Stebbins v. Town of St Anne/Opinion of the Court

by Horace Gray

United States Supreme Court

116 U.S. 386

Stebbins  v.  Town of St Anne

 Argued: January 11, 1886. ---

The object of this bill is to compel the town of St. Anne to pay the amount of the bonds which the town issued to aid in the construction of the railroad, and delivered to Joseph E. Young & Co., the contractors for building the road, in accordance with the agreement between those contractors and the railroad company. Assuming, without deciding, that the bonds were valid obligations of the town, and that there is such a want of adequate remedy at law as to justify a resort to equity, nevertheless this bill cannot be maintained. The bill, after many specific allegations, mostly of fact, but including some inferences of law not supported by the facts alleged, contains a general allegation that the town is indebted either to Joseph E. Young & Co. or to the railroad company in the amount of the bonds. If, as would appear to be the result of all the allegations of the bill, the debt of the town upon the bonds was to Joseph E. Young & Co., the bill cannot be maintained without bringing before the court the owners of the interests of all the members of that partnership in the debt. This has not been done. The three partners were Joseph E. Young, William D. Judson, and Amos Tenney. Said Judson and Tenney, as well as Edward G. Judson, William A. Tenney, and Sutherland Tenney, the pledgees of their interests in the claim of the partnership against the town, are joined as plaintiffs. But the interest of Young in the claim is not represented. The sale and conveyance to Stebbins (the only other plaintiff) from Pierce, as the receiver of Young's estate under insolvency proceedings in the state court, included only Young's interest in claims against the railroad company. The interest of Young in the claim of the partnership against the town remained in Pierce, either as such receiver, or as assignee under the subsequent proceedings against Young under the bankrupt act of the United States, and neither Young nor Pierce is a party to the bill.

If the alternative view is taken, and it is assumed that there is a debt of the town to the railroad company, and that Stebbins, by his purchase of Young's interest in the claim of the partnership against that company, and by the judgment subsequently recovered by the partnership upon that claim, acquired the right, jointly with the two other partners, to compel the application of the sum due from the town to the railroad company in satifaction of that judgment, another difficulty arises, namely, that Edward G. Judson, William A. Tenney, and Sutherland Tenney, the pledgees of William D. Judson's and Amos Tenney's interests in the claim of the partnership against the town, acquired no interest in the claim of the partnership against the railroad company, or in the judgment recovered upon that claim, and should not therefore be parties to this bill.

In fine, the whole interest in any claim of the partnership against the town was in Pierce, either as the receiver of Young's estate in insolvency, or as the assignee of his estate in bankruptcy, and in William D. Judson and his pledgee, Edward G. Judson, and in Amos Tenney and his pledgees, William A. Tenney and Sutherland Tenney; and no part of that interest was in the plaintiff Stebbins. The whole interest in any claim of the partnership against the railroad company was in Stebbins, as assignee of Young's interest in this claim, and in William D. Judson and Amos Tenney, and no part of this interest was in the plaintiffs Edward G. Judson, William A. Tenney, and Sutherland Tenney. Two alternative claims, each belonging to many persons, one of whom has no interest in one claim, and others of whom have no interest in the other claim, cannot be joined in one bill in equity. Decree affirmed.

Notes