The Emperor Marcus Antoninus: His Conversation with Himself/Gataker's Preliminary Discourse

by Thomas Gataker

---

---

GATAKER's

Preliminary

DISCOURSE.

In which

The Principles of the Stoicks are compared with the Peripateticks, with the Old Academicks, and more especially with the Epicurean Sect: The remaining Writings likewise of the Stoick Philosophers, Seneca, Epictetus, and particularly those of our Emperour Marcus Antoninus, are briefly examined.

'TIS the Opinion of several Christian Writers that the Principles of the Stoicks come nearer the Doctrines of the Gospel, than any other Sect of the Antient Philosophers. Josephus likewise who was a Pharisee by Perswasion, (which St. Paul calls the straitest Sect of the Jewish Religion^[1]) affirms that the Sect of the Pharisees resembled that of the Stoicks among the Greeks: ^[2] And to come within the pale of the Church, St, Hierom is positive that the Stoicks agree with the Tenets of Christianity in most Points, ^[3] And that they agree with us in many Things is past all Dispute, as will appear to any Person that will be at the pains to compare the Moral Precepts of the one Perswasion with those of the other. Indeed I think there's no Division of the Pagan Philosophy which reaches up to the Stoicks. To speak modestly, there's no Sect that I know of, that sets a greater value upon Virtue and Religion, drives the Notion higher, discovers more of good Earnest, and Bravery, presses the Practise with more Spirit and Argument, and promotes it with more warmth of Inclination.

To make this Truth more Evident, 'twill not be improper to compare the Philosophy of the Stoicks, with the most considerable pretensions of those of another Way; And here I shall wave the mention of Pythagoras's mystick, or rather magical System, ^[4] of which there are only some broken Remains come to our Hands: For the Golden Verses which go under Pythagoras's Name, are of the same stamp with Phocylides's Monitory, both of them Forg'd and Counterfeit. And as for the slovenlyness Smut and lewd Practice of the Cynicks, ^[5] they don't deserve the honour of a Competition; And here by the way, Juvenal was much mistaken in saying that the Cynicks differ'd from the Stoicks in nothing but in wearing fewer Cloaths; ^[6] Whereas the Stoicks hated the Cynical Uncleanliness both in Habit and Behaviour, as highly Scandalous and Dishonourable to Humane Nature. ^[7] To return, neither do I think the Scepticism of the New Academy worth the bringing into the Lists: For what regard is to be had to those People that distrust their Sences, and destroy the Grounds of all Science? that Degrade a Man from the privilege of his Reason, make his Body and Soul Insignificant, and neither allow him Eyes, or Understanding to any purpose.

I shall therefore proceed to those Sages who have been more happy in their pursuits of Wisdom, who have Cultivated Philosophy better, been better Follow'd, and gained more Credit in the World. And here I shall begin with the Old Academicks and Peripateticks, who were Plato's Disciples: And since these two Sects are the same in their Tenents, and differ only in their Names, and the Places where they first set up; ^[8] I shall for Brevity sake joyn them both together. Under this Distinction Aristotle was the most Eminent Person; He was indeed a very extraordinary Genius, ^[9] run through Logicks, Rhetorick, Poetry, Politicks, Oeconomicks, Ethicks, and Physicks, and perform'd Wonders upon almost all the parts of Learning and Philosophy; ^[10]insomuch that as far as we can guess by what is extant, the World is more oblig'd to his Pen, than to all the Old Authors put together. 'Tis true, some give him this Character with an Exception of Preference for Plato his Master. ^[11] But these Criticks seem to mistake the Drift of Plato's Writings : It being not so much the Design of this great Man to treat the Principles of Science, and leave us a Body of Learning, as to Combat the Sophists of his own Time : ^[12] For this purpose he disputes under the Person of Socrates, and makes it his main business, to refute the Fallacies, to pull of the Mask, and expose the Trifling, of these pretenders in Philosophy. And working upon this View, he was oblig'd to take a compass in his Reasoning, to run out into seeming Digressions; and carry the Dispute to a vast length; And tho' the Connexion is true and Artificial, yet 'tis wrought In so fine, that the Reader has sometimes much ado to keep sight of the main Argument. 'Tis granted a Man is not apt to Tire upon the Journey; There's great variety of Invention; the stile is entertaining, and the Tale very handsomly told, but then the Cause is so banded from one hand to another, ^[13] and pleaded with so much Colour, and Contradiction, that 'tis somewhat difficult, to come at the Truth, and know on which side the Verdict ought to be given.

And since Aristotle is more clear and intelligible, we shall apply to him for his Opinion concerning the Precepts of Life ; This Philosopher therefore shall Represent his Clan, and deliver the Sence of the Old Academicks, and Peripateticks. Now Aristotle, as Plato did before him, ranges the Notion of Advantage under three Heads, and throws it into the Divisions of Mind, Body, and Fortune. 'Tis true, He gives the Preferrence to the First, but then he lays great stress upon the two Latter , and makes them contribute very considerably to the satisfaction of Life ; ^[14] Insomuch that he won't allow the best Man Living to be Happy if either his Health, or his Pocket, are out of Order, ^[15] especially if he falls into any Remarkable Calamity ; This weight of Adversity is too much for the Mind , and forces a Man's Virtue to grow uneasie : It makes a breach in his Enjoyment, and crushes his Happiness to peices. ^[16]

This is Aristole's Opinion; But the Stoicks would not so much as grant Wealth, or Constitution any Consideration in this Case, nor vouchsafe to admit any thing without the Mind, into the Distinctions of Good, or Evil: With this Sect the Circumstances of Flesh and Blood, and the Condition of Externals, were but a sort of Indifferent Matters, and signified little either one way, or to'ther. For in their Philosophy nothing was Good,^[17] but what was Pious, Just, Honourable, and Humane. Nor any thing Bad excepting what was Wicked, Unjust, Inhumane, and Scandalous: And for this reason, they look'd upon Fools, and Knaves, Atheists, and Libertines, no better than Miserable Wretches, tho' they were never so well accommodated in their Purse, their Carkass, or their Quality. And on the contrary,^[18] that a Man of Virtue and Piety is always in a State of Happiness, let his Circumstances be what they will, and himself never so much harrass'd with the pretended Evils of Life. And lastly,^[19] that none but a Person of this Character can with any Propriety be said to be Wise, to be rightly Free, and Master of himself: And being always the Favourite of Heaven, and the particular care of Providence; he is the only Body that lives undisturb'd, and is out of the Reach of Fear, and Anxiety. For let him live, or dye, ^[20] the Deity he resigns to, will never suffer him to fall into a real Disadvantage ; ^[21] so that 'tis impossible for him ever to be wretched, or uneasy, or to meet with any thing big enough to throw him out of his Satisfaction. These are the Generous Principles of the Stoicks, in which as they overshot the Peripatetick, and Old Academick Sect, so they must be said to approach nearer to the true Greatness of the Christian Religion.

