The Lessons of the German Events/Chapter 1
I
THE REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL IN GERMANY
My report will be divided into two parts. The first will describe the work of the delegation, and give the facts and the most important documents in connection with this work. The second part will attempt to examine the great defeat of the Party, to explain its significance as Arwid and I see it.
I will commence with the first part. The delegation does not accept the decisive resolution of the Party that was passed at the Chemnitz conference in its absence.
What did the delegation find? The complete collapse of the plan of war as passed by the Executive. The plan of attack of the Party as was decided on here in September and October was based on the following: the proletariat was to march in Saxony in order to defend the workers' government which we were to join: in Saxony an attempt was to be made to utilise political power in order to arm, and in this limited proletarian district, in Central Germany to build a barrier between the counter-revolution of the South, Bavaria and the Fascism of the North. Simultaneously, the Party was to carry out a national mobilisation of the masses.
This plan failed for the following reasons. In the first place, when our comrades entered the government, they were not in a position to bring about the arming of the proletariat. We were informed that the Party in Saxony possessed 800 guns. At the Chemnitz conference the second part of the plan, namely, the joint advance of the social-democratic and communist masses of the workers was found to have collapsed. The proposal to proclaim a general strike and armed revolt was never made in Chemnitz in view of the opposition of the Left Social-democrats. Our Party retreated, and covered its retreat by the formula of the establishment of a committee of action which was to decide what was to be done. The Central Committee decided to avoid a battle on the ground that in this battle the proletarian united front could not be established, and in view of divided forces and the insufficient technical preparation, a revolt was impossible.
I have to take up a position on this situation. In my conversation with the comrades, I agreed that as they were unable to establish a united front with the Social-democratic workers, they had to abandon this plan for a revolt in Saxony. Nevertheless, I demanded of the comrades that they proclaim the strike. I argued that if we were not strong enough as a Communist Party alone to organise the revolt against the Fascists, nevertheless, we were strong enough to resist, and at least not to give up the position without a fight. All the comrades present at that time repudiated this point of view.
After the first practical decision, fresh discussions commenced every day. Always the question was raised, what is to be done next? In order to bring about a momentary pause in the discussion on the Central Committee, the delegation on the 26th proposed to the Seventh Commission the following resolution:—
The Seventh Commission resolves:—
(1) Social and political antagonisms are becoming more acute every day. Any day may bring great and decisive battles between revolution and counter-revolution.
(2) The vanguard of the working class (the Communists and a section of the Social-democratic workers) are eager to take up the fight, but the mass of the workers, in spite of their extreme feeling of bitterness and poverty, are not prepared to fight.
(3) Therefore, the proletarian reserves must, by means of an energetic agitation, be drawn into the vanguard. The sections of the proletariat which are of special importance in the fight (metal workers, miners, railwaymen, agricultural labourers, and State employees) must be reached by special efforts of the Party. All efforts must be devoted to technical preparation. In order to unite the proletariat for the struggle, negotiations be immediately entered into with the Social-democrats locally and centrally, with the view, either to compel the Social-democrats to take up the fight, or to divorce the Social-democratic workers from their treacherous leaders.
(4) In view of the present situation, it is necessary that the Party restrain the comrades from armed revolt for as long as possible, in order to gain time for preparation. In the event, however, of spontaneous uprisings of the working class breaking out, the Party must support them by all means at its disposal. The Party must also parry the blow of the counter-revolution by means of mass action (demonstrations, political strikes), In these actions, armed conflicts should as far as possible be avoided.
(5) In reply to the Stresemann ultimatum, the Party must call a national protest strike, in which armed conflicts are to be avoided. In the event of the Social-democratic Party in Saxony refusing to take up the fight against the Stresemann ultimatum, our comrades must break with the Saxony government, and commence a campaign against them.
(6) All members of the Central Committee must carry out the decisions of the Party. The Central Committee will arrange for a re-distribution of work among its members.
