The Annual Register/1758/History of the Present War/Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
THE original plan of this work proposed no more than that each volume should contain a narrative of those events which distinguish its own year. But, because we have entered upon our undertaking in the heat of an almost general and very important war, I thought it would not be unnecessary or disagreeable to look a little farther back. It would be difficult perfectly to understand the operations of the several powers at war, during the last year, without reviewing the transactions of the preceding years; nor would it be easy to enter into the spirit of these without examining the causes which more nearly or remotely operated to produce these troubles that have involved so many parts of the world in one common distraction.
The war into which all parties and interests seem now to be so perfectly blended, arose from causes which originally had not the least connection: the uncertain limits of the English and French territories in America; and the mutual claims of the houses of Austria and Brandenbourg on the duchy of Silesia. It is no wonder that the two former powers, seizing on a country in which they considered the right of the natural inhabitants as nothing, should find it a very difficult matter to settle their own. For a long time neither of these powers were sufficiently acquainted with the geography of America, to enable them to ascertain the limits of their several pretensions with any tolerable exactness; nor, indeed, were these matters deemed of sufficient moment to call for a very laborious discussion. At the treaty of Utrecht, whilst so many more important interests, or what then seemed more important, were discussed, the limits of Nova Scotia, then called Acadia, were expressed only in general terms, and left to be put on a more certain footing by subsequent negotiations. These negotiations, pursued with no vigour and drawn out into an excessive length, seemed only to increase the former confusion. After the accession of the present royal family, a French connection, perhaps necessary from the circumstances of the time, and afterwards a certain negligence of all affairs but those of our domestic polity, suffered this important point to vanish almost wholly out of our consideration. During this interval, our colonies on the continent of North America, extended themselves on every side. Whilst agriculture and the maritime commerce flourished on their coasts, the Indian trade drew several of our wandering dealers far into the inland country, and beyond the great mountains. Here they found themselves in a delightful climate, in a soil abundantly fruitful, and watered with many fair and navigable rivers. These advantages, joined to those of the Indian trade, appeared to compensate for its remoteness from the sea. It was judged that as the first settlers on the coast, we had a good right to the inland country; and, if so, to the navigation of the Missisippi, which opened another door to the ocean. With these views, a company of merchants and planters obtained a charter for a considerable tract of land near the river Ohio, on the western side of the Allegeney mountains, but within the province of Virginia; and the adventurers began to settle pursuant to the terms of their patent.
Now began to shoot forth the seeds of another dispute, which had long lain unobserved, but which proved altogether as thorny and intricate as that concerning the limits of Acadia. The French, pretending to have first discovered the mouths of the Missisippi, claimed the whole adjacent country, towards New Mexico on the East, quite to the Apalachian or Allegeney mountains on the West. They drove off the new settlers, and built a strong fort, called du Quesne, on the forks of the river Monongahela; a situation which commanded an entrance into all the country on the Ohio and Missisippi.
The reader will observe, that I do not pretend to decide concerning the right of either nation in this contest. It is evident enough, that the consideration of the right had much less influence on both parties than the consideration of conveniency. Should the French be able to unite Canada to their colonies at the mouth of Missisippi, by a possession of all that vast country which lies between them, the English colonies must lose all share in the Indian trade in time of peace; and in time of war be exposed to continual dangers, or to the ruinously chargeable defence of a frontier more than 1500 miles in length. If on the contrary, the French should fail to make good these claims on the Ohio, and those on Nova Scotia, their two colonies, entirely disunited, and the entrance into one shut up for the winter season by frost, and the entrance into the other difficult in all seasons by the banks at the mouth of the Missisippi, must certainly lose all their value to France, and in their fall involve much of the fortune of their great settlements in the West Indies.