I confess I am not altogether of ^[22] Tully's, and St. Augustin's ^[23] Mind, who will have it that these two Sects are agreed in the Thing, and differ only in the wording their Opinion. Such a perfect Accommodation is I think prov'd Impracticable by Tully himself in the Person of Cato : ^[24] However, I am so far of this great Orator's Opinion that the Contest between the Stoicks and Peripateticks, was very Honourable: ^[25] The Dignity, and Supremacy of Virtue was granted on both sides ; The only Dispute was whether 'twas sufficient to do a Man's Business alone ; and make him happy in spite of every Thing beside. But then to make no Difference between Zeno's Cloyster, and the Gardens of Epicurus ; to compare the Men of Liberty, with the great Champions for Virtue and Self-denial, and to bring Pleasure and Discipline into a Competition, this looks like a very unhandsome, and unreasonable Fancy. ^[26] For all that, some have been so hardy as to endeavour the Reconciling these Contradictions ; and to make the Matter the more Extraordinary, it has been attempted by some of the Stoicks. Let's see a little how one of them pretends to manage the Paradox.

If you fancy there's any great matter between us, you are mistaken, says Seneca : ^[27] A little difference indeed, when Virtue is all in all with one Sect, and Pleasure the Idol of the other!

Seneca goes on : ^[28] Epicurus, says he, puts Pleasure under the same Rules which we do Virtue. But first, under Favour, the Stoicks prescrib'd no Laws to Virtue, but took their Measures from her. Farther, granting their Doctrines the same in some Cases, this little step would never bring them together. All the World allows a great Difference between the Professions of Medicine and Philosophy ; and yet their Prescriptions concerning Diet, and Management are often the same. Let's hear the Advice of that Eminent Physician Hippocrates ; Let ^[29] Labour, and Meat and Drink, and Sleep and Pleasure be all taken with Moderation. And would not a Stoick, Epicurean, or any other Philosopher have order'd just the same Thing? But tho' the Prescription would be the same, the reason of prescribing would be different. Now in ^[30] Morality 'tis the End which gives the Form and Distinction to an Action : And here we shall find the Stoick and Epicurean Philosophers differ as much from each other in the main Drift, as they do from ^[31] the Profession of Physick. The Physician's Business is to guard against Diseases, the Epicureans against Pain : and the Stoicks against Vice and Immorality : The first aims at the securing of Health, the second of Pleasure, and the third of Honesty. Nothing can be more remote than these two Clans of Philosophy, The one place Virtue upon the Throne, make her Absolute, and Independent; and scarcely admit Pleasure to wait upon her tho' at an humble Distance. Whereas the other make probity truckle to Appetite, and afford Reason no better Office than to cater for their Senses. Here Pleasure is the Queen of the Country, ^[32] and Virtue allow'd no better Business than to whisper a little Caution to her Mistris; that she may not live too fast, wear up her Constitution; and destroy the Capacities of Enjoyment.

But there's a ^[33] great deal of Religion and Probity in the Precepts of Epicurus, yes a great deal of Discipline and Bravery too, if they are closely examin'd.

Wee'l come nearer then if you please, and look nicely into the Merits of the Cause : And this I shall do the rather because this Sect, as Tully ^[34] observes, by counterfeiting the Air of Virtue, and dropping a few shining Sentences, had drawn off a great many Proselytes.

And now in good earnest, can that Man set up for Religion who disclaims the Belief of Providence? ^[35]Who teaches that God is unconcern'd with the World, and neither gives himself, ^[36] nor any body else any manner of Trouble? That ^[37] the Business of Rewards and Punishments are foreign to his Nature, and that he can neither be angry nor pleas'd with poor Mortals? He must needs be a pious Philosopher, who as his Disciples are pleas'd to brag, was the first bold Man ^[38] who durst attempt the scaling of the Skyes, and make an open Attack upon the Deity?

And as for Honest Principles, how can we expect them from those People who declare they value neither ^[39] Friendship, Good Faith, Justice, nor any other Virtue any farther than their ^[40] Interest or their Fancy are serv'd by them : With these Philosophers ^[41] Virtue has no Intrinsick Goodness, no Native Beauty, nothing that's charming in the bare Practice : No, Honesty and Truth ^[42] do but glister in the Name, and make a handsome Noise, but there's nothing in them. And farther, they are so frank as to confess, that a Man ought not to balk himself in any Lewdness, ^[43] Crime or Scandal, that has either Profit or Pleasure in't : Not to balk himself, I say, upon the Score of any Moral Deformity of the Action; For to say ^[44] an Action is evil in it self, is a Jest : 'Tis true, one should be cautious when there's likely to be Damage, ^[45] or Danger in the Case. But as for any Apprehensions about the Displeasure, and Vengeance of Heaven, that's all Superstition and stuff, with these Gentlemen ; Conscience is a Cypher in their Philosophy ; their Reason to forbear doing Mischief is only to save their Carkass; 'tis not the Law, but the Gallows which frights them ; and besides, they are afraid a Provocation may be return'd by private Revenge ; for let them be never so cunning, ^[46] there's no Ensuring of Falshood, and foul play.

Let us proceed, and examine the Strictness and Sobriety of their Philosophy ; Alass ! They suffer, ^[47] if you will take their Word for't, under a wrong Imputation : They are represented to breed their Disciples to Niceness, and Luxury, whereas the Case is quite otherwise ; For their Lectures declare strongly for Regularity and Temperance, and are full of Gravity, and Discipline. Is not their Chief, Epicurus, ^[48] very satyrical upon the Libertines ? Does he not reprimand the Folly of those People who are overset with Pleasure, blinded with Appetite, and carried off with the Blandishments of Sense ? And while they lye thus at the Mercy of Luxury, and Lust, they never consider what Diseases they bring upon themselves, how much pain they are likely to feel, and how dear the Frolick will cost them?