This resolution was adopted unanimously. Comrade Ruth Fischer voted for this Resolution. This was five days after the first defeat in Saxony, after the Chemnitz conference,
Then came the second Saxony phase, namely, the Stresemann ultimatum, &c. The delegation submitted to the Central Committee the decision on the strike. The Central Committee, however, decided to call only a partial strike.
Comrades, we saw the task of the delegation of the Comintern and of the Central Committee as follows: That we have suffered a great defeat—a defeat that will leave its effects for some considerable time perhaps, was clear. There was the danger of panic and extreme disappointment among the masses. The defeat in itself was not as dangerous as this fact. For this reason, we took up the following task: to stop the flight of the masses, to make the Communist Party of Germany once again the rallying centre for the fighting masses, and to resume the fight.
When the Central Committee met it was not quite clear to us yet around which point to rally the masses and on what field action was to be undertaken. The lever of the action was not yet in our hands. That is why the passage in the thesis of the Central Committee, which we submitted, dealing with this point, is not sufficiently concrete. After a few days, it became clear, that the first task of the Party was to prevent itself from being forced underground, Already we had neither freedom of the Press nor freedom of assemble (street demonstrations), We sought to rally the Party on the policy of active struggle. How was this policy accepted? In general, the whole of the Executive was agreed on the question of unemployed demonstrations, &c. On the question of defending these demonstrations, the majority of the Central Committee was agreed. When it came to carrying out this policy, we met the strongest resistance of the Berlin representatives of the Central Committee, who held the view that the bitterness and disappointment of the masses of the Party was so great, that the comrades were not in a position to rally the masses for these demonstrations.
Comrades, the second point of difference was the question of armed demonstrations. The Berlin representatives in opposition to the Hamburg representatives, took the view that we could do nothing, it would only lead to unnecessary bloodshed. Our men cannot march through the streets armed merely with rattles.
It is clear why this policy was adopted. To me, it is clear, that the source of the weakness of the Party and of the masses is their passivity. As long as the masses are not convinced that we Communists at least, are prepared to exert all efforts and take all risks, it will not be possible to draw them into the struggle. What at present prevails among the German proletariat is a reflection of the general position in Germany. The collapse of political activity—extraordinary political passivity of all social classes, with the exception of the militarists. Without military, and without being able to say concretely how we shall be able to arrange for this defence, that was a question of military leadership, I said to myself, we cannot lead the workers for once or a second time into demonstrations and there to be beaten up like dogs, and then say to them come a third time and be beaten up again. Either the demonstrations were a mere gesture, or they had to be protected.
I now proceed from the explanation of the tactic of the delegation of the E.C. to the political analysis, in which I must assert two things. Of course, the first thing in our minds was the causes of our defeat, and we wrote concerning this in our reports to the Executive. The reports are before me. When the Party Committee met, the question was as follows: shall we at this stage enter into an internal Party discussion on the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party or not? My opinion, and the opinion of the whole delegation was that at the moment when the first attempts were being made to rally the Party to bring it to a stand, it was not only inexpedient but totally inadmissible to raise a debate on Party tactics. This is still my opinion to-day.
This was my view, and although I knew, of course, that after such a severe defeat a discussion in the Party must tend to an acute crisis, I held that it was necessary to postpone this until clearness had been reached on two points: whether we have entered into a long preparatory period, in which no great possibilities for action will exist; in that case the Party must solve the matter in the discussion; or we have come through a partial battle into a great battle. In that case the Party will overcome its weakness in that battle.
These are the reasons why I most energetically opposed the opening of the discussion in the middle of November. Naturally, I do not wish to assert, that the delegation and I at that time were in a position to see the full consequences of the defeat. Perhaps I have not read through all our correspondence. What I will say in concluding this discussion may contradict what we under the first impressions of the events, reported to the Executive as being the causes of these events. I do not think it is the first duty of a statesman, if he has said A once to say A for the rest of his life. Sometimes we must say B, sometimes we must even say Y, but sometimes we must even say that it never was A.
