The History of Slavery and the Slave Trade/Appendix
APPENDIX.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Case of Dred Scott vs. Sandford.
The Supreme Court of the United States, at the December term, in 1856, gave its decision in what is popularly known as the "Dred Scott case." This case involved not only private rights but constitutional principles of the highest importance. In reference to the questions involved, Judge Daniel declared, that since the establishment of the several communities now constituting the states of this confederacy, there never had been submitted to any tribunal within its limits, questions surpassing in importance those submitted in this case to the consideration of the court. Judge Wayne remarked, that there had become such a difference of opinion in respect to the questions presented that the peace and harmony of the country required the settlement of them by judicial decision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This case, Dred Scott vs. Sandford, was brought up by writ of error from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Missouri. It was an action for trespass vi et armis instituted in the circuit court by Scott against Sandford.
Prior to the institution of the present suit, an action was brought by Scott for his freedom in the circuit court of St. Louis county, (state court,) where there was a verdict and judgment in his favor. On a writ of error to the supreme court of the state, the judgment below was reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court, where it was continued to await the decision of the case now in question.
The declaration of Scott contained three counts; one, that Sandford had assaulted the plaintiff; one, that he had assaulted Harriet Scott, his wife; and one, that he had assaulted Eliza Scott and Lizzie Scott, his children. Sandford appeared and filed the following plea: "And the said John F. A. Sandford, in his own proper person, comes and says that this court ought not to have or take further cognizance of the action aforesaid, because he says that said cause of action, and each and every of them, (if any such have accrued to the said Dred Scott,) accrued to the said Dred Scott out of the jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the state of Missouri, for that, to wit: the said plaintiff, Dred Scott, is not a citizen of the state of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, because he is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves, and this the said Sandford is ready to verify. Wherefore, he prays judgment whether this court can or will take further cognizance of the action aforesaid."
To this plea there was a demurrer in the usual form, which was argued in April, 1854, when the court gave judgment that the demurrer should be sustained.
In May, 1854, the defendant, in pursuance of an agreement between counsel, and with the leave of the court, pleaded in bar of the action: 1. Not guilty. 2. That the plaintiff was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant, and, as such, the defendant gently laid his hands upon him, and thereby had only restrained him, as the defendant had a right to do. 3. That with respect to the wife and daughters of the plaintiff, in the second and third counts of the declaration mentioned, the defendant had, as to them, only acted in the same manner, and in virtue of the same legal right.
In the first of these pleas, the plaintiff joined issue; and to the second and third, filed replications alleging that the defendant, of his own wrong and without the cause in his second and third pleas alleged, committed the trespasses, &c. The counsel then filed the following agreed statement of facts, viz:
In the year 1834, the plaintiff was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United States. In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff from the state of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the state of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, In the territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situated north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the state of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling, from said last mentioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the plaintiffs declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post, situated as herein-before stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave at said Fort Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson herein-before named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.
In the year 1836, the plaintiff and said Harriet, at said Fort Snelling, with the consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner, intermarried, and took each other for husband and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the Steamboat Gipsey, north of the north line of the state of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the state of Missouri, at the military post called Jefferson Barracks.
In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said daughter Eliza, from said Fort Snelling to the state of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them and each of them as slaves.
At the time mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing, in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at such times.
It is agreed that Dred Scott brought suit for his freedom in the circuit court of St. Louis county; that there was a verdict and judgment in his favor; that on a writ of error to the supreme court, the judgment below was reversed, and the same remanded to the circuit court, where it has been continued to await the decision of this case.
In May, 1854, the cause went before a jury, who found the following verdict, viz: "As to the first issue joined in this case, we of the jury find the defendant not guilty; and as to the issue secondly above joined, we of the jury find that before and at the time when, &c, in the first count mentioned, the said Dred Scott was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant; and as to the issue thirdly above joined, we, the jury, find that before and at the time when, &c., in the second and third counts mentioned, the said Harriet, wife of said Dred Scott, and Eliza and Lizzie, the daughters of the said Dred Scott, were negro slaves, the lawful property of the defendant," Whereupon the court gave judgment for the defendant. After an ineffectual motion for a new trial, the plaintiff filed the following bill of exceptions:
On the trial of this cause by the jury, the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, read to the jury the following agreed statement of facts, (see agreement above.) No further testimony was given to the jury by either party. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the court to give to the jury the folowing instruction, viz: "That upon the facts agreed to by the parties, they ought to find for the plaitiff. The court refused to give such instruction to the jury, and the plaintiff, to such refusal, then and there duly excepted."
