The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 11

by Carl Russell Fish

CHAPTER XI.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

REFORM MOVEMENT.

Although the system of competitive examinations was begun so late in the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twentieth found it well established. The annual report of the Civil Service Commission for 1899-1900 showed 90,000 classified positions, and 100,000 unclassified, in the national service; but the salaries of the first amounted to about $75,000,000, while those of the latter amounted to only about $30,000,000. From 1883 to 1900, 78,791 officials had been appointed because of their standing in examinations. In the year 1900, 34,437 took the examinations offered, 22,985 received pass marks, and 9889 were appointed to some position. The appointing officers showed a growing tendency to select, from the three candidates certified to them by the commission as eligible, the one whose mark was highest; in about three-fourths of the cases this was done. That the extension of the system has not reached its limit is indicated by the inclusion of the rural delivery system within the rules in the year 1903.^[1]

In the meantime, some states and cities followed the lead of the national government. New York, where the first reform association was formed, adopted, in 1883, a statute resembling that of the nation; Massachusetts, prolific of reform literature, followed in 1884; then, after an interval, the system received some degree of recognition from Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana in 1895, from Louisiana in 1896, and from Connecticut in 1897. Various cities forestalled the action of their state legislature — as Philadelphia in 1885 and Denver in 1896; while in many other places the efforts, though unsuccessful as yet, have been persistent.^[2]

The two most notable exceptions to the national classification at present are the fourth-class postmasters and the consular service. For fifteen years efforts have been continuous to apply the merit system to the first of these. March 3, 1890, Henry Cabot Lodge, then a member of the House of Representatives, introduced a bill to bring about this result; this was followed by one prepared by Sherman Hoar of Massachusetts; and the question was presented to Congress by President Cleveland in his message of December 7, 1896. No action has yet been taken, however, except that some minor post-offices have been consolidated with larger ones, and thereby brought within the civil service rules.^[3]

The effort to provide for a trained consulate, as has been shown, dates farther back than the movement for competitive examinations. The small force of thirteen consular clerks has been long in existence, but has had no perceptible influence on the service. Nearly every Congress for fifteen years has had before it some measure intended to provide for a comprehensive reorganization; and in this movement, as in that to take the fourth-class postmasters out of politics, Senator Lodge has taken the lead. Unlike the interest in the latter agitation, however, that in the consular service has grown in the last few years, owing to our increased foreign trade and imperialistic proclivities. In 1900 the Cleveland chamber of commerce drew up a particularly good bill, which was presented to the House by Mr. Burton of that city. Action having been earnestly recommended by President Roosevelt, the matter was much debated in the first session of the fifty-seventh Congress; and, although nothing was decided, it may be said, in the congressional phraseology, to have been “ passed over without prejudice.”^[4]

Meantime something had been done by the executive. President Cleveland issued rules classifying candidates, and providing for examinations, promotions, and the reinstatement of former consuls in preference to new appointments. In March, 1896, it was reported that since September 20, 1895, four had been promoted, four reinstated, four had passed examinations,^[5] and four had been rejected. President McKinley announced that this system would be continued. In July, 1899, it was stated that, of 112 candidates examined, 111 passed; but who can say whether this indicates that the original selections were particularly excellent, or that the examinations had been devitalized?

Besides the attempts to extend the civil service rules, there have been efforts to make them more effective. July 8, 1886, the Civil Service Commission gave its opinion that, according to the laws and regulations governing the service, removals could legally be made for any reason except refusal to make political contributions, to do party service, or to submit to political dictation; but that as the reason for removal need not be stated, they could practically be made for any reason whatever. Now, in the beginning, the reformers were generally supporters of the prerogatives of the executive, and were disinclined to hamper the president's use of the removing power.^[6] It was argued that if political appointments were impossible, there could no longer be any temptation to remove men without cause; and this view seemed justified to a great extent, when it was seen that in Cleveland's first administration the removals from the classified service amounted to only six and one-half per cent. Yet in the course of time, sentiment has grown to favor some regulation of the president's prerogative. Legislation has not yet been effective,^[7] but the difficulty has been in great measure relieved by the above-mentioned order of President McKinley, requiring written charges to be filed, and giving the officer the right to answer. The executive itself has provided a definite rule for its own conduct.