I will now begin with the second part of my report.
What were the causes of our great defeat?
Firstly, is it a great defeat? I believe it can be established, that the defeat has thrown us back just when we were so near to achieving our goal. I hold the view, that we have missed a great historical situation, such favourable situation occurs rarely. This is the first thing.
The second thing is, we do not know whether the collapse of capitalism in Germany will come about soon. We, however, must keep the fight in view as long as it is not perfectly clear that it will not take place. A political party cannot say that an event will take place in this way or that. The theoretician can take all possibilities into consideration. The Party leader must ask himself, what do I desire in this relation of forces? If the possibilities are that things will become more acute, then we must decide to accelerate this situation, but I say, although at first we did not deem it necessary to take all possibilities into consideration, that all possibilities exist, including the possibility that the situation will remain bad for a long time; in that case our defeat will be much greater than it is now.
Thirdly, we did not know what would be the effects of this defeat internationally, upon the other Communist Parties.
I do not wish to say a single word to gloss over this defeat.
We must ask ourselves first of all, what were the causes of this defeat ? I find, in the main, two opinions on this matter. Some comrades say the mass of the Party is a good proletarian mass, but the leadership consists of social-democratic officials, whom we have not yet converted into Communists. These officials have betrayed us. The second opinion, which is also my opinion, is that our Party is a good proletarian party, but lacks revolutionary experience. Its leadership, like all Communist leadership, naturally, has its weaknesses which are connected with its having originated from the social-democracy, and also because it has never taken part in great mass struggles previously, has not sufficient revolutionary experience.
(Banfler: Some were not even social-democrats.)
(Mastov: There are some who will go back to the social-democrats.)
Although we are a good workers' party, nevertheless, we are not yet a good Communist party, and this is the most important part of the situation that I see. It is not true, comrades, that the leaders would not fight, while the masses everywhere were rushing into battle. That was not the situation. Take the Left Social-Democrats: perhaps the leaders are traitors, but the masses are not traitors: they are honest workers. But the fact is, that these masses did not regard their leaders as traitors, and the greater part do not regard them as traitors to-day. This shows that the reserves which are on the road towards us have still to be trained. Our German Party is not a social-democratically led party, but it is an as yet imperfect Communist party.
These facts greatly influence the development of the Party in its latest phase.
Comrades, we are asked, have we over-estimated the October situation? Is this the cause of the error of the defeat? I do not think so. I say that the cause of our defeat lies in that the Ruhr business opened a new phase in the development of the class struggle in Germany. At the Leipsic congress, in our appeal to the Party, we said: this phase will end with civil war. Theoretically, we saw the situation correctly, and we did not draw the practical conclusions from this. When the collapse of the Ruhr action was clear, and when the destructive elements were growing exceedingly, we should not have advocated the occupation of the factories, but encouraged the growing mass struggle.
Comrades, the fact remains that we, in Moscow, realised that decisive events were taking place in Germany, only after the August days. The evidence of this is the following: we had the conferences in Essen and Frankfort. Both these conferences had merely an agitational significance. They were not conferences for the purposes of organising the struggle. The proof of this is the fact that the Executive was not in the least disturbed that the French Party had sent only twenty comrades for work among the troops. At the meeting of the Enlarged Executive, we were concerned with the propagandist aspect of this thing. Had we regarded the situation seriously as driving towards revolution, there would have been but one question on the agenda of the Enlarged Executive, namely, the question of preparing for the mass struggle in Germany, and for the armed uprising.
(Clara Zetkin: Quite true!)
We did not do this. After the August events we saw the direction which things were tending, and we said: Either the Fascists take power, or we must. If we desired the fight, we could not make the defence of the November Republic our aim. The difference between the Kerensky and the November Republics was that under Kerensky the workers had the Soviets: they had something to defend. But the German November Republic did not live in the hearts of the workers; not a dog would move in its defence. Consequently, if we wished to fight through, we had to place as our aim the conquest of power.
