their turn to fall into opposition. The negative aim of the Government was to defeat the Octobrists, and this task was easy because the Octobrists had made themselves exceedingly unpopular in the country by their subservience to the Government in the third Duma. It was far more difficult to attain the positive aim: that of electing a Nationalist majority. The Octobrists were defeated, but there was nobody to take their place. There was no majority in the fourth Duma, as the Nationalists, even with Government aid, did not succeed in getting a majority. The opposition reappeared in slightly increased numbers, while the Octobrists, left to themselves and deprived of the element of discipline which they had owed to Government protection, fell to pieces. There were now three different groups, the central, the left and the right wing. With a composition like that, the fourth Duma seemed unable to live, and it would have been dissolved if only its existence had been considered of any consequence at that time. But just owing to its entire lack of power the fourth Duma was suffered to live, and the Government only tried to use the opportunity in order again to circumscribe and limit the rights of the chamber. Here, however, they met with opposition. A majority, which was not to be found for constructive work, was forthcoming in the fourth Duma when such matters as the right of interpellation or the right to legislative initiative or even the freedom of parliamentary speech were questioned by the Government. About two years ago, for the first time during the existence of the Duma, some votes of credit were refused to the Government, as a means of political resistance, and the vote of disapproval was carried by a majority. Such was the state of the internal struggle when the present war began. With this war all internal strife was postponed by the same majority in order to devote themselves to the one task of carrying the external struggle to decisive victory. Only two months ago you saw here in England representatives of all parties in the fourth Duma, and they appeared before you as they are now in their own country, united by one aim—to make national defence as efficient as possible.

I have given here only a few hints as to the internal story of the last two Dumas, but they are sufficient to show you two things: first, how difficult it was for the Government to secure a majority to their taste, and, second, just how much the representatives of the nation were handicapped in their endeavours for the regeneration of their country. It will help you to a still clearer understanding of the situation if you make yourselves acquainted with the structure of legislative institutions in Russia.

Let us begin with the electoral Law. Bismarck is said to have called the Prussian electoral system the most wretched in the world. I should think that the Austrian system before 1905, before the granting of universal suffrage, was still worse than the Prussian. And I may say that the Russian system is much worse than the Austrian. The system of Russian representation is purely artificial and depends entirely on the Government. For voting purposes the population is distributed into separate groups, called "curias." The principle accepted in Russia is this—the more democratic and numerous the group is, the more their electoral power is limited. There are three "curias" in the towns and as many in the country; the least democratic, the moderate, and the most democratic. Thus, for the towns these are: (1) wealthy capitalists, (2) the middle class of citizens, (3) the working classes; and, for the country districts, (1) the large landed proprietors, (2) small landed proprietors, (3) the peasants of the Russian communities. The vote, except in six large cities like Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and so on, is not recorded by the constituencies themselves but by special electors chosen by the constituencies. The number of electors given to the various constituencies varies in opposite proportion to the number of the population. Thus for instance one-fifth of a million of landed gentry have the right to choose 2594 electors, one-half million of wealthy citizens choose 788 electors, eight millions of the middle class choose only 590 electors, twelve millions of working-men choose 112 electors, seventy million peasants choose 1168. It works out at one elector for every 230 of the landed gentry, for every thousand wealthy citizens, for every fifteen thousand middle-class citizens, for every sixty thousand peasants, and for every 125,000 working-men. The former Austrian system was more liberal, as it gave one elector for every 64 noblemen, 23 wealthy citizens, 3171 middle-class citizens and 11,555 peasants.

Now let us come to the highest electoral unit,—the provincial electoral assembly, where the electors for the Duma are chosen. There are about fifty of them in Russia.

Table V.

Composition of a provincial electoral assembly.

