The American Democrat/On Slavery in the District of Columbia
ON SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Congress having all power to legislate for the District of Columbia, there can be no reasonable doubt of its power to legislate on slavery, as well as any other interest, under the limits of the constitution. A plausible question might even be raised whether the ordinary restrictions of the constitution apply at all to the legislation of the District, and whether the powers of congress over this particular portion of the country, are not as absolute as the powers of parliament in Great Britain.
Still the legislation for the District, in principle, depends on that general rule which ought to guide all just legislators. To pretend that a member of congress from Vermont, or a member of congress from Louisiana, is to respect the opinions of his own immediate constituents, in legislating especially for the District of Columbia, is like pretending that the emperor of Austria, who is equally sovereign of both countries, should consult the interests of the people of the kingdom of Bohemia, in establishing laws for the kingdom of Hungary. The relation between the constituent of the member and the District, is altogether anomalous, and, on no just principle, can be made to extend to this absolute control.
All legislation that is especially intended for the District, should keep the interests of the District alone in view, subject to the great reasons for which this territory was formed, and to the general principles of morality. So far as any influence beyond that of the District is concerned, on the question of slavery, this legislation should be more in the interest of the slave-holding states, than in the interests of the non-slave-holding states, as with the latter it is purely a negative question, whereas, with the former, it has a positive affirmative connection with their immediate interests, in more senses than one. Thus the slave-holder has a claim to be able to visit the seat of government, attended by his body servants, and this, too, without incurring any unpleasant risks of their loss merely to satisfy the abstract notions of right of the citizens of the non-slave-holding states. This claim may not be so great as to over-shadow those of the inhabitants of the District itself, should they demand a law for the emancipation of their slaves, but is quite great enough to overshadow the negative interests of the resident of a non-slave-holding state.
In the management of this interest, in general, it ought to be remembered, that to the citizen of the non-slave-holding state, slavery offers little more than a question of abstract principles, while to the citizen of the slave-holding state it offers a question of the highest practical importance, and one that, mis-managed, might entirely subvert the order of his social organization.