Spokane Falls Railway Company v. Ziegler/Opinion of the Court

by George Shiras, Jr.

United States Supreme Court

167 U.S. 65

Spokane Falls Railway Company  v.  Ziegler

This action was brought by William H. Ziegler against the Spokane Falls & Northern Railway Company in the superior court for Spokane county, Wash., and was, on the petition of the railway company, removed into the circuit court of the United States for the district of Washington. The trial there resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of Ziegler. That judgment the railway company, by a writ of error, took to the circuit court of appeals of the Ninth circuit. 15 U.S. App. 472, 9 C. C. A. 548, 61 Fed. 392, and 29 U.S. App. 69, 12 C. C. A. 488, 64 Fed. 960. The judgment of the circuit court was there affirmed. The case is before us on a writ of error to the judgment of the circuit court of appeals, sued out by the railway company.

The plaintiff in error now contends that the judgment should be reversed, and the record sent back to the circuit court, with directions to remand the case to the state court whence it was taken on the petition of the plaintiff in error. The ground of this contention is that the plaintiff's statement in the state court did not disclose either that the parties were citizens of different states, or a cause of action involving a right claimed under the constitution or laws of the United States.

Whether it would be competent for the plaintiff in error, in the circumstances stated, to challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court at this stage of the controversy, we need not consider, because we think that the plaintiff's statement did disclose a cause of action arising under the laws of the United States and cognizable by the circuit court.

In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that on May 1, 1889, he was in possession, as a preemptor under the laws of the United States, of a tract of land containing about 80 acres, and on said date had made all the improvements, and had lived on the land a sufficient length of time, and had done all other acts necessary to entitle him to a patent to the same from the United States; that the defendant company, being a corporation of the territory of Washington, on said date entered upon and seized a strip of said land 50 feet in width, and appropriated it for railroad purposes, without the consent of the plaintiff, and without having compensated him therefor; and that the entry upon and seizure by the defendant of the land was under and pursuant to the laws of the territory of Washington authorizing railroad companies to appropriate land for right of way for railroad tracks.

We have judicial knowledge that the authority of the territory to legislate in respect to the right of a territorial railroad corporation to enter upon the public lands of the United States was derived from the act of congress entitled 'An act granting to railroads the right of way through the public lands of the United States,' approved March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 482), whereby the right of way through the public lands of the United States was granted to any railroad company duly organized under the laws of any state or territory.

The plaintiff's complaint, therefore, discloses the case of a contest between a settler claiming title under the laws of the United States and a railroad company claiming a right under an act of congress; and of such a case the circuit court for the district of Washington clearly had jurisdiction. Doolan v. Carr, 125 U.S. 620, 8 Sup. Ct. 1228; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U.S. 375, 13 Sup. Ct. 340.

Passing from the question of jurisdiction, we come to the contention of the plaintiff in error that Ziegler, as a mere settler upon lands of the United States, although with an intention to obtain a title to the same under the pre-emption laws, did not have such a vested interest in the land as would avail against the railway company in asserting its right of way conferred by the act of congress.

An answer to this question is furnished by the case of Railroad Co. v. Osborn, 160 U.S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 219, where it was held that a railroad company whose road is laid out so as, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, to cross a part of the public lands, cannot take part thereof, in the actual possession and occupation of a settler who is entitled to claim a pre-emption right thereto when the proper time shall come, and who has made improvements on the land so occupied by him, without making proper compensation therefor.

The court based its conclusion in that case upon the language of the third section of the act, which is as follows: 'That the legislature of the proper territory may provide for the manner in which private lands and possessory claims on the lands of the United States may be condemned, and when such provision shall not have been made, such condemnation may be made in accordance with section three of the act entitled 'An act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific Ocean,' &c., approved July 1, 1862.'

And it was held that the right of a settler in possession of unsurveyed lands of the United States, who had made improvements with the intention of procuring a title under the pre-emption laws as soon as the same should be surveyed by the government, was a possessory claim within the meaning of the statute, for which compensation must be made by a railroad company seeking to appropriate a part of it for its tracks.

The final contention on behalf of the plaintiff in error is that the trial court erred in holding and deciding that the words 'possessory claims,' used in said act of congress, were intended to protect more than the improvements of a settler, and thus, in effect, holding and deciding that the settler was entitled to receive pay for the land as though he was the owner in fee.

Even if it were the law, as is assumed in this contention, that the plaintiff, as the holder of a possessory claim, was not entitled to the same measure of compensation as if he had secured his patent from the United States, it would be difficult to convict the trial judge of any error in that respect. In the charge the judge instructed the jury as follows: 'As I have said, the court holds the plaintiff to be the owner of the land, but I do not wish to be understood by that saying that he was then the owner in fee; that he had a title in fee, or other rights than such as belonged to a settler under the preemption law of the United States, which gave him a possessory right and a vested interest in the property, so that no part of it could be lawfully taken from him without compensation being paid for it; and in determining the amount of damages to be awarded to him you will take into consideration the condition the title was in at the time the road was built, and award him the value of the property as you find it to be, considering the title to be involved as it was by reason of the matter being undetermined in the land department as to his right to it, and there being a contest, and that he was obstructed in obtaining his patent to it by reason of a dispute as to its right. Now, taking that into account, you will award him such amount of damages as will compensate him for so much of the land as the railroad company has appropriated for the right of way, and for whatever injurious effect the road may have caused to the land which he owned,-the balance of the eighty-acre tract described in his complaint.'

Under this instruction the railroad company would seem to have received the benefit of any distinction that could be fairly made between a possessory title and one that had matured into a patent. But upon the facts disclosed by this record we do not think that the railroad company was entitled to the benefit of such a distinction. While it is true that at the time when the company took possession of the plaintiff's land the latter had not yet received his patent, but had only made the final proofs, and filed the same in the land office of the United States, and had tendered the purchase price thereof, and had demanded from the register and receiver of said land office a final receipt evidencing his entry of and payment for said land, yet it further appears that before the plaintiff brought this suit his purchase money had been accepted, and a patent from the United States for the said tract of land had been duly executed and delivered to him. The plaintiff, then, having been in possession of the land in question, and having done and performed all that the law required to give him a right to a patent, before the railroad company seized the land, we think the grant of the patent subsequent to such seizure, but before the bringing of the suit, operated to confer upon the plaintiff the right to demand and recover damages as the owner of the fee. The railroad company, having taken possession without the consent of the owner, and not having instituted proceedings to condemn, was a trespasser, and liable to indemnify the plaintiff in respect to his possession and title, as they were shown to exist at the time the suit was brought.

To avoid possible misunderstanding, it may be observed that, as mentioned by the circuit court of appeals, this case arose under section 2456 of the Code of Washington territory, which authorized any corporation organized for the construction of a railroad, canal, or bridge to take lands, but required 'compensation to be made to the owner thereof, irrespective of any increased value thereof by reason of the proposed improvement by such corporation.' See 15 U.S. App. 478, 9 C. C. A. 548, and 61 Fed. 392.

The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is affirmed.

Notes