Both nations being fully persuaded of this, no longer looked on the affair of the Ohio as a matter of indifference. They prepared to cut the gordian knot of the long and intricate negociation by the sword. Ships were fitted out, and some troops silently sent off from Brest. General Braddock sailed to Virginia 1755. with about 1500 regular troops; 24 men of war under the Admirals Boscawen and Mostyn were ordered to America, to intercept the French supplies. Orders were sent to our colonies to arm; and three operations were actually undertaken, one against Fort du Quesne under Braddock; the other two against the French forts in Nova Scotia, and the fort of Crown Point on the frontiers of New York. The two courts in the mean time breathed nothing but peace, and exchanged reciprocal professions of friendship and good will, which deceived neither party.
They who are of opinion that the passions and characters of the ruling men, influence all public concerns as much as the public interests themselves, thought they saw other causes operating to hasten this breach. On the death of a great minister, which happened some time before, the administration was new moulded. Some persons then taken in, were considered as belonging to a party not perfectly united with the remains of the old administration. It was thought that the leading man of this party proposed to work out the old servants of the crown, in order to make way for a more uniform system. As long as peace subsists government is supported by itself; and any change is difficult. But the conduct of a war is a thing critical to a ministry. The leader of this party therefore, conscious of his own talents, which all men acknowledged to be conspicuous, and of his connexions, which were considerable, warmly pushed on a war, seconded by the fairness of the public motives, and the general voice of the people. In this war his friends relied that things must necessarily be so embarrassed, that the old party would find themselves obliged to retire, and to leave the stage clear for them to serve their country according to their own plans, and on their own terms. This design was believed to be pushed forward by another great man of that party, who had played a game nearly of the same kind before, and in whom an advanced age had not abated any thing of his natural fire and love of violent councils.
Things came to a crisis by the June 10. taking of two French men of war by the admirals Boscawen and Mostyn. The operations by land were carried on with vigour; but whether conduced with equal judgment we stand too near the time to decide. However, June 16. the French fort at Beausejour was taken, and soon after those on St. John's river were abandoned; by which we remained masters of all Nova Scotia. The principal expedition was that against Fort du Quesne, under General Braddock. That general, abounding too much in his own sense for the degree of military knowledge he possessed, commanding in a country where he did not know, and carrying on a species of war in which he had no experience, suffered himself, when he had advanced within ten miles of Fort du Quesne, to be surprised by an ambuscade of French July 9. and Indians. His army was seized with a panic from the unusual appearance and horrid cries of the savages: they fled in confusion; they were totally defeated with a considerable slaughter, especially of their officers. The general himself, after having had five horses killed under him, was mortally wounded; wiping away all the errors of his conduct by an honourable death for his country.
The nation was something consoled for this loss in the signal advantage gained by General Johnson Sept. 7. who commanded the expedition designed against Crown Point. He was attacked in his retrenchments by the French General Dieskau; but the assailants wanting cannon, and firing from too great a distance, were totally defeated, and Dieskau himself was made prisoner. This victory, tho' very honourable for Mr. Johnson, and the provincial troops under his command, yet, as it was gained late in the season, and as the army was in no very good condition, it had no consequences. On the whole, we seemed, after allowing for this victory, and for the dislodgment of the French from Nova Scotia, to have had the worst part in the campaign; considering the sanguine expectations which had been formed, and the great superiority of strength which we exerted, or were able to have exerted, in that part of the world.
During this summer our court took a resolution not to wait the precarious operations of our arms in America, for redress of the grievances complained of, but to strike such a blow as would at once put a security into our hands, for the evacuating the places the enemy had fortified in our territories, and disable them in the two most material points, the resources of their trade and their seamen. Their merchant ships were every where attacked, as if war had been actually declared, and vast numbers brought into our ports. The French made all Europe resound with complaints of what they called a proceeding so unjust, and a violation of the law of nations, so flagrant and unprecedented. But, whether it was that they were really in no condition to act, or that they intended to influence the other courts in their favour, by a shew of extraordinary moderation, they contented themselves with this, and neither declared war nor made any sort of reprisal for 1756. several months after. At length they began to act; several bodies of troops moved to the coasts of Picardy, Normandy and Britanny; and all things threatened an invasion on some part of this kingdom. Under the shadow of this stratagem, they got ready in the harbour of Toulon April 18. a fleet of twelve men of war of the line with the utmost expedition, which convoyed an army of about 11,000 men, under command of the Duke de Richlieu, to the island of Minorca. April 25. In a few days they opened trenches before St. Philip's fort.