The court then gave the following instruction to the jury, on motion of the defendant: "The jury are instructed, that upon the facts in this case, the law is with the defendant." The plaintiff excepted to this instruction. Upon these exceptions, the case came up to the supreme court. DECISION OF THE COURT.
I.
1. Upon a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States, the transcript of the record of all the proceedings in the case is brought before this court, and is open to its inspection and revision.
2. When a plea to the jurisdiction, in abatement, is overruled by the court upon demurrer, and the defendant pleads in bar, and upon these pleas the final judgment of the court is in his favor—if the plaintiff brings a writ of error, the judgment of the court upon the plea in abatement is before this court, although it was in favor of the plaintiff—and if the court erred iu overruling it, the judgment must be reversed, and a mandate issued to the Circuit Court to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
3. In the Circuit Courts of the United States, the record must show that the case is one in which, by the constitution and laws of the United States, the court had jurisdiction—and if this does not appear, and the court gives judgment either for plaintiff or defendant, it is error, and the judgment must be reversed by this court—and the parties cannot by consent waive the objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.
4. A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
5. When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States as members of the community which constituted the State, and were not numbered among its "people or citizens." Consequently, the special rights and immunities guaranteed to citizens do not apply to them. And not being "citizens" within the meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has not jurisdiction in such a suit.
6. The only two clauses in the Constitution which point to this race, treat them as persons whom it was morally lawful to deal in as articles of property and to hold as slaves.
7. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, no State can by any subsequent law make a foreigner or any other description of persons citizens of the United States, nor entitle them to the rights and privileges secured to citizens by that instrument.
8. A state, by its laws passed since the adoption of the Constitution, may put a foreigner or any other description of persons upon a footing with its own citizens, as to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by them within its dominion and by its laws. But that will not make him a citizen of the United States, nor entitle him to sue in its courts, nor to any of the privileges and immunuities of a citizen in another state.
9. The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race, which has taken place since the adoption of the Constitution, cannot change its construction and meaning, and it must be construed and administered now according to its true meaning and intention when it was formed and adopted. 10. The plaintiff having admitted, by his demurrer to the plea in abatement, that his ancestors were imported from Africa and sold as slaves, he is not a citizen of the state of Missouri according to the Constitution of the United States, and was not entitled to sue in that character in the Circuit Court.
11. This being the case, the judgment of the court below, in favor of the plaintiff on the plea in abatement, was erroneous.
II.
1. But if the plea in abatement is not brought up by this writ of error, the objection to the citizenship of the plaintiff is still apparent on the record, as he himself, in making oat his case, states that he is of African descent, was born a slave, and claims that he and his family became entitled to freedom by being taken, by their owner, to reside in a territory where slavery is prohibited by act of congress—and that, in addition to this claim, he himself became entitled to freedom by being taken to Rock Island, in the state of Illinois—and being free when he was brought back to Missouri, he was by the laws of that state a citizen.
2. If, therefore, the facts he states do not give him or his family a right to freedom, the plaintiff is still a slave, and not entitled to sue as a "citizen," and the judgment of the Circuit Court was erroneous on that ground also, without any reference to the plea in abatement.
3. The Circuit Court can give no judgment for plaintiff or defendant in a case where it has not jurisdiction, no matter whether there be a plea in abatement or not. And unless it appears upon the face of the record, when brought here by writ of error, that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, the judgment must be reversed.
4. When the record, as brought here by writ of error, does not show that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, this court has jurisdiction to revise and correct the error, like any other error in the court below. It does not and cannot dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction here; for that would leave the erroneous judgment of the court below in full force, and the party injured without remedy. But it must reverse the judgment, and, as in any other case of reversal, send a mandate to the Circuit Court to conform its judgment to the opinion of this court.
