The Early Indian Wars of Oregon/Rogue/Chapter 4

CHAPTER IV.

Troubles in Wright's Sub-Agency—The Coquille Guards—Their Operations in Coquille District—Letter of Captain Packwood to Governor Curry—Poland's Gold Beach Company—The Massacre of February Twenty-third—Killing of Wright and Poland—Long Siege of Those who Escaped—Loss of a Party of Rescuers from Port Orford—Fears of a Famine—Timely Arrival of Regular Troops Under Colonel Buchanan—Organization of Minute Men—Abbott's Company Attacked—Indifference of the Regular Troops to their Sufferings—Petition of Jackson County to General Wool—His Attitude Towards the Civil Authorities—Re-organization of the Second Regiment—Extract from the Writings of J. M. Sutton—Extracts from Reports of Captains O'Neil, Bushey, Buoy, George, Sheffield, Wallen, Creighton, Harris, and Colonel Kelsey—Attack on The Meadows—The Indians Dislodged—Plans of the United States Officers for Peace—A Fight and a Council—John Determined to Continue Hostilities—Smith Attacked Near The Meadows—The Battle and Relief—Movements of Volunteers—Surrender of the Indians—They are Taken to the Coast Reservation—Discomfort and Discontent—Military Establishment—Final Close of Indian Wars in Southwestern Oregon—Present Condition of the Indians.

 

At the breaking out of war in the interior, Ben Wright, in charge of the several bands below Coos bay, hastened to make them acquainted with the order issued by Superintendent Palmer, with whom they had made treaties, that in order to prevent suspicions concerning their intentions, and consequent collisions with white men, they must remain upon their reservations and avoid every appearance of collusion with the Rogue-river bands. To those roving Indians from the interior whom he found on the coast he gave admonition, and ordered them back to their own reserve; otherwise to submit to arrest. They complied, although insolently, and the tribes in his sub-agency promised obedience and friendship. But on arriving at the mouth of the Coquille he found the settlers alarmed by appearances among these Indians. On conferring with them, however, they professed friendship, and ascribed their restlessness to the discovery of a camp of Rogue-river women and children in their vicinity, and to knowing that

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this circumstance might be construed against them. They also exhibited fear lest the volunteers operating in the Umpqua valley should come down upon them, to extermi nate them, as they had been informed was their intention. Wright succeeded in quieting, as he believed, their appre hensions, and returned to Port Orford, appointing a local agent, David Hall, to look after them.

Hall was a member of a company on its way to the Coquille camp with the design of disarming or killing the Indians, who had been guilty of the death, in 1854, of two citizens, Venable and Burton, for which crime they had gone unpunished, and who now, according to their belief, were preparing for further mischief. But "Wright suc ceeded in allaying this feeling, or at least in persuading them to trust their safety to the Indian department and the United States troops at Port Orford yet a little longer; and by making one of them local agent, left the manage ment of affairs largely to his discretion. The settlers not being convinced of the good intentions of the Indians, soon after removed their families to Empire City, where a fortification had been erected. The miners at Randolph also concealed their portable property, and removed to Port Orford for safety; and at the mouth of Rogue river a fortified house was prepared for a refuge in time of trouble.

These events occurred immediately after the outbreak in Rogue-river valley. On the fifth of November Wright wrote Major Reynolds at Port Orford, "I deem it expedient and necessary to request you to allow the present force stationed at Port Orford to remain as a means of enabling me to carry out rny plans for the preservation of peace among the Indians of my district, and for the security of white citizens;" which request was granted.

Early in November, the Coos county people, being still apprehensive, raised a company of nineteen rnen. who applied to the local Indian agent, Hall, for authority to defend the people of his district the governor having discountenanced independent companies. On his author

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ity, and by agreement between the agent and themselves, they carried out their design, as shown in the following compact :

FORT KITCHEN, Coos County, O. T., November 6, 1855. Articles of agreement made and entered into between David Hall, local Indian agent for the Coquille district, on the part of the United States, and the undersigned persons, to wit : Wo, the under signed, do hereby agree to serve and obey all orders given us by David Hall, local Indian agent for the Coquille Indians, for the pur pose of promoting and maintaining peace between the Indians in his charge and the settlers, or citizens of the United States in this valley; also, to prevent other Indians now at war with the United States from joining and forcing the Indians in this district into a war with the United States; and to serve until such times as peace may be declared, unless relieved or discharged, and to receive for such service such pay and emoluments as the United States may think fit to give us. ( Then follow nineteen names, and the affidavit of the agent.)

I certify, on honor, that believing the public tranquility required the measures I have adopted, I have contracted with and engaged the above-named men to assist me in promoting and maintaining the peace as above specified.

DAVID HALL,

Local Indian Agent, Coquille District, Coos County, O. T. Witnesses: H. W. SANFOBD,

ELIJAH MOUTS, J. P.,

Coos County, Coquille Precinct, O. T.

The same day on which the agreement was signed a site was selected on the Coquille river for the erection of a fortification, which was named Fort Kitchen, and which in a few days was so nearly picketed that it could be de fended by half a dozen men. Captain Packwood then, with less than a third of the little force, made a scout up the south fork of the river on the twelfth of November to look after the property of several settlers who were absent from their places. They found that a house had been robbed of a large amount of flour, and thereupon Hall sent an express to Port Orford to notify sub-Indian agent Ben Wright of the absence of the Indians from the reser vation, of the robbery, and other matters connected there with, and asking him to come to Coquille to settle with

the Indians, and relieve the men he ( Hall ) had contracted with to aid him in keeping the peace; the settlers above having in the meantime returned and forted themselves at the place of a Mr. Roland, after leaving their families at Coos bay for safety.

Captain Pack wood, while waiting for Wright s appear ance, remained at Fort Roland to watch the Indians, and became convinced, although they pretended to be friendly, they they were, if not in league with, at least very much excited by the visits to them of the hostile Indians from the Rogue-river camp. Pending Wright s arrival, Pack- wood ordered the Indians off the reservation to be arrested, two of them, Elk and Long John, to be treated as crimi nals if attempting to escape, and shot. The whole band were notified of the order, and that those who peaceably obeyed would be treated as friends. John, however, man aged to escape, and when the express returned from Port Orford it brought only the news that Wright was absent down the coast, and that a company of volunteers was gone up to the big bend of Rogue river, about twenty-five miles from Fort Roland, to watch the Indians. This dearth of news left the local agent without instructions, and Packwood released the prisoners he had taken, advis ing all the band to go on the reserve and remain quiet.

On the twenty-second of November sixteen men from Coos bay joined the Coquille guards at Fort Kitchen. On the same day the local agent, Hall, was relieved by William Chance, who accepted the services of the guards and the sixteen recruits on the same conditions as those agreed to by his predecessor, certifying on his honor that he believed the public tranquility required the measures adopted. The instructions issued to Packwood after the flight of Long John directed him to treat all Indians, in future, without a pass, as enemies, those belonging to chief Washington s band having commenced hostilities by burn ing the house of a Mr. Hoffman, robbing the house of J. J. Hill of four hundred dollars worth of provisions, rob

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bing the house of Mr. Woodward, cutting adrift the ferry boat at the crossing of the Coquille, with other similar acts of enmity.

On the twenty-third Chance took a party of the guards and went to the forks of the Coquille to try to persuade Washington to go upon the reservation, but found the chief had erected a barricade on the point between the two branches of the river, where he could only be ap proached by water at a great disadvantage. As the party came in view he stationed himself, gun in hand, behind a myrtle tree, and twice raised it to fire, but seeing several rifles pointed in his direction refrained.

Chance hastened to send a friendly Indian to invite Washington to a conference, which, after some parleying, he consented to. Rumors were then sent to inform the Indians up the river that they must go upon the reserva tion if they would not be treated as suspects; after which the agent returned to Fort Kitchen, while the guards with him continued on to Fort Roland under their captain, Pack wood.

On the following day, having received such orders, this detachment, after allowing time for the Indians to move as directed, marched down the north and east side of the south fork, and meeting two Indians, one of whom was armed with a gun, and who either through fear or hos tility made as if he would have used it, shot them, killing one and wounding the other, who escaped. Near the forks of the river another Indian was wounded, after which the company returned to Fort Kitchen.

Concerning these acts of the guards, Packwood explains, in a report to Governor Curry, in which he relates with great candor all that occurred, that the Indians had been warned by sub-agent Wright in October to keep upon the reservation ; also by David Wall, local agent, and by his successor, William Chance; and that "it would have been madness and folly to use gentle means any further," but that force was necessarily resorted to. The order to the

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-Indians to remain on the reservation was given in their Mown interest, as when the hostile Indians from the interior made incursions into their country and committed depre dations, they were likely to be suspected and treated as enemies, all of which they perfectly understood, and in Respite of which they continued to roam about the settle ments.

-(. No news being received from Wright, and the local agent ^being reluctant to undertake disarming the Indians, the IGoos bay men becoming alarmed for their families returned Ihome December eleventh, leaving the guards as first or ganized. The weather being now very cold in the moun- teiins, which were covered with snow so that emissaries <ffom the Rogue-river Indians were believed to be barred fjQut, the white people in Coos county recovered somewhat -from their apprehensions, and the guards being stationed in ithree several detachments among the settlements, allowed ithemselves to hope for peace.

,niOn ma-king a visit to the beach where their provisions were stored, two of the guards from Fort Roland found aLong John in the cabin cooking, and other Indians on the outside peering through the cracks. They demanded an ex planation, which John endeavored to avert first by lying, ^cnd then by giving the war-whoop apparently to summon -ethers to his aid, when he was shot. The men fearing an $fktack, hastened back to camp, and again quiet reigned in etbe Coquille region.

oilJOn the twenty-fourth of December, Wright arrived at Fort Kitchen, spending three days with the Indians, who ,Jadid the blame of all the disturbances which had hap- ifJsned upon the white people. They promised to remain iqaaiet and obey orders. Wright accepted the Indian prot- fMtations of innocence, and informed the guards that their atkiganization must be approved by the governor in order itoosecure any compensation for their services to his depart- imnt, whereupon Captain Packwood discharged his com- dpfatny, and made a report in due f6rm of his operations

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and expenses, which was forwarded to the executive, who was asked to recognize them as volunteers under his proc lamation of November fifteenth. It was, however, only at a later period, when Pack wood reorganized his company under a proclamation of the executive as the "Coquille Minute Men," that they came to be recognized as belong ing to the volunteer service, their muster roll dating back to November sixth.

