The Last Will and Testament of Cecil Rhodes/Part 2/Chapter 4
CHAPTER IV.—HIS SPEECHES.
Mr. Rhodes’s speeches between 1881 and 1899 were collected and published in 1900 (publishers, Chapman and Hall). Whether the publication of Mr. Rhodes’s speeches will tend to vindicate his reputation—as the publication of Oliver Cromwell’s speeches tended to justify the favourable verdict of Mr. Carlyle—remains to be seen. Here, at least, we have material for judgment. In this book, the painstaking research of a chronicler who preferred to veil his identity behind the pseudonym of “Vindex,” are collected all the public speeches of Mr. Rhodes which have ever been reported since he entered public life in the Cape in 1881, down to his famous speech at Kimberley immediately after the relief of the beleaguered city.
These speeches, however, we are given to understand, have neither been bowdlerised nor edited, excepting so far as is necessary to correct the somewhat slipshod grammar of Colonial reporters, excusable enough when grappling with the ill-hewn sentences of a man who thinks as he is speaking. Mr. Rhodes, however, had no reason to fear being tried by this ordeal. He does not emerge an immaculate saint, carved in the whitest of Parian marble. He is revealed not as an archangel of radiant stainless purity, but neither was he a cloven-footed devil. Judging him by his stature in influence, in authority and in driving force, he belonged to the order of archangels; but he was a grey archangel, with a crippled wing, which caused him to pursue a somewhat devious course in the midst of the storm-winds of race-passion and political intrigue. A grey archangel crossed with a Jesuit, who was so devoted to his ends that almost all means were to him indifferent, excepting in so far as they helped him to attain his goal—that is the man who is revealed to us in these speeches,
Mr. Rhodes did not execute so many curves in his political career as did Mr. Gladstone. His course, with one great and lamentable exception, was characterised by an unswerving adhesion to one political line; but throughout the whole of his life there was manifest the same steady purpose, to which he was true in good report and in ill. He tacked hither and thither, steering now to the north and now to the south; but he ever kept his goal in view. He did not navigate these crowded seas without a compass and chart. Short-sighted mortals, who have no other mete-wand by which to test the consistency of statesmen than their fidelity to the ephemeral combinations of parties, were bewildered and declared that there was no knowing what this man was after. But by those who watched his course afar off it was seen that his apparent divagations from the direct course were only those of the mariner whom long experience has taught that against an adverse wind the shortest way to your port is often the longest way about. Mr. Rhodes himself always maintained to those who knew him intimately and who could enter into his higher thoughts, that he had one object—namely, to promote by all the means in his power the union, the development, the extension of the English-speaking race. Empire with Mr. Rhodes meant many things, chiefly the maintenance of the union between the widely scattered communities which owe allegiance to the British Crown; secondly, the established authority of this race—peaceful, industrious and free—over the dark-skinned myriads of Africa and Asia; thirdly, the maintenance of an open door for the products of British manufactures to all the markets of the world.
These were Mr. Rhodes’s political objects. To attain these ends he devoted his life and dedicated the whole of his money, the acquisition of which some erroneously imagined to be the great object of his life. To achieve these ends he worked first with one set of men and then with another; but on the whole it will be found by reference to the speeches that for the most part he stood in with the Dutch.
Without further preface I will proceed to examine the book, and quote from the 912 pages of the speeches here collected some short and pithy extracts. It is impossible to read Mr. Rhodes’s speeches without feeling that “Vindex” had good reason for the faith that was within him. I always thought a great deal of Mr. Rhodes, but the perusal of these speeches led me to feel that I had never done justice to many sides of his singularly attractive character.
Take, for instance, the fascination which he undoubtedly 
A Characteristic Portrait.
It was in the year 1882 that Gordon and Rhodes met. “Vindex” says that they were both deeply interested in the Basuto question. They used to take long walks together and discuss Imperial and other questions, with the result of vigorous argument between them. They became such close friends that when Rhodes was starting for Kimberley, Gordon pressed him hard to stay and work with him in Basutoland. Rhodes refused on the ground that he had already mapped out his life’s work, which lay elsewhere. Gordon would take no denial for a long time, and when forced to give in at last, said, ‘‘There are very few men in the world to whom I would make such an offer, but of course you will have your own way.” “You always contradict me,” Gordon said to Rhodes, “you always think you are right and every one else wrong,” a formula which Rhodes, no doubt, would have applied with equal justice to Gordon himself. The closeness of the tie which bound together the two men was natural enough. Both were idealists whose thoughts ran on the same lines in many things, the chief difference being not as to aims but as to the practical methods for realising them. This is well illustrated by Rhodes’s well-known observation when Gordon told him that he had refused a roomful of gold offered him by the Chinese Government as a reward for suppressing the Taeping rebellion. “I would have taken it,” said Rhodes, “and as many roomfuls as they would have given me. It is of no use to have big ideas if you have not the cash to carry them out.”
That Rhodes had big ideas no person who reads this collection of speeches will doubt. One of the earliest speeches in “Vindex’s” collection was that which he delivered in July, 1883, on the Basutoland Annexation Bill. It was a veritable Confession of Faith, the declaration of political convictions from which Mr. Rhodes never varied.
“I have my own views as to the future of South Africa, and I believe in an United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire. I believe that confederated states in a colony under responsible government would each be practically an independent republic; but I think we should have all the privileges of the tie with the Empire. Possibly there is not a very great divergence between myself and the honourable member for Stellenbosch, excepting always the question of the flag.”
The honourable member for Stellenbosch was Mr. Hofmeyr, who was reported to have said that he was in favour of the United States of South Africa under its own flag.