Many suggestions for minor improvements have been made from time to time. The proceedings of the National League are filled with them; and every session of Congress sees bills introduced to prevent drunkenness, to prevent congressmen from making recommendations, to regulate applications for office in the unclassified service,^[8] and for similar purposes, all indicating a healthy interest in the subject.

For thirty years the system of appointment by competitive examination has been on trial in America, and for twenty years it has been recognized by Congress and operated by an executive on the whole favorable. It is time, then, to form some idea of its success, and to say something definite as to the changes it has wrought. In making such an estimate, it should be borne in mind that the advocates of the system had two objects in view: while they differed from previous reformers in earnestly desiring to improve the service, — making that, in fact, their first object, — they were as anxious as their predecessors of 1836 to purify political conditions, and believed that the competitive system was admirably fitted to that end also.

Of the effect of the system on the service, details and statistics may be found in abundance in the Civil Service Commission reports, of which the fifteenth is particularly valuable, as it contains a general summary of results. In this summary it is estimated that two million dollars a year is saved in the collection of the customs by the merit system, and that the saving through the whole service is ten per cent of the salaries. Such definite statements, however, lack a firm basis. Efficiency cannot be reckoned in figures; and it is certainly improper to attribute to competitive examinations or to the Civil Service Commission all the improvements made since 1883. It is altogether likely that, under any circumstances, the service would have improved in the last twenty years. Much more convincing, therefore, than statistical expositions of benefits is the general testimony of the most trusted executive officers as to the change for the better; and the more efficient work that these men have been able to do, because relieved in large measure of importunities for office, must be counted among the most important of the gains.

There are other facts which statistics do not show. One is that, under the new conditions, an entirely different class of men is attracted into the service. Under the old lack of system, any position might lead anywhere, and that quickly; removal was constantly impending; government service was speculative, and because of the opportunities it afforded attracted clever, sometimes brilliant, men. Now it offers, in the main, the advantage of steady, light employment, at a moderate remuneration and attracts the steady-going and unimaginative. Government service, moreover, in this country, is not held to be a badge of honor, as it is in Germany and France, and, to a degree, in England; it will never form the basis of a bourgeois aristocracy, and hence will attract of the steady-going only those who have no better financial opportunities. The question as to which of these two classes it is most desirable to secure is one of time and circumstances. During the middle of the century, when the American rotated in other professions, it was natural that he should rotate in office, and rotation and the spoils system probably secured, in most parts of the country, a better corps of civil servants than the present system would have done. To-day our general mode of life is more stable, and it is therefore natural that the government service should become more so; the class that is willing to settle down permanently to the prospect of a small but steady income, and a respectable but not distinguished station, is increasing. It must be acknowledged, however, that as yet the ordinary positions of the civil service — those offering no special inducements for research or travel — do not tempt as able young men as business opportunities of equal grade. It seems, also, that the examinations are so managed, doubtless partly in deference to public sentiment, that men of higher education are not encouraged to enter. In 1891, 62⁹⁄₁₀ per cent of those who took the examinations on the basis of a common-school education passed, 77³⁄₁₀ per cent f those who had been through high school, and only 67¹⁄₁₀ per cent of the college men.^[9] Of course many of the college men took more difficult technical examinations, yet the figures seem to indicate that many of the college-bred men who applied were of inferior capacity. Certainly an infusion of college men would benefit the service.