5. The difference of the jurisdiction in this court in the cases of writs of error to state courts and to Circuit Courts of the United States, pointed out; and the mistakes made as to the jurisdiction of this court in the latter case, by confounding it with its limited jurisdiction in the former.
6. If the court reverses a judgment upon the ground that it appears by a particular part of the record that the Circuit Court had not jurisdiction, it does not take away the jurisdiction of this court to examine into and correct, by a reversal of the judgment, any other errors, either as to the jurisdiction or any other matter, where it appears from other parts of the record that the Circuit Court had fallen into error. On the contrary, it is the daily and familiar practice of this court to reverse on several grounds, where more than one error pears to have been committed. And the error of a Circuit Court in its jurisdiction stands on the same ground, and is to be treated in the same manner as any other error upon which its judgment is founded.
7. The decision, therefore, that the judgment of the Circuit Court upon the plea in abatement is erroneous, is no reason why the alleged error apparent in the exception should not also be examined, and the judgment reversed on that ground also, if it discloses a want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court.
8. It is often the duty of this court, after having decided that a particular decision of the Circuit Court was erroneous, to examine into other alleged errors, and to correct them if they are found to exist. And this has been uniformly done by this court, when the questions are in any degree connected with the controversy, and the silence of the court might create doubts which would lead to further and useless litigation.
III.
1. The facts upon which the plaintiff relies, did not give him his freedom, and make him a citizen of Missouri.
2. The clause in the Constitution authorizing congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the government of the territory and other property of the United States, applies only to territory within the chartered limits of some one of the states when they were colonies of Great Britain, and which was surrendered by the British government to the old confederation of the states in the treaty of peace. It does not apply to territory acquired by the present federal government, by treaty or conquest, from a foreign nation.
The case of the American and Ocean Insurance Companies v. Canter (1 Peters, 511) referred to and examined, showing that the decision in this case is not in conflict with that opinion, and that the court did not, in the case referred to, decide upon the construction of the clause of the constitution above mentioned, because the case before them did not make it necessary to decide the question.
3. The United States, under the present constitution, cannot acquire territory to be held as a colony, to be governed at its will and pleasure. But it may acquire terrritory, which, at the time, has not a population that fits it to become a state, and may govern it as a territory until it has a population which, in the judgment of Congress, entitles it to be admitted as a state of the Union.
4. During the time it remains a territory, Congress may legislate over it within the scope of its constitutional powers in relation to citizens of the United States—and may establish a territorial government—and the form of this local government must be regulated by the discretion of Congress—but with powers not exceeding those which Congress itself, by the constitution, is authorized to exercise over citizens of the United States, in respect to their rights of persons or rights of property.
IV.
1. The territory thus acquired, is acquired by the citizens of the United States for their common and equal benefit, through their agent and trustee, the fedefederal government. Congress can exercise no power over the rights of persons or property of a citizen in the territory which is prohibited by the constitution. The government and the citizen, whenever the territory is open to settlement, both enter it with their respective rights defined and limited by the constitution.
2. Congress has no right to prohibit the citizens of any particular state or states from taking up their home there, while it permits citizens of other states to do so. Nor has it a right to give privileges to one class of citizens which it refuses to another. The territory is acquired for their equal and common benefit—and if open to any, it must be open to all upon equal and the same terms.
3. Every citizen has a right to take with him into the territory any article of property which the constitution of the United States recognizes as property.
4. The constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the federal government to protect it. And Congress cannot exercise any more authority over property of that description than it may constitutionally exercise over property of any other kind.
5. The act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the United States from taking with him his slaves when he removes to the territory in question to reside, is an exercise of authority over private property which is not warranted by the constitution—and the removal of the plaintiff, by his owner, to that territory, gave him no title to freedom.
V.
1. The plaintiff acquired no title to freedom by being taken, by his owner, to Rock Island, in Illinois, and brought back to Missouri. This court has heretofore decided that the status or condition of a person of African descent depended on the laws of the state in which he resided.
