The Development of Navies During the Last Half-Century/Chapter 5
CHAPTER V
BARBETTE SYSTEM COMBINED WITH BROADSIDE
Battle of Lissa—Lessons to be derived from this Action—Introduction of the Barbette System of Mounting Guns—First applied in the 'Temeraire'—The ’Admiral' Class—Increase in Dimensions of Battle Ships to 14,000 tons—New Vessels, ’Royal Sovereign,’ 'Empress of India,' 'Ramillies,' ’Repulse,' ’Resolution,' and 'Royal Oak’—Disadvantages of Monster Ships.
Having thus detailed the changes by which the stately three-decker of 1850 was transformed into the massive ironclad structure of twenty years later, it is desirable here to give an account of the first action between two fleets containing this new type of battle ship. In the short but decisive war between the combined forces of Prussia and Italy against Austria, in 1866, the issue could not depend upon any naval operations that might be undertaken, and the decisive victory of Sadowa overshadowed to a great extent the sea fight off Lissa and the many lessons to be derived from it. Even in naval circles there was not that keen scrutiny into cause and effect which might have been anticipated when constructions based largely upon theoretical considerations had thus been brought to the test of actual conflict. Yet no naval incident of such importance had occurred since the battle of Trafalgar. The American Civil War had been signalised by gallant encounters between single ships, and interesting as well as instructive assaults upon land defences. The Crimean War had shown that even when denied the opportunity of meeting an enemy at sea a powerful navy can enable operations on land to be undertaken and sustained which otherwise were impracticable. But since 1805 no hostile fleets had met, and when we consider the nature of the naval forces engaged at Lissa, the strategy displayed, and the tactics adopted, this action is worthy of the closest attention. I shall deal very briefly with the composition of the forces engaged. Nearly all nations had followed the example of France and this country in reconstituting their fleets, so that in 1866 Italy was able to muster twelve ironclads, varying in size from 5800 tons to 2000 tons. According to dimensions, they were protected with 5½, 4½, or 4-in. iron plates. The armament was in most cases a combination of rifled and smooth bore ordnance, mounted on the broadside system. Besides these ironclads there were several wooden frigates and smaller vessels. In command was Admiral Persano, a man who had seen much service, though without war experience.
The Austrian fleet was less powerful in ironclads, of which there were only seven, varying from 5200 tons to 3000 tons. Their armour ranged from 4½ to 5-in. plates. The guns of this squadron were decidedly inferior to their opponents, consisting for the most part of smooth bore 48-pounders, though five of the iron-clads had rifled ordnance in addition. Besides these there was a wooden screw line-of-battle ship, the 'Kaiser,' with several other wooden frigates and smaller vessels. In command was Admiral Tegethoff, an officer of distinction, who had commanded an Austrian Squadron in the Danish War of 1864, and taken part in an action off Heligoland, between two small squadrons, which was without decisive result.
The following is a list of the vessels that were to meet in the Adriatic:—
| Italian. | Austrian. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Ships. | Tonnage. | Ships. | Tonnage. |
| Armoured. | Armoured. | ||
| 'Ré d'ltalia,' | 5800 | 'Ferdinand Max,' | 5200 |
| 'Ré di Portogallo,' | 5600 | 'Hapsburg,' | 5200 |
| 'Maria Pia,' | 4300 | 'Don Juan d'Austria,' | 3600 |
| 'Castelfidardo,' | 4300 | 'Kaiser Max,' | 3600 |
| 'Ancona,' | 4200 | 'Prinz Eugen,' | 3600 |
| 'San Martino,' | 4200 | 'Drache,' | 3000 |
| 'Affondatore,' | 4000 | 'Salamander,' | 3000 |
| 'Carignano,' | 4000 | ||
| 'Formidabile,' | 2800 | ||
| 'Terribile,' | 2800 | Unarmoured | |
| 'Varese,' | 2000 | 'Kaiser,' | 5000 |
| 'Palestro,' . . . 12 | 2000 | ||
| 18 Frigates and smaller Vessels. | |||
| Unarmoured. | |||
| 22 Frigates and smaller Vessels. | |||
When hostilities commenced, Tegethoff made a demonstration on the Italian coast, but was unable to meet any portion of the Italian fleet, and returned to Fasano. This appears to have caused considerable excitement in Italy. The navy recently created was held in great esteem, and known to be, both in the number and equipment of its vessels, superior to that of the enemy. It was doubted whether an Austrian Squadron would venture to encounter it at sea under such disadvantages. This only can account, to my mind, for the course taken. Persano was urged to some striking feat of arms, and the attack on Lissa was organised. What can be thought of such strategy? No indication had been given that he had such a command of the sea as to permit him to take no account of the enemy's squadron. Proof had been afforded that the Austrian commander was a man who would be troublesome if not disposed of. His force must be sought out and fought, or blockaded. Persano's first duty was to follow the Austrian fleet. Such was his numerical superiority that he might have detailed a portion of his force for this duty while the remainder carried out some other operation. But he disregarded all the experience which has shown that naval supremacy must first be obtained before territorial attack is justifiable, and he embarked upon an undertaking which only added one more lesson to the many history affords on this head.