Until men of more ability are attracted by the examinations that give entrance to the civil service, the system of mechanical promotion cannot be extended up through the service to positions requiring executive power and independent judgment; though if such positions were included within the system, that fact of itself would of course afford an inducement to enter the lower grades which does not now exist. We may well doubt, however, whether, while business continues to hold out such opportunities as at present, the permanent civil service will be able to draw in many men fitted for the highest posts.^[10]

When we turn to the political results of the competitive selection of candidates, it is necessary to keep in mind the causa eundi of the spoils system — the fact that it came into being to supply a means of supporting political organization, that its essence lies in making the offices the campaign fund of the different parties. The first point to be considered is whether it has taken the offices out of this category — whether promises of office count less in party warfare, and whether officers are less active party workers, than previously. The mere fact that appointment to so many offices has been taken from the discretion of the executive means that so many the fewer friends can be rewarded. The successive reports of the Civil Service Commission show that, although every campaign brings to light new methods of circumventing the law, assessments are really becoming much less common;^[11] and also that other forms of political activity diminish, in spite of an evident itching on the part of public officers to take the lead in party management. It is noticed, however, that as the number of places disposable has become smaller, the pressure for them has increased; that the desire for this particular method of payment for political service has not diminished as rapidly as civil service reform has advanced; and the tremendous stress brought upon the McKinley administration indicates that civil service reform will not find its further advancement along a pleasant path.

Whether a further withdrawal of the offices from politics will prove to be possible, depends upon circumstances. Practically we may omit the supposition that a modern democracy could exist without parties; it may be possible, but it is a condition which lies far in the future. Under existing conditions the possibility of a complete civil service reform, as generally understood, depends upon whether our parties can be convinced that they can exist without their present elaborate organizations, or can maintain these organizations without the cohesive power of the public offices.^[12] If the organizations are maintained, reform is impossible, unless a substitute is found for the spoils system. If the substitute be money, the change is a bad one; if it be argument and the devotion of earnest men, it is good; if it be the drawing of rich men into politics and an approximation of the English aristocratic system, there may be two opinions as to its value; or there might be a simplification of political machinery, as by the introduction of primary elections. All these tendencies are observable, and civil service reform is to be studied in connection with them and with all other political reform movements. Eternal vigilance, and not merely the mechanical selection of public officers, is the price of liberty.

A troublesome minor question in this connection is how far the servants of the state may be allowed to indulge in politics. As has been pointed out, and as every man in middle life knows, the activity of office-holders is much less than it once was; but what are the proper limits? Present public sentiment in America would not countenance any effort to gag the civil service; and we certainly do not wish the public employees to constitute a separate political body as they come very near doing in Australia. Some reformers have of late been taking very advanced ground; Postmaster-general Heath has been criticised for allowing participation in caucuses and conventions,^[13] and Commissioner Foulke for his circular of 1902, which argued that it was not a violation of the spirit of the law for members of the cabinet to take part in a political campaign.

Such extreme criticisms injure a good cause. The ideal condition, doubtless, is that all citizens should participate alike in politics; but it is also true that, in order to discourage officials from taking that undue interest in politics to which they have been accustomed in times past, special repression will be long necessary. It should, however, be recognized that the influence which a collector of customs exerts over his subordinates and that by which a manufacturer controls his employees, are closely akin. Here again it is a broad, general problem that is to be solved.

One interesting result of the law of 1883 has been the more equal sharing of positions between the different states and parties. As a result of the long Republican dominance, the Southern states had a comparatively small number of citizens in the departments at Washington, and an undue proportion of these consisted of negroes, because of the political proclivities of the latter. At present there are no glaring inequalities; and white Democrats from the South are more numerous, while the negroes from the North have increased.^[14] Thus a result always aimed at, and especially desirable in a federal republic, has been brought about. It is a very valuble thing to have at the capital a large number of representatives of the different sections; it creates a national atmosphere, and probably exerts an unconscious influence of a most beneficial character on Congress. The reflex influence on the states is, of course, not so great as in the days of rotation. Then the great numbers of men with four years of Washington experience and fresh from contact with their fellow-citizens from far away, who scattered broadcast over the land, must have carried with them much information that was useful to their friends, and that probably strengthened the bonds of union, which in those days so much needed strengthening. With our present facilities of travel, and our strong national spirit, this function may well be dispensed with; but it can never cease to be important to have at Washington a population drawn in proper proportion from all the states, centring there ties of family interest, and prepared to furnish knowledge of local conditions.