But now by the last Sentence of his Correstion we may discover the Ground of his falling out with these Sparks. The good Man does not lash their Vice out of any ill will to't ; he is no Enemy to Debauchery ; For all Pleasure, ^[49] let it come which way 'twill, is a good thing : Therefore says he, If those ^[50] Satisfactions which gratify a Libertine, could deliver him from the Rebukes of Conscience and the fear of Death, and Apprehensions of Pain, if they could do this, and set Bounds of Convenience to his Fancy, I should have nothing to object against his Method ; I should rather applaud his Choice, and encourage his Freedom ; For when a Man is brim full of Delight, and has nothing to trouble him ; he can't be in an Ill way ; for nothing but Pain and uneasy thinking, are Evil. Here we see plainly this Philosopher has no quarrel with a Debauchee for his Lewdness ; he rather commends him for humouring his Palate, and making much of himself. He does so, provided he stands clear of Inconvenience ; and in order to this, especial care must be taken to get the better of his Conscience, and drive Religion out of his Head : Why, when does Epicurus fall foul upon Spendthrifts and Libertines ? Because they are Blockheads, ^[51] and have no Discretion with their Vice ; because they run themselves out of breath, and destroy the Pleasure with their Eagerness. Their unmanagableness ruins their Health, and their Fortune, and their Reputation, and more than that, it often brings them under the lash of the Law. These are the strict Morals, the hard Lessons of Epicurus's School, and the rugged Penance he puts his Proselytes upon! He gives them their full Freedom in Debauchery : But then they must be lewd like Men of Sense, and Understanding ; for to over-drive their Constitution, and lose their Credit, and bring themselves to Beggary, and Trouble, these are bad things indeed !

But notwithstanding the Liberty of their Principles, and their Idolizing of Pleasure, there were several of them Men of great Temperance, and Frugality : ^[52] Epicurus will tell you, that he could satisfy his Stomach for a half Penny ; And Metrodorus, tho' a lower Proficient could do it for three Farthings. Yes, Epicurus had put so much Philosophy in his Palate, that Bread and Water ^[53] would Regale him, and make him almost wild with Satisfaction: As for Luxury, and Expence he despis'd the Relish, and abominated the Thoughts on't: Give him but a Glass of pure Element, and a little Hasty-pudding, and he would hardly have ^[54] own'd that Jupiter had eaten better: This ^[55] Diet if you are but rightly sharp has as much taste in't as you would wish: For ^[56] very ordinary Meat and Drink will oblige the Sense, and lay Hunger asleep as effectually, as that which is counted the most Delicious.

Eudoxus liv'd before Epicurus, and was a Person of the same Persuasion: Now ^[57] Arislotle gives this Man an extraordinary Character for Sobriety, and makes him a great Master of his Palate : This Command of himself made his Opinion go much the farther : ^[58] For People would not believe that any Byass of Interest, or Sensuality could govern him, but that 'twas pure Conviction and ^[59] Force of Truth, which brought him to declare for the Preheminence of Pleasure. But as for Epicurus's Temperance, there's some Reason to question it. For Timochares assures us, ^[60] that he was so far from being satisfied with a Meal of three Farthings, that 'twas his Method to eat up three Pounds Sterling every Day: And this Story he does ^[61]not stick to confirm himself. So that his common Custom, and his Fits of Mortification, seem to be very different. Sometimes 'tis granted he us'd to accomodate his Stomach ^[62] very indifferently; This he did to try whether his Pleasure abated with his Retrenching, or to what Degree: And that he might be convinc'd whether Good Eating was worth the Drudging for or not: And it may be He made the Experiment ^[63] to arm himself against Casualty, and Misfortune, and that ^[64] Poverty might never catch him unprovided. In short, He seems to have done that by Fits, which it may be was Eudoxus's constant Practice. Let us now enquire into the Reasons of his Discipline : Let us examine why he refuses to be always in a Course of Luxury; what puts him upon starts of Austerity, and makes him prefer a homely Diet to a plentiful Table. Now in the first place Hee'l tell you, He does not take up upon the score of Conscience, as if ^[65] Temperance were worth the minding, or there was any harm in Gluttony : Not at all. 'Tis the ill effects, and not the Excesses of Gourmandizing which makes him a little Cautious. For to keep the Kitchin always hot, is the way to set the House on fire. To be always loading the Table, and eating of tid-Bits, must sink a Man's Pocket cruelly. Such Extravagance commonly ends in Beggary; the Glutton lays ^[66] all upon the tip of his Tongue, and swallows his Estate like a poached Egg. And which is more, these Excesses make the Carkass smart, as well as the Pocket. And here ^[67] the Epicurean is attack'd in the Seat of his Pleasure, and touch'd in the most sensible Part. Thus Epicurus observes, that those People who have no Brains to their Palate, commonly pay for't in their ^[68] Health. For that which would be Nourishment to a hungry Stomach, is but a Burthen to us when we are full. Thus a great many Dishes ^[69] breed a great many Diseases, we eat our selves into a Consumption ; and grow leaner by being over stuffed, than we should do by fasting. And to conclude, Drunkenness and Gluttony, are punish'd withy such Defluxions ^[70] of Rheum, with so much Qualm, and Headach, with such Pains and Weakness in their whole Body ; insomuch that if Men ^[71] would think a little before-hand, and compute upon the Consequences of a Debauch ; they would not run themselves a ground so often, nor carry the Frolick so far as they do. Besides, Epicurus and his Followers, had a farther aim in their Experiments of Sobriety : They did not practise it as a Virtue, but as an Exercise: ^[72] They made Prosperity do Pennance sometimes, that they might bear Adversity the better: That they might have nothing New to surprize them; and that the Hardships of Choice might reconcile them to those of Necessity. They had likewise a mind to try how ^[73] little would satisfy Nature, and how ^[74] rellishing Hunger could make it. And lastly, they pinch'd now' and then, that they might feast ^[75] with the better Gust: For ^[76] sensual Satisfactions are the more welcome, by makinq their Visits seldom: Frequency in this case does but clog the Senses, and make the Appetite grow dull. And therefore feeding constantly upon Delicacies is said to have more of Expence than Pleasure ^[77] in't. Distance, and Intermission, give a Keenness to Desire: Hunger strengthens ^[78] the Taste, and doubles the Satisfaction; as Liberty is much sweeter when it rises out of Servitude, and Oppression. This made Socrates pronounce ^[79] Hunger an admirable Sauce: And as that Philosopher use to say, that by walking himself sharp, ^[80] he had no occasion to go to the Butcher; for his Loaf would afford him Bread and Meat too, when he was throughly hungry. Just thus Epicurus used to balk himself sometimes and keep his Stomach craving; that he might fall too with more Eagerness afterwards, and be better prepared for a Luxurious Entertainment. But when the Design is thus mean, what Virtue or Credit can you exepect in the Practise? He is a poor Man of Morals that can rise no higher then Pleasure, and Cramming! A Man may find as much Philosophy in a Hen-coop, as this comes too.