Persano left Ancona, on the 16th of July 1866, with nearly thirty vessels, of which eleven were ironclads, and steered for the small island of Lissa on the Austrian coast. The principal port was San Giorgio, where fairly strong batteries skilfully handled might be expected to give hostile ships a warm reception. A short distance off was another harbour, Carobert, and on the other side of the island were the bay and town of Comissa. Neither of these places had any defences to speak of The plan of Admiral Persano was to attack the batteries of San Giorgio, and when these had been silenced to land a body of troops sufficient to overcome the garrison and occupy the island. An alternative plan would have been to land his own force at any convenient place, under cover of his ships, and take San Giorgio in rear—as we had done at Bomarsund—keeping his squadron ready and uninjured to meet the enemy at sea. But he started without his troops, which were to follow the next day, convoyed by an ironclad and three wooden vessels—another error, as they were thus liable to be cut off by an Austrian Squadron before reaching their destination. Arriving at San Giorgio, on the morning of the 18th, the ships shortly after opened a heavy fire on the batteries, which was returned, and the action continued throughout that day. Night brought about a cessation of the cannonade, but the land defence was not overcome. The next day the troops arrived to the number of about 2000, and preparations to land were then made. The disembarkation was to be at Cambert. Two ironclads were sent to make a diversion at Comissa, four others were to endeavour to enter the harbour of San Giorgio while the remaining ships covered the landing. This was on the 19th. But the naval attack on San Giorgio did not succeed, and the detachment detailed for it withdrew, having sustained considerable injury and loss. The disembarkation was postponed for that day.In the meantime where was Tegethofif? He had heard of the intended attack on Lissa while at Fasano, but distrusted its reality until, on the 19th, he received news which cleared away his doubt on the matter. He therefore sailed with his whole squadron that afternoon, bent on attacking the enemy and frustrating his purpose. Whether Persano heard that night of his departure I do not know, but on the morning of the 20th he prepared to renew the attack and land his troops, as if deeming no interference possible. At eight A.M., however, one of his look-out vessels signalled 'suspicious fleet in sight' And what a condition he was in to meet even a less powerful squadron than his own. He had materially contributed to put the two fleets on an equality. One of his ironclads had been so knocked about the day before that she was practically useless, two others were out of reach, making a diversion elsewhere, and his unarmoured vessels were encumbered with the landing appliances, and unable to cope effectively with the Austrian vessels of the same nature. Persano hastily collected his uninjured ironclads and advanced to meet Tegethoff, whose squadron was now plainly visible. The fighting formation he adopted was single line ahead, so that his squadron presented a long line extending over 2 miles. The Austrian squadron bore down in three divisions, each forming an obtuse angle and composed of seven ships. The divisions were about 1000 yards astern of each other, Tegethoff led in the ’Ferdinand Max.' This formation was more compact than the single line, but one difficult to maintain when the opposing forces came in contact. To bring this about, however, was the first aim of the leader, and after that the result must mainly depend on his subordinates. At about half-past ten Persano, who was in the 'Ré d'Italia,' stopped her and went on board the 'Affondatore.' To do this at such a moment indicates a sudden decision not made known to his followers. The 'Ré d'Italia' was fourth ship in the line, consequently those in rear had to reduce speed, thus increasing the distance between them and the three leading ships. Tegethoff's order to his squadron was to rush at and sink the enemy. He was then bearing down on the port bow of the Italian line. When about 1000 yards distant the leading vessels of the Italian Squadron opened fire, which was not returned until Tegethoffs leading division had arrived within about 300 yards; but little damage was done on either side. Whether smoke now obscured both squadrons or an alteration of course was inadvisable at the last moment is uncertain, but it happened that the whole of the Austrian vessels passed through the gap between the third and fourth ships of the Italian line without contact. The fight now became a mêlée. The Austrian division of wooden ships bore down to attack the Italian unarmoured vessels that had remained behind, but was intercepted and engaged by the rear Italian ironclads. The 'Kaiser' was attacked by the 'Affondatore,' who tried to ram, but failed. Then another ironclad, the 'Portogallo,' made for the 'Kaiser,' whose captain, to cover his smaller wooden consorts, decided to ram the newcomer. He succeeded in striking her on the port side, sustaining severe injury to his own ship without greatly damaging the 'Portogallo.' Being now almost disabled, the 'Kaiser,' followed by most of the Austrian wooden ships, made for San Giorgio. Though all had suffered more or less severely, they had held their own against a portion of the Italian ironclads, leaving the remainder to be dealt with by their own.