Having examined the advantages and disadvantages of the existing civil service system, we must briefly consider its elements of stability, and first the points of attack, internal and external. It is not the purpose of this study to detail minutely the workings of the system, — the reports of the Civil Service Commission are too candid and too easily available to make that necessary, — but certain plausible methods of evading restrictions must be mentioned. One of the most dangerous is reinstatement. It seems just that, if a man be dismissed without just cause or because of a reduction in force, he should be readmitted without having to run the gantlet as a novice. When, however, one recalls the conditions in the forties and fifties, it becomes obvious that, if this practice were freely allowed, rotation would be again introduced, each party turning out its opponents and reinstating the martyrs of its own faith. There would be two sets of men, one in office, and the other working to obtain it by a party success. The civil service rules formerly allowed reinstatement within one year of dismissal, but not thereafter. President Harrison, as has been shown, provided that veterans might be taken back without regard to time. President McKinley, in his order of April 26, 1899, extended this provision to all officers in the classified service, with the restriction that those separated from the government for more than twelve months should take a pass-examination. The Civil Service Commission, in its seventeenth report, earnestly recommends that the former rule be reëstablished.^[15]

Transfers form another vexing problem. Constant attempts are made to obtain permission for men to be transferred from the unclassified service to positions included under the rules. The commission has recently recommended stricter regulations,^[16] and has thus far been able to prevent any serious encroachments. Another method of evasion is illustrated by the abolition of the office of superintendent of the binding division, carrying a salary of nineteen hundred dollars, and the establishment of a chief of the division at the same salary. A new man was of course appointed.^[17] Thus far the enforcement of the law has been practically always in the hands of friends. If it fell into those of its enemies, it could probably be much relaxed without any great surface changes; in fact, the conditions in some of our states and cities show that the working of the law depends almost entirely upon the animus of the controlling political forces.

A well-known American statesman once said, — of course in private, apropos of a pension bill, that the fact was that the grand army of the republic saved the country, and now it wanted it. It has been shown, from time to time, that military service has been thought to entitle a man to civil office. This sentiment was naturally strengthened by the Civil War; Lincoln felt it, and in 1865 it was provided by law that soldiers discharged “by reason of disability resulting from wounds or sickness incurred in the line of duty” should “be preferred for appointments to civil offices, provided they are found to possess the business capacity necessary.” In 1876 they were given preference when reductions in force were to be made.^[18] There is a certain justice in such provisions, and civil service reformers have been somewhat chary of opposing them; but since 1883 there has been a constant effort to extend their scope, and an equally steady effort to prevent this extension. The division has tended to lie between those favorable and those unfavorable to civil service reform.

Congress has been flooded with bills to make the road to office easy for the soldier: in one session four such bills were presented to the Senate and thirteen to the House. Reports have been called for, chiefly by the Senate, to show how far the preference already provided for is observed. Bills have passed the Senate to extend the preference to all soldiers honorably discharged; bills have been introduced to extend it to Confederates.^[19] Just when such measures were becoming less dangerous because of the age of the veterans of the great conflict, the Spanish War brought new candidates for recognition, and renewed interest in war and warriors, and since then new floods of measures have been presented. President McKinley, without waiting for legislation, properly extended to our new veterans the privileges of the old; but preference is still restricted to the wounded and sick, and in the classified service of course applies only to those who receive a pass mark.^[20] The inclusion of all those honorably discharged would be most unwise, at a time when three hundred thousand young veterans have just come into existence; but the agitation will undoubtedly continue while there are men in Congress whose sympathy for the soldier, and appreciation of the soldier vote, is stronger than their desire for civil service reform.^[21] In the past the South has on obvious grounds consistently opposed such legislation; but her position can no longer be predicted, as she now has Spanish War veterans of her own who might profit by the privileges to be granted. The problem is thus an open one.

Not all the dangers of the present system are internal: from the very first direct attack has not been lacking. The session of Congress next after the passage of the law of 1883 saw two bills to repeal it, and three or four such bills have been introduced in every succeeding Congress. These bills for repeal are seldom debated, being reported adversely by the civil service reform committee of the House, or the civil service and retrenchment committee of the Senate; but every Congress witnesses a debate over the appropriation for the expenses of the commission. It was the intention of the framers of the law that these expenses should be made a permanent charge; but precedent was lacking for such a course, and thus the entire system is in constant danger of being impaired, if not destroyed, by a hostile vote. Nevertheless, supplies have not failed, and have grown increasingly liberal.