2. It has been settled by the decisions of the highest court in Missouri, that, by the laws of that state, a slave does not become entitled to his freedom where the owner takes him to reside in a state where slavery is not permitted, and afterwards brings him back to Missouri.
Conclusion. It follows that it is apparent upon the record that the court below erred in its judgment on the plea in abatement, and also erred in giving judgment for the defendant, when the exception shows that the plaintiff was not a citizen of the United States. And as the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, either in the case stated in the plea in abatement, or in the one stated in the exception, its judgment in favor of the defendant is erroneous, and must be reversed.
ANALYSIS OF THE DRED SCOTT DECISION.
It was held by seven judges (M'Lean and Curtis dissenting) that the record showed on the part of Scott a disability to maintain his suit. Of these judges, Taney, Wayne and Daniel held that the fact set forth in the plea in abatement in the court below, and admitted in the demurrer, "that the plaintiff was a negro of African descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were brought into this country and sold as slaves," showed him not to be a citizen of the United States, and therefore disqualified to sue in a United States Court; and that the suit ought, on that ground, to be remanded to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Grier and Campbell (making with the other three a majority of the court) concurred in this remanding for dismissal, and such was the judgment of the court. Both Grier and Campbell based themselves, however, not on the plea in abatement, but on the fact apparent, as they thought, in the agreed statement of facts which made a part of the record, that Scott was a slave, and on that ground disqualified to sue, and they both seemed to think that the more regular course would be to confirm the judgment of the court below. Such a confirmation of the judgment of the court below, Nelson and Catron held to be the only proper course, thus siding, so far as the question of jurisdiction was concerned, with Curtis and McLean, while even Grier (making up, with the other four, a majority of the court) went so far as to admit that the record showed a prima facie case of jurisdiction.
McLean and Catron held, that as there was no appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court on the plea in abatement, the question of jurisdiction was not before the court. Taney, Wayne, Daniel and Curtis held, per contra, that, as the courts of the United States were of limited jurisdiction, the question of jurisdiction was always in order. Grier, Nelson and Campbell were silent on this point.
Three judges—Taney, Wayne and Daniel—held that, although the court below had no jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed on that ground, it was still competent for the Supreme Court to give an opinion on the merits of the case, and on all the questions therein involved. McLean and Curtis dissented from this view. In their opinion, any doctrines laid down under such circumstances must be regarded as extra-judicial. They based their right of going into the merits on the assumption that the court below had jurisdiction, a view in which they were sustained by Catron and Grier. Nelson and Campbell, as they had avoided any expression of opinion on the question of jurisdiction, did the same on this question of judicial propriety; but Nelson, by confining himself, in his opinion, to the single point of the revival of Scott's condition of slavery by his return to Missouri, seemed to concur in the view of judicial propriety taken by McLean and Curtis.
Three judges—Taney, Wayne and Daniel—held that a negro of African descent was incapable of being a citizen of the United States, or even of suing as such in a federal court. From this doctrine McLean and Curtis expressly dissented, while Nelson, Grier, Campbell and Catron avoided any expression of opinion upon it.
Taney, Wayne, Daniel and Campbell held that the constitution conferred no power on Congress to legislate for the territories, the power to make all needful rules and regulations being confined solely to the disposition of lands as property, and even that authority being limited to the territories belonging to the United States (i. e. the territory northwest of the Ohio) when the constitution was made. They, however, seemed to admit a certain power of legislation in Congress, based on the fact of acquisition and growing out of the necessity of the case. McLean, Catron and Curtis held, on the other hand, that under authority to make needful rules and regulations, as well as by the necessity of the case, Congress had a full power of legislation for the territories, limited only by the general restraints upon its legislative power contained in the constitution. Nelson expressed no opinion on this point; nor did Grier, except the implication in favor of the first view from his joining in pronouncing the Missouri prohibition of 1820 unconstitutional, though on what particular ground he held it to be so does not appear.