Thus we have taken a View of the Rigour, Severity, and Mortification of Epicurus's Doctrine! Let us now proceed to his Flights of Fortitude. Yes, says Seneca, Epicurus had Mettal both in his Books, and his Practise: He ^[81] was a finical Spark 'tis true, but a brave Fellow for all that. How do you prove it? Because there's Resolution; as well as Prudence in his Conduct. For notwithstanding he ^[82] pronounces all Pleasure to be Good, and Pain to be Evil in it self, yet sometimes, when Interest and Convenience require it, he ^[83] manages as if he believ'd the quite contrary. Upon this Account, he checks his Fancy, and denies himself in his Pleasure, when he foresees there will be Pain at the end on't; And on the other Hand, makes no difficulty to submit to Fatiguing, and Trouble when he has a fair Prospect of an over-ballance of Pleasure by the Bargain. And is not all this an Argument of Fortitude, as well as Understanding?

But under favour, the submitting to some Instances of Hardship is no sufficient Proof of Fortitude. If this Pretence would do, ^[84] Lovers, and Madmen ^[85] would be the bravest People in the World: For won't the first drudge and mortify strangely to gain their Point? And as for the latter, they'l charge up to the Cannons Mouth, and no Consideration of danger can stop their Frensy. At this rate a hardy Malefactor might challenge the Virtue of a Philosopher. Those Libertines likewise may come in for a share of this Character, who murther themselves, because they han't patience to out-live their Pocket, nor bear up against the Consequences of their Folly. And yet Epicurus ^[86] himself gives the Cause against these People. To go on; By this reasoning, those wretches ^[87] may be said to be brave, who out of an over-fondness of Life are contented to put an incurable Carkass upon the Rack, and submit to extremity of Torture; tho' all they get by it, is rather to prolong their Misery, than their Being. And thus that scandalous Carpet-Knight Mæcenas, would pass for a Man of Fortitude; for if those Verses of his cited by Seneca, were spoken in earnest, nothing can be more mean:

^[88] Let Gout my Hands and Feet distress,
Or Palsy make me Motionless;
Let my whole Body start in Tumours,
And all my Blood be turn'd to Humours;
Grant me but Life, and I'm contented,
And on the Rack shall ne're repent it.

I am willing (says he) to be impaled ^[89] or crucified if you please, so you will but let me live through it. Without doubt 'tis worth his while to rest on his Wounds, and be strain'd on a Gibbet, only to keep his Punishment alive; which 'tis the best of his Case to dispatch as soon as may be! And lastly by this Notion; whosoever denies himself for his Pleasure, and suffers to gratify a Vitious Passion may be called a Man of Fortitude. But we say, 'tis the ^[90] Cause and not the Punishment, that makes the Martyr. And thus 'tis not the What, but the Why of a Mans suffering ; which gives him the Credit on't : The Virtue turns chiefly upon the Reason, not upon the Pain : He only is the brave Man, that mortifies upon Principle; ^[91] that chuses rather to suffer than misbehave himself; and runs through all Discouragements upon the score of Conscience and Honour. But how can that Man suffer upon these Grounds, who lays it down for a Maxim, that Honesty unattended with Pleasure, is good for nothing : A meer Shadow ^[92] without any thing Substantial to fill the Grasp: And who looks upon ^[93] Fortitude without reference to Interest, to be no better than Whimsey, and Romance.

However, it must be granted, Epicurus has a great deal of Courage in some of his Sentences: Tho' after all, the Vanity of them seems more remarkable than the Greatness. His Wise-man, if you'l take his Word for't, must be Happy with the Scottish Boot. Yes, if he was roasting in ^[94] Phalaris's Bull, he would bellow with Satisfaction; and cry out what a delicious Torture is this? And how handsomely do I contemn it? Nay, he tells you of himself, ^[95] that the last Agonizing Day of his Life was the happiest in the World; 'Tis true the Cholick and the Stone, ^[96] raged to Extremity, and did their worst upon him. But then the Pleasure ^[97] he had in the Reflection upon his own Writings, overtop'd the Pain; and made his Imagination too strong for his Senses.

But we must not be too forward in believing a Rhodomontade, againft avow'd Principles. 'Tis true, if these Flourishes had been spoken by a Philosopher that confines the Notion ^[98] of Advantage to Honesty, and reckons nothing but ^[99] Vice a Misfortune. That makes Good and Evil, ^[100] lye only in the use of the Will, and the Temper of the Mind : who declares Virtue self-sufficient ^[101] for a happy Life, and that she stands in need of no Foreign ^[102] Assistance. He that tells you that a perfect Philosopher is impregnable in his Happiness, and proof against the Impressions of Pain: ^[103] That Virtue is never to be beaten off, 'twill keep a ^[104] Man Company under all Tryals, mount the Scaffold, and the Wheel, and shine ^[105] through his Limbs, while he's burning at the Stake. A Man that has such hardy Principles may talk at this rate; for here his Heart, and his Tongue go together, and there's consistency in the Case. But can any one be so void of common Sense, as to believe Epicurus in earnest in such Flights as these? Epicurus, I say, who makes Pleasure the Supreme Good, ^[106] Pain and Torment, the most formidable Evil. And when he has done, states his Notions of these things in the most scandalous manner imaginable. For he affirms the Body ^[107] the main Seat of Satisfaction; denies the Mind any independent Entertainment of her own: And maintains that all the Pleasure of Thought, either begins from the Body or Ends in it. And lastly , He is so frank as to confess; that as for the Notion of Good, as some People understood it, he neither knew where 'twas, nor what. Nothing was Good to him; that was not Good to his ^[108] Senses, that did not please him in his Eyes, or in his Ears, in his Touch, his Taste, or his Smelling,