This rather lengthy account of the volunteer service in this region is introduced in this place because certain statements were made derogatory to the people of this isolated portion of Oregon, and to such an extent as to influence public opinion to their injury. In a subsequent communication to Governor Curry, speaking on this sub ject, Packwood says:

We had just cause; and should it be urged that there was the military at Port Orford, and consequently no necessity for organiz ing a company, I would only refer to the fact that they remained there after knowing our situation, and would, I believe, have re mained there all the same had all the Indians of southern Oregon been concentrating on us. And the military have never been used in this portion of Oregon for the purpose of averting Indian hostili ties, but only come on the field in treaty-making time, after the exasperated citizens have assembled, conquered, and brought the Indians to terms. There is another thing some persons take upon themselves to do, and that is to decide that a community of people are in no danger from Indian hostilities. The above decision has, I believe, been made in our case. * * * There seems to be an opinion afloat that several white men must lose their lives before Indians are "hostile." I hold to a very different one, and consider the following as hostile acts, especially when a chief and his baud turns out to defend the perpetrators, to wit : breaking open and rob bing houses; stealing ammunition, etc.; stealing blankets and other articles; robbing cornfields; poisoning dogs (invaluable here); ob stinately remaining off the reservation for the. purpose of harboring Indians from the Umpqua, Cow creek, and Rogue river, and to concoct a plan to exterminate the whites on this river. [Then follows a narrative of his own escape from being killed when the Ooquilles were exulting over the tidings of the massacres of white families in Rogue-river valley.] * I found that nothing but

a mild, firm, and energetic course with the Indians here would

avert a war with them, as they knew all the particulars of the Indian war in the interior; believed also from what had been told them "by some white man" that the time had come when they must either exterminate the whites, or the whites would extermi nate them. Such was the impression on the minds of the Indians here at that time. Their number of fighting men is forty-six to fifty, and should a party of Rogue-river Indians have effected a junction with them at the time, they could easily have overwhelmed us with numbers. Our number at that time being eleven men near the forks, and four men in the mountains. Our arms for defense were nine long rifles, two government rifles, two shotguns, two single-barreled pistols, and two revolving pistols. The Indians were in proportion to their numbers nearly as well off as we were, both in arms and ammunition, as the Klickitat tribe have been supply ing them with both for the last two years.

This communication of a settler of a good degree of intelligence and acquainted with Indian characteristics, goes far to account for the feeling, quite universal at this period, that the regular military authorities were indiffer ent to the alarm felt by exposed settlements, and that they, would not move to prevent hostilities, but only to " chas tise." and then "protect" the Indians "after a few white men had lost their lives."

About the time referred to in Packwood s report, Indian Agent E. P. Drew, in charge of the Umpqua and Coos bay Indians, became convinced that the latter were holding communication with the hostiles, and made haste to collect them on the reservation at the mouth of the Umpqua river, where he placed over them a local agent. Shortly after he found the settlers from Coos and Coquille valleys congre gated at Empire City, and a company formed (those who had resigned from the guards probably), to punish the savages for fresh depredations. An attack was made on them at Drolley s, on the lower branch of the Coquille, four being killed, and four captured and hanged. This chastisement seemed to have convinced these Indians of the folly of attempting to follow the example of the Rogue- rivers, for they remained quiet during the winter, being closely watched and guarded.

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In the month of November, a company was raised among the miners at Gold Beach and the southern coast generally, with John Poland for captain. It did not be long to the second regiment as organized under the procla mation of the governor; but since the proclamation made no provision for the defense of the coast counties, and since the military force at Fort Orford was entirely inadequate, even with the desire to be useful, which was said to be lacking, to the task of guarding the lives and property of the people, this company performed guard duty during the period between the proclamation of the fifteenth of November and that of January eighteenth, which dis charged the northern and southern battalions, and called for recruits.

The encampment of this company had been at the big bend of Rogue river, between the interior and coast tribes, during the winter, but in February it was moved down to within a few miles of the coast settlements in order to re cruit the company to the standard of sixty privates and eleven officers, as ordered by the. governor, to fill up the regiment by recruiting.

So quiet had been the coast tribes for some time that suspicion of their intentions was almost forgotten; and on the night of the twenty-second of February, an anniver sary ball was given at Gold Beach, or Whaleshead, near the mouth of the river, which was attended by Captain Poland and the majority of his men, a few being left to guard camp. Early on the morning of the t went} 7 -third, before the dancers had returned to camp, the guard was attacked with such suddenness and fury by a large num ber of Indians that but two out of ten were able to escape. One of these, Charles Foster, being concealed in the woods near the scene of the massacre, was witness of much of the terrible slaughter and mutilation, and able to identify those concerned in it, who were seen to be such as lived about the settlements, and were professedly friendly.

Ben Wright was then at the house of J. McGuire, about

four miles from the coast, and between the volunteer camp and Whaleshead. Early in the day, and while Captain Poland was with him, Wright received a visit from some Indians of the Mackanotins tribe, who had a village on the south side of the river opposite McGuire s, who came ostensibly to inform him that Enos, 1 a notorious half-breed, who had been with the hostile Rogue-rivers all winter, was in their camp, and they wished to have him arrested. 2

Without a suspicion of treachery, Wright and Poland repaired to the Indian village, where they were immedi ately seized and killed, with the most revolting blood- thirstiness, being mutilated beyond recognition. Wright s heart, as subsequently learned from the Indians them selves, was cut out, cooked and eaten, in admiration of his courage, which they hoped by this act of cannibalism to make themselves able to emulate.

Every house on the river below big bend, sixty in all, was burned that day, and twenty-six persons killed. The persons who suffered were Ben Wright, Captain Poland, Lieutenant B. Castle, P..McClusky, G. C. Holcomb, Henry Lawrence, Joseph Wagoner, Joseph Wilkinson, Patrick McCullough, E. W. Howe, J. H. Braun, Martin Reed, George Reed, Lorenzo Warner, Samuel Hendrick, Nelson Seaman. W. R. Tulles, John Idles, Joseph Leroc and two sons, John Geisell and four children, while Mrs. Geisell and two daughters were taken into captivity. Subsequently to the first attack, Henry Bullen, L. W. Oliver, Daniel Richardson, John Trickey, and Adolf Sinoldt were killed, making thirty-one victims of this massacre. Seven differ ent points on the south side of the river were attacked within twelve hours, showing how well concerted was the outbreak.

When the alarm was given at Gold Beach, some of the officers of Captain Poland s company were still there, and

1 Indian Affairs Report, 1856, pp. 201-2; Oregon Statesman, March 11, 185C; Crescent City Herald, extra, February 25, 1856.

2 Enos was hanged at Port Orford in 1857 for his part in the murder of Wright and Poland. He was guide to Fremont in 1843.

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Relf Bledsoe, first lieutenant, was at once chosen to com mand. He concentrated the men, women, and children to the number of one hundred and thirty at the unfinished fortification known as " Miners Fort," which they hastened to complete and to stock with the provisions at hand, and otherwise to prepare to stand a seige for seige it was likely to be, with no force in that part of the country, either regular or volunteer, sufficiently strong to deliver them.

Charles Foster by using great caution reached Port Or ford, carrying the news of the outbreak. But Major Rey nolds, in command of the post, dared not divide his handful of men, nor would the citizens of Port Orford, only about fifty in number at this time, consent to the withdrawal of this force. They, however, dispatched a whaleboat down the coast to open communication with the fort, which act of kindness only brought with it further disaster, for the boat was overturned in the surf, and the six citizens in it drowned, their bodies being cut to pieces by the savages who were watching their efforts to land, and who would have butchered them had they lived to reach the shore. The men who so generously sacrificed themselves for the consolation of their fellows in misfortune, were H. C. Gerow, a merchant of Port Orford, and formerly of New York state; John O Brien, a miner; Sylvester Long, a farmer; William Thompson and Richard Gay, boatmen, and Felix McCue.

The boat not returning, Captain William Tichenor, the founder of Port Orford, sent his schooner Nelly to bring off the people of Whaleshead, but was prevented by adverse winds from approaching the shore. Again, the schooner Gold Beach, at a later date, left Crescent City with a volunteer company, designing to attack the In dians; but they, too, were prevented from landing, and the inmates of the fort could only, with sinking hearts, witness these repeated failures.

Arms were scarce at the fort, the Indians having cap tured those of the volunteers, but they kept a careful

guard, and after a single attack on the twenty-fifth, the Indians seldom approached within rifle shot, although the rolling sand hills in the vicinity favored by sheltering them from observation. Under cover of darkness, milk for the children was sometimes obtained from the cows feeding near the fort. Once an attempt was made to gather potatoes from a field in daylight, but soon the men employed discovered the wary foe creeping upon them under the shelter of the sand dunes, and were forced to retreat in haste to the fort, one man being killed and four wounded before they reached cover. Whenever after this an Indian s head was discovered peering over the edge of a ridge it was shot at, and the marksmen took true aim.

Ten, twenty, thirty days passed, during which the silence of death brooded over the country. Port Orford was the only place in Oregon to which the news of the massacre had been carried, and to send it to the governor at the capital, or to San Francisco to the military authorities, took time, when steamers made only monthly or bi-monthly trips along the coast. The Indians, always well informed of the movements of the volunteers, had seized upon that period when the disbandment of companies, and the slow recruiting of them rendered the state soldiery practically useless, so that even after the news of the tragedy had filtered through the Indians lines and reached the volun teer camps, it found them unprepared to act.

Thus time wore on while the Indians waited for famine and despair to place a hundred victims in their bloody hands.

On the thirty-first day, ah ! what sound breaks the pain ful silence of this tragic solitude? Fife and drum, and the tramp of many feet! To the straining eyes of the im prisoned inmates of the fort was revealed the ravishing sight of two companies of the United States troops march ing up from Fort Humboldt to their relief. Instantly the Indians fled to the hills, and the people rushed out into the free air with shouts of gladness.

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In the meantime, Governor Curry, being taught by the Gold Beach disaster that a few hundred men could not protect so large an extent of territory as southern Oregon from a roving enemy, early in March authorized the organization in exposed localities of companies of minute men, and recognized those already formed as belonging to this branch of the service.

Under this order George II. Abbott was engaged in the recruiting service at Fort Johnson in Chetcoe valley early in March, with the intention of going to the relief of the Bledsoe command at Gold Beach, when he learned that Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan of the regular army had arrived at Crescent City by sea, and was marching up the coast to take charge of the Indian war in southern Oregon.