It 1s very interesting to see this difference on the flag cropping up as long ago as 1883. Mr. Rhodes was always a fanatic on the subject of the British flag. Speaking at Bloemfontein in 1890, Mr. Rhodes is reported as having said that he felt admiration for the sentiment regarding the possession of a national flag, and he looked forward to equitable understandings which, while not sacrificing sentiment, would bring about a practical union in South Africa. What he meant by this is quite clear, and would have been clearer had “Vindex” reported his speech in full. Mr. Rhodes was in favour of allowing the republics to retain their own flags when they came into the Confederation, and he angrily reproved those who wished to take away the republican flags from South Africa. Devotion to his own flag enabled him to sympathise with the sentiment of the Dutch. At Kimberley, in 1890, he said that he deprecated any attempt to force a union of South Africa under the same flag. He said:—
“I know myself that I am not prepared to forfeit at any time my own flag. I repeat I am not prepared at any time to forfeit my own flag. If I forfeit my flag what have I left? If you take away my flag you take away everything. Holding this view I cannot but feel the same respect for the neighbouring states where men have been born under republican institutions and with republican feelings.”
Therein Mr. Rhodes laid his finger upon the great secret of his success—that which differentiated him from the ruck of the people by whom he was surrounded. He had not only imagination, but he had sympathy.
It would be difficult to find any speeches so instinct with the spirit of true Colonial self-government, and the assertion of the fundamental principles which military Imperialism tramples under foot, than those which meet us on almost every page of this book. One of the best speeches which Mr. Rhodes ever delivered was that which he addressed to the Congress of the Afrikander Bond in 1891. We are told constantly that the Afrikander Bond is a treasonable association.
But in 1891 Mr. Rhodes stood up to propose the toast of the Afrikander Bond. He had just returned from England, where he had received, as he said, “the highest consideration from the politicians of England,” and Her Majesty had invited him to dine with her. Fresh from these tokens of confidence at Downing Street and at Windsor, he hastened to Africa to propose the toast of the Afrikander Bond, and to declare that he
“felt most completely and entirely that the object and aspirations of the Afrikander Bond were in complete touch and concert with a fervent loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen.” “I come here,” said Mr. Rhodes, ‘‘because I wish to show that there is no antagonism between the aspirations of the people of this country and of their kindred in the mother country. But,” Mr. Rhodes added significantly, ‘‘provided always that the Old Country recognises that the whole idea of the colonies and of the colonial people is that the principle of self-government must be preserved to the full, and that the capacity of the colony must be admitted to deal with every internal matter that may arise in this country. The principle must be recognised in the Old Country that the people born and bred in this colony, and descended from those who existed in this country many generations ago, are much better capable of dealing with the various matters that arise than people who have to dictate some thousands of miles away. Now that is the people of the Afrikander Bond. I look upon that party as representing the people of that country.” He declared that “the future rested with the Afrikander Bond. Your ideas are the same as mine.”
While always professing his full loyalty and devotion to the mother country, he asserted that self-government would give them everything they wanted.
“Let us accept jointly the idea that the most complete internal self-government is what we are both aiming at. That self-government means that every question in connection with this country we shall decide, and we alone. The we are the white men in South Africa—Dutch and English.”
Between the two Mr. Rhodes kept the balance even. Speaking at the Paarl about the same time, he declared that he hardly knew which to choose between, the Dutch and the English, as the dominant race in the world.
“You have only got to read history to know that if ever there was a proud, rude man, it was an Englishman—the only man to cope with him was a Dutchman.”
The impression left upon the mind by the reading of these earlier speeches of Mr. Rhodes is that, while devoted to the British Empire and true to the principle of the Empire, he was nevertheless primarily a Cape Colonist. We have here nothing concerning the paramountcy of Downing Street, or even of the supremacy of the Empire. What he struggled for was the paramountcy of Cape Colony. The Cape was to be the dominant power in South Africa. The Northern extension of Bechuanaland was to be made for the Cape, and the Cape was then, as 
Dr. F. Rutherfoord Harris.
We had the same kind of thing in 1884, when, after the Warren expedition, it was reported that Sir Charles Warren had drawn up a scheme which contained a provision that no Dutchman need apply for land in the newly-acquired territory. Upon this Mr. Rhodes said:—
“I think all would recognise that I am an Englishman, and one of my strongest feelings is loyalty to my own country. If the report of such a condition in the settlement by Sir Charles Warren is correct, that no man of Dutch descent is to have a farm, it would be better for the English colonists to retire. I remember, when a youngster, reading in my English history of the supremacy of my country and its annexations, and that there were two cardinal axioms—that the word of the nation when once pledged was never broken, and that when a man accepted the citizenship of the British Empire there was no distinction between races. It has been my misfortune in one year to meet with the breach of one and the proposed breach of the other. The result will be that when the troops are gone we shall have to deal with sullen feeling, discontent, and hostility. The proposed settlement of Bechuanaland is based on the exclusion of colonists of Dutch descent. I raise my voice in most solemn protest against such a course, and it is the duty of every Englishman in the House to record his solemn protest against it. In conclusion, I wish to say that the breach of solemn pledges and the introduction of race distinctions must result in bringing calamity on this country; and if such a policy is pursued it will endanger the whole of our social relationships with colonists of Dutch descent, and endanger the supremacy of Her Majesty in this country.”
No one could have denounced more vehemently than Mr. Rhodes the suggestion that a Crown Colony of any kind should be established under Downing Street in the heart of South Afnica.
“I have held,” he said, “to one view. That is the government of South Africa by the people of South Africa whilst keeping the Imperial tie of self-defence.”