Country				City
$\scriptstyle {\overbrace {\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad } }$				$\scriptstyle {\overbrace {\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad } }$
Peasants	Small land owners	Big land owners		Rich citizens	Middle class	Working men
		$\scriptstyle {\underbrace {\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad } }$
			A majority of these elects, own represen- tatives, others of peasants and working men:
province $\mid$	province $\mid$	province $\mid$		province $\mid$	province $\mid$	province $\mid$
district $\mid$	district $\mid$	district		district	district	district $\mid$
township $\mid$	preparatory					factory
village

You see from this plan that in order to become an elector in that assembly one must pass through different stages of election, and the more democratic the voter is, the more stages have to be passed. The peasants choose their electors in the village, these electors are sent to the townships, in the township they elect to the district the second degree electors, who in the district choose the third degree electors, who finally go to the provincial assembly and elect members for the Duma from the province. There are three stages of election for small landed proprietors—the preparatory, the district, and the provincial assemblies, but only two for the large landowners, who choose their electors in the district to elect deputies in the province. It is the same for the wealthy class of the capitalists. They choose their electors, who choose the deputies in their provincial assembly. It is the same for the middle class of citizens. But for the working-men there are again three stages: they choose their electors in the factories, and these come to the district assemblies where they choose their electors for the provincial assemblies. Thus six groups of electors meet in the general assembly of the province, and they elect members of the Duma from their majority, which chiefly consists of landlords and capitalists, sometimes with the addition of small landowners and middle-class citizens. The influential group of large landed proprietors and capitalists, before electing members of their own class, is obliged to elect, one peasant and one working-man member from each province. Thus neither peasant electors nor working-men within the assembly have the right to elect separately, whom they like best: their voice is drowned in that of the majority. You can imagine the result. The landed proprietors, of course, elect such peasants as are likely to comply with their interests, which gives to the Duma the worst representation of the peasant class. This explains how it could happen in the third and fourth Dumas that the peasants entirely changed their position. They had been in the ranks of opposition in the first and the second Duma; they now sit on the benches of the Government parties. It is not quite so bad with working-men, because every representative of the working-men is invariably a Socialist in Russia. Thus it is quite impossible for the capitalists to elect a non-Socialist member. Russia is the only place in the world, I suppose, where the "bourgeois" and the "junkers" are obliged to elect Socialist members.

I must add, first, that every citizen who enjoys the right to vote may at any time, under this or that particular pretext, which are unhappily too many to be enumerated here, be struck off the electoral list; and, secondly, that if a majority in a District or Provincial assembly is not quite to the taste of the Government, the local authorities have the right to redistribute the voters, and in such a way as to secure artificial majorities. If you consider all these things, you may wonder how it happens that in spite of all there is still an opposition in the Duma, and that this opposition even formed one-third of the third and the fourth Dumas. The answer is, first, that the six large cities which have the direct-vote have always elected opposition members; and, in the second place, owing to the peculiarly democratic composition of the population in the extreme North and in East Russia between the Volga and the Ural Mountains, the deputies who are elected there always belong to the opposition^[3]. Siberia, on the other side of the Urals, has always belonged to the Cadet Party, and the Caucasus has always been represented by Socialists. On the other hand, Central Russia is represented in the Duma mainly by the parties of the landed gentry, chiefly by Octobrists. As to the Nationalists, the most conservative group, they regularly come to the Duma from the western frontier and partly from the south, where national antagonisms are more keenly felt. The deputies representing the Russian "dominating" nationality in these countries form a thin upper social stratum, and they always carry on a somewhat bitter struggle with the more ancient and sometimes more cultured members of the Polish gentry. That is why they bring with them to the Duma feelings of religious and racial hatred which unhappily sometimes find expression in the legislation of that body. The local peasant population is Russian, but, as we already know, the power of their vote is exceedingly limited. Such as come to the Duma invariably share the views of their landlords and sit on the same benches.

Now we come to the rights which the Duma possesses. The Duma has got the power to legislate, the power to vote the Budget, and the power to control the administration. Full power to legislate does not belong to the Russian Duma. Entire branches of legislation, and sometimes very important branches, are withdrawn from its competence. Thus, the right to legislate in military matters has always been withheld, although the Duma did very much to improve the state of the Russian army and navy a few years before the war. The right to legislate in questions of church administration is also a subject of dispute, although the Duma claims nothing more than what the Government has always possessed in matters of religious legislation since the time of Peter the Great. Further, the Duma is thwarted by the indiscriminate use of Imperial edicts and orders in Council. There is one case in which the law expressly allows emergency legislation; this is when the Duma is not sitting. You can, however, hardly imagine how much this Article 87 is misused for matters not at all urgent, at times when the presence of the Duma is not desired. We even had a case of the prorogation of the Duma and of the Council of Empire for three days in order to carry through without the legislative assembly a very important law.