Abbott s company being only thirty-four strong, he thought it prudent to hold back a little, and even re mained three days in camp six miles north of Chetcoe river to allow Buchanan s force to come up within support- t ing distance. On the sixteenth of March the regulars were only five miles in the rear, and the volunteers started forward towards Pistol river, sixteen miles distant, which was reached about two o clock on the morning of the seven teenth, when preparations were made to attack an Indian village at break of day. The village was found to be abandoned, and was burned. Seeing two or three Indians on the hills half a mile distant herding horses, Abbott made a sortie with thirteen men to gain their attention and capture their horses. But on coming near it was dis covered that instead of two or three, at least fifty Indians were in the immediate vicinity and more arriving with every moment. A hasty retreat to the beach was effected, the Indians following, and a runnrng fire was kept up until within supporting distance of camp, when the In dians were repulsed in a brisk skirmish. A messenger was sent to Colonel Buchanan, while the enemy gradually surrounded the volunteers, who, by sharpshoot ing, kept

them at a distance, while they selected a position natur ally strong and erected an enclosure of logs, fifty feet square and about four feet high. In this were placed their provisions and water; the horses of the company being picketed in open ground under cover by their guns.

About four o clock in the afternoon of the seventeenth the Pistol-river Indians were reenforced by a body of Rogue-rivers, mounted and on foot. At sunset the main body began an approach from the mouth of Pistol river, protecting their persons by rolling logs in front of them, while smaller parties approached from the south along the sand hills bordering the beach, and from the east over the grassy flat where the animals were tethered.

The situation now appearing critical, Abbott threw out a party of skirmishers under cover of a sand hill, on the south, and leaving the horses to be defended by the fort, took another small party and stationed himself among the drift logs and sand drifts to oppose the main body of the enemy. Contrary to Indian usage, the action was con tinued after dark, the Indians charging the volunteers with the most desperate courage and confidence, but suf fering more losses than the white men, who as long as it was light enough fought with rifles, and at close quarters with revolvers, but in the darkness found double-barreled shotguns most effective. In this night s fight Kirby Mil ler, a recruit, was mortally wounded, dying in an hour after being carried into the fort, and a citizen named Sloan wounded slightly. During the night ten horses and twenty mules arid equipments were captured by the Indians.

Fighting continued with intermissions through the eighteenth, and until two o clock P. M. of the nineteenth, at which time Colonel Buchanan arrived, having moved as slowly as if he had not been called upon for aid, and saying in reply to suggestions, that he did not desire to engage the Indians at Pistol river. On the last day T. J. Sharp, an independent volunteer, was wounded, which

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comprised, with one dead and one other wounded, the total loss of men in a three days fight. The Indian loss was twelve killed, and several wounded. The bravery displayed by both sides was very great, the Indians having to advance in the face of a fortified foe, and the volunteers having to defend themselves against six times their numbers.

The indifference of Buchanan to the fatigues and suffer ings of Abbott s party was a subject long dwelt on by the settlers whom they were hastening to relieve, and who resented the cold blooded manner in which the army officer reproved the volunteers for " meddling with things they did not understand." He might, they thought, have shown some kindness, even while obeying General Wool s order "not to recognize the volunteers in the field." He was to show these un martial men how to conduct an Indian war. We shall see presently how he did it.

The intermission of aggressive operations during the interval between the order disbanding the two battalions and the recruiting of the regiment, afforded much en couragement to the enemy. The citizens of Jackson county seeing that the business of the country was being ruined, many persons having removed to the Wallamet in consequence of the Indian troubles, and all merchantable property being unsafe, whether in transit from Crescent City, or in warehouses after arrival; also that volunteering proceeded slowly, petitioned General Wool to v send a suf ficient body of United States troops to southern Oregon to protect the people, or end the war.

Ever since Wool had assumed command of the Pacific department he had behaved with a degree of hauteur towards civil authorities which had gained him the dislike of every governor, and had occasioned some complaints to the secretary of war, who had administered to him reproof very irritating to his arbitrary nature. He was too good a soldier, however, not to obey when commanded, and

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when it was indicated to him that he should give bis per sonal attention to Oregon and Washington, he had yielded and come in person to look after army affairs in the north west.

The first visit of the general to Vancouver was in November, 1855, and he returned to San Francisco with out communicating in any way with the governor of Oregon. About midwinter he paid a second visit to Van couver to inquire into the conduct of some of his own officers who had so far forgotten themselves as to fight in the same battles with volunteers even to call for the assistance of volunteers. Again in March he returned, accompanied by the troops intended to answer the petition of Jackson county, and conquer the Indians at the same time. It was while on his way to Vancouver that he left at Crescent City, March eighth, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan, with officers and men to the number of ninety- six, rank and file. On arriving at Vancouver he ordered to Port Orford, Captain Auger of the fourth infantry, to reenforce Major Reynolds of the third artillery, who was directed to protect the friendly Indians and the army stores at that place. Captain Floyd Jones, fourth infantry, at Fort Humboldt, was ordered to Crescent City to protect friendly Indians, and to guard army supply trains, a duty performed for months by the volunteers. Captain Smith of Fort Lane was directed to repair to Port Orford with eighty dragoons, to make a junction with Buchanan, and a general rendezvous was appointed in the Illinois valley, where the superintendent of Indian affairs was to meet the Indians in council after the troops had brought them to reason, and the volunteers were prevented from harrass- ing them. Such were the general s plans.

But these too deliberate movements did not commend themselves to the governor or the people of Oregon. The legislature of 1855-6 had elected a southern Oregon man, J. K. Lamerick, brigadier-general, and, as was probably

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intended, this concession to local pride and prejudice kept aglow the fading fire of patriotism, and promoted the recruiting of the southern battalion. There were those of the north who found cause of complaint against Colonel R. L. Williams, and when an election for colonel took place, John Kelsey of the northern battalion was chosen to that office, with W. W. Chapman, lieutenant-colonel. Major Bruce retained his office in the southern battalion, and William II. Latshaw was made major of the northern, vice Martin resigned, to take a civil office.

At no time had military operations ceased, but some companies had immediately reformed and kept the field in detachments, guarding trains and settlements. In the latter part of February, about the time of the uprising on the coast, the Indians had appeared again in the Illinois valley, killing two men and wounding three others, and soon after shot a citizen named Guess, who was ploughing in a field on Deer creek, his Avife and two children being domiciled at the house of Dr. White, some distance away. It was already night when news of the killing of Guess was brought to Captain O Neil, who, with a detachment of his company, was scouting in the vicinity ; but he set out immediately to recover the body of the murdered man, and convey it to his family. A description of that night s ride, and the duty performed by O Neil and his company, dramatically illustrates the lives and characters of the volunteers. It is here condensed from the pen of J. M. Sutton, himself a volunteer, who lived to write of those troublous times, but who has long since passed over to the silent majority:

The trail led through a forest which intensified the darkness. Philip Weaver, who lived in the vicinity, acted as guide, and was careful to report every place where an ambush might be feared, when the captain would ride forward and through the pass with two or three men before allowing the remainder to advance. Ar riving at the most dangerous crossing of a deep ravine, Captain O Neil directed Sergeant Stannis to take four men and go down the gulch to a lower trail, while Corporal Geddes went above to another

crossing, when he would move on by the main trail, and all would meet on the other side, thus giving an opportunity for some to escape, or to rescue the others in case of an attack.

When he had reached half way to the bottom of the ravine the horses gave unmistakable signs of smelling Indians, and the cap tain, in a low voice, gave the order to trot briskly forward. They were met at the bottom by a volley of rifle shots. Putting their horses to the top of their speed, the company made a dash for the opposite side in the darkness and gained the bank, the Indians shouting and yelling. As soon as the volunteers were out of the ambush they returned shots and yells. Leaving their horses in care of a guard, they poured a brisk fire into the thicket where the In dians were stationed, but without being able to take aim at any thing. However, in a short time the Indians stopped firing and were heard retreating up the opposite side of the ravine; and the darkness not permitting a pursuit, the company, which had sus tained no injury, pursued its way to the house of Dr. White, where two men, neighbors, were found stationed midway between the house and the horse corral, guarding both, while Mrs. Guess, not knowing what was going on outside, sat waiting for her husband, ignorant of though fearing the cause of his absence so far into the night.

The volunteers placed their horses, ready to mount, under guard, and set out to look, or to feel in the darknes for the body of the mur dered man, under the guidance of Mr. Weaver. As they neared the field they heard the oxen with which Guess had been ploughing still hitched to the plough running and surging around the field in great terror. The captain divided his men, sending one squad to the left hand side of the field, with orders to go up the outside to the middle, and there leave all but two who were to climb the fence and cross over to the middle of the ploughed ground, and there await further orders, while he performed a similar movement on the right. Cautiously each party filed up the sides of the fence to the place where they were to cross and meet in the middle of the field.

Not a sound could be heard save the dull measured tread of the men, and an occasional rush and quick spasmodic snort of the oxen. Soon was heard the anxiously expected " Here it is ! " and all was again hushed and still. The oxen seemed to know that friends were near, for they were now standing quietly by the fence and did not move when Weaver went to them, but when they heard his voice, with which they were familiar, they answered with low plaintive lowing, while to make their recognition complete, they tried to touch him with their noses as he passed before them.

When all was ready, four men took up the body on a stretcher rudely constructed of rails, and preceded by a guard set out for the house. Taking the body into a small room it was hurriedly pre pared for burial, for it was now nearly dawn. Four bullets were

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found to have penetrated the body from the front, one through the heart, one through the left shoulder, the other two through the breast. While the body was being prepared for burial, Weaver, who had called upon Mrs. Guess, came into the room and said she had asked if her husband was dead ; but that he had evaded the question, as he would not tell her. No one could be found to per form the painful office, and it devolved upon Captain O Neil, who, as all who knew him will recollect, was no coward ; yet he shrunk from this. But time was pressing and he must perform the sad duty. How it was performed is not known, but that he told her the terrible truth was soon evident from the anguished cries of the widowed wife and fatherless children ; sounds deeply painful to all who stood around that lifeless body on that February morning.

Such were the duties in which volunteers were month after month engaged, their time being divided between skirmishing with the enemy, protecting property, rescuing, if possible, those in peril, burying the victims of savage hate, and removing their helpless families to places of safety. If they lacked the discipline of mercenary soldiers, they did not lack either courage or sympathy.

The following brief reports found in some of the monthly returns further illustrate the conduct of the war. Writes Captain O Neil of how he spent the month of February:

The company for the past month, as will be seen by weeklj- report, has been stationed on Applegate, and Illinois valley. The most of the men have been continually on the move, scouting and escorting pack trains from Illinois valley to Jacksonville. No gen eral movements have been made toward the Indians this month, the greatest number of men, in pursuance of order No. 22, having been discharged, and recruits very hard to get. This month passed out by mustering in of recruits on February 29, 50.