The debates on these appropriations are not usually very edifying. Epithets are freely hurled: the Civil Service Commission has been called a “Republican, Pecksniffian, political machine”; the reformers, “eunuchs and sissiri of American politics, canting prelates and Pharisees”; while the system has been described as “conceived in iniquity and born of hypocrisy . . ., administered infamously, and sustained by cowardice and demagogy.” Mr. Eaton was attacked because in a bill of expenses were included thirty cents for lemonade and a dollar for supper, gin, and ale; another commissioner for expending forty cents for “porter,” but apprehension was relieved when it proved to be a Pullman car porter. By saner critics the system is said to disregard a man's moral character, or to allow no chance to size a man up.^[22]

Mr. Bailey of Texas touched a politically weak point when he said, “If the civil service law continues on the statute books of the United States for twenty years it will be followed by a civil pension list, and that itself is objection enough to the system.” General Grosvenor also, prompt to see the unpopularity of civil pensions, has insisted that under present conditions humanity demands them. This, indeed, seems to be one of the rocks threatening the progress of the movement. Now, as before 1830, the tendency is for clerks to remain in office to extreme old age; and the question arises as to how long they can be retained without detriment to the service, and whether it is just to dismiss them without providing for their last days. Of late this problem has been attracting much attention. Bills have been introduced fixing an age limit for retirement, providing for insurance systems, for civil pensions, and for the payment of a lump sum on retirement. Secretary Gage formulated a plan for an “honor roll,” in which the names of clerks who had passed seventy were to be included; they were to be retained in the service, but their salaries were to be reduced to a nine-hundred-dollar basis. The scheme was not popular and has never been put completely into operation. Among the clerks themselves there have been attempts to form insurance arrangements;^[23] but as yet none of these schemes have seemed to offer inducements superior to those of the regular companies.

It may seem inconsistent that a government so profuse with its military pensions should not grant them to the civil service. It is probably true, moreover, that in the long run a civil service pension system properly related to salaries would not cost the government one cent; for, when pensions are not given, pay must be high enough to allow of individual saving. Still, it cannot be denied that such a provision would be unpopular, and would indeed denote a change in the spirit of American institutions, which have been so strongly individualistic and so insistent that each man should take care of himself.^[24] On the other hand, American individualism is being modified; and if many private corporations follow the example of the Pennsylvania Railroad, of Harvard University, and of other employers, the idea of pensions for the servants of the government will become less strange, and therefore less unpopular.

Many attempts, more or less avowed, have been made to cripple the merit system before destroying it; for instance, bills have been introduced to allow the appointing officers to choose any applicant who has passed the examination, “to improve the civil service by affording advancement to those in the classified service who have been denied advancement through circumstances beyond their control,” to suspend the law during the first year of every presidential term. Perhaps the most notable effort of this kind was that to place the employees of the bureau of the twelfth census, who had been appointed on pass-examinations, within the pale of the classified service. Senator Lodge pointed out that this would carry over, and place ahead of the highest eligibles, a thousand or twelve hundred names. An amendment was of course offered, giving a preference to those of them who had been soldiers in any of our wars, or who were the widows of soldiers. After a long debate it was arranged by a conference committee that the employees of the bureau should be admitted to the classified service, but should be eligible only to appointment in the new permanent census bureau; the preference for soldiers was retained.^[25]