Taney, Wayne, and Daniel held that the ordinance of 1181, though good and binding under the confederation, expired with the confederation, and that the act of Congress passed to confirm it was void, because Congress had no power to legislate for the territories. M'Lean, Catron, and Curtis held, per contra, that the reënactment of the ordinance of 1787 was a valid exercise of the power of Congress; while Campbell admitted—and in this Catron concurred with him (Daniel contra, the others silent)—that the ordinance of 1787, having been agreed to by Virginia, became thereby a part of the compact of cession permanently binding on the parties, and was so regarded by the convention that framed the constitution.
Five judges, a majority of the court—Taney, Wayne, Daniel, Campbell, and Grier—held that the Missouri prohibition of 1820 was unconstitutional and void; while Catron argued that it was void because it conflicted with the French treaty for the cession of Louisiana. M'Lean and Curtis held the prohibition constitutional and valid. Nelson silent.
Five judges—Taney, Wayne, Daniel, Campbell, and Catron—a majority of the court, held that slaves were property in a general sense, as much so as cattle, or at least were so recognized by the constitution of the United States; and as such might be carried into territories, notwithstanding any congressional prohibition. M'Lean and Curtis held, per contra, that slaves are recognized property only locally and by the laws of particular states, being out of those states not property, nor even slaves, except in the single case of fugitives. Grier and Nelson silent.
It was held by six judges—Taney, Wayne, Daniel, Campbell, Catron, and Nelson—that, whatever claim to freedom Scott might have had (if any, which most of them denied,) he lost it by his return to Missouri. This opinion, on the part of Taney, Wayne, and Daniel, was based solely on the law of Missouri, as recently laid down by the Supreme Court of that state. Nelson and Catron based it on what they thought the prevailing current of legal decision on the subject; and Campbell on the fact that no sufficient domicil, either in slave or master, appeared in Illinois or Minnesota. M'Lean and Curtis held, per contra, that Scott had been made free by his residence in Illinois and Minnesota, and that the rules of international law respecting the emancipation of slaves by residence were a part of the law of Missouri, which law had been improperly departed from and set at nought by the Missouri decision in the plaintiff's case; and that, on Questions depending not on any statute or local usage, but on principles of universal jurisprudence, the decisions of state courts are not conclusive on the United States courts as to the laws of the states.
Seven judges (M'Lean and Curtis dissenting) held that by the facts on the record, it appeared that Scott was a slave, notwithstanding his residence in Illinois and Minnesota.
It appears from this analysis that only the following points commanded a majority of voices, and can be considered as having been ruled in this case:
1. That Scott was a slave notwithstanding his residence in Illinois and Minnesota. Seven judges to two.
2. That the Missouri prohibition of 1820 was unconstitutional and void. Five judges against two; one silent, and one holding it void but not unconstitutional.
3. That, under the constitution of the United States, slaves are as much property as horses. Five judges, all slaveholders, against two non-slaveholders, the two other non-slaveholders being silent.
The question whether any power of legislation over the territories is given to Congress, by the power to make needful rules and regulations, is left undecided, four judges denying any such power, three maintaining it, Nelson silent, and Grier in nubibus. THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.
Election of Speaker—The "Impending Crisis."
The thirty-sixth Congress assembled at Washington on the 5th day of December, 1859. On the first day of the session, after the House was called to order by Mr. Allen, the Clerk, who announced that 231 members had answered to their names, Mr. Phelps, of Missouri, moved to proceed to the election of a Speaker, which motion prevailed. Mr. Houston, of Alabama, nominated Thomas S. Bocock, of Virginia, Mr. Corwin nominated John Sherman, of Ohio, Mr. Adrian nominated John G. Davis, of Indiana, Mr. Haskin nominated John Hickman, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Stevens nominated Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Briggs nominated Alexander B. Boteler, of Virginia. On proceeding to a ballot, it was found that 230 votes were cast—necessary to a choice, 116.
Mr. Bocock had 86 votes; Mr. Sherman, 66; Mr. Grow, 43; Mr. Nelson, of Tennessee, 5; Mr. Gilmer, of North Carolina, 3; Mr. Davis, 2; Mr. Adrian, 2; Mr. Haskin, 2; scattering, 7. No choice.
Mr. Grow then withdrew his name as a candidate. A motion was then made to adjourn. Lost.