Captain Bushey writes:

February nineteenth, organized by electing captain, first and second lieutenants, and first sergeant at headquarters ; remained in camp until the twenty-fourth ; marched fifteen miles down Rogue river ; twenty-fifth, marched to Fort Vannoy, crossed the river, and went down two miles and camped ; twenty-sixth, captain and nine men went as scouts to the mouth of Jump-Off-Joe creek, returning in the evening ; no Indian signs discovered ; remained in camp twenty-seventh, twentj T -eighth, and twenty-ninth, preparing for a trip in the mountains.

March first, captain, with a party of twenty-men, started into the mountains ; second, discovered Indian trail and followed it to near their camp on Wolf creek, about one mile from its mouth ; the captain and two men went near the camp, and found from fifty to one hundred men, women, and children ; third, sent one man back with an express to Colonel Williams, then at Fort Vannoy ; the same night Major Bruce arrived with all the troops around Camp Vannoy ; fourth, found the Indians had moved camp up the creek ; fifth, followed their trail ; Major Bruce arrived in the evening ; a night attack was talked of, but thought to be not advisable ; sixth, the company started back to Grave creek, and remained the seventh and eighth ; returned to Vannoy s, and remained there in the vicinity until the thirteenth, and up to the twentieth (except scout ing parties), and jerked beef for a trip in the mountains ; passed over a steep mountain two miles and joined Captains Kelsey and Latshaw with about ninety men, and encamped for the night at a place we supposed the Indians had camped in the night after the battle of Hungry hill ; sixteenth, came back to near the Grave- creek house ; seventeenth, back to Fort Vannoy ; eighteenth, a special order, called No. 16, from General Lamerick, that Captain Bushey s company, from and after this date, will hold themselves in readiness to act as spies until otherwise directed.

Bushey s company performed the duty of spies during March and April, the weather being most of the time cold, with rain and snow alternately. Captain Buoy reported for one month, from February twenty-fourth to March twenty-fourth, nothing worthy of note accom plished :

Received an order from General Lamerick to furnish twenty men to escort government stores south. I complied with order, and the stores were escorted to their destination. On the fourth of March the detachment arrived in camp ail well. Reported plenty of In dians south. Eighth of March, with forty men and five days pro visions, started for big bend of Cow creek; gone six days; no fresh Indian signs seen. Thirteenth, moved camp from Kent s to Wm. McCully s, on the Olily, thinking to better my condition. From thirteenth to twentieth nothing worthy of note. On the night of the twenty-first the Indians made an inroad into settlements, shoot ing several head of cattle, killing some. Our term of enlistment for last time has just expired; and during last four weeks I have been recruiting my company, consequently we have been in a confused state, and have not been prepared to operate against the Indians as desired, having a lack of men and ammunition, but now we have

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men, some arms and ammunition, and we hope to render a good account of ourselves in next report.

Captain George reported for the month of March :

March third left Camp Vannoy and moved to Fort Leland in the night by a forced march. Next night went from Fort Leland to the Six-Bit house. March fifth, marched back to Fort Leland. March seventh, marched all night on foot. March ninth, left Fort Leland and camped on Rogue river six miles below Camp Vannoy. March eleventh, left camp and went to Deer creek by order of Major Bruce. Out on scout and chasing Indians for three days, and returned to camp below Vannoy s on the fourteenth. March seventeenth, Captain George returned from furlough, bringing twelve recruits. March nineteenth, all hands in camp to attend election. March twenty-second, Lieutenant William Chaplin resigned. Sergeant F. D. Chaplin discharged by order of General .T. K. Lamerick. March twenty-third, F. M. Rhodes transferred from company C to Captain M. M. Williams s company. Left camp six miles below Vannoy s for Jacksonville. Camped near Jewett s ferry. March twenty- fourth, started from Jewitt s before daylight; got as far as Colonel T ; Vault s; were overtaken by an express from Major Bruce ordering a return to Camp Vannoy; arrived at Camp Vannoy; were ordered to Camp Hayes; arrived at Camp Hayes same evening. Twenty- fifth, met with losses mentioned on next page. Twenty-ninth, returned to Vannoy s.

The losses referred to in Captain George s report were twenty horses with their equipments, and several rifles and revolvers. They were lost in the engagement de scribed below in Captain O Neil s report, previous to which he was encamped in Illinois valley, and scouting.

Sunday, March twenty-third, whilst preparing to start an escort with pack train to Fort Vannoy, an express came in camp reporting two men killed by Indians on Slate creek, and a large band of Indians making their way to Mr. Hayes house. Lieutenant Arm strong, with his command numbering about fifty men, immediately started, and on arriving within three hundred yards of the house, a heavy fire was opened on all sides by the Indians, who had com pletely surrounded Mr. Hayes house, and numbered near two hun dred warriors. The order was immediately given to go through and reach the house, which was promptly obeyed. On arriving at it, and finding the family secure, the men immediately returned to the place of their first attack. Discovered two men killed (John

Davis and Alexander Caldwell), and one man (a packer) severely wounded. The dead men were carried off by six men during a heavy fire from the enemy. Had they done any good shooting, many a life must have been sacrificed. The fight then became general, which lasted until dark, when the Indians, after making a great number of fires, and as we supposed, burning their dead, drew off. An express was immediately dispatched to Major Bruce, and likewise to the inhabitants of Illinois valley. Major Bruce, with all the available forces under his command, arrived on the following morning. On Tuesday, while preparing the whole command to march in pursuit of the enemy, an express arrived reporting a pack train robbed by Indians on Deer creek. Twenty-five men, well armed and mounted, started direct for the place, Major Bruce with the remainder flanking out in different directions. On arriving at a low divide, a heavy cross fire was opened by the enemy who were lying in ambush. Another engagement commenced. On the first fire two of Captain George s company were killed, and two of Cap tain O NeiPs slightly wounded. The men took their stations, killing three Indians, sure. Major being on the point of outflanking them, they scattered over the whole country, and not having a suf ficient force to make a successful fight, Major Bruce with a portion of each company, returned to Illinois valley to get the families together for their safety. The remainder of the force returned to Camp Hayes. Major Bruce, with men from each company, started today with three pack trains to Fort Vannoy, and to get sufficient provisions, as well as men to make a more successful attack, as the Indians are in great force, and will require a strong number to strike anything like a decisive blow.

( The loss sustained by O NeiPs company, besides the two men already named, were a dozen horses and mules, with equipments for half of them, six rifles and revolvers, and many blankets, all of which, except the horses killed or wounded, went to enrich the Indians.)

The Indians were driven farther south at this time by operations in the Cow creek region, as we learn from the report of Captain Edward Sheffield for the month of March.

Fourteen men employed as spies ; sixteen employed building fort at Smith s station on upper Cow creek. March first, twenty-six of company employed escorting government train to Jacksonville. Twenty men under first lieutenant stationed in lower Cow creek valley. Remainder of company at Fort Smith. March sixth, twenty-six of company on expedition down Grave creek under Major Bruce. March twenty -fourth, twenty of company com

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manded by Second Lieutenant Capron, with Major Latshaw s com mand in a battle with the Indians on Cow creek, six miles below Fort Smith. March twenty -eighth, thirty men commanded by Captain Sheffield, with Major Latshaw s command on an expedition in the Cow creek mountains. March thirtieth and thirty-first, detach ment of thirty in the mountains. Detachment of fifteen stationed in lower Cow-creek valley. Remainder of company at Fort Smith, escorting trains, building fort, etc. William Dooley was killed in battle of the twenty -fourth ; A. H. Woodruff and Thomas Gilmore, wounded slightly.

By the promotion of Latshaw to major, the first lieu tenant of his company, John M. Wallen, became captain. Tn a reminiscence of the Rogue-river war, and Latshaw s campaign in Cow creek valley, he writes as follows:

From Cow creek we followed the Indians six days. It was in March, and the weather rough and blustery. One night we were encamped in a canon, and expecting an attack, for the Indians were near. Clubfooted David Wilson was our corporal. We burned off the dead leaves from a small circle of ground, dug a hole, and built a small fire in it, and when the ground was dry put out the fire, and erected a small awning over it so he would not suffer from cold. Wilson said: "I had taken my place, put my feet in the hole, drawn my wraps around me, and taking my gun upon my knee was ready for duty. The night settled down dark and dreary. I had been on duty several hours, and was sitting there thinking of the day s march, and the probability of the Indians attacking us. At the same time I was raising the hammer of my gun, and lowering- it to see how quickly and noiselessly it could be done. Suddenly a flash ran down the barrel. I had the hammer back when the flash came, and I pulled the trigger at the same instant bang ! bang ! the report of two guns mingled, but few who heard them knew that more than one gun was fired. I called to the guard ; he answered all is well. When I went to Captain Wallen s tent on being re lieved, he said, Wilson, what did you shoot at? The guard says you killed a mule; he heard it struggle. I answered, f wait, captain, till morning. Half an hour later the Indians fired several times into camp. We did not return the fire, as it was too dark to distin guish any object. Next morning we found a dead Indian about fifty yards from where I sat, shot through the head."

On the twentieth of March, Captain Buoy resigned, when P. C. Noland was elected captain of his company. The first return of Captain Nolaud has this by Captain Buoy:

On twenty-fourth of March just as a small detachment of my com mand were ready to make an excursion into the adjacent mountains (from Ten-Mile prairie), a messenger came running, stating that the Indians were in Carnas valley. Forthwith we repaired to said place, and found the beautiful little valley enveloped in a cloud of smoke. The Indians had burned several houses, and killed some stock, but had retired to the mountains. We followed, found and chastised them, killing two, and wounding others. They stole nine of our horses on the rounds.

With the coining of spring the Indians became more active, although the weather was still unusually severe; appearing occasionally in force, but more often in raiding parties, which had the mysterious power of vanishing when the volunteers came in sight, and generally of car rying with them some property not their own. It was only by the organization of independent companies that it was possible to guard the settlements at a distance from headquarters, although detachments were stationed at cer tain points, as at Illinois valley, and at Hayes place in Deer-creek valley. After the massacre at the mouth of Rogue river, and the proclamation of the eleventh of March calling for minute men, John Creighton of Port Orford raised a company for this service, who gave a good account of themselves in the following report:

In consequence of depredations committed by the Coquille Indians deserted from the Port Orford reservation, I called out my company of minute men for the purpose of chastising them, and to induce them to return to the reserve at this place. On the twenty- seventh of March I proceeded to the Coquille river, meeting some Indians on the route, who fired on us and fled. Upon reaching the mouth of that river, I found one tribe of Indians encamped there, and attacked them on the morning of the thirtieth, routing them with the loss on their part of fifteen men, all their canoes, arms, provisions, etc., and took thirty-two women and children prisoners. The latter I have sent to Port Orford, where they have been taken in charge by Mr. Olney, Indian agent at that place. Learning that there was a party of Indians near the forks of the river, I started the same day for that place, and succeeded in killing three men be longing to the " Jackson " tribe, also taking several prisoners, prin cipally squaws and children. Since then I have been in pursuit of others belonging to those tribes and a party of twenty-five from

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 395

Umpqua valley, who had been engaged in the difficulties there last fall. We have succeeded in taking some four or five Umpquas, and twenty Coquilles of Washington s tribe ; also twenty-three of the north fork Indians. The company has been in actual service from the twenty-sixth of March to the thirtieth day of April, both days included. I have also stationed guards at Coquille, Sixes, and Elk river ferries, according to request of S. S. Mann, quartermaster of this place. These men are still on duty.