It is not to be supposed that the assailants of the present system are without a programme of their own. For a long time they seemed to be so, but of late a clearer idea may be obtained of what they desire beyond a return to the old lack of system. One idea that crops out continually is that of the New York constitution of 1820 — to extend the elective system to the minor offices. This is generally urged in regard to postmasters; but one bill has also been introduced providing that the various states and territories elect definite quotas and send them to Washington to work in the departments. More representative, however, is the plan which General Grosvenor of Ohio, who has made himself the leader in attacks on the merit system, set forth in an elaborate speech printed in the appendix to the Congressional Record for the first session of the fifty-fifth Congress. This is a careful and deliberate assault on existing methods, supplemented by suggestions as to what he thinks would prove better. He would divide the service into three classes, — the executive, advising, and administrative class, the executing or clerical class, and the workman class. He would have a limited term and a strict pass-examination, would have each appointee recommended by his representative as a friend of the government, and would have congressional districts equally represented. He considers that congressmen shirk their duties at present. In other words, he would turn the appointing power over to legislators. At bottom, the present attack on the merit system is, in large part, a reappearance of the old jealousy of the executive so many times illustrated in the history of the patronage.^[26]

What has enabled civil service reform to progress, unpopular as it has been because of its foreign origin, and interfering, as it has done, with our established political institutions? Why have not the congressmen, who have been deprived of the means of sustaining their political machines, and more than half of whom are probably hostile to the system, risen in successful revolt? These questions seem more difficult of answer if we consider the character of its advocates. In list after list of the members of civil service reform associations, not a name can be found that does not suggest to one acquainted with the nomenclature of the various localities, education, wealth, or social position; the very list of such societies existing in 1892 shows that centres of learning and wealth, and not of population, are represented. Addresses are occasionally made to workmen, pointing out the value of the reform to them; but the platforms of labor parties do not testify to their interest in it. In the main, it has been an agitation carried on by a comparatively small, educated class.

One great source of success has been the non-partisan character of the movement, at the same time that it has not been unpartisan. The bill was introduced by a Democratic senator, and passed by a Republican Congress; its supporters have come from both parties, and in the commission both parties have been represented by stalwart supporters, by men like Theodore Roosevelt and Governor Thompson of South Carolina, whose honest partisanship could not be mistrusted. This fortunate condition was seriously threatened when, in 1896 and 1900, the national platform of the Democratic party condemned the movement. Many advocates of reform were still in the Democratic ranks however, and the platform of 1904 once more pledged the party to the support of the reform measures undertaken by the government, and has thus prevented them from becoming an issue between the parties. As a result of this appeal to both parties, the progress of reform has received no serious check through the mutations of party fortunes. It has had constantly that support from the several presidents and from most of the heads of departments, which is a necessary condition of its success. This has given an unusual opportunity to test its value and demonstrate its merits to the public.

Another element of strength has been the publicity and candor which has characterized the movement from its initiation. The reformers have proceeded straightforwardly in the belief that, if the people saw what the system they proposed was, and how it worked, they would support it. By that truly democratic method they have taken the sting out of the gibes directed at the system as aristocratic, and have demonstrated that what the people can see and touch and find good they will have.

Not, however, to the members of civil service reform associations can we attribute the whole or the greater influence in bringing about the result, any more than we can attribute to the abolitionists the abolition of slavery. The civil service will ever assimilate itself to surrounding conditions. Before 1828 it tended to be staid and aristocratic. At that date tendencies which had long been gaining strength obtained the mastery; and the civil service shared in the blatant democracy, the dazzling confidence in results to be obtained, the lofty carelessness as to the methods of obtaining them, and all the other characteristics of the ruling class in the United States between 1830 and 1870. Since that time there has been a growing civic consciousness, an appreciation of the serious duties of citizenship, which has furnished the energy to start numerous reforms on the road to ultimate adoption. Most significant, however, are the two facts that the balance of power has for some time been held by the business class, and that business methods have, since the crisis of 1873, become more careful and systematic. To call competitive examinations businesslike in 1850 would have been absurd; yet that has been constantly and increasingly the most effective argument in favor of the system. As long as the controlling element in the country manage their private affairs in a careful, systematic manner, we may expect the government to conduct its business on approximately the same principles.