No Man, says the Poet in Seneca, is ^[109] Happy who does not think himself so: Yes, says Epicurus; he must ^[110] fancy himself superlatively Happy, or else it won't do: Now how can that Man have such a pleasant Fancy, that lies Agonizing in Pain? And owns himself afflicted with the greatest Evil, and in the highest Degree imaginable?

But Epicurus's Lodgings are too Rank to stay in; a little better Air won't do amiss, and therefore wee'l take a turn in Zeno's Piazza.

Now the Stoicks are of a quite different Complexion, and directly opposite to the Epicurean Tenents above-mention'd.

These Philosophers have admirable Notions; "They ^[111] hold that God Almighty governs the Universe; that his Providence is not only General, but Particular, and reaches to Persons, and Things: That ^[112] he presides over Humane Affairs; that he assists Men not only in the greatest Concerns, in the Exercises of Virtue, but also supplies them with the Conveniencies of Life. And ^[113] therefore that God ought to be Worship'd above all Things, and applied to upon all Occasions ; that we ^[114] should have him always in our Thoughts, acknowledge his Power, resign to his Wisdom, and adore his Goodness for all the ^[115] Satisfactions of our Being, To ^[116] submit to his Providence without Reserve. To be pleased with his Administration; ^[117] and fully persuaded that the Scheme of the World could not have been mended, nor the Subordination of Things more suitably adjusted, nor all Events have been better timed for the common Advantage: ^[118] And therefore that 'tis the Duty of all Mankind, to obey the Signal, and follow the Intimations of Heaven, with all the Alacrity imaginable: That the ^[119] Post assign'd us by Providence must be maintain'd with Resolution; and that we ought to die a ^[120] thousand times over, rather than desert it.

These are the Stoick Principles concerning the Deity, and the Regard due to him: Let us now examine how they stand affected towards Mankind.

And here their Precepts are no less extraordinary than in the former Case. For "They declare ^[121] plainly, that we must love all Mankind heartily, and without a Compliment; that we must solicit their Interest, bear with their Infirmities, and do no manner of Injury to any Mortal: That a Man should not think himself born only for his private Satisfaction; but exert his Strength for the publick Advantage, and make his Life as significant to the World as 'tis possible: That ^[122] the Conscience of a good Action should content him; without the prospect of Fame or Reward: That he should never be tired with the Exercise of Good Nature, but pursue one Kindness so closely with another, that there may be no room for any insignificant Spaces of Life to come between. That a Man ought to look upon a Generous Action as a Reward to it self, and that we oblige our selves, by doing a good turn to another. And therefore that 'tis a piece of Meanness to ramble Abroad, and grasp at Interest, or Applause. ^[123] Farther; "That the polishing our Reason; and the governing our Will, is the most noble Imployment; and that nothing ought to be preferr'd to the Practise of Honesty. And lastly, ^[124] "That a Man should stand immovably by his Reason, that no clamour of Appetite should call him off, that no Loss of Fortune, no Menaces of Death, no Extremities of Torture, should make him give way, or frighten him from a known Duty."

These are some of the Noble Sentences we meet with in the Writings of the Stoicks ; what strains of Piety, what Instances of Humanity, what flights of Greatness are here? And to give them their due, they don't run out into Inconsistency, nor talk above their Principles. Whereas the Epicurean Doctrines if you take them rightly, have neither Substance nor Show in them.

But 'tis objected against the Stoicks, that they were but little follow'd, that they were not constant to their Party, and fail'd in the point of Practise. I shall touch upon all these.

And first of the Smallness of their Numbers; it seems this Sect had always fewer Disciples than any of the rest. The Epicureans had it clearly by Poll : They used to Flourish mightily upon the crowd of Proselytes which followed their Master. And Torquatus in Tully does not stick to affirm ; that the Bulk of the People ^[125] run after Epicurus, and that the Strength, tho' not the Reason, of Mankind, was undoubtedly on his side.

Neither is there any great wonder in all this. Strato the Natural Philosopher was much in the right when he observ'd, That the Bath, and the Wells were much more fancied, than the making a Campaign. People don't care for straining up an Ascent, nor travelling in a rugged Path; A Road that's open and unfatiguing has always most Company. But then the Multitude are little more than so many Noses: They have Numbers but no great weight in them. Pebbles are much more common than Diamonds. And 'tis an old Saying, that the bad ^[126] sort are always the Majority. ^[127] To agree with the Multitude, is an Argument of a wrong Choice. ^[128] Things extraordinary in Value, are not thick sown : Neither was the World ever in so happy a Condition, as that the Best ^[129] Practises, should be follow'd by the Most.

2ly. As the Stoicks made the least Body in the Field, so several of them changed their side, and went over to other Parties, particularly to the Epicureans, whereas on the contrary very few Deserted to them.

This Objection supposing the Fact true, has as little weight in't as the former. When an Argument proves too much 'tis like a Gun over-charg'd, and recoils upon him that shoots in't.

" I remember Calisto ^[130] an Athenian Strumpet had the Impudence to tell Socrates, that her Profession was better than his ; there was more Force and Persuasion in't she said, for 'twas more than he could do to draw off any of her Guests : But 'twas in her Power to thin his School, and leave him little more than the Walls to talk to when she had a mind to't." Socrates replied, all that might very well be: For Philosophy was like tugging up the Hill, and went somewhat against the Grain : Whereas Lewdness, was rolling downwards, and the Motion might seem easy at present, tho' a Man broke his Bones at the Bottom. Pleasure lies upon a Descent, but the way to Virtue has a contrary Situation ; And since the Biass of Mankind leans towards Vice; 'Tis no wonder to find People revolt from Discipline, and go over to the loosest Doctrines.