W. H. Harris of Coos bay was captain of a company, also raised immediately after the Gold Beach massacre, or about the twenty-eighth of February, and which was after wards " recognized" by the governor, and continued in the service under the new organization of recruits to the southern army. In his report to the adjutant-general, Harris wrote :

On the first day of March I set out with twenty men of my com mand from Empire City to Port Orford, in view of forcing open a communication between these two places. Every citizen on the coast between Empire City and Port Orford had fled to one or the other of these places, leaving their homes and property unprotected. From best information I was advised that a party of Indians on the Coquille were then preparing to make a descent upon this helpless section, thus forsaken of its inhabitants, in view of seizing the un protected property of our citizens as the spoils of the enemy. After cooperating with the forces at Port Orford in such a way as would best prevent a catastrophe thus fatal, I returned with my command to Empire City, where I arrived on the tenth of March.

Believing that a party of disaffected Umpquas were scouting between the waters of Coos and Coquille, in view of enlisting the Coos bay Indians, I set out from Empire City on the fourteenth of March with a detachment of twenty-one men. I proceeded with my command up Coos river, and thence southwardly to the north fork of the Coquille. At Burton prairie I saw the old camp of the Indians I was in search of, but they had taken the alarm some days previous, and had fled to the mountains. The exhausted state of my men and supplies would not admit of pursuit, and I returned with my command to Empire City on the twenty-fourth.

On the twenty-fifth of March I sent a detachment of ten men to the upper Coquille to act in concert with Captain Creighton s com pany in view of securing the friendly Indians in that quarter to the charge and control of the Indian agent. This detachment was under command of Lieutenant Foley, whom I joined in person at the scene of action on the twenty -sixth. Having secured the pledge

of the friendly Indians in that quarter to submit to the agent, and remove at his instance to Port Orford, I returned with my com mand to Empire City on the first day of April.

A portion of the Indians at the forks of the Coquille deserted their camps and fled to the mountains to avoid being removed by the agent ; and as was then believed, joined the disaffected TJmp- quas and Cow-creeks scouting upon the waters of the north fork. On the sixteenth of April I set out with a detachment of thirty men, with sufficient supplies for a thorough campaign in that quarter. Making headquarters at Burton s prairie, I sent an ex press to Mr. Seth Lount of Port Orford (then at Coquille, and acting in the service of the Indian agent at Port Orford ), in view of securing the removal of the Indians, with information that I was proceeding against the disaffected Indians ( Coquilles and others ), in the mountains. He sent a friendly Indian with the news that " the Coquilles had better come in, or they would be killed." On the receipt of this information the Coquilles came in, and the others removed their encampment and fled. Finding that the Indians were on the alert, and circumstances being unfavorable to any further pursuit, I returned with my command to Empire City on the twenty-seventh of April.

Learning that the agent was on his way with the Coquille In dians to Port Orford, and fearing that his forces might not be suffi cient to prevent a possible effort to escape on part of the Indians at the mouth of the Coquille, I detached, on the twenty-eighth of April, ten men to the aid of that undertaking, which detachment returned to quarters the eighth of May. Having received informa tion from the Coos bay Indians that a number of the Coquille In dians had stolen away from the reserve at Port Orford, and were hidden near Coos bay, I sent, April twenty-eight, under command of Lieutenant Foley, a detachment of twelve men with instructions of reduce the fugitives to obedience. The lieutenant with his com mand succeeded in capturing the squad, which consisted of eight men, six women, and three children, which where secured to the proper authorities and forwarded to Port Orford, May second. Meanwhile, I have furnished numerous escorts necessary for the protection of the quartermaster and commissary s stores, with their trains and other means of transportation from the Umpqua to this place, and also from Eugene City to Port Orford.

The state of Indian affairs in this section of the coast country is by no means of a settled nature. The Coos bay Indians have here tofore acted in the most trustworthy manner. But the effort of the agent in the removal to the mouth of the Umpqua is attended with dissatisfaction on part of a large proportion of their number. They understood, in their treaty with General Palmer, that they would be permitted to remain on the bay for two years after the time of treating before their removal. A part of the Indians have consented

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to go and are gone, while the residue yet remain, and it is likely that difficulties may yet arise.

Although I have not accomplished with my command as much yet as I could have desired, you will nevertheless see from my re port that I have by no means been idle. It would have been my pride, if circumstances had afforded me the opportunity, of render ing greater service to my country, but I must remain content with the conviction that I have done the best I could considering the cir cumstances which have attended niy command. I must say, in conclusion, that it has been my aim to induce as much discipline in my ranks as my ability afforded; and it is with pleasure that I can speak in terms of high commendation both of the officers and privates of my command. My company consists of forty -five men, rank and file.

According to Captain W. A. Wilkinson s report for April, and a part of May, he was employed during most of this time in escort duty between Camp Vannoy, Fort Leland, Camp Hayes, and Camp Wagoner, and in the spy service; also in escorting government pack trains from Crescent City mountain to Camp Yannoy. Captain James Barnes spy company were in the field performing their dangerous duty from the twenty-sixth of February to the close of the campaign.

Thus every company of from thirty-five to sixty men constituted a detached and often an independent com mand, which, while obeying orders in a general way, was forced to take the responsibility of conducting the war, wherever the enemy were found, upon its own best judgment, often for weeks at a time.

On the eleventh of April, Colonel Kelsey joined a de tachment of Captain Robertson s company, and with Barnes spy company and a detachment from Captain Wallen s company, set out from Fort Leland, down Grave creek, in search of the enemy, taking four days pro visions, packed on mules. The following is a part of Kelsey s report:

I accompanied the command in person. Camped that evening about five miles below here (Fort Leland). Next morning took the line of march over the creek, and camped on the night of the

twelfth on the east side of Mount Reuben. Some Indian signs dis covered during the day. The company moved over Whisky creek and camped that night on Mount Wilkinson. More Indian signs discovered during the day. Captain Barnes, with a portion of his spies, together with one man of Captain Robertson s detachment, set out after supper over the mountain for the purpose of examining the meadows and the bar on Rogue river for the Indians. Soon after dark it commenced raining and snowing, and by the morning of the fourteenth the snow was four inches deep on the mountain where the spies were, and a dense fog hung on the meadows and the bar. The snow continued to fall on the mountain ; so much so that Captain Barnes considered it at that time not practicable to attempt to reconnoiter the meadows and bar, and returned to camp about nine o clock A. M. Captain Barnes and myself were still anxious that the meadows and bar should be examined, and with eight of his spies and two of Captain Robertson s company, I set out down Rogue river to the meadows. At the same time I ordered the remainder of the company back across Whisky creek, and we proceeded down the river across the base of Mount Wilkinson, about six miles to a high point that ran down to the river bank and overlooked the whole country down to near the meadows, the meadows being obscured from view by another point of the moun tain also running down to near the meadows. The party now being very much fatigued from the hard travel over a rough country, Captain Barnes suggested the propriety of his taking four men and going forward, and examining the bar and meadows. I remained behind with the six men, and watched his movements, so that in the event of the enemy discovering his movements and attempting to cut him off, I could bring the men left with me to their assist ance. As soon as Captain Barnes came out on the high ground a signal gun was fired on the other side of the river near the bar. It was now late in the morning, and frequently a storm of snow swept by them ; and finding that they were discovered, he, with his men, returned to me, when, being out of provisions, we abandoned the examination in that quarter and returned to camp. We made the hardest marches in this expedition of any I have been in since I joined the army.

As late as the fifteenth of April the weather was still cold, with rain and snowfalls of considerable depth on the mountains. But Lainerick and Kelsey had determined upon concentrating the regiment at or near the main camp of the Indians at Big Meadows, apd attacking them in force. The murder and mutilation of McDonald Hark- ness, about the twenty-fifth, two miles from the meadows,

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furnished fresh incentive to the volunteers in that neigh borhood to strike back. The time seemed propitious, for the Indians, so continuously harrassed by them, had begun to show signs of weakness, some of the poorer bands being not unwillingly taken prisoners and sent to Fort Lane, where they were fed and protected.

On the sixteenth, Lieu tenant -Colonel Chapman and Major Bruce moved with the entire southern battalion down the south side of Rogue river towards the meadows; the northern battalion passing down the north side entire, with the exception of Captain Thomas W. Prather s spy company, provisioned for thirty days; with Colonel Kel- sey and Brigadier-General Lamerick in the field, Lamerick having declared to the governor his intention to stay with the enemy until they were subdued or starved out.

On encamping at Little Meadows on the twenty-first the picket guard was fired upon. A force of forty men, ten each from the companies of Noland, Sheffield, Robertson, and Wallen, was ordered out to engage the Indians, who, however, fled before them down a deep canon, under cover of the thick underbrush, and were soon beyond reach. Captain Barnes then went out with twenty-five picked men to reconnoiter, and found that the Indians were encamped in considerable numbers on a bar on the south side of the river between Little and Big Meadows.

The effective force in the camp of the northern battalion numbered two hundred and ten men. With a detach ment of fifty men, Colonel Kelsey made a reconnoissance on the morning of the twenty-second, having to cross a deep canon and ascend a high mountain densely timbered with fir and underwood, but having near the summit a small prairie, near which he halted his command and sent forward spies. They immediately returned with the in formation that the enemy s camp was in plain view from the prairie. Kelsey then moved forward to ascertain whether or not the Indians were fortified, and was fired on while taking observations. He drew up his men in order

of battle, but after a few shots exchanged, the Indians suddenly disappeared. A few moments later, however, the pickets reported the Indians crossing the river in strength, and it was thought prudent to retreat to camp. On the following day Barnes, with his spy company, was unable to discover anything further of importance. On the same day the southern battalion arrived in camp, its available force being three hundred and thirty-five men, swelling the army to five hundred and forty-five men fit for duty.