What transpired? Before we here, in September and the beginning of October, had decided on this policy—the struggle for the capture of power, had decided the question of the date, as it were, Zinoviev wrote his draft of the fourteen points, which I amended, and which was sent to the German Party, not as decisions but for discussion. The German Party declared that it accepted the points. It was a programme of action. It stated concretely what should be done in all spheres. The outstanding fact is. that we could at no time conduct rearguard actions. When the Communist Press was suppressed we did not make a single retort.
We resolved, the situation is serious; either the Fascist take power, or we do. We decided that we must take power. We set ourselves a certain date. Now the attempt is being made to stamp this as the principal error. Now I say we must keep two things separate.
Firstly, when the Communists seriously think of capturing power must they set a definite time for their work, or not? They should.
Can you picture yourself saying to the masses: Dear comrades, we do not know when we shall take power, but for pedagogical reasons we fix a certain date? No, you cannot do this.
Therefore you must fix a date for the fight. The mistake was not in fixing a date, but in that the fixing of the date was done in Moscow. I pointed out at that time that only in the course of events can the body which is conducting the struggle fix the date. If Moscow fixes the date, the Party learns of it; if it does not, it is absurd to fix a date, for when it is necessary to postpone the fight it gives rise to panic and cries of treachery.
My opinion, however, is that fixing dates, whether right or wrong, is not in the least important. The main thing in the whole business is the fact that the Party had not reviewed the line of battle. They said, we must prepare for the attack, but they did nothing.
This was the outstanding fact of the defeat.
You may say, the important question is not whether we erred in October or May. The important question is, why we erred.
Comrades, there is a period in our history that goes right up to the March struggle. What period is this? The period when we strove to set the capture of power as an active task before us. Since 1920, since our defeat in Poland, it was clear that the tide of revolution was on the ebb, and that our main task must be to win over the majority of the proletariat. How did we come to fix this task? The Party could not proceed further with the effort to capture power without approaching closer to the tactic of first organising the majority of the proletariat. It soon became clear that neither we, in Moscow, nor the comrades here, observed in time that a change in the situation had taken place. Only when we were unexpectedly attacked did the scales fall from our eyes, and we said the situation has changed: we must first of all win over the masses, This period of winning over the masses by agitation and propaganda lasted until the Ruhr war. Then we could no longer win them over merely by propaganda, and we had to go over to action. And again the situation arose that we were on the eve of another revolutionary tide which neither we in Moscow nor you there saw in time.
Well, does this mean that the leadership was Social-Democratic? No. The leadership of the German Communist Party is better than in any other country where we have mass parties, and this for one simple reason: in no other country had we the struggle that we had in Germany. We had the Marxian training. There was the fight against Kautsky, and there is the great experience of the revolution. Naturally, the leadership has Social-Democratic features, just as there are comrades that betray the complete failure to understand the meaning of mass movements, and who have never been Social-Democrats. The leadership of the Party is made of the elements that we possess. It is not made out of air.
For this reason the most important question for me, alter having thus defined the causes of our defeat, is what next?
Before replying, we must first of all establish the following. First of all we must discover who is ruling in Germany. In every situation the leader of a mass action must first of all know the opponent against whom he is to lead the struggle. The controversy over the question as to whether Fascism had conquered or not, was settled not by words but by facts. It was settled by the fact that the bourgeoisie, by military means, drove back the working class and thrust the Stinnes programme upon it, and that the working class fled. I can understand your opposition as long as you thought that we were still able to attack and that we were barring our road by formulas which Comrade Zinoviev thought meant capitulation. At that time your opposition had another meaning. When, however, dear comrades, you will be compelled to argue for another year whether Fascism has triumphed, then that in itself is a proof that it has come. I place so little importance on formalities that I concede to the request of Comrades Remmele and Koenen in order not to aggravate the controversy that the Whites have won. For my part, we can say that the brunettes or blondes have won.