Tegethoff had meanwhile attacked the Italian centre, and a hot engagement ensued. The 'Ré d'ltalia' had her rudder damaged, and being observed by Tegethoff in this condition, he directed the 'Ferdinand Max' to be steered at her. The 'Ré d'ltalia' endeavoured to avoid the assault, but did an unwise thing by first going ahead and then astern. She thus had little movement at the instant the 'Ferdinand Max' struck her on the port side at full speed. The shock was tremendous on board the 'Max,' but by going astern with the engines she extricated her stem from the hole made in the ill-fated 'Ré d'ltalia.' That vessel had heeled over to the blow, then rolled to port, and almost immediately sank, taking down most of her crew. Another Italian iron-clad, the 'Palestro,' had been set on fire by a shell, and blew up afterwards. Several single fights had taken place between other ships, but without decisive results One is struck by the opportunities for ramming this action afforded, the many instances in which it was attempted, and the number of failures to strike that took place. The battle was practically over soon after noon. The Italian Squadron withdrew, and Tegethoff went into San Giorgio, which he had thus saved. The number of killed and wounded in his ships was about 200, while the Italians lost over 700 men, principally by the sinking of the 'Ré d'Italia.' Besides this vessel they had lost another ironclad, the 'Palestro,' while the Austrian Squadron was intact The 'Kaiser' was most injured, but forty-eight hours sufficed to put her in a sea-worthy condition. Whatever errors he may have committed previously, when once the action began, Persano fought gallantly. His ship, the 'Affondatore,' was in the thickest of the fight, though he failed to ram any of his opponents. Even when his squadron was much scattered, Persano signalled to attack again, and made for the Austrian vessels. But his ships were in some cases too distant to join in time, the opportunity passed away, and the attack was not made. Though his force was reduced by two ironclads, he was still superior in numbers. The preceding attack on Lissa, coupled with this action at sea, had so told on the crews that the Italian commander molested his adversary no further. Tegethoff having gained his object was not likely to assume the offensive.
On the Austrian side only the wooden vessels suffered to any considerable extent from the enormous quantity of shell and shot discharged during that day. This was due to inaccuracy, in the first place, and, secondly, to the protection of 4½-in. iron plating. The Italian fire was exceedingly wild; broadsides at close quarters missed their object, and I have heard it stated that often guns were fired without projectiles. This showed a most inefficient control of the fire on the part of the officers, and it is a matter which should receive the greatest attention in all navies. Much is written about the fire discipline of armies in the field, but no less important is this supervision in a naval action.
One thing is wanting to complete the valuable experience gained on that day and make it applicable to the present time. No locomotive torpedoes were used, this arm as a naval weapon not having been then introduced. Whether, after the line was broken and the ships were all mixed up together, it would not have been as dangerous to friend as to foe may well be questioned; but small vessels specially armed in this way would have had good opportunities of gliding in under cover of the smoke and dealing deadly blows to partially disabled ships. Time was everything to Tegethoff, and hence it is difficult to say what effect torpedoes would have had upon his tactics. We can only deal with matters as they were; and we have sufficient material for reflection both in the strategy preceding the action and the manner in which two modern fleets first met in war.