Mr. Clark, of Missouri, offered this resolution:
Whereas, Certain members of this House, now in nomination for Speaker, did indorse and recommend a certain book hereinafter mentioned: Therefore,
Resolved, That the doctrines and sentiments of a certain book called the "Impending Crisis of the South," purporting to have been written by one Hinton R. Helper, are insurrectionary and hostile to the peace and tranquility of the country; and no member of this House who has indorsed or recommended the doctrines and sentiments therein affirmed, is fit to be Speaker of this House.
Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, rose to a question of order, insisting that but one of two things could be in order, a motion to adjourn, or a motion to proceed to another ballot.
The Clerk said that point had been decided both ways.
Mr. Clark proceeded: Representing, as he did, a border Slave State, adjoining two non-Slave-holding States of this Union, representing a Slave-holding constituency, which he nevertheless claimed to be equal in intelligence, patriotism and morality with the constituency of any other member, he would be recreant to that constituency, wanting in self-respect, and himself a traitor to the common country, were he to fail in denouncing as they deserved the sentiments which had been indorsed by men who appeared before them as candidates for election to be presiding officer of the House.
Mr. Stanton said this line of discussion would be much more appropriate and better managed, if the House were first organized with a presiding officer.
Mr. Clark proceeded to denounce the indorser of the "Impending Crisis" as guilty of advising treason, murder and rapine.
Mr. Kilgore thought it would he as well to let the New York Herald tell its own story. His name appeared in the list of Helper's indorsers, yet he had no recollection of having seen the book.
On the next day, the debate was renewed. Mr. Clark continued his speech; after he concluded, Mr. Sherman asked the Clerk to read a letter from F. P. Blair, dated Washington City, December 9, 1859, in which Mr. B. explained how the names of many leading Republican members, recommending the compendium, were obtained in advance of its publication. Mr. Helper brought his book to him at Silver Spring to examine and recommend, but after its perusal, he either wrote to Mr. Helper, or told him that it was objectionable in many particulars. To this, Mr. Helper deferred, and promised to omit entirely or alter the passages objected to. Mr, Blair understood that it was in consequence of this assurance that the obnoxious matter should be expunged, that many members of Congress were induced to recommend the work.
Mr. Sherman said that he did not remember signing the paper referred to, but as his name was published among the signers of the circular, he might have done so, and presumed he did. He had never read either the book or the compend, and had never seen a copy of either.
The contest for Speaker commenced on the first day of the session, and continued until the first of February. The debate was mainly carried on by the Democratic members, the Republicans generally refusing to speak until the House was organized by the election of a Speaker. During the contest, many of the Southern members took occasion to ventilate disunion sentiments, which passed without rebuke from their Democratic colleagues.
On Wednesday, December 7, a second ballot for Speaker resulted—for Sherman, 107; Mr. Bocock, 88; Mr. Gilmer, 22; Mr. Pennington, 3; scattering, 8.
Tenth Ballot—On this ballot, Mr. Briggs, of New York, (American,) received nine votes.
Eleventh Ballot.—After this ballot, Mr. Bocock withdrew, but his friends continued to cast occasional votes for him.
Thirteenth Ballot.—Mr. Barksdale, of Mississippi, received the Democratic vote on this and the two following ballots. The scattering vote on the thirteenth ballot was 46.
Sixteenth Ballot.—The scattering vote was 48.
Seventeenth Ballot.—Before this ballot was taken, Mr. Boteler withdrew, and nominated Mr. Millson, of Va., (Dem.) On this ballot Mr. Etheridge, of Tenn., (Amer.,) received 7 votes.
Twenty-first Ballot.—Twenty-three candidates received votes on this ballot, Messrs. Sherman, Bocock, Gilmer and Houston leading. Twenty-Second Ballot.—.Mr. Scott, (Dem.,) of California, was put in nomination, receiving 17 votes on this ballot, none on the twenty-third, and 83 on the twenty-fourth. Mr. Maclay, (Dem.) of New York, received 12 votes on the twenty-second ballot, and the scattering vote was 35.