While he would not object to allow the Imperial Government a temporary responsibility during a period of transition, he declared—
“I do object most distinctly to the formation of a separate British colony in the interior of South Africa on the Zambesi apart from the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.”
If he felt that as far away as the Zambesi is, how much more strongly would he have felt it just across the Vaal and the Orange River!
Incidentally also note that Mr. Rhodes strongly supported the Dutch policy of dealing with the natives as opposed to the policy of Exeter Hall and the missionaries. He maintained that the Dutch treated the natives very well. His own native policy, which is practically accepted to-day by nearly every white man in South Africa, was stated by him in 1888 as follows:—
“Well, I have made up my mind that there must be class legislation, that there must be Pass Laws and Peace Preservation Acts, and that we have got to treat natives, where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way to ourselves. We are to be lords over them. These are my politics on native affairs, and these are the politics of South Africa. Treat the natives as a subject people as long as they continue in a state of barbarism and communal tenure; be the lords over them, and let them be a subject race—and keep the liquor from them.”
Viewed in the light of these extracts, we can see what would have been the line which Mr. Rhodes would have taken in the immediate future of South Africa. First and foremost, Mr. Rhodes would have stood by the flag. He would never be the George Washington of a revolted South Africa—unless, of course, Downing Street should try to play the part of George III. Secondly, he would of necessity have become the centre round which would have gravitated all the forces making for self-government and colonial independence. He was the natural leader of the protest against that militarism which cost us the Transvaal in 1880–81, and which will inevitably produce the same results if it is allowed to place South Africa under the rule of the soldier’s jack-boot. Thirdly, Mr. Rhodes would have undertaken the championship of the Dutch against the dominant party which wished to put them under the harrow.
Extracts give an imperfect idea of Mr. Rhodes’s speeches. I quote therefore one speech in full. It was that which he delivered when he was at the zenith of his fame at the beginning of the year which was to close so disastrously with the Jameson Raid. The speech is that which he addressed to the shareholders of the Chartered Company on January 18th, 1895. It is also interesting as containing a very full description of the condition of things in Rhodesia at that time.
“Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, I have to thank you for the reception which you have accorded to me, but I think that you naturally desire that we should deal with the practical part of the Company’s development in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, because you must remember that the English are a very practical people. They like expansion, but they like it in connection with practical business. I will not refer to the causes that led to our late war, but I may tell you very frankly that we either had to have that war or to leave the country. I do not blame the Matabele. Their system was a military system; once a year they raided the surrounding people, and such a system was impossible for our development. Conclusions were tried, and they came to a successful issue so far as we were concerned. I might make one remark with respect to that war; that to refer to the men who took part in it as political adventurers was a mistake. You can quite understand that, however bad times were, you would not risk your life unless there was something other than profit from the possible chance of obtaining a farm at the end of the war of the value now of about £50. Really, why the people volunteered so readily was that they had adopted this new country as their home, and they saw very clearly that unless they tried issues with the Matabele, they would have to leave the country. I think that is the best reply to the charge that the men who took a part in the war did it for the sake of loot and profit.
“Now, in looking at this question, we have to consider what we possess, and I can tell you that we possess a very large piece of the world. If you will look at the map, let us consider what we have north of the Zambesi. We have now taken over the administration of the land north of the Zambesi save and except the Nyassaland Protectorate. We have also received sanction for all our concessions there; that is, the land and minerals north of the Zambesi belong to the Chartered Company, with one exception, the small piece termed the Nyassaland Protectorate. Even in that, however, we have considerable rights as to the minerals and land, in return for the property we took over from a Scotch company called the Lakes Company. We have, however, been relieved from the cost of administration of the Nyassaland Protectorate. Her Majesty’s Government and the British people have at last felt it their duty to pay for the administration of one of their own provinces, and I think we have a very fair reply to the Little Englanders, who are always charging us with increasing the responsibilities of Her Majesty’s Government, and stating that the ‘Charters,’ when in difficulty, always appeal to the mother country. Our reply must be that the boot is on the other leg. For four years we have found the cost of administration of one of your own provinces, and we are proud to think that we have yearly paid into Her Majesty’s Treasury a sum for the administration of one of our own provinces, because Governments were unable to face the House of Commons to ask them to contribute to their obligations.
“Well, that is the position north of the Zambesi; and I may say, in reference to that part of our territory, that there are very promising reports from it. It is a high plateau, fully mineralised, and every report shows that the high plateau is a part where Europeans can live. If we pass from that to the South, we first come to Matabeleland and Mashonaland. There we have had great difficulties in the past. We had a Charter, but not a country. We had first to go in and occupy Mashonaland with the consent of the Mashonas, and then we had to deal with the Matabele. At the present moment there is a civilised government over the whole of that. We also possess the land and minerals, and from a sentimental point of view I will say this—that I visited the territory the other day and saw nearly all the chiefs of the Matabele, and I may say that they were all pleased, and naturally so. In the past they had always “walked delicately,” because any one who got to any position in the country and became rich was generally “smelt out,” and lost his life. You can understand that life was not very pleasant under such conditions. In so far as the bulk of the people were concerned they were not allowed to hold any cattle or possess anything of their own. Now they can hold cattle, and the leaders of the people know that they do not walk daily with the fear of death over them. We have now occupied the country, which I think we administer fairly, and in that territory also we possess the land and minerals.