While we were thus developing side by side the broadside and turret systems of mounting guns behind armour our neighbours the French had proceeded on somewhat different lines. At first, like ourselves, they had adopted the broadside system, and then the central battery, but with the latter and above it they usually placed a few guns en barbette on each side. This principle was continued as guns increased in weight until the combination became impossible. Then, rejecting the turret except for coast defence vessels, they mounted all the heavy guns en barbette. Even now considerable difference of opinion exists as to the relative advantages of the two systems, as may be observed from the fact that one of the new 14,000-ton battle ships we are building is a turret vessel. This is one of the problems that only such a practical test as war can solve. The barbette system consists of a thick inclined wall of armour, usually pear-shaped, built into the ship, enclosing a turntable, which carries the gun, and is high enough to permit the latter to fire freely over the wall in any direction as the turntable revolves. Therefore only the apparatus for manipulating the gun is protected, and the piece itself is exposed throughout its length to hostile fire. With the revolving turret protection is afforded to a greater portion of the gun, because the height of the wall is greater, and the gun points through an embrasure. With short ordnance there was little exposed even at the moment of firing, and after discharge rotation of the turret took the guns out of danger. It was this peculiarity of the turret system which gave the 'Monitor' such an advantage over the 'Merrimac' As the officers of the latter said, the 'Monitor's' guns were fired and the turret revolved so quickly that they had not a chance of getting a fair shot at them. But when guns were given great length, and slender muzzles which might be disabled by small projectiles, the advantage in this respect was lessened. Moreover, the turret involved additional weight, while the barbette permitted a higher position for the gun, which at sea is a considerable advantage. When a gun is not many feet above the water there is a liability of projectiles striking crests of waves near the ship and being deflected from the path required. This has been observed at target practice from some of our turret ships in rough weather.
Though circumstances inclined us to the turret, we tentatively gave one ship—the 'Temeraire'—a barbette at each end. These were pear-shaped redoubts, but differed from those now constructed, because their dimensions were such as to allow the gun mounted within to recoil down after firing behind the walls, and thus disappear during the process of reloading. This
THE 'TEMERAIRE.'
necessitated a larger enclosure, and the gain was considered so small as against the extra weight entailed that this disappearing principle has not been repeated in ships, though it is coming into greater favour for land defences.
But a further consideration brought about a modification not only in the method of carrying the heavy guns which the genius and enthusiasm of artillerists had pressed upon us, but also in the composition of the armament itself. The inevitable result of contracting the thickest armour to a comparatively small area on the side of a ship was that the remainder of a hull could be effectually penetrated by less powerful ordnance. Much damage could be done by light shells to the unprotected parts. It might be more profitable to disregard the 24-in. armour of the 'Inflexible' and endeavour to disable the ship by attacking the much larger portion without protection. Numerous light guns would be useful for this purpose, and the French for some time had been in the habit of associating with the heaviest guns an auxiliary armament of lighter ordnance, mounted on the broadside. The latest phase was to be a combination of the barbette and broadside systems. A series of vessels were constructed, now well known as the 'Admiral' class, because each bears the name of a distinguished British admiral, which varied in size from 9200 to 10,000 tons. All are constructed with a pear-shaped barbette at each end, for one or two heavy guns, and between the barbettes a broadside battery of 6-in. guns. The armour at the water line is 18 in. extreme thickness, and of compound manufacture. This armour does not extend to the ends, which are protected with a steel deck. The absence of a complete belt gives an opportunity for critics to deny that such vessels are efficient as battle ships. On the other hand, their speed is higher considerably—17 knots—than any previous vessels, and they carry a large supply of coal. They differ chiefly in the heavy armament. The smallest, the 'Collingwood,' carries four 45-ton guns, the 'Howe' four 67-ton, and the 'Benbow' two 110-ton guns. Probably naval opinion would incline to the 'Collingwood's' armament for all ships of this size, with perhaps an addition to the auxiliary ordnance. There might also be a preference for a reduction in thickness of armour, and a corresponding increase in the extent of water line covered by it. But of vessels that can steam fast and hit hard it is easy to be hypercritical.
Another inducement to supplement the necessarily few heavy guns with an auxiliary armament had gradually been assuming great importance, and that was the necessity of meeting the attack of torpedo boats. It was evident that neither an 80-ton nor a 6-in. gun would be the best weapon to stop the advance of a small craft capable of covering a mile of water in three minutes. One round from a heavy gun at such a mark was as much as could be anticipated, while under cover of the cloud of smoke the boat, if intact, had an excellent opportunity for effecting her purpose. Numerous guns of just sufficient power to penetrate the boiler, or smash the machinery of a torpedo boat, would therefore be most effectual in neutralising such an attack. Hence the development of machine and quick-firing guns throwing projectiles of from 1 to 6 lbs. The armament, therefore, of the modern ship is composed of a few heavy guns, a secondary battery of ordnance of moderate calibre, and numerous machine and quick-firing guns. All this entails a great weight of ammunition, so that if required to be combined with extensive armour protection, great speed, and a large coal supply, we are forced into a ship of huge dimensions. Confining our attention at present to the barbette system, let us see the latest development of this type of battle ship, though there was an interval when we returned to our early love the turret.