Twenty-third Ballot.—Mr. Maynard, (Dem.) of Tenn., was now made the Democratic candidate, on nomination of Mr. Brabson, receiving 65 votes, against 105 for Sherman, the rest scattering.
Twenty-fifth Ballot.—Mr. Vallandingham, (Dem.) of Ohio, was nominated by the Democrats, receiving 12 votes on this ballot, and rising to 69 on the twenty-sixth. He was then dropped.
Twenty-eighth BallotTwenty-eighth Ballot.—There were seven leading candidates on this ballot, viz: Messrs. Sherman, McClernand, Bocock, Davis, Gilmer, Quarles, and Houston; 16 scattering votes were also cast.
Twenty-ninth Ballot.—Mr. Hamilton, (Dem.) of Texas, became the Democratic candidate on the nomination of Mr. Davis of Ind., and centered the vote of that party until the thirty-fourth ballot—his highest vote being 89 and his lowest 75.
An interval of fourteen days (January 11 to 25) elapsed between the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth ballot. During that time several exciting passages occurred in the House. Mr. Haskin created a sensation by dropping a pistol from his pocket; Mr. Pennington vainly endeavored to procure the passage of the plurality rule; Mr. Pryor uttered his fulmination against the New York Herald; Mr. Sherman defined his position; Mr. Corwin grew facetious over the troubles of the House; Mr. Etheridge's resolution to stop the talking and vote at least three times per diem was adopted.
Thirty-fifth Ballot.—The American vote was united on Mr. Smith, of North Carolina, in whose favor the tide ran strongly until the thirty-ninth ballot, when, but for the change of several votes, he would have been elected.
Thirty-ninth Ballot.—This ballot, cast on Friday, January 27, produced the greatest excitement in the House. Mr. Smith gained, but subsequently lost, the votes necessary to elect. The whole number cast was 228. Mr. Smith received 115 votes, but before the result was announced, three members, viz: Messrs. McPherson, Morris and Stanton, (all of Pennsylvania,) withdrew from Mr. Smith and voted for Mr. Corwin; thus reducing Mr. Smith's vote to 112—three less than the requisite number. The vote, as finally announced, stood as follows: Smith, 112; Sherman, 106; Corwin, 4; scattering, 6. The House then adjourned over to Monday. Before it again met, a Republican caucus was held, at which it was resolved to concentrate the Republican vote on Mr. Pennington, of New Jersey; Mr. Sherman announcing his intention to withdraw.
Fortieth Ballot.—On Monday Mr. Sherman rose in his place and formally withdrew his name. Mr. Pennington was then nominated in his place. The Democrats and South Americans continued to vote for Mr. Smith. The vote on this and the two succeeding ballots stood, 115 for Pennington and 113 for Smith.
Forty-third Ballot. — On Tuesday, January 21, the programme again changed. Mr. Smith withdrew, and Mr. McClernand was nominated in his place. Only one ballot was taken this day, resulting in 116 votes for Pennington, and 91 for McClernand; 26 scattering.
Forty-fourth, and Last Ballot. — The final ballot took place on Wednesday, Feb. 1. Mr. Briggs of New York voted for Mr. Pennington, giving him 117, the number necessary to elect. Thus, after wrangling for nearly two months, was the House organized. Mr. Pennington was at once conducted to the chair, duly sworn in, and so ended this remarkable and exciting contest.
Summary of the Several Ballots.