The curtailment of the control of the Duma over the Budget is, perhaps, even more serious. It is particularly here that the feeling of distrust toward the young representative body has guided the Government in the making of our constitution. In the first place, all the expenses which were customary before the granting of the constitution in 1905, were considered sacrosanct and not to be touched. They are specially "protected^[4]" from the hasty influence of budget legislation. Doubly protected are the expenses for the Court and Imperial Family, the yearly interest on the State Loans and so on. In the Budget of 1908, these protected items amounted to 1,164,000,000 roubles, i.e. they made up 47 per cent, of the whole of the Budget expenses. If you consider that out of the remaining 53 per cent.—the "non-protected" expenses—a large part cannot be exactly determined in advance, as they belong to different branches of the State economy and can only be approximately estimated at the beginning of the year, you will see how small the financial power of the Duma really is. But that is not all. Even if its members should try to use their rights in order to reject some non-protected item of expense—such an item as had already figured in the previous year's Budget—in that case, the only result would be that the figure of the previous year's Budget would be substituted. It is only entirely new and unprecedented expenses which can be struck out of the Budget with practical results. But the most important thing is that the permission of the Duma can be evaded altogether for all expenses necessary for war, and also for preparations for war, and even in all cases of urgent necessity. You can easily guess what happens when circumstances like the present occur. In such cases the regular Budget presented to the Duma does not at all reflect the real state of things. Also in such important matters as signing commercial treaties, giving concessions for the construction of railways, determining the details of a foreign loan and the tariffs, and so on, the Duma is not asked to give its help and consent.

We find the same thing when we come to the third chapter of the Duma's rights, the control of the administration. It is a right which is especially important in Russia owing to the habit of lawless and arbitrary action inveterate in Russian administration. But the representative system is quite incompetent to tackle it. According to the law, the Duma has the right to interpellate and ask questions, and the Government is bound to return answers within a month. But even supposing that an interpellation on current events preserves its interest after a month and still draws the attention of the public, which is not often the case, and supposing that the answer of the Government has proved unsatisfactory, what is the result? It is no use carrying through the Duma sweeping orders of the day expressing strong disapproval perhaps of the whole administration. The Cabinet is not responsible to the elected Chamber. The question of ministerial responsibility is, I might say, the most delicate and the most burning question of the present day in Russia, for, while concerted action is a crying need, nothing except an occasional coincidence of opinion is possible, under the present system.

But however much these obstacles hinder the working of the representative system, there remains one more obstacle to be mentioned, and that is perhaps the most serious of all. I mean the composition and working of our Upper House, the Council of Empire. I know the alternatives proposed in England under similar circumstances—although I can hardly call them "similar." "Mend it or end it." Well, we cannot possibly "end" it. "Mend" it—that sounds all right, but the Lower House cannot apply this practical remedy in Russia, because the chief features of the constitution—the Upper House is included—are "protected" by fundamental laws, and the initiative in every important change belongs to the Monarch.

What then does this Upper House represent? I am afraid it is a chamber unique in the world. Half the members are nominated by the Tsar, chiefly from former officials. I do not wish to be disrespectful. Many glories of the past are contained in our Upper Chamber. But as our historical life began late and develops quickly, one is startled to see under the peaceful roof of the Marinsky Palace men and names which remind one of political standards long since doomed to oblivion, and of political experiments proved inadequate by painful failures. Too much of the past surviving in the present makes one feel uneasy. Of course, it would be unjust not to mention that there are many excellent legislators amongst the Councillors, men of profound knowledge and very large experience, perfectly acquainted with the technicalities of legislation. But there is one circumstance which prevents them from being able to express their mind freely and independently and makes them bow to the average standard of the assembly. Every nominated member of the Upper House can be removed from the House by the simple process of omitting his name from the list published at the beginning of every year.