This was done while the nation trembled under a shameful panic, too public to be concealed, too fatal in its consequences to be ever forgotten. The real invasion did not lessen our fears of the imaginary one; it threw us into a confusion that suffered us to be sensible of nothing but our own weakness. We did not look upon ourselves sufficiently secured by the arrival of the Hanoverian and Hessian troops, which the same weakness had induced us to call to our assistance. The ministry seemed to have been infected with the common terror; for, though they had very early notice of the French designs, such was the apprehension of the invasion, or such the ill contrived disposition of our navy, that Admiral Byng was not dispatched to the Mediterranean before the 5th of April, and then with a squadron of no more than ten ships of the line.
The engagement with the French fleet under M. Galissoniere; May 12. the retreat of Byng, by which the garrison of fort St. Philip was cut off from all hopes of relief; the surrender of that garrison after nine weeks open trenches; the sentiments June 29. of the court and the public, on the different merits of the governor and the admiral; the opposition of some, who thought the one too highly honoured; and the other too severely censured, and the measures which rather indignation at our losses and disgraces, than a cool sense of things obliged us to take, are known to all the world. Our affairs were in such a condition, that we were driven to the expedient of a court martial to revive the British spirit, and to the unfortunate Feb. 14, 1757. necessity of shedding the blood of an admiral, a person of a noble family, as a sacrifice to the discipline of our navy.
From this melancholy picture, let us turn our eyes another way, and review the steps by which this war came to involve the rest of the contending powers. The French, amongst the other plans they formed for distressing our affairs, made no secret of their design of attacking his Majesty's German dominions. These countries evidently had no sort of connection with the matters which gave rise to the war. But being under a sovereign so remarkably affectionate to his native country; they judged he might be terrified into a relaxation of his rights in America, to preserve Hanover from the calamities with which it was threatened. Their politics, however, in this instance proved as unsuccessful as they were unjust. No motion was made towards an abatement in our claims with regard to America; his Majesty took other methods for the preservation of the peace of Germany. His British subjects by their representatives, not more generously than reasonably, resolved to defend the Hanoverians if attacked in their quarrel. To answer this purpose; the ministry entered into a subsidy treaty with the Empress of Russia, in virtue of which she was to hold 55,000 men in readiness to be sent on a requisition wherever the British service required.
The alliance with Russia was chosen for reasons which were then sufficiently plausible; though it is to be hoped they can never subsist again. The long ill understanding between the king of Prussia and our court, and his close ccnnection with that of Versailles, raised no ill-grounded apprehensions that he might be induced to act a dangerous part on this occasion. Russia was therefore a proper ally, who had both a political and personal enmity to this monarch, and who would be sure to employ a great power with great vigour in such a cause. But this system was in a short time totally reversed. The King of Prussia had been too well apprised of the close conjunction of the courts of Petersbourg and Vienna, and of the real motive to that conjunction, to have the least design of embroiling himself with England. Matters were therefore very soon explained, and the treaty between his Prussian majesty and this court, to keep all foreigners out of the empire, was signed at London in Jan. 1756. These treaties were censured as inconsistent with each other; but in reality they were consistent enough, aiming precisely at the same object, to oppose the scheme meditated by France for disturbing the affairs of Germany.
If, reflecting on the sentiments of these courts, there was something unexpected in the alliance between Groat Britain and Prussia; it was then followed by another alliance of a nature infinitely more surprising. The Empress Queen of Hungary finding England in no disposition to co-operate in her designs, had recourse to other measures. The house of Austria, which had formerly united Europe to preserve her from the power of France, now entered herself into the most intimate union with that power. By this extraordinary revolution, the whole political system of Europe assumed a new face; it was indeed a revolution so extraordinary, that we shall be justified if we interrupt the course of this narrative, to look back at the causes which produced it.