Colonel Kelsey on the twenty-fourth, assisted by Major Latshaw, led one hundred and fifty men of the northern battalion towards the enemy, using a detachment of fifty as a decoy to draw him into an engagement, when he was fired on. At the same time, Major Bruce assisted by Ad jutant J. M. Cranmer, led an equal number of the southern battalion down to the Big Meadows to make a reconnois- sance of that favorite position of the Indians, but found none there as expected ; nor were the volunteers able to discover them that day.

Again, on the twenty-fifth, tweiit} r -five men from the northern battalion were sent to take a position on the high ground northwest of camp, to note whether the enemy passed up into the mountains to the west, and to discover, if possible, what he was doing. At the same time, twenty- five men from the southern battalion took a station on high ground southeast of camp, to observe the enemy s movements during the day. Nothing was discovered be yond what was known, that the Indians numbered several hundred men, women, and children.

About sundown on the twenty-sixth, the picket guard observed Indians firing on some cattle belonging to the regiment, which had strayed three-quarters of a mile from camp, when Colonel Kelsey with one hundred men, imme diately pursued them, they fleeing before him. It looked, indeed, as if they could not be brought to battle, so easily did they elude pursuit, and so difficult of access was their encampment.

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On the twenty-seventh, however, Kelsey and Latshaw took out another detachment of one hundred men from the northern battalion; twenty-five of Captain Wallen s company, under his command ; twenty-five from Robert son s company, under Lieutenant Phillips; and the same number each from Sheffield s and Noland s companies, under their proper commanders. The sortie was made before daylight in order to take possession of a deep canon a mile west of the Indian camp, if possible, undiscovered, and to bring on a battle by annoying the enemy from this position, and decoying him into attacking on the east (the river here running north for some distance ) side of the river, which the spies had discovered to be well guarded and dangerous to cross for several miles above and below. Besides the hazard of crossing, the steep and rocky hills on the west side left no room for the passage of troops.

Major Bruce and Adjutant Cranmer led forth another detachment of one hundred and fifty men, from the south ern battalion, and took a position on the elevated prairie before mentioned, in order to be in the way of a retreat should the Indians attempt it. This movement was also made before daylight. With the coming of day a heavy fog arose which concealed either of these forces from the view of the enemy, enabling Kelsey to pass the only ex posed point on his route without discovery; but which cleared away suddenly soon after he had made the passage, leaving the river in full view.

Contrary to expectation no Indians were found in the canon; and in accordance with the determination of the colonel in command, with the concurrence of the major, and the volunteers, who were anxious to get at the enemy they had pursued so toilsomely for months, this detach ment made but a short pause, but proceeded another mile and a half, under cover of fir aud oak timber, to a ridge running down to the river, and sparsely covered with trees, immediately opposite the bar on which the Indians were encamped.

26

When the Indians discovered the troops they were within three hundred yards of their camp, with the river between them. Instead of showing a disposition to fight, the Indians were thrown into confusion. Many had not yet come out of their wickiups. The women and children were running hither and thither, in alarm. To escape the heavy fire of the volunteers, these hid themselves in the timber in the rear of their camp; while a portion of their fighting force stationed themselves behind rocks and trees and fought in defense of their camp; and another portion took to the cover of the trees lining the river out of range of the volunteers guns, to watch .the movements of the attacking party.

So interested were they in these, that they failed to discover Major Bruce s detachment which had hastened to support Kelsey, until Captain George s company had de livered a fire into their midst. Bruce was then stationed on Kelsey s left, and firing was kept up all day, with the result of a very considerable loss to the Indians. Ap parently, nothing saved them from a total rout but the river; and on the other hand the river cut off their re treat. The loss to the volunteers in this engagement was one man wounded in Wilkinson s company Elias D. Mercer. That night the regiment encamped at the Big Meadows.

The following morning Colonel Kelsey and Major Lat- shaw took one hundred and fifty men and two canvas- boats two miles below the battle ground to look for a crossing of the river, with the design of scouring the mountains in the vicinity of the enemy s camp ; while Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman with an equal force took up the position occupied the previous day, to prevent the es cape of the Indians, as well as to divert their attention from the movement below.

When the colonel s command reached the river, how ever, he found that his purpose had been divined, and the Indians were stationed in the thick timber ready to receive

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 403

him. He could only fire on them across the river, while they were sheltered by trees; and after three hours of am munition wasted, the volunteers returned to camp, with one man wounded of Sheffield s company John Henry Clifton. The Indian loss, so far as known, was two killed.

On the twenty-ninth of April, the wounded having been sent to Camas valley under a heavy escort, and the Indians having abandoned their position on the opposite side of the river, the regiment crossed over and occupied it, find ing seventy-five deserted camp fires, indicating a large number of occupants. This was, indeed, the refuge to which, during the winter, the predatory savages had escaped after their successful raids into the settlements and their robberies of pack trains. Here were found the bones of numerous oxen slain, and the remains of hun dreds of broken packages of provisions and ammunition. The Indians had fared better than the volunteers, many of whom were at that moment almost barefoot, with only a blanket betwixt them and the weather, which still con tinued stormy and cold.

As the spies reported the Indians gone down the river, and as provisions were growing scarce in camp, with no prospect of improvement in the weather, Colonel Kelsey, so reporting, was ordered back to Fort Leland. It was decided, however, to erect a fort at the meadows, and a site was selected May first by Majors Bruce, Latshaw, and Hoxie, and the companies of Captains Wilkinson, Keith, Williams, and Blakesley were detailed to remain at the meadows under Major Bruce to construct it, which fortifi cation was known as Fort Lamerick. The companies of Sheffield and Noland were ordered to Roseburg, via Camas prairie, under Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, while Robert son, Miller, O Neil, Wallen, and Alcorn accompanied the colonel to Fort Leland.

It will be observed that during the month occupied by these events, the volunteers had received no aid from the

regular army. "I have good reason to believe," wrote Lamerick to the governor, " that General Wool has issued orders to the United States troops not to cooperate with the volunteers. But," he added, "the officers of Fort Lane told me they would, whenever they met me, most cordially cooperate with any volunteers under my command."

Captain Smith of Fort Lane had been directed to make a junction with Colonel Buchanan s force at Port Orford, whence the united forces were to repair to the mouth of the Illinois river to meet Superintendent Palmer and the Indians of the Rogue-river valley, with whom a council would be held. The time seemed propitious for making propositions of peace, and the superintendent, who had all the Indians of Oregon, and some of those of Washington, on his hands in a state of insurrection, was anxious to get these troubles settled for the good of all concerned, him self included, for if he could not control his wards some one else would be found who could be induced to under take it.

In the contention between the adherents of General Wool and the governors of Oregon and Washington as to the best methods of restoring peace, Palmer had adopted the views of the regular army that the volunteer service kept up the irritation, and prevented a peace which was desired by the Indians. That the Indian leaders did not desire a peace, except on their own terms the absolute possession of the country he did not believe. But the volunteers had many times called out to them to come and have a peace talk, which advances had invariably been met with scoffs and taunts anything but indicatory of a disposition to yield. And so the fighting went on ; because the volunteers believed in preventing robberies and massacres instead of chastising, in a half-hearted way, the perpetrators after the crimes had been committed. But now the United States authorities were making ready to try the effect of their policy in bringing about the settle ment of the Indian question in Oregon.

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 405

Captain Smith moved with his eighty troopers from Fort Lane about the thirteenth of April, a few days before the volunteers marched to their destination at the meadows. At the crossing of Rogue river, which was effected on a raft, he found a camp of Indians, which he attacked and de stroyed. Traveling through the mountains in rain and snow was exceedingly trying to dragoons, whose horses often were unable to carry them up the sharp and slippery ascents, compelling them to climb on foot. Wrote one of them: "We suffered much on the march. There was a thick fog on the mountains, and the guide could not make out the trail. We were seven days straying about, while it rained the whole time. Our provisions ran out before the weather cleared and we arrived at Port Orford." The experience was at least useful as showing what the volun teers had endured ever since October.

When Colonel Buchanan first arrived at the mouth of Rogue river, some of his younger officers and the soldiers plunged boldly into the forest in pursuit of the fleeing savages, but finding the scrambling over hillocks and through underbrush fatiguing, and the sting of arrows annoying, had been glad afterwards to leave such work to those who chose to perform it; while their chief spent about a month in the effort to induce the Indians in that region to go upon their reservations, without success. After occupying a defensive attitude for this period of time v on the twenty-sixth of April, Buchanan sent Lieutenant Ord, with one hundred and twelve men, to destroy a vil lage of the Mackanotins, eleven miles above Whaleshead, and to force them upon the reservation, which was accom plished with some fighting and loss of one soldier.

But there was plenty of fighting yet to be done in other quarters, as appeared when Ord with sixty men, on his way to Crescent City to escort a large train with army stores to the mouth of Rogue river on the twenty-ninth, was attacked at the Chetcoe river by about an equal number of Indians, losing in the skirmish one man killed

and three wounded. The Indians were repulsed with a loss of six killed, and were driven from the field. On other occasions the same hostility was manifested, and there seemed little hope for peace, without first conquering the Indians.

The volunteers had at no time ceased operations, their intention being to force the Indians upon the regulars, who would deal with them according to the laws of civil ized warfare. Captains Harris, Creighton, and Bledsoe continually scouted in the mountains and along the streams, giving the coast tribes no rest. Lieutenant Ab bott surprised a party of Coquilles on that river in two eanoes, and killed twelve, including one woman. Twice had the Coquilles agreed to go and remain on their reser vation, and twice ran away before they could be disposed of. It seemed as if extermination was to be their fate, for in no other way could they be subdued. Emissaries from chief John of the Rogue-rivers, and Enos, his half-breed ally, continually alarmed and agitated the fickle and ig norant creatures, who acted without knowledge or reason, and were governed by fear, first of one and then another calamity; the worst of all being that of having to leave the country where they were born.

Early in May, Buchanan moved the whole force of reg ulars to Oak Flat, near the mouth of Illinois river. Among the Indians who had surrendered or been taken prisoners, these last being chiefly women and children, were some who could be used as messengers to the various bands, to urge them to meet him and the superintendent, to hold a council with a view to establishing peace. After consider able of this sort of correspondence, the chiefs finally came together on the twenty-first of May at the place appointed, no restraint being put upon them, John of Scott valley, and his son; Rogue-river George; Limpy, and other chiefs both of the Rogue river and Cow creek bands, to listen to what the agents of the United States had to say which they might be pleased to accept.