The elected half of the members of the Council of Empire represents by a large majority the class of large landed proprietors, the most influential part of the Russian nobility. The nobility is represented directly by eighteen members as well as indirectly through the representatives of the Zemstvos, who number fifty. One may add to these 68 members representing the upper social stratum six dignitaries of the Church, which makes a solid majority of 74 out of the whole number of 98 elected members, on the side of Conservatism. There remain twelve representatives of commerce, a rather inadequate representation of capital if compared with that of the landed interest, and six intellectuals, representing the learned order of the Academy of Sciences and the Universities; and these generally form the extreme left wing in the Council of Empire. Six members for Poland, here as well as in the Duma, take an intermediate position between the two wings.

The activities of such an Upper House are directed as might be imagined. Not only the Duma, but even the Cabinet, even the Ministers, are often considered too Liberal by the Council of Empire. Every law which bears as they say "the stamp of the 30th of October"—the date of the constitutional manifesto—is sure to fall through, or to be relegated to the archives of the Upper Chamber. One must not forget that no Bills are able to reach the Upper House unless they have previously been approved by a majority of the Duma. You will see for yourselves what are the prospects of constructive and of Liberal legislation in Russia. As, on the other hand, the existence of the Duma does not admit of any reactionary legislation, the practical upshot is that all legislation of a constructive character is entirely paralysed: a state of things which cannot but be transitional.

Well, that is all now. But if you should think that with all these restraints, which are intended to hedge round and prevent the free play of our young representative institutions, we are driven to something like despair of their future development, you would be very much mistaken. On the contrary, we are very hopeful, particularly when we consider how much has been done in the line of constitutional practice and the political development of large masses in the very short space of ten years, during which our representative institutions have existed. Not only have we kept them alive in spite of all attempts of autocratic conspirators to abolish them, but we have found a steadily growing support in the country for a system of Liberal policy. We have seen our political parties, even the more Conservative and those which had been artificially built up with the aid of the Government, one by one yielding to the claims of the country.

The present war did very much to reveal that hidden process and make the result clear to everybody. I have told you already that this war has united us in the general aim of victory. I must say now that the war has done more than that. It has really worked miracles. It taught the united fourth Duma the best means to obtain their general aim. It taught us that in order to be strong the nation must be thoroughly organised. In the fourth Duma, whose composition you know, there is now a strong majority, 315 members out of the whole number of 440, for a scheme of constructive policy on a Liberal basis. That is what is known under the name of the "Progressive Block." This majority, moreover, has not only talked and discussed, it has already begun to act. The session of the Duma that ended a month ago, on the 3rd of July, has already enacted by way of Parliamentary initiative such measures as the prohibition of alcoholic drink for all time to come. This had been introduced by an Imperial Ukase for war-time, but it is now confirmed and extended beyond the war by the law of the Duma. They have passed another law for the equalisation of the rights of the peasants. In their committees they have prepared important drafts of laws extending the franchise and the functions of both Zemstvos and cities, and these will come before the whole house at the beginning of the next Session, i.e. in the autumn of 1916.

Lord Robert Cecil told you in his inaugural address at this Summer Meeting that British political conceptions of freedom and justice appealed to Russian ideas. Well, I am here to witness that they do appeal to the Russian representative assembly. I had personally to report to the Duma in the last days of its closing session the experience brought back by our parliamentary delegation from Great Britain two months before, particularly as to some national questions, and I can tell you that the Chamber was very much impressed by what we had to tell, and that this impression will be reflected in future legislation.

My time is up, ladies and gentlemen. Permit me again to quote the words of Lord Robert Cecil. "It may be truly said that freedom is as much admired in Russia as in England." Yes, ladies and gentlemen, it may be truly said that we worship freedom, we are worthy of freedom, we shall have freedom.

"Long live the Duma!"

1. The Right group of the first Duma preferred to be classified with the "independents."
2. The politically more independent groups of citizens and of "liberal professions" are not included.
3. In that part of Russia the landed nobility is mainly non-resident and peasants form the great majority of the population.
4. This is the mock term borrowed from naval terminology ("armour-plated") by the opposition, and now in general use.