| Sherman,Bocock,Barksdale,Boteler,Gilmer, | |||||
| (Rep.)(Dem.)(Dem.)(Am.)(Am.) | |||||
| First Ballot | 66 | 86 | . . . | 14 | 3 |
| Second Ballot | 107 | 88 | . . . | . . . | 22 |
| Third Ballot | 110 | 88 | . . . | . . . | 20 |
| Fourth Ballot | 108 | 86 | . . . | . . . | 22 |
| Fifth Ballot | 110 | 85 | . . . | . . . | 22 |
| Sixth Ballot | 110 | 85 | . . . | . . . | 18 |
| Seventh Ballot | 96 | 86 | . . . | . . . | 36 |
| Eighth Ballot | 111 | 83 | . . . | 25 | . . . |
| Ninth Ballot | 111 | 85 | . . . | 23 | . . . |
| Tenth Ballot | 111 | 84 | . . . | 15 | . . . |
| Eleventh Ballot | 112 | 85 | . . . | 21 | . . . |
| Twelfth Ballot | 112 | 10 | . . . | 29 | . . . |
| Thirteenth Ballot | 110 | 12 | 20 | 31 | . . . |
| Fourteenth Ballot | 111 | . . . | 15 | 39 | . . . |
| Fifteenth Ballot | 110 | . . . | 10 | 43 | . . . |
| Sixteenth Ballot | 109 | . . . | . . . | 38 | . . . |
| Millson, (Dem.) | |||||
| Seventeen Ballot | 106 | . . . | 96 | . . . | 6 |
| Eighteenth Ballot | 95 | . . . | 79 | . . . | 36 |
| Nineteenth Ballot | 108 | . . . | 69 | . . . | 21 |
| Twentieth Ballot | 103 | . . . | 10 | 27 | 19 |
| Houston, (Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-first Ballot | 100 | 20 | 17 | . . . | 17 |
| Scott, (Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-second Ballot | 101 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 14 |
| Maynard, (Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-third Ballot | 105 | . . . | 65 | . . . | . . . |
| Twenty-fourth Ballot | 102 | . . . | . . . | 83 | 14 |
| McClernand,Vallandigham, (Dem.)(Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-fifth Ballot | 101 | . . . | 33 | 12 | 14 |
| Twenty-sixth Ballot | 104 | . . . | . . . | 69 | 7 |
| Davis,Nelson, (Dem.)(Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-seventh Ballot | 103 | 56 | 6 | 8 | . . . |
| McClernand, (Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-eighth Ballot | 109 | 32 | 37 | . . . | 4 |
| Hamilton, (Dem.) | |||||
| Twenty-ninth Ballot | 103 | . . . | 89 | . . . | 14 |
| Sherman, Bocock, Hamilton, Nelson, Gilmer (Rep.)(Dem.)(Dem.)(Am.)(Am.) | |||||
| Thirtieth Ballot | 105 | ... | 88 | ... | 22 |
| Thirty-first Ballot | 105 | ... | 88 | ... | 19 |
| Thirty-second Ballot | 105 | ... | 88 | ... | 18 |
| Thirty-third Ballot | 108 | ... | 81 | ... | 19 |
| Thirty-fourth Ballot | 106 | ... | 75 | ... | 25 |
| Smith,(Am.) | |||||
| Thirty-fifth Ballot | 105 | 51 | 26 | ... | ... |
| Davis,(Dem.) | |||||
| Thirty-sixth Ballot | 109 | 58 | 37 | 5 | ... |
| Thirty-seventh Ballot | 110 | 55 | 36 | 7 | ... |
| Thirty-eighth Ballot | 109 | 51 | 33 | 7 | 4 |
| Thirty-ninth Ballot | 106 | ... | 112 | ... | ... |
| Pennington, (Rep.) | |||||
| Fortieth Ballot | 115 | ... | 113 | ... | ... |
| Forty-first Ballot | 115 | ... | 113 | ... | ... |
| Forty-second Ballot | 115 | ... | 113 | ... | ... |
| McClernand, (Dem.) | |||||
| Forty-third Ballot | 116 | ... | 91 | ... | 1 |
| Forty-fourth Ballot | 117 | ... | 85 | ... | 16 |
JOHN BROWN INVESTIGATION.
The Senate Committee to investigate the Harper's Ferry Insurrection matter, have had a number of persons before them. They have not, as yet, reported; but it is ascertained that they have not obtained any evidence to implicate any other persons in the affair besides those who were actively engaged in it. Thaddeus Hyatt, of Massachusetts, was subpoenaed, but denied the right of the Committee to act in the matter. This was regarded as contempt, and he was imprisoned in the jail at Washington city, where he still remains. On May 28th, 1860, Mr. Dixon offered a resolution to authorize the Sergeant-at-Arms to remove said Hyatt from the jail, and permit him to pass without restraint within the limits of the city of Washington. The resolution was objected to, and laid over.