The house of Brandenbourg, a little more than two centuries ago, was in a very humble condition. But by the part she took in the reformation, which put into her hands the estates of the Teutonic order; by a marriage from which she acquired the duchy of Cleves; and by an uncommon succession of able princes, who carefully improved every turn in the affairs of Germany to their advantage, she raised herself by degrees to a considerable state, to an electorate and at last to a royalty, not only in name but in power. The late King of Prussia, in order to strengthen this power, tho' he past almost his whole reign in the most profound peace, gave his whole attention to his army: frugal in all other respects, in this alone he was expensive; it was his business, and, what was perhaps of greater moment, it was his only diversion. Thus in a reign apparently inactive, there was always kept up an army of near 100,000 men, in as much exercise as they could have in peace, and formed with the most perfect discipline.
When his present majesty came to the throne, he immediately shewed a disposition of employing effectually that military force which his father had spent his life only in forming and training. He managed his dispute with the bishop of Liege by the summary method of force: and seemed disposed to carry all things with so high a hand, as made him indeed much respected, but much dreaded too by the Princes of the Empire, who saw that there was another power to be feared in Germany, besides that of Austria. But these were small matters, rather signs of the disposition of this Prince, than exertions of it. He meditated much greater things; and only waited an opportunity to make good the antient claims of his family on the most considerable part of the duchy of Silesia. The right to that duchy had been a very intricate affair; but the house of Austria availing herself of the greatness of her power, and of a dissension between the Elector Frederick II. and his son, prevailed with the Elector to give up that right for an equivalent; then she persuaded his son to confirm the treaty; and at the same time for a trivial consideration to give up the equivalent itself. The King of Prussia, not thinking himself bound by these acts, though confirmed by a long possession, took advantage of his own power, and the embarrassed circumstances of the house of Austria, to resume what their power and the embarrassed circumstances of his family had formerly deprived him of. For Dec. 1740. immediately on the death of Charles the Sixth, when the Austrian greatness seemed irrecoverably lost, he entered into Silesia, and made himself master of the whole country with little opposition. Then uniting with the French and Bavarians, he secured his conquests by June 11. 1742. two decisive victories, and by a treaty which yielded him the greatest and best part of Silesia, and the whole county June 2. 1744. of Glatz. But the cause of the Emperor, which the King of Prussia had embraced, soon caused a renewal of hostilities. The Queen of Hungary saw herself defeated in three pitched battles; her new ally the King of Poland driven from his German dominions, and the King of Prussia entering Dresden in triumph, where he gave the law in a treaty, Dec. 1745. by which Silesia was once more solemnly confirmed to him: in return to which he guarantied to the Queen of Hungary the rest of her dominions.
The Queen of Hungary could not easily lose the memory of the wound she had received in the loss of one of the finest and richest parts of all her dominions. Silesia, which she had just yielded, extends in length 200 miles along the course of the large and navigable river Oder. A country of the most exquisite fertility and highest cultivation; abounding with men, abounding with valuable manufactures, and yielding a clear yearly revenue of 800,000 pounds sterling. The peace was hardly concluded by which she resigned this valuable territory, than she set on foot practices for recovering it. She entered into a treaty with the court of Petersbourg, of an May 22, 1746. innocent and simply defensive nature, so far as appeared to the public; but six secret and separate articles were added to it; one of which provides, that in case his Prussian Majesty should attack her Majesty the Empress Queen, or the Empress of Russia, or even the republic of Poland, that this attack should be considered as a breach of the treaty of Dresden; that the right of the Empress Queen to Silesia, ceded by that treaty, should revive; and that the contracting powers should mutually furnish an army of 65,000 men to reinvest the Empress Queen with that duchy.