In the 'Benbow' we have a ship of 10,600 tons, in which the principal armament is a single gun of no tons at each end, and ten guns of 5 tons on the broadside. She has 18 in. of compound armour covering the central portion of the water line, but the broadside guns, as well as the ends of the vessel, are unprotected with armour on the side. It was freely asserted that for this reason such vessels were liable to be disabled by vessels with numerous light guns before perhaps their own ponderous ordnance could neutralise the attack. The explosion of a number of even small shell at the water line would, it was urged, admit sufficient water to impair the speed and manœuvring qualities of the ship, though not necessarily to overcome her buoyancy. Again, all nations were seeking some more powerful explosive than powder as a bursting charge for shells. To get these projectiles through iron without breaking, their walls must be thick. Consequently the interior capacity is reduced, and the amount of powder such shells can contain is only sufficient to just open the iron case, or may not even do that. We want, however, the shell to be fractured with violence into numerous pieces, each acting as a separate projectile, and for this a more energetic explosive is required. Many exist, but the difficulty hitherto has been to obtain one which with great power, will combine safety in handling and withstand the great concussion of the enormous powder charges now fired in guns. Experiments in different countries seem to show that this difficulty can be overcome, and that such shells are terribly destructive when exploded inside a ship. Thus the old idea of protecting crews from such effects again came to the front. All these moderate sized guns and their workers must fight behind armour of some sort, and not be left entirely unprotected. There was also a demand for more of such guns to supplement the principal armament. Nothing was to be given up, but a good deal more was asked for.
The naval architect was willing to provide it, but said that all this could not be done under a displacement of 14,000 tons. Thus when a large increase to the navy was sanctioned in 1889, and it was decided to at once lay down ten battle ships, of which eight were to be of the first class, it was perhaps not unnatural that we should endeavour to embody in these all the varied demands for powerful armament, extended protection, great speed, and prolonged endurance at sea, only to be given in mastless ships by a large coal supply. As regards the first item, a feeling that we had exceeded the limit of usefulness in guns of such weight as 110 tons, and the restriction thereby imposed as to number, led to a more moderate calibre being adopted for the principal armament. The 67-ton gun had been tried, and found satisfactory in some ships of the 'Admiral' class, so it was selected for the new vessels. All of them are to have four of these guns, mounted in pairs, at each end of the ship. In seven out of eight of these first-class battle ships, to be named the 'Royal Sovereign,' 'Empress of India,' 'Ramillies,' 'Repulse,' 'Resolution,' 'Revenge,' and 'Royal Oak,' this part of the armament is to be en barbette. This system would therefore appear, according to present opinion, to offer the greatest number of advantages. The two barbettes form separate protected positions, so that no injury to one could affect the other. Where two such stations are placed in a single central citadel, and hence necessarily in somewhat close proximity to each other, there must be a risk of both being disabled at the same time.
The auxiliary or secondary armament is to consist of ten 6-in. guns, five on each side, in a central battery between the barbettes. To obtain greater distribution of these guns, and so reduce the effect of hostile fire in this part of the ship, they will be mounted on two decks, one above the other. As to protect them by external armour on the side of the ship would involve great additional weight, steel shields only will be provided for these guns, those between decks having side screens as well, also of steel. A number of machine and other smaller guns will be disposed where convenient. As regards armour, these vessels will cany a belt of compound armour for two-thirds of the length, 8½ ft. broad and 18 in. thick, in the central portion. Above this, for a length of 145 ft., the broadside is to be protected with 5-in. steel plates to a height of 9½ ft. above the water. The barbettes will have compound armour, 18 in. thick, for protecting the machinery employed in the manipulation of the heavy guns. The ends of the vessel have no external armour, but a steel deck will confine any water that may enter, from this portion being penetrated by projectiles, and prevent it from flooding the ship. Even if the spaces at each end were so filled, the trim of the vessel would be little affected.