“With regard to the South, in the country termed the Bechuanaland Protectorate, we possess all the mineral rights of Khamaland, and we have the negative right to the land and minerals as far south as Mafeking. What I mean by the negative right is, that from Mafeking throughout the whole Protectorate, since the grant of the Charter, no one has any right to obtain any concession from the natives except through the Chartered Company. We therefore possess the land, minerals, and territory from Mafeking to Tanganyika—that is, twelve hundred miles long and five hundred broad. I might say, with respect to that country, that I see no future difficulties in so far as risings of the natives are concerned. We have satisfied the people throughout the whole of it, and we may say that we have now come to that point when we can deal, without the risk of war, with the peaceful development of the country. That is what we possess.
“Now, you might very fairly ask what has it cost us. Your position is somewhat as follows:—You have a share capital of £2,000,000, and you have a debenture debt to-day of about £650,000; and I might point out to you that as against that debenture debt you have paid for the one hundred miles of railway in the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland, you have about fourteen hundred miles of telegraph, you have built magistrates’ courts in the whole of your territory, you have civilised towns in five or six different parts, and the Beira Railway. Although you do not hold their debentures, you have the voting power, and the railway is completed. We might now fairly say, if you put aside the Mafeking Railway and the land you hold in the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland, as apart from the chartered territories, that your debenture debt can be regarded as about £350,000; because I do not think it is an unfair price to put in your assets in Bechuanaland at £300,000, for, since the railway was opened there, it has paid its working expenses and four per cent. Therefore, in looking at the matter from a purely commercial point of view, you might say, we possess a country with all the rights to it, in length twelve hundred miles and in breadth an average of five hundred, and we have a debt of about £300,000 or £350,000, because we have an asset apart from that country in the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland of about £300,000.
“The next question you would naturally ask would be, what is the appreciation of the people as to that country? The only test you can take in a way is, apart from the very large sum put into mineral developments, what the people consider the value of the townships sold, because that is always the judgment of the individual. He buys a stand because he wishes to erect a store or building. You cannot term that the speculative action of syndicates. I may tell you that at the last stand sale in Bulawayo the purchases were made by people who have since erected stores and buildings with the intention of remaining and residing in the country. As you are aware, the sales there realised £53,000, and I received in connection with this matter an interesting telegram last night. A stand which fetched at our sale £160 was sold—I suppose yesterday or the day before, because we are now in complete communication by the telegraph—for £3,050. The value of the building on it is estimated at £1,000, so within six months, in the estimation of the purchaser, the stand has risen from £160 to £2,050, in so far as the ground value is concerned. That speaks more than words, and shows the confidence of the people in the country.
“The next risk with a commercial company like ours would be the question of the cost of administration. You might very fairly say, ‘We know that the future is all right. We feel that so huge a country, mineralised like that, must come out successfully; but what is the cost of administration, what is the difference between revenue and expenditure?’ That is the next question which business men would ask. In connection with that you will no doubt have examined the reports, but it is always very difficult to obtain a practical idea from a report, respecting a question like this. I can, however, tell you from my knowledge about the position. The revenue now is about £50,000 per annum from the country, and the expenditure is about £70,000. You must, however, remember that I do not include in the revenue of £50,000 the sale of stands, because I call that capital account. I mean by revenue, what you receive monthly from stamps, licences, and the ordinary sources of revenue which every country possesses. I am therefore justified in thinking that we need feel no alarm as to the future about balancing our expenditure with our revenue, because I would point out to you, that if with no claim licences—because we are deriving few or none now—with no customs, and practically with no hut tax at present, you almost balance now, I think we may fairly say that we shall balance in the future, and earn a sum with which to pay interest on our debentures. I do not think that is an excessive proposition to make, and you must remember that this expenditure covers a force of over two hundred police. Two years ago, when I told you we were balancing in Mashonaland, we had practically dismissed all our police, as we could not afford them, but the new position is that with an expenditure of £70,000 and a revenue of £50,000, we are paying for two hundred police, and really we do not want more expenditure. We have magistrates in every town, mining commissioners, and a complete system of government. We have a Council, an Administrator, a Judge, and a Legal Adviser. I cannot therefore see that we want any more heavy expenditure, and that is why I have not asked for any increase of capital.
“From a commercial point of view, the way I
Mr. Hays Hammond.
look at it is somewhat as follows:—We have a capital of £2,000,000 in shares, let that be our capital; we have our debentures, as to half of which we have a liquid asset in the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland. What future extra expenditure can there be? There can be no more wars, for there are no more people to make the wars. As to public buildings, in each of our towns we have most excellent public buildings, quite equal to the ordinary buildings in Cape Colony; I speak of Bulawayo, Salisbury, Umtali, and Victoria. As to telegraphs, every town in the country is connected with the telegraph excepting Umtali. As to railway communication. we have given railway communication in the east from Beira to Chimoio, through the ‘fly,’ and one of the richest portions of the country is only seventy-five miles from the terminus. We have extended the Vryburg Railway to Mafeking—that is five hundred miles from Bulawayo. If the country warrants further railway communications the money can be found apart from the Charter. If the country does not warrant any further railway extensions, then we had better not build it. The people must be satisfied as we were in the past at Kimberley. For years we had to go six hundred miles by waggon to Kimberley, and then we went five hundred miles, and later four hundred miles by the same means, although the yearly exports were between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000. When Kimberley justified a railway, a railway was made, and so it will be in this case. We have maintained our position. We have a complete administration, and we have railway facilities which will allow batteries to be sent in. I do not see, therefore, where more public expenditure is required. The extension of railways will be undertaken when the country warrants it, apart from the Charter. When, therefore, I came home, and was spoken to about the question of an increase of capital, I, after a careful consideration, thought it would be an unwise thing to submit to the shareholders. We are practically paying our way, and we shall keep our Chartered capital at £2,000,000; and I cannot see in the future any reason which would cause us to increase it. If the country is a failure, we had better not increase it; and if the country is a success, it will not be wanted.