Why do the Fascists win? The preceding period in Germany, as it says in the book, was the period of bourgeois democracy. Except for recurring periods of suppressions, in no other country in the world have the proletariat such freedom of action as in Germany. And what great influence the Labour aristocracy had on the November Republic! Those who ignore this fail to understand why the Social-Democratic masses clung so to their republic. The dispute among us was not over the question as to whether the Social-Democracy was violated or whether it was a prostitute. The reason why I regarded it as necessary to say that the Fascism had won is quite different. If Fascism has won, and the Social-Democracy is its ally, then there can be no alliance between us and the Social-Democracy.
The second reason. Next to the question of the revision of the united front tactics, i.e., the challenge to the Social-Democratic leaders, as was stated in the National Committee resolution, I think the outstanding question in the German revolution is the attraction of the petty bourgeois masses. And here I come to a point which I must say is for me; on the one hand, one of the most important, and on the other the most humorous question of controversy.
Comrades, during the discussion over the national question in Moscow with the German comrades in the spring, we said the Party is confronted by a new task, the winning over of the petty-bourgeoisie, which is becoming proletarianised, as an ally, who will help us to capture power in Germany. Hence the participation of the Party in questions affecting the middle class and the national question. On the Enlarged Executive we took up a definite attitude. The speech on Schlageter was unanimously approved. After that speech, Comrades Fischer and Remmele carried this propaganda further arm-in-arm with me. More than that: in the theses of the Executive and of the Russian Central Committee on the German question, and in the articles published by Comrade Zinoviev on the German revolution, all this was quite rightly mentioned again and again. In Russia the peasant is an ally because he belonged to the army. Had there been no army he would have played an important role later, after the capture of power, but not so important a role as during the capture of power. In Germany we have a proletarianised petty-bourgeoisie which marches under the banner of Fascism, whereas the victory of Fascism means its ruin. Hence the differences in the Fascist camp are of decisive political importance for us. Only when these antagonisms become pronounced, and when the petty-bourgeois masses, or at least a section of them, can be torn away from Stinnes and Westarp and won over to our side, not as members but as allies, even if somewhat hesitating, shall we have made some real progress.
Comrades, what special tasks confront us? Permit me to read you an extract from Comrade Lenin's brochure on "Infantile Sickness of Left Wing Communism":—
"A powerful enemy can be overcome, only by the greatest exertion of effort by the absolutely careful, painstaking, cautious, and able utilisation of the most minute differences in the camp of the enemy, the antagonism of interests between the various sections of the bourgeoisie in each country, as well as even the smallest possibility of recruiting allies even When they are temporary, hesitating, vacillating and unreliable. He who does not understand this, has not grasped a gramme of Marxism and of modern 'civilised' scientific Socialism generally. Those who have not, during a fairly lengthy period, and in various political situations, shown that he knows how to apply this truth in practice has not yet learned how to help the revolutionary class in its light for the emancipation of toiling humanity and the exploited, What has been said applies equally to the period prior to, as well as after the capture of power by the proletariat."
In another part of the pamphlet, he deals with the differences hot only between the petty-bourgeois and the masses, but also the peaceful, transition situation in England.
For me, this implies the following: in Germany, the peasants after the victory of the revolution, will play an important role, because the question will arise: how how shall we obtain bread? The peasants will not play an important part in the actual capture of power, because it will be captured in the towns. There is no concentrated peasant army in Germany, and no great concentrated mass. For that reason, the petty-bourgeois of the towns will play a great part.
What part will the conflicts of groups in the Fascist camp play in this?
In his article on the "German Koltchak," Comrade Zinoviev does not sufficiently emphasise the difference between the petty-bourgeoisie in Germany and that in Russia. He says, that the mensheviks after the defeat of the revolution in 1205, caused the differences between the Cadets and the Octobrists to come out more clearly. We, Bolsheviks, knew that these parties represented various sections of the bourgeoisie, but we said that these antagonisms will not be outstanding, and therefore we would have to light the bourgeoisie.