To drive a floating weight of 14,000 tons through the waters obviously requires powerful machinery, and as it was considered desirable that these vessels should have a speed of 16 knots without pressing the engines, and under ordinary atmospheric draught for the fires, while with forced or artificial draught the speed should be capable of being increased to 17½ knots, boilers and engines are being provided equal to the development under the latter condition of 13,000 horse power. As there will be two sets of engines for revolving twin screws, each set will be of 6500 horse power. When we remember that the 'Warrior' had a single engine of 5000 horse power, which propelled her at 14 knots, it can be realised what a vast increase of power is required to obtain the additional 3½ knots, notwithstanding the great improvements in steam propulsion since that time. In the 'Collingwood', a vessel of the same displacement as the ’Warrior,' to pass from 14 knots to 17 knots required practically the horse power to be doubled. At moderate speeds modern marine engines are economical in coal consumption, but beyond a certain rate the fuel rapidly disappears. A large supply is therefore essential, and in the new battle ships the amount is fixed at 900 tons. 
First class battle ship Ramillies, building by Messrs J. and G. Thomson, Clydebank
With this unstinted commendation I must at the same time express my preference for a greater number of vessels of smaller size. This is a difficult question, but it has been somewhat obscured by the extreme views of those who advocate vessels of 2000 or 3000 tons for battle ships as a limit. It has been even advanced that a vast number of gunboats is a more advantageous force than a few very large vessels. Those, however, who have practical experience of the sea, and who have endeavoured to benefit by the history of the past, will at once reject such a doctrine. Looking back, I observe in the old days that though four-deckers were to be found in the fleets of our adversaries, we abstained from adding them to our own; that at one time, as a result of war experience, we converted three-deckers into two-deckers; and that this type of vessel was then most largely represented in our fleet. It could cope with the bigger vessel, and if assisted by a companion, with success. On the other hand, it is argued that two frigates never took a line-of-battle ship, and hence one big vessel is better than two small ones; but the argument is fallacious, because frigates were not battle ships, and as a rule did not attempt to attack them. Examples of their doing so and being sunk by a single broadside are to be found in naval history. In the same way we may say now that two cruisers cannot take the place of a battle ship in a sea fight. Yet as actions then were entirely decided by the gun, it might be thought that the greater number of these weapons carried the more efficient the vessel, and such an increase was only effected by adding to the number of decks. Still, we did not do it. And now we have ram and torpedo to contend with, weapons which attack the most vulnerable part of the ship, and which no increase in her dimensions can enable her to withstand. Though a vessel of 20,000 tons could be constructed with armour impervious to the gun, her hull under water could not be made strong enough to resist the shock of a swift ram or the explosion of 200 lbs. of gun cotton, which the latest torpedo carries.
The great argument in favour of the very big ship is that it represents the principle of concentration, and that tactically a small number can be more efficiently handled than a force numerically superior but composed individually of weaker ships. This is true in a general sense, but the principle may be carried too far, and take us on to the 20,000-ton ship alluded to. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby, while endorsing the concentrated strength principle, has also said: 'I think it better that we should have ships of medium size.' Does he look upon 14,000 tons as 'medium size'? My friend Mr White, if he ever reads this work, will probably say here: 'What is the limit you would impose?' and be ready to show that it precludes some important qualification. To this my reply would be that I am prepared to sacrifice some protection, and to risk being struck by the heaviest projectiles, as long as my ship will exclude the remainder. Rapidity of movement and an overwhelming fire from your own guns will probably prove the best defence. There seems to me no reason why a good speed, large supply of coal, and a powerful armament cannot be obtained within a displacement of 10,000 tons. In eight vessels of 14,200 tons we have an aggregate of 113,600 tons of material employed. If we distribute this among twelve vessels, they can be approximately of 9,500 tons. I have asked admirals which of two such squadrons, if pitted one against the other, they would prefer to command. The selection has usually been with the greatest number, for a squadron of twelve ships can be controlled and directed as effectively as one of eight. There are many other points which might be brought forward against the bigger vessel, such as difficulty in harbour accommodation, depth of water, passage through the Suez Canal, individual cost, and time required for completion, but space will not permit my dwelling on them. I am content to rest the argument on the increase of strength given by the additional ram and torpedo power of the numerically superior squadron. These views will not, probably, influence warship construction in the slightest degree. Whether they are sound or not can only be demonstrated by the searching test of war, and all we can say is, that hitherto our experience has been in favour of moderate dimensions for ships and their armament.