“Now, we have dealt with the question of what we possess, what it has cost us, and our present financial position, and you might next very fairly say, What are the prospects? Well, looking at that question, I can only say that I have been through the country, and from an agricultural point of view I know it is a place where white people are going to settle. It is good agricultural country. As to climate, it is asked by some whether it is not a fever country. It is nothing of the kind. It is a high healthy plateau, and I would as soon live there as in any part of South Africa. Towards the Portuguese territory and in some parts of the low country the climate is unhealthy, and the same applies to the country just on the Zambesi; the high plateau, however, is perfectly healthy. You may therefore say that you have a country where white people can live and be born and brought up, and it is suitable for agriculture; but of course the main point we must look to, in so far as a return to our shareholders is concerned, is the question of the mineralisation of the country. I have said once before that out of licences and the usual sources of revenue for a Government you cannot expect to pay dividends. The people would get annoyed if you did; they do not like to see licences spent in dividends—those are assets which are to pay for any public works and for good government. We must therefore look to our minerals to give us a return on our capital, which you must remember is £2,000,000.
“In dealing with that question, I will ask, What have you got? You possess a country about one thousand two hundred miles by five hundred which is mineralised, and as regards the efforts which have at present been made, you have in connection with the search for minerals forty thousand claims registered with the Government of the country. That means two thousand miles of mineralised quartz, and I would refer you to the report of Mr. Hammond, who went through the country with me, and who is the consulting engineer of the Goldfields of South Africa Company. He was highly pleased with what he saw. There was a suggestion made that the reefs were not true fissure veins; did not go down. He pooh-poohed that idea. I would refer you to page 35 of the directors’ report, where he alludes to that, and says: ‘Veins of this class are universally noted for their permanency.’ Then if you follow his remarks on the mineral position, you will find that he says: ‘It would be an anomaly in the history of gold-mining if, upon the hundreds of miles of mineralised veins, valuable ore-shoots should not be developed as the result of future work.’ He adds: ‘There are, I think, substantial grounds to predict the opening up of shoots of ore from which an important mining industry will ultimately be developed.’ Then he warns people about the mode of investing money in the search for minerals, and says: ‘With these admonitions, I confidently commend the country to the attention of mining capitalists.’ That is the report of a cautious man who visited the country and reported on what he saw.
“You must remember that in the past, in dealing with our reefs, we have not had men acquainted with mining. They were chiefly young fellows who went up and occupied the country, and who knew as little about mining as many of you here do. They had no means of ascertaining, because the mineralisation of that country is quartz, and not alluvial, and we could get in no batteries. Still, the past four years have proved that the whole country is mineralised from end to end, and in reference to the discoveries made I think I am justified in stating that such have been the reports of those who are connected with those discoveries, that nearly three-quarters of a million sterling has been subscribed lately for the development of them, not by puffing prospectuses, but privately by friends of those who have gone out and made reports on what they have discovered. If I might address a word of warning to you, I would say we, as directors, are responsible to you for the Charter as to its capital. Do not go and discount possibilities as if they were proved results. I think, however, that with the facts which I have stated, you may be confident that in the future Matabeleland and Mashonaland will be gold-producing countries, because it would be contrary to Nature to suppose that a country that is mineralised from end to end should not have payable shoots. With these words I will make no further remark as to the gold, save and except to tell you this, that if one of you asks how you will get a return in connection with that gold, I may state that what I term the ‘patent’ in the country—namely, the Company getting a share in the vendor scrip—has been practically accepted by the country. We have not had the slightest diffculty in settling with the various corporations who have obtained capital from the public.
“The great objection to the idea was its newness. It had never been tried before. It has now been tried and accepted, and for a very simple reason. The prospector has found that he is not eaten up by monthly licences while holding his claim; the capitalist, when he goes to purchase, knows that the Charter has a certain interest, and pays accordingly; and as to the public, who always find the capital for quartz mining, it is a matter of no importance to them whether Jones gets all the vendor scrip or whether Jones and the Government share it together. The public do not take such a personal interest in Jones that they require that he should have the whole of the scrip. They also know that if the Government receive half of it, it is held until the value of the mine is proved, whereas if the whole of it was handed over to Jones, he might part with it to a confiding public. When, therefore, you are considering this question commercially you will say, ‘Well, we are dealing with a proposition of a capital of £2,000,000; we are dealing with a country nearly as big as Europe, and we know it is mineralised. The present tests must be fairly satisfactory, or else the friends of those who have gone out and found reefs would not have subscribed three-quarters of a million sterling for their development. We must always remember in connection with mining that it is very speculative, as I told a friend of mine the other day—they are always bothering me about mines—and I said to one of my friends, a French financier, ‘I will give you advice at last.’ He was delighted, and asked what I would advise. I said, ‘Either buy French Rentes or Consols.’ Then he went away annoyed. What, however, I desire to put to you is, that when you go into a mining venture you go into a speculative venture; but as a proposition with a capital of £2,000,000, dealing with a country almost as big as Europe, which is mineralised, and with that subscribed capital for its development—and as regards its administration, the revenue paying for the expenditure—it is a fair business-like proposition. When you consider this comparatively—and that is the great secret in life—it represents in capital perhaps one Rand mine. As to the question whether the scrip proposal has been accepted, we have settled with all the chief corporations, and as minerals are found in that territory, you therefore know perfectly well that in reference to the share capital you have an interest in everything that is discovered. I will not say anything more than that with regard to the mineral question, but I would repeat again: do not discount possibilities as if they were proved results.