But farther 'tis alledged, that a great many who stood firm to the Stoical Philosophy, and disputed strongly for their Notions ; yet lived quite counter to what they professed. They had the Name and the Habit, but nothing of the Regularity of their Distinction : Their Tongues were not all of a piece. They talk'd like People of their own Sect, but tasted like Epicureans. For this Inconsistency of Practise and Pretention, they are handsomely ^[131] lash'd by Lucian and several others.

Now this Charge has nothing new in't, neither does it bear particularly against the Stoicks. For among all sorts of Persuasions, we may meet with enough that are meer Instruments and ^[132] Organs in their Business, like Viol and Trumpet they entertain the Company, but not themselves ; they make Musick, but they don't hear it. The Stoicks were not the only People in the World, that had their Tongues tipt with Philosophy, and not one jot of Good in them beside. Even in the first Fervours of Christianity, the Apostles complained there were some, who said one thing, and did another. Who ^[133] professed to know God, but in Works they denied him, ^[134] who had a Form of Godliness, but denied the Power thereof. Who turned the ^[135] the Grace of God into Lasciviousness : Who made ^[136] use of their Liberty for a Cloak of Maliciousness; who ^[137] promised others Liberty, and were themselves the Servants of Corruption : Now 'twould be very unreasonable to make a Judgment of the Christian Religion from the Misbehaviour of such Men. Such Men I say, as would have been a scandal to a much lower Institution ; And, as our Emperour ^[138] speaks, were rather Ulcers, than Members of a Society. Crates ^[139] the Philosopher used to say, that a Good Pomgranate, was seldom without a rotten Kernel ; And Varro is much to the same Purpose, where he says, that it must be ^[140] a rare Field of Corn that has not a blasted Ear in't. Nay, even in our ^[141] Lord's Husbandry the Tares grow up with the rest of the Crop, and yet to judge of all the Grain by the Quality of the Weeds, would be a very undistingushing Conclusion.

And lastly, Whereas 'tis objected, that the greatest part even of the most Eminent of this Sect have not exactly come up to their own Precepts ; But in some Instances at least, have fallen short of that Rule they took the Liberty to make themselves.

In answer to this, I desire to know whether those who are Christians in earnest don't sometimes warp in their Practise, and start now and then from the Institution ? Those who in St. Paul's Language were Pillars of the ^[142] Church, and in the most significant Sense too, have without Exception declar'd, that ^[143] in many things we offend all. And St. John assures us, that if we ^[144] say we have no sin, we deceive our selves, and the Truth is not in us. Even the Apostles themselves who had the Benefit of our Saviour's Instruction and Example, were not without their ^[145] Failings. And therefore 'tis the less wonder to find the highest Pretenders among the Heathens, to forget themselves a little, and sleep over their Philosophy. The Oracle never deliver'd a greater Truth than that of Æschylus, where he tells us that

^[146]The wisest living an't without their Errors.

As for the Stoicks, they ^[147] ne'er pretended themselves big enough for their Speculations, or that their Lives were an exact Counterpart of what they taught. 'Tis true, they made a Beautiful Scheme, and set the Rule high ; But this was chiefly to put People upon doing their Best, to awaken Industry and encourage Imitation.

And yet after all, the Stoical Philosophy has produced great Examples of Virtue in several Ages. Some of this Persuasion have been remarkably consistent with their Doctrines, and held out to the length of their Principles : And that not only by Fits, and broken Intervals, but by a constant and uninterrupted Regularity. Amongst these we shall mention Zeno first, in Honour of whose Memory there was an Extraordinary Vote past by the Senate of Athens, viz, Resolv'd,

" That in ^[148] Consideration of the great Merit of Zeno's Virtue, the Consistency of his Precept and Practise, and the noble Example he set the World, This House has thought fit to order him a Statue of Brass, with a Golden Crown on the Head on't ; to erect him a Tomb at the Publick Charge, ornamented with two Pillars, with the Inscription of this Vote upon each of them. "

Zeno the Chief of this Clan, had several eminent Disciples who in their respective Times, were remarkable Instances of Virtue, in all the parts of a Good Life; and here waving those who were Philosophers by Profession ; I shall mention some of great Quality, and Figure ; As Cato Uticensis , Thraseas Pætus, Helvidius Priscus , and more especially our Emperour Marcus Antoninus, who is the occasion of the present Discourse.

From the Philosophy of the Stoicks, let us proceed to those Authors that delivered it, and by whom the Subject is treated at large. Amongst these Zeno, and Chrysippus were the most considerable. The first was Founder of the Sect, and is stiled the Prince and Father of the Stoicks, by ^[149] Tully, ^[150] Strabo, and ^[151] Galen. The other was a very successful Champion, and added a great deal of Strength, and Defence to the first Plan: Insomuch that it was commonly said, That Zeno's Cloyster ^[152] must have tumbled, had it not been Buttress'd up by Chrysippus. Both these Philosophers were very Voluminous Writers, Chrysippus is said to have left no less, then ^[153] seven hundred and five Tracts behind him ; But neither of them have had the good luck to stand the shock of Time; nor indeed have we so much as any one Volume of the first set of these Sages come to our Hands. There are only some Fragments of them remaining in Plutarch, Galen, Laertius, and Tully. The first ^[154] is always, and the second ^[155] for the most part, their Enemy ; The third ^[156] is but a bare Reporter, and the last ^[157] Disputes the Question on both sides. 'Tis true, we had a little better Fortune afterwards : The Works of some later Philosophers of this Perswasion have reach'd us; And those are, Seneca, Epictetus, and our Emperour.