To this so extraordinary a treaty, the King of Poland was invited to accede; and he did so far accede to it, as to shew he perfectly agreed in his sentiments with these courts. But his situation in the jaws of a formidable enemy, and the experience of past misfortunes, had rendered him so wary, that he declined signing the treaty; but still, with the consent of the parties concerned, whom he fully convinced of his resolution to co-operate in all their measures. He desired, and they agreed, that in the success of their arms he should have a share in the spoil, on the footing of a treaty for May 18, 1754. the eventual partition of the King of Prussia's dominions made in the last war. On these conditions the King of Poland, without actually signing, was understood, and received as a party to the treaty of Petersbourg.
In consequence of these measures, all sorts of means were employed to embroil the King of Prussia's affairs in the North, and particularly to render him personally odious to the Czarina. When their machinations had taken full effect, and Russia was fixed in an unalterable enmity to that monarch, preparations of magazines and armies were made in Bohemia and Moravia; and the King of Poland, under pretence of a military amusement, drew together about 16,000 men, with which he occupied the strong and important post of Pirna. The Queen of Hungary saw that she stood in need of yet stronger supports than these, in the arduous business she had undertaken. She found that Great Britain, which had often done so much for her distress would do little for her ambition: she therefore had recourse to France, who joyfully accepting an alliance, that promised to confound the whole Germanic body, concluded a treaty with the Empress at Versailles the 1st of May 1756, a remarkable æra in the political history of Europe.
The secret articles of the treaty of Petersbourg, the fountain of the present troubles, and the steps taken to put that treaty in execution, tho' formed and carried on with as much secresy as earnestness, could not escape the vigilance of his Prussian majesty, who watched all their motions, and had perfect intelligence of their most hidden designs. When therefore he perceived, that by the breach between England and France, the Empress Queen would take advantage of these troubles to avail herself of her alliances and her armaments; he ordered his minister at Vienna to demand a clear explication, and proper assurances concerning the preparations he saw making: and receiving only a dry and equivocal answer, that the Empress had taken measures for her own security, and that of her allies and friends, the King believed himself no longer bound to preserve any terms; a dangerous war was to be kept out of his own territories at any rate; and being always in perfect readiness for action, he fell upon Saxony with a considerable army.
Aug. 29. At first the King of Prussia seemed only to demand a free passage for his troops, and an observance of the neutrality professed by the King of Poland; but as he had very good reasons to distrust such a neutrality, he demanded as a security, that the Saxon troops should quit the strong post they occupied, and disperse themselves immediately. This demand was refused, and the King of Prussia, in consequence of that refusal, immediately formed a sort of blockade about the Saxon camp at Pirna, with a view to reduce it by famine, since its inaccessible situation rendered an attack unadviseable. There were in Bohemia two Austrian armies under M. Brown and M. Picolomini. To keep these in awe, M. Schwerin had entered Bohemia from the country of Glatz; and M. Keith had pentrated into that kingdom on the side of Misnia. But the King of Prussia, not entirely confiding in these dispositions, and still apprehensive that M. Brown might be able to convey some relief to the Saxons, resolved to bring him to an action, to the success of which he knew his own presence would greatly contribute. He therefore left the blockade of the Saxon army, joined his forces under Keith, and engaged the Austrians at Lowositz. Dec. 1. Here he obtained a victory, which though it was not undisputed with regard to the field of battle, yet with regard to the consequence it was as decisive as could be wished. M. Brown found it impracticable to relieve the Saxons, notwithstanding the judicious efforts he made for that purpose; and that army, after a vain attempt to retire from their difficult post, which had one fault, that it was as difficult to leave it as to force it, were obliged to surrender prisoners of war. The King of Poland quitted his German dominions; and the Prussians took up their winter quarters in Saxony, seized upon the revenues, levied exorbitant contributions, and obliged the country to furnish recruits. This unhappy people saw their country exhausted, and forced to bear the burthen of a war against itself. It was then that the King of Prussia, consulting the rules of policy more than those of politeness, made himself master of the archives of Dresden, in doing which some roughness was used towards the Queen; but he made himself amends for the clamour industriously raised on this pretence, by acquiring the originals of those pieces, which evinced to the world the reality of the design against him, and which therefore in a great measure justified the means he had taken to come at them, as well as the extraordinary severities he used towards the unfortunate Saxons.