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 407

The council was not a friendly one, notwithstanding every effort had been made by the white chiefs to have it appear so. It was evident that if the Indians surrendered it would only be because they were weary of the present state of warfare, and wanted time to recuperate, not that they were convinced that it was for their good or even that they might not eventually conquer.

"You are a great chief," said John to Colonel Buchanan. "So am I. This is my country; I was in it when those large trees were very small, not higher than my head. My heart is sick with fighting, but I want to live in my country. If the white people are willing, I will go back to Deer creek and live among them as I used to do. They can visit my camp, and I will visit theirs; but I will not lay down my arms and go with you on the reserve. I will fight. Good-by." Whereupon he took his departure un restrained, as had been agreed upon.

The other chiefs, however, after much argument, con sented to give up their arms on the twenty-sixth near the meadows, and allowed themselves to be escorted, a part by Captain Smith to the coast reservation, by the way of Fort Lane, and the remainder to be escorted by other military officers to Port Orford, thence to be conveyed by sea to the reservation. One of the arguments which Captain Smith had felt himself forced to use, was that of the hangman s rope should any of them be taken with arms in their hands roaming about the country.

On the twenty-sixth, as agreed upon, Smith was at the rendezvous with his eighty dragoons to receive them. That they failed to appear on that day did not give him any uneasiness, the day being a stormy one and the moun tain trails slippery. But during the evening he received a visit from two Indian women, who brought him the in telligence that he might expect an attack from John on the following day. He now understood the failure of the Indians to keep their appointment, and hastened to change his camp from the low ground to higher, and to dispatch

a courier to Colonel Buchanan, with a request for reen- forcements, as John had sent word he would fight him.

The position to which Smith removed his camp was an elevation, oblong in shape, between two small streams entering the river from the northwest, and with an open surface of about two hundred and fifty by fifty yards. The south side was difficult of ascent, the north side still more abrupt, the west barely approachable, while on the east the ground sloped gently. Directly north of this mound was a similar one, covered with trees, and within rifle range. Between the first knoll and the river was a narrow strip of bottom land, which was known as "The Meadows."

The night of the twenty-sixth was a fatiguing one to the soldiers, who were occupied, without sleep, in moving camp and preparing for battle. Early on the twenty- seventh, the Indians appeared in considerable force on the north knoll, and directly forty warriors approached up the eastern slope to Smith s camp, declaring that they had come to lay down their arms, and asking to see the com mandant in person; but Smith knew enough of their plans to avoid being seized by them, simply directing them to deposit their arms at a spot outside the camp. Foiled in their design, the party retired, casting frowning looks towards the howitzer, which was so planted as to command the approach from the east. A detachment of infantry, under Lieutenant Sweitzer, was guarding the western approach, while the dragoons were stationed along the front and rear. All this was observed and understood by the forty warriors, and could be seen from the north knoll as well.

Finding Smith prepared to fight, and that they would not be allowed in camp with arms in their hands, the Indians attacked about ten o clock, charging up the east and west slopes at once, being repelled by the howitzer on one side and by rifles on the other, when they sought the cover of the trees on the north mound. Successive charges

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 409

were made during the day, chief John thundering forth his orders in the voice of a stentor, and so clearly that they were understood in Smith s camp. Not being able to come up by the east slope on account of the howitzer, nor the west on account of the riflemen, the Indians made continued attempts to get into camp by escalade at the more precipitous sides, keeping the dragoons busy to prevent it, the}^ being, too, at a disadvantage on account of the inferiority of their musketoons to the rifles of the Indians. A number of the attacking party rolled back to the bottom of the cliff, to annoy dragoons no more. Rifle balls from the north mound compelled the soldiers to use the dead bodies of horses as barricades; but no entrance to camp was effected. Thus passed the long day of the twenty-sixth. The night was spent in digging, without the proper implements, rifle pits, arid erecting breastworks. This was the second night the command had passed with out sleep, food, or water.

On the twenty -eighth, the Indians renewed the attack. To fatigue was now added the torture of thirst, it being impossible to reach water without imperiling the com mand. The wounded and the able men were alike suf fering, a circumstance observed by the Indians with the highest satisfaction, who called out frequently, "Mika hias ticka chuck?" (You very much want water?) " Ticket, chuck?" (Want water?) "Halo chuck, Boston!" (No water, white man!) To this taunt, they added another (referring to Captain Smith s threat at the council ground of hanging all Indians found roaming with arms in their hands), that they had ropes for every trooper, the soldiers not being- worth the ammunition it would cost to shoot them; and occasionally a rope was dangled over the breastworks with the invitation to Captain Smith to hang himself, 3 delivered

3 Captain Smith had told John at the council ground in answer to his defiant utter ances : " We will catch and hang you, sir ; but if you go on the reservation, you can live in peace. Do you see those wagons, blankets, clothes, horses? You will have everything good, plenty to eat, peace. If you do not come, do you see that rope, sir?" So, John, when he had the captain at a disadvantage, retaliated: "Hello,

in fairly good English. Offensive epithets were continu ally applied to the soldiers; for Indians, like Homer s heroes, fight with the sword of the spirit, which is the tongue, of course, as valiantly as with their arms. They boasted that the soldiers and all their possessions would soon fall into their hands. Such was their daring, that they crawled up to the barricades and with hooked poles drew away the soldiers blankets, who ventured not to defend them.

By four o clock of the second day, a third of Smith s command was killed or wounded, and yet no help had came from Colonel Buchanan s camp. For some time the firing had ceased on both sides, and the only sounds heard in camp were the groans of the wounded and their cries for water. About sundown the Indians held a council, and planned to charge upon the white camp with their whole force. It was an hour never to be forgotten a silent and awful hour, in the expectation of speedy and cruel death. 4

Presently, as by the baton of a concert leader, an infer nal chorus burst forth the war-cries of each band in John s host joining in one blood-curdling burst of fury, and the rush was made up the east and west approaches. To their surprise, the soldiers received them with cheers, and returned the charge. The sight which inspired the cheers and the charge had escaped the eyes of the Indians, intent on the work before them. It was Captain Augur with seventy-five men of company G, fourth infantry, who was approaching through a ravine, and which charged the Indians in the rear, as Smith met them in front. The en gagement lasted no longer than fifteen minutes, when the Indians fled to the adjoining hills, taking with them their dead and wounded. Augur lost five men, whose bodies

Captain Smith ! You go on the reservation ? Hiyu chick chick ( a great many wagons, good traveling); hiyu icta(mauy things); hiyu muck-a-muck (plenty to eat); hiyu clotftes ( plenty to wear ) ; wake clatawa reservation ( if you do not go to the reservation ) ; take lope Captain Smith ; do you see this lope, Captain Smith ? " Graver s Public Lift, MS. 49.

• Letter of a soldier.

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 411

were found next day, stripped naked and hung to trees, with their eyes picked out, and otherwise fearfully muti lated. In one part of the field was found a pile of ropes made of green bark of trees, with which John expected to have hnng all Smith s command.

The flight of the Indians when they had so great an advantage both of position and numbers, is to be attrib uted to alarm, lest a still larger force should be coming up, or to the fickle nature of the savage, or to both to gether. Chief John was a bolder, firmer, and stronger man mentally than any chief west of the Cascade moun tains. When dressed in civilized costume, he presented an appearance not very different from that of many a hard working farmer of Pennsylvania or Ohio of fifty years of age. His features were marked by that expression of grief, which is a common characteristic of savage coun tenances after youth is past, intensified in his case, no doubt, by disappointment at the. result of the war. In strong contrast to him was his son, who possessed no in dications of strength of any sort, and who had a lumpish, stolid face, devoid of any expression. Yet like his father, or in imitation of him, he on occasions displayed a desper ate courage worthy of the admiration of the United States military officers. Indians generally, however, after a valor ous onset, run away on the first sign of a turn in affairs favoring the enemy.

In the time occupied by the movements of the regulars, the volunteers had not been idle. Some companies whose time had expired were marched to Roseburg and dis charged, their places being taken by companies of second recruits, by order of the brigadier-general. Other com panies were still serving out the time of their enlistment, and even exceeding it. Captain Wallen s report shows that his company marched to Fort Lamerick at the meadows and back to Fort Leland, returning to the mead ows, leaving a detachment as escort on the road from

Canonville to Rogue river. The company returned from the meadows to Roseburg via Camas valley, sending a de tachment under Lieutenant McClure back to the meadows, and marching to quarters at Fort Smith on Cow creek, where it arrived by the end of the month.

Captain Keith had been ordered to meet Captain Smith on Rogue river near the meadows, but being ill, requested Wallen, whose time of enlistment had expired, to go in his stead. The company commanded by him had not been discharged, yet was under no obligation to obey orders. On calling their attention to the situation, and asking for volunteers from his own and other companies similarly placed, one hundred and forty-five men were found who would join him, only sixty-eight of whom were accepted, the commissary stores being low, the re mainder promising to follow as soon as provisioned.

On the twenty-seventh, the day that Smith was attacked, Wallen s command came upon an encampment of the hostiles, which fled before them without firing a gun, and which proved to be composed of the bands of Limpy and George, and some Galice-creek Indians, showing that they were not in the fight with the regulars. A few Indian women and children were captured on this occasion.

Two days later, on the twenty-ninth, the command was surprised while resting under some trees at the noon halt by some of John s band retreating from the battlefield, and H. C. Huston of Kieth s company, wounded. An en gagement then took place in which the Indians were routed, and many fled down the river towards Buchanan s camp, where they eventually surrendered themselves, being driven to it by the volunteers.

The day following this skirmish, Daniel Cooley of Wal len s company, was fired on and wounded while looking- for his revolver lost in the battle. Proceeding on down towards the meadows, the volunteers picked up many bands of John s now scattered army. At Smith s camp they found Superintendent Palmer, who had arrived to

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 413

take part in the expected surrender to the United States officers. His messengers had been sent into the mountains to collect the fugitives which the volunteers were guard ing, and now offered him, to the number of several hundred.

Instead of coming in as invited, John sent the volun teers a challenge to engage in battle with them, which was the more cheerfully accepted as the hundred men left be hind at Fort Smith had come up. At the hour appointed by John for the contest, the Indian warriors issued from the cover of the woods in two lines, advancing directly towards the volunteers until within one hundred and fifty yards of their lines, when they halted, and at the word of command from the chief, fired a voile} 7 , which, being aimed too high, whistled harmlessly over the heads of the white men, who returned the fire with a more sure aim and deadlier result.. The Indians front line then took to flight.