Of these three, Seneca is the first in Time, but in my Opinion, the least in Value, and Merit : 'Tis granted, he has a great many ^[158] shining Sentences, his Precepts are admirable, his Manner Noble, and his way of Arguing very Acute in many Places ; Indeed he deserves to be read by the most serious Professions as well as others; but then this ought to be done with somewhat of Care and Caution. For to be free with him, he is not Uniform, and all of a Piece. I don't mean his Life, tho' Dion Cassius taxes him upon this Score, as if he wrote ^[159] one way, and lived another. No, 'tis his Books that I speak to ; And here, how fulsomely does he flourish upon that heavy Emperour Claudian : ^[160] And to pass his Flattery the better, makes his Compliment to that scandalous Tool of a Courtier Polybius? But these good Words, were all given while Claudius was living ; for when the Emperour was once dead, he palts his Memory ^[161] to some purpose; and falls upon him with all the Violence of Satyr imaginable. To go on : How does he contradict himself about the State of the Soul after Death ? One while he makes her shoot the Gulph, and ^[162] mount the Skies, without the least Damage : At another time she is little better with him than a Wax ^[163] Candle : For when the Matter is once spent, the Vital Flame sinks in the Socket, and all the pretended Immortality is over. Sometimes he bears hard upon Epicurus, censures his Writings, and lashes him for his Liberty severely : Calls ^[164] him a Man of an Abject, and Scandalous Temper, perfectly ridden by his Appetite, fitter for a Cook, than ^[165] a Philosopher, and that his School ^[166] taught nothing hut Luxury and Pleasure. But his angry Humour does not last always : For upon another occasion, (it maybe to curry Favour with his Friend Lucilius, who was an admirer of this Sect;) he comes round again, and not only excuses Epicurus, wipes out his Infamy, ^[167] and Blanches his ^[168] Reputation; but likewise gives him a great Character, says his Priniciples are Remarkable for ^[169] Justice and Piety, and if you examine them nicely, for Mortification too. And lastly, he is sometimes guilty of the same Trifling, which he finds fault with in Zeno and Chrysippus. He is ^[170] Gay sometimes when he should be Solemn, and Flourishes when he should strike home. He makes a Pass with a Pin, and rather pricks a Subject than pierces it. He gives you sometimes a turn of Fancy, instead of Solid Proof; His Notions are now and then so superfine, that the least Resistance turns the Edge of them. They have generally a Point, but no Weight of Body for Execution. This may be looked on as an Excess of clear Dealings; but I am not the first that have taken this Freedom with Seneca; several Great Men have pass'd the same Judgement upon him long since. However I desire not to be understood as if I had a mind to detract from the Worth, or discourage the Reading of this Philosopher, who was really a Person of an extraordinary Genius; and has always had Men of Sense and Learning to admire him. My meaning is only to shew, that this Roman failed a little in the Points of Gravity and Fortitude, so peculiar to the Stoicks: And that Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus out-did him, both in their Pens and their Practise. These two Persons, tho' in contrary Stations, and in the Remotest Distance of Circumstances imaginable ? The one being a poor Slave, and the other the greatest Monarch in the Universe. These two Persons, I say, have shew'd the Force of the Stoical Philosophy; and how strongly it Operates under all Diversities of Condition; And that not only by a Comprehensive Body of Refined Morality in their Writings, but also by an Illustrious Example every way agreeable to the Nobleness of the Precepts delivered.

Thus far I have Translated the Learned Gataker, who proceeds in his Prolegomena, to draw a Parallel between the Doctrines of our Blessed Saviour, and those of Marcus Antoninus in many considerable Instances, insomuch that one wou'd imagine the Emperour had Transcribed part of his Philosophy from the four Evangelists : But this I shall rather leave to the Reader's Collection, than present him with that before-hand, which 'tis likely he may with more Satisfaction discover for himself. The rest of Gataker's Introductive Discourse is foreign to our Purpose, and therefore I shall go on with it no farther.