“Now, gentlemen, I think that on this occasion you cannot accuse me of not dealing with the commercial aspects of the country. I think you will admit that I have shown you the size of it, the cost of it, and the possibilities of it, and if there is any point I have missed, please tell me. We have to consider, because we are a Charter, and are connected with politics, the political position of the country, and I may say that that is most satisfactory. We had a good many enemies before, and difficulties with the Portuguese, with the Transvaal, and with the Matabele. As you know, the Matabele difficulty has disappeared; they have incorporated themselves with us. The difficulties with the Portuguese are also over. We had different views as to where our boundaries were situated; but now I may say that our relations with them are on the most friendly footing, and we must always remember, with reference to the Portuguese, that they were the original civilisers of Africa. They had the bad luck, if I may say so, to get only the coast, to be on the fringe, and never to have penetrated to the high healthy plateau at the back. Their power is not what it was; but we must respect them, and we must remember that the man who founded the Portuguese Colonial Empire—that is, Henry the Navigator—was of our own blood. The other day, when we were at Delagoa Bay, they had trouble with the natives, and we offered—Dr. Jameson and I—to assist them, because the natives in rebellion were a portion of the tribe of Gungunhana, to whom we pay tribute, but the Portuguese declined our assistance, and one cannot help respecting their national pride. They would not take help from anyone, and we should do the same. They were very courteous and thanked us, but they declined our proffered assistance, although they knew that we could help them, because these natives who were troubling them were receiving tribute from us. In the same way they refused assistance from the Transvaal Government, and I believe from two foreign Powers. With national pride they are settling their difficulties themselves. It will be our object to work in perfect co-operation with the Portuguese Government and officials.
“With regard to the Transvaal, our neighbour the President finds that he has quite enough to do in dealing with his own people. I have always felt that if I had been in President Kruger’s position I should have looked upon the Chartered Territory as my reversion. He must have been exceedingly disappointed when we went in and occupied it; but since then we have co-operated most heartily with him, and I look to no political difficulty from the Transvaal. We have received throughout the complete support of the Cape people, who, recognising that it was too great an undertaking for themselves to enter upon, were glad that we undertook it, and they look upon it as their Hinterland, as, remember, we shall pass from the position of chartered administration to self-government, when the country is occupied by white people—especially by Englishmen, because if Englishmen object to anything it is to being governed by a small oligarchy. They will govern themselves. We must therefore look to the future of Charterland—I speak of ten or twenty years hence—as self-government, and that self-government very possibly federal with the Cape Government.
“Then when we think of the political position, we have also to consider the English people, and I must say we have received the very heartiest support from the English public, with a few exceptions, possibly from ignorance—(laughter)—and possibly from disappointment—(laughter) and I think in many cases from an utter misconception. I remember whilst coming home, sitting down on board ship and reading this from the Daily Chronicle:—‘Not a single unemployed workman in England is likely to secure a week’s steady labour as a result of a forward policy in South Africa.’ What is the reply to that? I do not reply by a platform address about ‘three acres and a cow’—(laughter)—or with Socialistic statements as to ‘those who have not, taking from those who have.’ I make the practical reply that we have built 200 miles of railway, and that the rails have all been made in England and the locomotives also. We have constructed 1,300 miles of telegraphs, and the poles and wires have all been made in England. Everything we wear has been imported from England. And can you tell me that not a single labourer or unemployed workman in England is likely to secure a week’s steady labour as a result of that enterprise? I can assure you it does them much more good than telling them about three acres and a cow, because nothing has ever come out of that yet. (Laughter.) And as to the Socialistic programme—well, you know the story of one of the Rothschilds, I think, who listened to it all in the train, and then handed the gentleman who addressed him a sovereign as his share of the plunder. (Laughter.) But we have to deal with this question, and I hope I am not tiring you of it, because we have to study the feeling of the English people, and they are most practical. You must show that it is to their benefit that these expansions are made, because the man in the street, if he does not get a share, naturally says: ‘And where do I come in?’ (Laughter.) You must show them that there is a distinct advantage to them in these developments abroad. That is the reason why, when we made a constitution for this country, I submitted a provision that the duty on British goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff. I should like you to listen to me on that, if I do not tire you. You must remember that your ‘Little Englander’ says, and very fairly: ‘What is the advantage of all these expansions? What are the advantages of our Colonies? As soon as we give them self-government, if we remonstrate with them as to a law they pass, they tell us they will haul down the flag; and on receiving self-government, they immediately devise how they can keep our goods out, and make bad boots and shoes for themselves.’ It is true that many of our Colonies have found out the folly of Protection, but they have created a bogey which they cannot allay, because the factories have been created, the workmen have come out there, and they are only kept going by the high duties; and a poor Minister who tries to pass a low tariff knows perfectly well that he will have his windows broken by an infuriated mob. The only chance for a colony is to stop these ideas before they develop, and taking this new country of ours, I thought it would be a wise thing to put in the constitution that the tariff should not exceed the present Cape tariff, which is a revenue and not a protective tariff. (Cheers.) The proof of that is that we have not a single factory in the Cape Colony. I thought if we made that a part of our constitution in the interior, we should stop the creation of vested factories, a most unfair treatment of British trade, and a most unjust thing to the people of a new country. You may not be surprised that that proposition was refused. It was refused because it was not understood. People thought that there was a proposition for a preferential system. I may tell you that all my letters of thanks came from the Protectionists, and nothing from the Free Traders, though it was really a Free Trade proposition. A proposition came from Home that I should put in the words ‘That the duty on imported goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff.’ I declined to do that because I thought that in the future, twenty-five or fifty years hence, you might deal with the United States as you would with a naughty child, saying, ‘If you will keep on this system of the McKinley tariff, or an increase of it, we shall shut your goods out,’ in the same way that you go to war, not because you are pleased with war, but because you are forced. That is why I wished to put the words ‘British goods,’ because actually England in the future might adopt this policy and yet have a clause in the constitution of one of her own colonies which prevented it. (Cheers.) Now who could object to this? Certainly not the French or the German Ambassadors, because so long as England’s policy is to make no difference, they come in under this clause, the policy of England being that there should be no preferential right. Any law passed by us giving a preferential right would be disallowed. But this clause would have assisted the German and French manufacturer, so long as England remains what it is, because they also would have shared in the privilege of the duty on imported goods, or British goods not exceeding 12 per cent. If you follow the idea, so long as England did not sanction a law making a difference, we had to make it the same to all. But this great gain was obtained, that supposing that the charter passed into self-government, and a wave of Protection came over the territory, and they pass, we will say, a duty of 50 per cent. on British goods, that would be disallowed, because it was contrary to the constitution. The only objection that has ever been made to this proposition is that it would have been law as long as it was no good, and when it was any good it would have been done away with. That shows a want of knowledge again. People think the people in the colonies are all for Protection. It is nothing of the kind. They are very sensible people, and they know that Protection means that everything you eat and wear costs you 50 per cent. more. But what does happen is that at times a wave comes over a country, of Protection, and it is carried by a small majority. It then becomes law; the factories are created and the human beings come out and they have to be fed, and therefore you cannot get rid of them. But in case of a wave coming in the country under a constitution as suggested, the Secretary of State would be justified in disallowing. He would say: ‘There is a large minority against this law, and as it is against the constitution I disallow.’ And look at the ramifications of it. Of course if the gold is in the quantity in Matabeleland and Mashonaland that we think, that will become a valuable asset in Africa, and we know perfectly well there is going to be a Customs Union of Africa—leave out the question of republics and the questions of Government and the Flag; but we know the practical thing will happen, that there will be a Customs Union in Africa. This clause being in our charter would have governed the rest of Africa, and therefore you would have had preserved to British goods, Africa as one of your markets. (Cheers.) Take the comparison of this question, and I will show you what it means. You have sixty millions of your people in the United States. You created that Government; that is your production, if I may call it so; they have adopted this folly of Protection—they cannot get rid of it now. What is your trade with the United States—sixty millions of your own people? I will tell you. Your exports are about £40,000,000 per annum. Now, in Africa and Egypt we have only 600,000 whites with us, and I do not think the natives are very great consumers—but you are up to £20,000,000. I will take Southern Africa. You are doing about £15,000,000 with the Cape and Natal, almost entirely British goods, and about £4,000,000 with Egypt, where you have a fair chance for your goods; and you are doing £20,000,000 with those two small dependencies, as against £40,000,000 with another creation of yours which has shut your own goods out and only takes £40,000,000 from you. If it had given a fair chance to your trade you would be doing £150,000,000 with the United States, to your own advantage and to the advantage of the American people. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) I can see very clearly that the whole of your politics lie in your trade, or should do so, because you are not like France, producing wine—you are not like the United States, a world by itself—you are a small province, doing nothing but making up the raw material into the manufactured article, and distributing over the world, and your great policy should be to keep the trade of the world, and therefore you have done a wise thing in remaining in Egypt and taking Uganda. You have to thank the present Prime Minister for that, and remember this, when it has to be written, that he has done that against probably the feelings of the whole of his party, which comprise the Little Englanders. He has taken Uganda and retained Egypt, and the retention of Egypt means the retention of an open market for your goods. (Hear, hear.) Why, the lesson is so easy! When I came home to England the first time, I went up the Thames, and what did I find they were doing?—for whom were they making? They were making for the world. That was what they were doing in England; and when I went into a factory there was not a man who was not working for the world. Your trade is the world, and your life is the world, and that is why you must deal with those questions of expansion and of retention of the world. (Hear, hear.) Of course, Cobdenism was a most beautiful theory, and it is right that you should look to the whole world; but the human beings in the world will not have that. They will want to make their own things; and if they find that England can make them best they put on these protective duties; and if they keep on doing that they will beat you in the end. It is not ethical discussions about the House of Lords that you want, or about three acres and a cow. And you talk nonsense if you talk about doing away with a Second Chamber so that a wave of popular feeling could sweep away your Constitution. Brother Jonathan does not do that. (Laughter.) It may all end in strengthening the House of Lords. We all know that. When you come to the election, and when you go on your various election committees, do not give your entire attention to the ethical question of the House of Lords. When Jones or Smith at the ensuing election asks you for your support, tell them—for there is really nothing else before you in the election—‘We will have this clause put in about Matabeleland.’ Everything comes from these little things. You do not know how it will spread, the basis of it being that your goods shall not be shut out from the markets of the world. That clause will develop, and will spread from Matabeleland to Mashonaland, and then perhaps Australia and Canada will consider the question, and you will thus be retaining a market for your goods. And you have been actually offered this, and you have refused it. You will be acting foolishly if you do not in the forthcoming elections insist upon that clause being put in. Now, I hope you will not say I have departed from the commercial aspect and gone to a political speech; but I can assure you of this—I think it will do you and your trade more good than anything I can conceive. Gentlemen, in all things it is the little questions that change the world. This charter came from an accidental thought, and all the great changes of the world come from little accidents. All the combinations and beautiful essays that are put forward so eagerly are unpractical enough, but this constitution is a more practical thing. I can assure you there is a very practical thing in it. We have been accused of being a speculative set of company-mongers, and nobody could see any great chance of our ultimate financial success; but by your support we have carried it through. When the man in the street sneers at you, you can remind him that it was an undertaking he had not the courage to enter upon himself as one of the British people; the Imperial Government would not touch it; the Cape Government was too poor to do it. It has been done by you, and the enterprise has succeeded, and I do not think anybody would say they would like to see that portion of the world under another flag now. And it has been done, which the English people like, without expense to their exchequer—(laughter)—and we have had to combine this expansion with the commercial or else we should not have succeeded. Don’t be annoyed with me, gentlemen. Let us look at the facts. There was that development of East Africa based, if I might put it, on the suppression of the slave trade and the cultivation of the cocoanut-tree. (Laughter.) Well, I saw Sir William Mackinnon at the end, and it almost killed him. He got no support from the public. We are very practical people. Take my own case. Take that of the transcontinental telegraph. It will be of great assistance to the Chartered Company, because it will put our territories at the end of Tanganyika in touch with us, and yet the bulk of the public did not help us. I think the public had really no grounds to subscribe. But I will take two corporations I am connected with. Well, one gave nothing, and with the other an indignant shareholder wrote to the Board to inquire who paid for the paper and envelopes of the circular. (Laughter.) Now, I mention this to show what an eminently practical people we are. Unless we had made this undertaking with its commercial difficulties, we should have failed, and that is the best reply to those who sneer at us and call us a set of company-mongers. (Cheers.) We have been fortunate in forming an imaginative conception, and succeeded, and really, if you look at it, within a period—well, I would say, it is hardly equal to the term allotted to an Oxford student. (Laughter.) Commercially, if you think it out, I think you will go away from this room—no, I don’t think you will go away to sell your shares, for it is fair business. When you went into our Company you went into speculative mining; it is certainly not Consols or French Rentes. There are no more claims for fresh money, and our two millions represent a very large interest in all the gold that will be found practically between Mafeking and Tanganyika in a highly mineralised country—(cheers)—and, therefore, if you are satisfied with the commercial, I really think you might give a help in the political. I do hope in the ensuing election you will do your best to see my clause carried, because you will do by that a really practical thing, and take the very first practical step that has been done towards the promotion of the Union of the Empire.” (Loud cheers.)
It is impossible to attempt to summarise the whole of Mr. Rhodes’s speeches here, but it is equally impossible to close this section without noticing in passing one of the most famous, and in some respects the most unfortunate of all his speeches, which he delivered immediately after the relief of Kimberley, on February 19th, 1900. It was in this speech that Mr. Rhodes made use of the famous phrase so constantly quoted against him, in which he spoke of the British flag as a “commercial asset.” This much misquoted passage occurs in a speech addressed to the shareholders of the De Beers Company. Mr. Rhodes had been using the resources of the De Beers shareholders without stint in the defence of Kimberley against the Boers. He was appealing to shareholders, many of whom, being French and Germans, regarded the whole British policy in South Africa with unconcealed detestation. His speech was primarily intended to reconcile them to an employment of the funds for political purposes to which they objected. He had also to deal with other shareholders, whose only concern was their dividends. This is quite clear from the opening passages of his speech. He said:—
“Shareholders may be divided into two classes—those who are imaginative and those who are certainly unimaginative. To the latter class the fact of our connection with the Chartered Company has been for many years past a great trial. Human beings are very interesting. There are those of the unimaginative type who pass their whole lives in filling money-bags, and when they are called upon, perhaps more hurriedly than they desire, to retire from this world. what they leave behind is often dissipated by their offspring on wine, women and horses. Of these purely unimaginative gentlemen, whose sole concern is the accumulation of wealth, I have a large number as my shareholders.”
It was to these unimaginative persons, especially to the foreign shareholders, that he addressed his vindication of the transformation of a purely commercial company unconnected with politics, into warriors fighting for the preservation of our homes and property.
“I have to tell the shareholders in Europe,” he said, “that we have for the last four months devoted the energies of our company to the defence of the town.”
After describing what had been done by the citizen soldiers of Kimberley, he concluded his speech by the following passage:—
“Finally, I would submit to you this thought, that when we look back upon the troubles we have gone through, and especially all that has been suffered by the women and children, we have this satisfaction—that we have done our best to preserve that which is the best commercial asset in the world—the protection of Her Majesty’s flag.”
When Mr. Rhodes came back from Kimberley, I had a talk with him upon this subject. He said that it was very ridiculous the way people had abused him for the passage about the flag. If they had considered the circumstances in which the speech was made, they would have seen the reason for it.
“People talked as if I were making a political speech, or speaking as a politician. I was not. I was addressing a meeting of the De Beers shareholders, half of whom were Frenchmen. Of course, the number of people present at the meeting was small, but I was addressing the French shareholders through the press. French feeling is very strong against England, and the French shareholders might naturally feel aggrieved. They had lost an enormous sum of money from the cessation of industry during the war. The part which the De Beers Company had taken in defending Kimberley was another point upon which, as shareholders, they might fairly take an exception. In order to parry their objection and to show to them that, after all, I was really looking after their business, I finished up with a declaration that I had been spending their money in defending what was, after all, the greatest commercial asset in the world, the protection of the British flag. It was a perfectly true thing, and it seemed to me a very useful thing to say in the circumstances. I was addressing, not the world at large, but De Beers shareholders. I had my French shareholders in my eye all the time.”
Mr. Rhodes’s last Portrait.