Smith v. Morse/Opinion of the Court

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

76 U.S. 76

Smith  v.  Morse

Several objections were taken, in the court below, to a recovery by the plaintiffs, the principal of which, and the only objections requiring notice, were substantially these: that there is a variance between the covenant to submit, stated in the declaration, and the covenant in the submission produced; that the submission contains no authority to the arbitrators to appoint an umpire, and no agreement to abide any award rendered by him; that Kendall was not authorized to sign the submission for the plaintiffs, and, if authorized, the manner in which his authority was exercised was defective; and that there is a defect of parties plaintiffs, Kendall having signed the submission and not having joined in the action.

1st. The supposed variance between the covenant stated in the declaration and the covenant contained in the submission, arises from the fact that the submission, after referring the claims mentioned to the decision of the arbitrators, and an umpire, if necessary, adds the words, 'as provided in articles of submission this day executed,' and the declaration makes no mention of any such articles. In truth, no such articles ever had any existence, and the insertion of the words relating to such supposed articles probably arose from the carelessness or unskilfulness of the draftsman who prepared the formal submission. Previous to its preparation, the parties had informally agreed upon the terms of the submission, which were incorporated into the instrument signed, and the draftsman no doubt had this informal arrangement in his mind in the reference made. Be this as it may, the articles named having no existence-and this fact was established by the proofs in the case-formed no part of the contract of submission, and ought not, therefore, to have been stated in the pleadings.

On the hearing before the arbitrators, and subsequently before the umpire, no allusion was made to any such articles, nor was any objection taken on account of their absence. The parties treated the instrument under which the submission was made, as embracing the whole of the terms stipulated between them.

2d. The agreement in the submission that the claims designated should 'be referred to the final decision and arbitration' of parties designated, 'and an umpire, if needful,' authorized the arbitrators, in case of their disagreement, to appoint an umpire. It will be presumed that the parties intended that the usual mode should be followed in the appointment, in the absence of any different designation; and the usual mode is by the act of the arbitrators themselves. So the agreement to submit the matter to arbitrators, and to an umpire, if needful, carried with it the further agreement to abide the award which they might render, or, in case of their disagreement, which he might render. The law implies an agreement to abide the result of an arbitration from the fact of submission.

3d. The objection from Smith that Kendall was not authorized to sign the submission for the plaintiffs comes too late. That instrument recites that Kendall was the agent of Morse and the executors of Vail, and as such agent he makes the settlement mentioned therein between them and Smith, and agrees to submit the disputed claims between them to arbitration. That instrument Smith signs, and thus becomes a party to the settlement and submission, and must have been satisfied of the sufficiency of the authority upon which Kendall acted. And this is not all: throughout all the proceedings before the arbitrators and the umpire, Kendall represented the plaintiffs, and Smith, who appeared in person on the other side, took no exception to his authority. But if the authority had been originally insufficient, the plaintiffs have adopted and ratified his acts by accepting the settlement made by him on their behalf, and by bringing the present action upon the covenant contained in the submission.

The manner in which Kendall executed his authority is not open to the criticism of counsel. Where an instrument shows on its face the names of the contracting parties, the agent may sign his own name first, and add to it, as in the present case, agent for his principal, or he may sign the name of his principal first, and add, by himself as agent. Either form may be followed; all that is required in such case is that the contract shall purport on its face to be the contract of the principal. ^[1]

4th. There is no defect of parties plaintiffs. Kendall had no cause of action against Smith, or against any other party to the submission. He signed that instrument only for the purpose of settling various causes of action in which he was personally interested. The agreement of submission was exclusively between the parties to the present action. The award followed the submission, and neither adjudged anything to Kendall or against him.

In coming to the conclusion we have upon the objections of the defendants, we have not regarded the memorandum between the parties, made on the 13th of December, 1859, or the previous correspondence with Cooper, as affecting in any respect the terms or character of the submission. Those documents were admissible to show that no articles of submission were ever executed, as mentioned in the sealed instrument, that the defendant recognized the authority of Kendall, and that both Smith and Kendall treated the sealed instrument as containing the whole of the stipulations between the parties, and went to the hearing before the arbitrators and umpire with that understanding.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Notes

1. 1st American Leading Cases, 605; notes to Elwell v. Shaw.