Texas Railway Company v. Anderson/Opinion of the Court

by Melville Fuller

United States Supreme Court

149 U.S. 237

Texas Railway Company  v.  Anderson

Pending the writ of error, the defendant, Ida May Cox, intermarried with one Scott Anderson. Upon reception of the mandate, execution was issued by the clerk of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company for the full amount of the judgment, with 8 per cent. interest and costs. The company thereupon filed its bill against the marshal in whose hands the execution had been placed, asking that he be restrained from levying the same, upon the ground that there was no judgment to support the execution. A restraining order was granted, which was continued in force until November 22, 1892, when it was dissolved. On that day Mr. and Mrs. Anderson filed a motion that execution should issue in their names against the defendant company. This motion was resisted, but the objections of the company thereto were overruled, and the court entered an order directing the clerk to record the mandate, and to issue execution against the company for the sum recovered, with interest at 8 per cent. from the date of the original judgment, and costs; to which action of the court the company excepted, and, a bill of exceptions having been signed and approved, a writ of error was allowed from the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit. The case came on to be heard in that court upon the motion of the defendants in error to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction and upon the merits, whereupon the court granted a certificate stating the facts as above given, though with greater particularity, which concluded as follows:

'Whereupon, the court desiring the instruction of the honorable the supreme court of the United States for the proper decision of the questions arising herein, it is hereby ordered that the following questions and propositions of law be certified to the honorable the supreme court of theUnited States, in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the act entitled 'An act to establish circuit courts of appeals, and define and regulate, in certain cases, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and for other purposes,' approved March 3, 1891, to wit:

'First. Does the act of March 3, 1891, entitled 'An act to establish circuit courts of appeals, and to define and regulate, in certain cases, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and for other purposes,' give to said circuit courts of appeals jurisdiction, by appeal or writ of error, or otherwise, to review the decrees, orders, or judgments made by district courts or existing circuit courts, construing a mandate from the supreme court of the United States, and in executing the same?

'Second. Was it the intention of the supreme court of the United States, in affirming the judgment in the case of John C. Brown, Plaintiff in Error, v. Ida May Cox, Defendant in Error, that said judgment should be subject to the general equitable jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver was appointed, and be paid in due course of the administration of said receivership, or did it intend that execution should issue directly against the Texas and Pacific Railway Company for the amount of said judgment?

'Third. At the date said judgment was originally recovered, to wit, September 15, 1888, it bore interest under the law of the state of Texas at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum. Subsequently, to wit, on April 13, 1891, the statute of the state of Texas fixing the rate of interest that judgments of this kind should bear was amended, so that, instead of bearing eight per cent. interest, judgments thereafter obtained were made to bear only six per cent. interest per annum. Should the judgment in this case bear interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, or at the rate of six per cent. per annum?'

Jno. F. Dillon and Winslow S. Pierce, for plaintiff in error.

Harry Hubbard and W. Hallett Phillips, for defendants in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

Ghe circuit court was correct in awarding execution against the company under the mandate. The judgment was originally against the receiver, to be paid in due course out of the assets in his hands; but the receiver had been discharged, and the property restored to the company, and the company had been substituted as the party to the writ of error here, and been made in all respects as liable to the defendants in error as if it had itself brought the writ. The judgment was made final by the order of this court, and was not again subject to be reviewed by the court below in the exercise of its equitable powers, or otherwise. If the judgment had been reversed, the company would have recovered its costs against the defendants in error, and the reversal would have been a bar to any liability on the judgment as such. It so happened that it was affirmed, and the company was equally concluded. While the only question is as to the order of this court, we do not think there is any conflict between the mandate and the stipulation, or that the language of the stipulation in any respect limited the liability of the company in case of affirmance. Every point the receiver could have presented was raised on behalf of the company, and disposed of after elaborate argument and careful consideration, and the stipulation in that regard was fully complied with. If it had been intended to reserve the present contention, it is enough to say that that intention was not expressed, and cannot be inferred, and the matter was determined by our judgment. The circuit court properly attempted to exercise no discretion in the premises, but discharged its duty by carrying the mandate into effect, according to its terms. This court awarded execution against the company for the costs here, but it was for the circuit court to award execution for the amount of the judgment, as it was directed to do, and as it did; and interest was properly included at the rate which obtained under the law of Texas at the time judgment was rendered, the change in the law in that respect operating only prospectively. Inasmuch as its action conformed to the mandate, and there were no proceedings subsequent thereto not settled by the terms of the mandate itself, the case falls within the rule often heretofore laid down, and a second writ of error cannot be maintained. Cook v. Burnley, 11 Wall. 677; Stewart v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 361; Humphrey v. Baker, 103 U.S. 736.

For these reasons the answer to the first question certified must be that, upon the facts stated in the certificate, the circuit court of appeals cannot review by writ of error this judgment of the circuit court in execution of the mandate of this court. This dispenses with the necessity of answering the other questions certified. Ordered accordingly.

Notes