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1. Congressional Record, 57 Cong, 1 sess. 1833.
2. United States Civil Service Commission, 15th Report (1897-1898), 492.
3. Congressional Record, 51 Cong. 1 sess. House Bill No. 7707; Cambridge Civil Service Reform Association, Report, 1891-1892; Richardson, Messages, ix. 740; Good Government, January 15, 1896.
4. Congressional Record, 57 Cong. 1 sess. 75, 249, 415, 1991, 2496.
5. Richardson, Messages, ix. 722; Good Government, March 15, 1896; March 15, 1899; July 15, 1899.
6. Civil Service Reformer, April, 1886; Cary, Curtis, 199-203.
7. Good Government, April 15, 1895; Civil Service Reformer, January, 1887; Congressional Record, 50 Cong. 1 sess. House Bill No. 1628.
8. Massachusetts Reform Club, Report, 1895; and Congressional Record Index, Civil Service.
9. Good Government, November 15, 1892; Civil Service Reformer, February, 1891.
10. H. T. Newcomb, Forum, xx. 120-128; Benjamin Kidd, Nineteenth Century, xx. 491-502; F. A. Vanderlip, Scribner's Magazine, xxxiii. 404.
11. An act of June 30, 1868, forbade any officer of the government to pay money for political purposes to a workman in the navy yards. A law of August 15, 1876, forbade any officer or employee of the United States, not appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, to give to, or receive from, any other such officer or employee any money for political purposes. In 1886 the commission recommended that every one be forbidden to solicit such contributions.
12. Gamaliel Bradford discusses this question in an interesting article on “The Progress of Civil Service Reform” in the International Review for September, 1882.
13. Massachusetts Reform Club, Report, 1898, p. 11.
14. United States Civil Service Commission, 17th Report, 1899-1900, pp. 405-465; T. Roosevelt, Atlantic Monthly, lxvii. 252-257; Civil Service Record, April, 1891.
15. House Miscellaneous Documents, 52 Cong. 2 sess. i. No. 93; Congressional Record, 55 Cong. 1 sess. 721, 747, 793.
16. 17th Report, 16; Congressional Record, 54 Cong. 1 sess. Senate Bill No. 2563.
17. Good Government, September 15, 1894.
18. Senate Reports, 38 Cong. 2 sess. i. No. 122; Revised Statutes, § 1754; Statutes at Large, xix. 143.
19. Senate Reports, 47 Cong. 1 sess. iv. No. 780; House Reports, 52 Cong. 1 sess. vii. No. 1925; Congressional Record, 50 Cong. 1 sess. Senate Bill 2443; 51 Cong. 1 sess.; 55 Cong. 2 sess. 718, 4275; 56 Cong, 1 sess. 5612.
20. United States Civil Service Commission, 15th Report (1897-1898), 34; Civil Service Record, November, 1885.
21. The same movement has been going on in the states, notably in Massachusetts. See Civil Service Record, July, 1887, March, 1888, February, 1889; Good Government, December 15, 1895; May 15, 1896; New York Civil Service Reform Association, Reports, 1886, 1887.
22. Good Government, June 15, 1894; Massachusetts Reform Club, Report, 1893; Civil Service Reformer, August, 1885, June, 1890; Congressional Record, 55 Cong. 3 sess. 459.
23. National Civil Service Reform League, Proceedings, 1895, pp. 76-80; G. B. Raum, in North American Review, cxxxvi. 492-493; F. A. Vanderlip, in Scribner's Magazine, xxxiii. 403; Civil Service Record, June, 1891.
24. The argument that a pension system would reduce the number of removals has ceased to be of significance, owing to the recent orders forbidding removal except on written charges. Australian experience would seem to prove that the system would not be efficacious for this object under any circumstances.
25. Congressional Record, 50 Cong. 2 sess. Senate Bill No. 3927; 52 Cong. 2 sess. House Bill No. 1024; 54 Cong. 1 sess. 445; 57 Cong. 1 sess. 1770, 1839, 2395.
26. Congressional Record, 47 Cong. 1 sess. 5707; 49 Cong. 2 sess. House Bill No. 10,209; 53 Cong. 1 sess. House Bill No. 246, and Appendix, 419-445; Good Government, April 15, 1893; Interview with Senator Wellington, Boston Herald, August 1, 1902.