The Dialogues of Plato (Jowett)/Cratylus

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Cratylus Introduction

The Dialogues of Plato
by Plato

Cratylus translated by Benjamin Jowett

Phaedrus Introduction

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3748156The Dialogues of Plato — CratylusBenjamin JowettPlato

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CRATYLUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Socrates.

Hermogenes.

Cratylus.

^{Steph. 383}

Cratylus.
Hermogenes, Cratylus, Socrates.

Cratylus and hermogenes have been disputing about names; they refer their dispute to Socrates.

H ERMOGENES. Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?

Cratylus. If you please.

Her. I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional : not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use ; but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates? 'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he replies— 'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a ³⁸⁴further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means ; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear.

Socrates not having heard the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, Socrates. Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in

Cratylus.
Socrates, Hermogenes.

is incompetent to decide.

grammar and language—these are his own words — and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters ; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you ; — he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of know- ledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

There is no correctness in names other than convention, says Hermogenes. Her. I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than con- vention and agreement ; any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old — we fre- quently change the names of our slaves, and the newly- imposed name is as good as the old : for there is no name given to anything by nature ; all is convention and habit of the users ; — such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.

Soc. I dare say that you maybe right, Hermogenes: let ³⁸⁵ us see; — Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it ? Her. That is my notion. Soc. Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Well, now, let me take an instance ; — suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world ; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world : — that is your meaning?

Her. He would, according to my view.

But how, rejoins Socrates, Soc. But how about truth, then ? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false ?

PHAEDRUS.

INTRODUCTION.

Phaedrus.
Introduction The Phaedrus is closely connected with the Symposium, and Phaedrus. may be regarded either as introducing or following it. The two Dialogues together contain the whole philosophy of Plato on the nature of love, which in the Republic and in the later writings of Plato is only introduced playfully or as a figure of speech. But in the Phaedrus and Symposium love and philosophy join hands, and one is an aspect of the other. The spiritual and emotional part is elevated into the ideal, to which in the Symposium man- kind are described as looking forward, and which in the Phaedrus, as well as in the Phaedo, they are seeking to recover from a former state of existence. Whether the subject of the Dialogue is love or rhetoric, or the union of the two, or the relation of philosophy to love and to art in general, and to the human soul, will be here- after considered. And perhaps we may arrive at some conclusion such as the following — that the dialogue is not strictly confined to a single subject, but passes from one to another with the natural freedom of conversation.

^{Steph. 227} Analysis. Phaedrus lias been spending the morning with Lysias, the celebrated rhetorician, and is going to refresh himself by taking a walk outside the wall, when he is met by Socrates, who professes that he will not leave him vmtil he has delivered up the speech ²²⁸ with which Lysias has regaled him, and which he is carrying about in his mind, or more probably in a book hidden under his cloak, and is intending to study as he walks. The imputation is not denied, and the two agree to direct their steps out of the public way along the stream of the Ilissus towards a plane-tree which is seen in the distance. There, lying down amidst pleasant sounds and scents, they will read the speech of Lysias. The ²²⁹ country is a novelty to Socrates, who never goes out of the town;

Phaedrtis. and hence he is full of admiration for the beauties of nature, which Analysis, he seems to be drinking in for the first time. As they are on their way, Phaedrus asks the opinion of Socrates respecting the local tradition of Boreas and Oreithyia. Socrates, after a satirical allusion to the ' rationalizers ' of his day, replies that he has no time for these 'nice ' interpretations of mythology, and he pities any one who has. When you once begin there is no end of them, and they spring from an uncritical philosophy after all. ' The proper study of mankind is man ; ' and he is a far more complex and wonderful being than the serpent Typho. Socrates 230 as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters ? Engaged in such conversation, they arrive at the plane-tree ; when they have found a convenient resting-place, Phaedrus pulls out the speech and reads : — ■ The speech consists of a foolish paradox which is to the effect that the non-lover ought to be accepted rather than the lover — 231 because he is more rational, more agreeable, more enduring, less suspicious, less hurtful, less boastful, less engrossing, and because there are more of them, and for a great many other reasons which are equally unmeaning. Phaedrus is captivated with the beauty of the periods, and wants to make Socrates say that nothing was or ever could be written better. Socrates does not think much of 235 the matter, but then he has only attended to the form, and in that he has detected several repetitions and other marks of haste. He cannot agree with Phaedrus in the extreme value which he sets upon this performance, because he is afraid of doing injustice to Anacreon and Sappho and other great writers, and is almost inclined to think that he himself, or rather some power residing within him, could make a speech better than that of Lysias on the same theme, and also different from his, if he may be allowed the 236 use of a few commonplaces which all speakers must equally employ. Phaedrus is delighted at the prospect of having another speech, and promises that he will set up a golden statue of Socrates at Delphi, if he keeps his word. Some raillery ensues, and at length Socrates, conquered by the threat that he shall never again hear a speech of Lysias unless he fulfils his promise, veils his face 237 and begins. First, invoking the Muses and assumingironically the person of Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/434 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/435 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/436 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/437 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/438 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/439 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/440 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/441 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/442 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/443 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/444 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/445 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/446 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/447 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/448 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/449 Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/450

Footnotes