The second line stood until several volleys had been fired, when panic seized them and they also retreated. In vain the iron chief commanded in thunder tones; they paid no heed to him, but ran until beyond the reach of the guns of their white conquerors, when they squatted on the ground in a circle, in the hot sunshine, and wailed piteously for two hours in sorrow for a young chief who had been killed, and over their own misfortunes. Once more John endeavored to rally them, but the heart had gone out of them. It was the old pathetic story, " By the waters of Babylon they sat down and wept."

After a few hours spent in this manner, John sent word by a woman to Captain Smith that he wished to surrender if his people could be allowed to retain their guns. The proposal was refused. He then sent his son to ask leave to retain half their guns, which was also refused. Another proposition to keep one-third of their arms was in like manner negatived, and the Indians ordered to stack their arms against a rock, or return with them and fi ght. John

himself at last came to entreat permission for his people to keep some arms, and when lie was denied walked away with a malediction on the hard turn-turn (heart) of the white conqueror.

Towards night forty warriors laid their guns against the rock, and small squads kept coming in until darkness set tled down over the camp, when, to prevent any treacherous movement, they were ordered to remain without camp, at the peril of their lives, during the night. When morning came the surrender was completed, John coming in last. He set his gun against the rock, then suddenly grasped it, but before he could raise it to his shoulder fifty rifles were alined at his heart. He again relinquished it, and sul lenly, with a defiant manner, took his place among the prisoners. 5 At the final settlement, however, of the terms of surrender, it was agreed that neither he nor any of his people should suffer any punishment for acts committed by them, nor be compelled to surrender any of the prop erty captured by them during the war.

As soon as his wounded could be moved, Smith set off by easy marches for the mouth of the river, embarrassed by the number of his prisoners, which more than doubled that of the regulars and volunteers. Some fears were ex pressed that the Indians, even without guns, and only armed with stones, might make an attack on numbers so inferior; but no outbreak occurred on the passage.

On arriving at the mouth of Rogue river it was found that a band of renegades from the coast tribes were about attacking the camp of the miners at Gold Beach, which again furnished work for the troops, who together killed about forty of them before capturing the remainder. As the regular camp moved from Rogue river to Port Orford, it gathered up the Pistol-river and Chetco Indians, the month of June being spent in this movement, which ended at Port Orford, July second. On the ninth, about

5 This account of the surrender of John s band was given by Captain Wallen, who was present. It agrees substantially with other accounts given at the time.

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 415

seven hundred, not including John s people, were placed on board a vessel in charge of Captain Smith, to be taken to Portland, and thence to the northern end of the coast reservation in Polk county. Four hundred others, with whom went John s band, and the Pistol-river and Chetco bands, were sent to the southern end of the reservation ma the valley of the Coquille and Roseburg, at which place Captain Smith met them with his command as escort.

The removal of the Indians was not accomplished with out much difficulty, the coast tribes being especially troublesome, and escaping in parties of twos, threes, or half dozens. At the reservation affairs did not move smoothly. It was for the most part a rugged and heavily timbered country, bounded by mountains on one side and by the sea on the other. The Indians complained that the forest did not afford game. The houses hastily erected were uninviting. The shops, mills, farming machinery, and other beneficent gifts promised by the terms of the several treaties, were absent. The climate, though health ful, was rude compared to the warm southern airs of the Rogue-river country. Even the commissary department was a failure, because congress delayed making appropria tions, and the agents having to purchase on credit, were forced by that circumstance, and the long distance over which freight had to be hauled, to accept as flour the sweepings of the mill in the Wallamet, or at the best shorts ground over, 6 which the contractors thought good enough for Indians.

It might here be said that during the Cayuse war, sim ilar frauds were practiced upon the provisional govern ment, and by the same mill at Oregon City. 7 When good flour sold at Portland for eight dollars a barrel, the con tractor who furnished the reservation charged the govern ment twenty dollars a barrel for shorts, delivered at the

6 Report of Ross Browne in United States executive documents, 39, p. 42, thirty-fifth congress, first session, volume IX.

7 Owned in 1856 by George Aberuethy and Robert Pentlaud ; in 1846-7 by Abernethy and associates.

agency. The quarterly expenses of the Siletz reservation, which the Indians found so undesirable, were over one hundred thousand dollars, a large part of which sum was expended in improvements. The agent, R. B. Metcalf, found his pay to be so meager as to offer no inducement for him to remain ; though he did remain, and come out at the end of four years with forty thousand dollars.

These apparent abuses were known by and complained of among the Indians before they came to the ears of the people. The superintendent was powerless to prevent it, und finally resigned before congress had made good the obligations entered into between him and the Indians, a new superintendent, A. F. Hedges, being appointed in his place. This was also a source of disquiet among the In dians, who had looked upon Palmer as the representative of a powerful government, whose office was permanent like that of one of their own chiefs. Hedges remained in office but a few months, when he also resigned, and J. W. Nesmith was appointed.

The constant cry of the Indians from the first was that they were homesick, and longed to return to their native country. Rogue-river Sam and others complained that they had been deceived in the matter of their land in southern Oregon; that by the treaty of 1853 the Table Rock reservation had not been sold to the government, but that they had been driven away from it by the war; iind that Captain Smith, Superintendent Palmer, and the agents, had promised them they should return to it when the war was ended. Then why were they not permitted to go back, now that there was no more war? They did not like the country they were in; it was cold, sickly, and destitute of game. They might as well be killed as die of disease on the reservation.

They even suspected the agent of attempting to kill them by poison, such was the effect of the food furnished them, added to other causes of disease, namely, venereal infection, change of climate, indolence, and over-eating.

THE ROGUE EIVER WARS 417

After a hospital was erected for them, they would not re main in it more than two or three days, but would return to their huts, and having nothing else to do, gamble away the clothing furnished them, take cold, and die. What ever the causes, out of the six hundred Rogue-river and Cow-creek Indians taken to the Siletz reservation in 1856, there remained in 1857 but three hundred and eighty-five.

John said to Ross Browne, appointed by the government in 1857 to examine into the affairs of the Indian reserva tions : " For my own part my heart is sick. Many of my people have died since they came here; many are still dying. There will soon be none left of us. Here the mountains are covered with great forests; it is hard to get through them. We have no game; we are sick at heart; we are sad when we look on the graves of our families. A long time ago we made a treaty with Palmer. There was a piece of land at Table Rock that was ours. He said it should remain ours, but that for the sake of peace, as the white settlers were bad, we should leave it for a while. When we signed the paper that was our understanding. We now want to go back to our country. During the war my heart was bad. Last winter, when the rain came and we were all starving, it was still bad. Now it is good. I will consent to live here one year more; after that I must go home."

John was quite in earnest in his determination to return to Table Rock, and by his incendiary councils kept up a spirit of unrest and rebellion among the chiefs, which caused the military authorities to send him and his son to San Francisco to be confined in Fort Alcatraz. When the steamship Columbia, which carried them, was off Hum- boldt bay, they made an attempt to take the vessel that they might escape to their beloved country. The sergeant, in whose charge they were, being asleep in his berth, about one o clock at night they attempted to take the revolver with which he was armed, but awoke him in the act. In the struggle which ensued, the chief throttling

27

the sergeant and his son endeavoring to disarm him, John forgot his prudence and gave the terrifying war-whoop, which startled every soul on board, and brought officers and passengers to the scene. A fight for liberty followed, in which a couple of passengers were wounded, and in which the young chief received an injury which caused him to lose a leg. After a residence of several years at Alcatraz, John was pardoned and allowed to return to the reservation, where, as he expressed it, he " could see again his wife and daughters, who would tend upon him and comb his hair."

The military establishments which were erected to guard and control the Indians subsequent to their removal to the reservation, were Fort Sheridan at the Grand Rond reser vation in Yamhill county, which was abandoned in a few years, or as soon as the Indians on this reserve could be removed to the Siletz; a blockhouse at the Siletz agency where a "corporal s guard" was stationed; Fort Hoskins in King s valley, Benton county, thirty miles from the agency, where a full company was stationed, and Fort Umpqua, at the mouth of Urnpqua river, where it was placed to intercept fugitives escaping from the reservation, as well as to look after some still uncaptured bands, whose depredations upon settlers and wars among themselves were disquieting to the white inhabitants. At the latter post were stationed at different times Major Scott and Lieutenants Loraine, Piper, and Harding, the latter be coming a general in the civil war.

The post at Port Orford was maintained for a year or two. As late as March, 1858, the miners and settlers at and near the mouth of Rouge river petitioned Governor Curry to " recognize" a company of Gold Beach guards, consisting of nineteen men under the command of Elisha H. Meservey, which company was formed to protect the white inhabitants from murder, arson, and robbery crimes being committed by the several small mountain

THE ROGUE RIVER WARS. 419

tribes remaining at large. This company received the approbation of the governor, serving until July.

In the meantime, the Indian superintendent was com pelled to call upon the military department for aid, and Lieutenant Ihrie, with special agent William Tichenor of Port Orford, finally succeeded in collecting and forcing upon the reservation these roving savages. On the march of Lieutenant Ihrie s supply train from Pistol river, where he was encamped, to Crescent City for provisions, the escort was attacked and one soldier and ten animals . killed. Tichenor, with a considerable number of prisoners, was waiting for an escort to the reservation; but Ihrie being unable to furnish it, and the Indians being very restless, set out with a small party to conduct them out of the dangerous vicinity. Above Rogue river the prisoners at tempted an escape, and, in the struggle for the mastery, fifteen of them were killed.

In his report to the superintendent, Tichenor says : " They had eight days previously come off the war path, having killed the remainder of the Sebanty band. They stated the facts to me, telling me how they killed two little boys of the band by throwing them into the river; describing their struggling for life in the water, and how they beat them under with stones. They were the most desperate and murderous of all the Indians on the coast. As they never intended to surrender or go on the reservation fifteen of them were killed and two wounded. * * * Ten men and twenty-five women and children yet remain in that country, and I am ready to make further efforts to capture them, or induce them to go on the reservation should you again desire my services."

On the second of July, 1858, Captain Meservey of the Gold Beach volunteers wrote to adjutant-general of Oregon: "The last of the red men have been captured and shot, only women and children spared, and they are en route for the reserve. All further apprehension of danger is at an end, and this portion of Oregon will rest in Iranquility."

420 INDIAN WARS OF ORE GO ft.

Thus ended the Indian wars in this quarter of Oregon. They were unavoidable. They laid waste the homes of white and red men alike; but the white race was com pelled to make good its own and its enemy s losses, and while it ploughed and planted and built, the Indians were fed, nursed, and taught, so far as they would be. When a large proportion had died off, who were unfit to live, the remainder began a new growth and increase in numbers. The children born on the reservation know no other home, and even their elders are at length content, living a half civilized life, which, compared with their former nomadic existence, is one of indolent ease.