Comrades, if the difference between the petty-bourgeois doctors, government employees, handicraftsmen, and Stinnes and Westarp were the same us the differences between Guttchkov and Muilukov, Zinoviev would be right. But he forgets the most outstanding. In Western Europe, we have large masses of new middle class, the remnants of the old middle class, and the millions of the petty-bourgeoisie, whom capitalism is ruining completely. This situation is different to that in Russia in 1907. Russia was in a period of economic development in which capitalism, while it robbed the middle class of its independence, did not worsen its social position to such an extent. In Western Europe we have a process of the expropriation of the middle classes, which has taken place nowhere else. These, then, are the destructive elements, which we must utilise.
Comrades, I am prevented from taking up a question on which there are important differences between us, namely, the continuation of the united front tactics on an international scale. On this I will say just one or two words. The Fourth Congress did not have the view that the united front tactics were to serve evolution, that a long period would elapse before the revolution during which we would be under democracy. Nevertheless, it had in mind the possibility of situations arising in Europe, when it would be possible to utilise democratic workers' governments, which fall into our hands as spring-boards in the fight for the dictatorship. We make thousands of mistakes in the application of the united front tactics, but we can rectify them. If, however, we lose sight of these possibilities, if we say that the united front tactics is purely agitation, we are wrong even theoretically, because we close our eyes to possibilities that may recur in Germany.
(Scholem: Hear, hear!)
I declare that I am not a politician, but I want to have the differences discussed, in order that when the break-up of Fascism and of the Fascist troops takes place, we shall be in a position where we can play our Saxony cards better than we played them before.
(Cries of: Quite right! Hear! hear!)
And for those who wish to close up these possibilities, there can be no compromise on this question.
(Quite right!)
For the simple reason that we, in Western Europe, will make our organisations either Communist discussion parties, or fighting parties, and if the latter, then we must make use of all practical possibilities. Ninety-nine chances out of a hundred are that the question of a workers' government will not play an important role on the continent of Europe, but that it will play a decisive role in England, I have not the slightest doubt.
For these reasons, I say, I am prepared, because for me the practical policy of the Party is a thousand times more important than all the theoretical hairsplitting as to what things will look like in one, five, or six years' time, to sacrifice ten formulas, rather than obstruct our own path. If we do, we shall raise a crisis in Communism due to the fact that our theories do not reflect the real requirements of the movement.
I now conclude.
I would like to throw out just one more thought. The greatest cause of the crisis we are now experiencing, and of the many crises that we shall yet experience for years to come, if the revolution does not come, arises from the fact that we are the Party of dictatorship, but when there is no revolutionary wave, we can only conduct propaganda and agitation for the dictatorship. The masses however, do not live merely by propaganda and agitation alone. Practical tasks confront the Communist Party. It is so difficult to carry through the point of view of Communism, that a great discrepancy arises between desiring and doing. If we fail to see this, we shall break up. When I heard the speech of Thalman, I said to myself: What agitational zeal, what faith in the revolution: and yet in Hamburg we have 14,000 members, while the Social-Democrats have 78,000.
(A voice: It has now lost 30,000.)
After five years of the greatest betrayal of the revolution.
With a purely agitational policy of Communism, we will have only small Communist parties. The question will again arise, sect or masses. That question has already come up. Had we not restrained the Party in March, Levi would have been right. We restrained it, saying, go among the masses on a practical basis. And to-day the question has come up again,
We will fight out our differences. We are not Levis. Whatever the decision of the Executive will be, we will all submit, but we will not ignore the differences as they stand to-day. We will fight this matter out in the Communist International.
If the Commission will function, I will present my views in the form of the theses drawn up by Comrades Trotsky, P., and myself.