Footnotes

1. Acts 26, 5.
2. Joseph in vita lua
3. In Esayam Comment. cap. 11.
4. See Pythagoras's Life written by Laertius, Lib. 8. and by Jamblieus, and in the Life of 'Jamblieus', by Eunapius
5. See Dio prus Orat. 6. in Diogen: & Laert. lib. 6. in Diogen.
6. Juven, Sat. 13.
7. Laert. Lib 7. Epictet. Dissert. Lib 4. cap. 11. Senec. Epist. 92.
8. The first studied in the Academia, and the other in the Lycæum: Cicer Acad. Lib. 1.
9. Averrores in proæm. Physic.
10. Cicer. Acad. Lib. 4.
11. Cicer. de finib. L. 1.
12. Cicer. de finib. Lib. 2.
13. Cicer. Acad. Lib. 1.
14. Arist. Ethic. Magn. lib. 1. cap. 2. Idem. Ethic. Eudem. lib. 6. cap. 13.
15. Cicer. de fin. lib. 2. Aristot. Ethic. Magn. lib. 2. cap. 8.
16. Aristot. Ethic Nicom. 1.1. c. 10. Idem. Magn. lib. 6. cap. 13.
17. Laert. l. 7. Zeno. Senec. Epist. 71.
18. Senec. Epist. 120. & Ep. 82. Ambros. Offic. L. 2. c. 3. Senec. Epist. 91.
19. Epict. Differt. L. 1. cap. 9.
20. Plat. A. pol. Socrat. Cie Tuse 1. 1. Epictet. Dissert. 1.
21. Epict. enchir. c. 52. Dissert. L. 3. c. 22. Senec. Epist. 107.
22. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. L. 1. De Finib L. 4.
23. August. de Civir. Dei, Lib. 9. c. 4.
24. Cicer. de finib. L. 3.
25. Cicer. de finib. L. 2.
26. Menand. spud Cyrill. advers. Julian. L. 7.
27. Senec. de Vit. beat. c. 13.
28. Ibid.
29. Hippocrat. Epidem. L. 6. Sect. 6.
30. Aristot. Ethic. L. 3. c. 7.
31. Plut. de valetud. precept.
32. Cicer. de finib. L. 2.
33. Senec. Epist. 33. & alib.
34. Cicer. de finib. L. 1.
35. Lucret lib. 1.
36. Epicur. apud Laert. lib. 30. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.
37. Cicer. in pison.
38. Lucret. lib. 1. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.
39. Torquat. apud Cic. fin. lib. 1.
40. Idem. Ibid.
41. Cicer. Ibid. Epicur. apud Laert. lib. 10. Senec. Epist. 97.
42. Torq. ubi supr.
43. Cicer. defin. lib. 2. Vid. Sen. Supr.
44. Epicur. apud Laert.
45. Torq. ubi sur. Epicur. apud Laert. Senec. Ep. 97.
46. Epicur. apud Laert. Senec. Ibid.
47. Torq. apud Cic. de finib. lib. 1.
48. Torq. Ibid.
49. Cicer. de finib. lib. 2. Epicur. apud Laert lib. 10.
50. Cicer. de fin. lib. 2. Laert. lib. 10.
51. Torq. apud Cic. de finib. lib. 1.
52. Senec. Ep. 18.
53. Epicur. apud stob. tom 2. tit. 17.
54. Ibid. Senec. Ep. 110. Ep. 25.
55. Epicur. Ibid. Cic. de finib. lib. 2.
56. Laert. lib. 10.
57. Arist. Ethic lib. 10. cap. 1.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Laert. lib 10.
61. Ep. ad Leontium Meretriculam, &c.
62. Senec. Ep. 18. ex Epicuri. ad Polyænum. Ep.
63. Idem. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Epicur. apud slob. tom. 2. tit. 17. Torquat. apud Cic. de finib. lib. 1.
66. Athen. lib. 4.
67. Cicer. de finib. lib. 2.
68. Cicer. de finib. lib. 1.
69. Senec. Epist. 95.
70. Senec. Ibid.
71. Athen. lib. 1. and lib. 15.
72. Senec. Epist. 18. Epicur. apud. Laert. lib. 10.
73. Epicur. apud Senec. & Laert. Ibid.
74. Epicur. apud stob. sup.
75. Cicer. de finib. lib. 1.
76. Juven. Sat. 11.
77. Athen. lib. 10.
78. Senec. de benef. lib. 1. c. 11.
79. Cicer. de finib. lib. 2.
80. Cicer. Tuscul. lib. 5. Laert. 1. 2.
81. Senec. Ep. 33.
82. Epicur. apud Laert. 1. 10.
83. Epicur. apud Laert. lib. 10.
84. Ovid Amor. 1. Eleg. 9.
85. Senec. Ep. 36.
86. Senec. Epist.
87. Senec. Ep. 101.
88. Apud Senec. Ep. 101.
89. Senec. Ibid.
90. August. in Psal. 34.
91. Aristot. Erbic. lib. 3. cap. 7.
92. Torq. apud Cic. de finib. lib. 1.
93. Epicur. apud Laert.
94. Cicer. Tusc. lib. 2. lib. 5. Senec. Ep. 66. Epicur. apud Laert. Phalaris's Bull was made of Brass, hollow, and red hot.
95. Epicur. Epist. ad Idom. Laert. lib. 10. Cicer. Tusc. lib. 2. Senec. Epist. 66. and 92.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Senec. Epist. 3.
99. Id. de vit. beat. cap. 4.
100. Ibid. c. 16.
101. Ibid.
102. Id. Ep. 92.
103. Ibid.
104. Cicer. Tusc. lib. 5.
105. Senec. de benef. lib. 6. c 4.
106. Epicur. apud Laert. 1. 10 Cicer. de finib. lib. 1. & 2.
107. Cicer. de finib. lib. 1. & 2.
108. Epicur. apud Laert. lib. 10. Cicer de finib. 1. 2. Tusc. 1. 3.
109. Senec. Ep. 9.
110. Epicur. apud Laert.
111. Epict. dissert. 1. 1. c. 12. & c. 14. & 16.
112. Marc. 1. 1. Sect. 17. & alib.
113. Marc. 1. 5. Sect. 33. & alib.
114. Epict. 1. 2. c. 16. 1. 4. c. 4.
115. Epict. 1. 1. c. 16.
116. Epict. 1. 4. c. 12.
117. Marc. passim.
118. Epict. lib. 4. c. 7. Marc. lib. 12. & alib.
119. Senec. Ep. 107.
120. Epict. 1. 3. c. 24.
121. Senec. de benef. 1. 2. c. 6. Marcus passim.
122. Cic. de finib. 1. 2. Marcus.
123. Marc. Imp.
124. Marc.
125. Cic de finib. 1. 2.
126. Bias.
127. Senec de Vit. beat. c. 2.
128. Id. Ep. 42.
129. Id. de vit. beat. c. 2.
130. Æl. Hist. var. 1. 3. 32.
131. Luc. in vir. auctione, & aib.
132. Laert. 1. 6. & 1. 7.
133. Tit. 1. 16.
134. Tim. 2. Ep. 3. 5.
135. Jude. v. 4.
136. Pet. Ep. 1. c. 2. v. 16
137. Pet. Ep. 2. c. 2. v. 19.
138. Marc. 1. 2. Sect. 16.
139. Laert. 1. 6.
140. Var. apud non.
141. Mat. 13. 25, 27.
142. Gal. 2. 9.
143. Jam 3. 2.
144. Joh Ep. 1. c. 1. v. 8.
145. Gal. 2. 11. Act. 15. 39.
146. Stob. tom. 2. tit. 3.
147. Senec. de vit. beat. c. 18.
148. Laert. lib. 7.
149. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. 3.
150. Strab. Geogr. lib. 14.
151. Galen. de Dogmat. Hippoc. & Platon. 1. 2. c. 6.
152. Laert. lib. 7.
153. Laert. Ibid.
154. Plut In stoic. repugnant. de commun. Notit. & de Paradox
155. Galen in lib. de Dogmat. Hippocrat & Platon.
156. Laert. lib. 7.
157. Cicer. In Acad. Tuscul. de fin. & de nat. Deor.
158. Quintil. Instit. lib. 10. cap. 1.
159. Dio. Cass. lib. 61. in Xi. Phil.
160. In Consolat. ad. Polyb.
161. In Άποϰολοϰιυνδώσει
162. Ad. Lucil. Ep. 102. ad Polyb. Consol. cap. 28. Ad. Marc. Consol. cap. 25.
163. Ad. Lucil. Ep. 54.
164. Ad. Lucil. Ep. 42.
165. Ep. 18.
166. Ep. 9.
167. Ep. 13. & 21. & 48.
168. De Vit. beat. cap. 13.
169. Ibid.
170. Quintil. Instit. lib. 10. c. 1. Gellius Noct. Actic. 1. 12. 62. Erasmi. prefat. ad Senec.