The Life of Lokamanya Tilak/Chapter 11
CHAPTER XI
TILAK AND THE CONGRESSII
The days of absolute leadership are gone, never to return back.
N. G. Chandavarkar
ELSEWHERE we have traced Mr. Tilak's connection with the Congress from 1889 down to the early years of the present century. We have seen, how, in the period of political re-action, beginning 'with 1897, the Congress leaders showed their "statesmanship," by scrupulously following a policy of Moderation, which, very often meant inaction, timidity or indifference to the National good. Ever since his return (1899) to public life after one year's incarceration, Mr. Tilak had been fighting with these tendencies in and out of the National Congress. but what with his pre-occupations in the Tai Maharaj Case, and what with the small following he had in the Congress, he could not effectually raise his voice against the policy of inertia and negation, which Sir Pheroze-shah later came to glory in. From 1905, however all this was changed. The wave of awakening in the country strengthened the nascent New Party and Mr. Tilak could get that amount of following in the Congress which was required to put up a fair fight. This tended to enUven the proceedings of the Congress and increase its popularity. Mr. Tilak determined that the Congress should no longer retain its moribund character. He resolved that (1) the Congress tradition of seeking official favour, or at least official recognition must be broken; (2) the National sentiments must be more faithfully echoed in the Congress resolutions; (3) The Congress must no longer remain a holiday gathering, but must work continuously and lead the National agitations. This was a war between autocracy and democracy, oldage and youth, apathy and enthusiasm, between timidity and courage. The old generation tried to win the officials; Mr. Tilak sought to inspire and organize the people of the country.
At the Benares Congress (1905) Mr. Tilak got much, though not all, that he wanted. Sir Pherozeshah, "the Autocrat of the Congress" was absent; and the President, Mr. Gokhale, had enthusiastically championed the Bengalees' cause in England and had justified the inaguration of the Swadeshi Boycott movement in speeches which came as a surprise to many of his followers. In his Presidential address, he severely criticized the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, compared it with the odious reign of Aurangzeb and spoke in favour of Swadeshi and Boycott. Mr. Tilak wanted separate resolutions on Swadeshi and Boycott. The resolution, justifying the Boycott of British goods, as perhaps the only constitutional and effective means left to the Bengalees, was huddled up with the condemnation of the repressive Policy of the Bureaucracy. Mr. Tilak would have liked an independent resolution on the subject. He wanted the Boycott resolution to go one step further and call upon the various Provinces of India to prove their sympathy for the Bengalees by adopting Boycott, but evidently, the Moderates were not yet prepared to recommend Boycott for all the provinces. Mr. Tilak, however, was not discouraged* The Congress, he said, had broken its tradition by supporting the Boycott and he looked up to the next Congress at Calcutta, to vigourously continue the work so substantially begun at Benares.
In June 1906, Mr. Tilak paid a visit to Calcutta on the occassion of the Shivaji festival. Soon after, Babu Bipin Chander Pal made the proposal that Mr. Tilak should preside over the Calcutta Congress. This was the first time in the history of the Congress when Mr. Tilak's name was seriously proposed for the highest honour at the disposal of the Nation. Mr. Pal was not content merely with proposing Mr. Tilak's name. He carried on a regular campaign. The Moderates were afraid. Sir Pherozeshah set racking his brains to avert the "catastrophe." Babu Surendranath, evidently smarting under the misrepresentations of the "crowning" incident promised every possible help to the Lion of Bombay. At last a master stroke was delivered A cable was sent to Dadabhai Naoroji, the G. O. M. of India; it said that the Congress was in danger; would Dadabhai return to India and preside over the Congress? The Cable was despatched by Babu Bhupendra Nath Basu, the right-hand man of Babu Surendranath. Without consulting his colleagues, without consulting the Reception Committee, he took this step, relying upon Dababhai's innocence and fidelity. Dadabhai was the last man to shirk help when the Congress was reported to be in danger. At once he cabled back aa affirmative and the Moderates were delighted at having out-witted the Extremists; for it was clear that none would like to contest the honour of the Congress Presidentship with Dadabhai Nooroji.
But though the question of the Presidentship of the Congress was thus settled to the satisfaction of the Moderates, the larger question still remained. "Should the Policy of the Congress be changed?" (The Hon.) Mr. Khaparde, after full consultation with Mr. Tilak sent a Circular letter to leading Congressmen as early as July (1906) wherein he showed how a radical change had been necessitated in the programme of the Congress. The letter attracted considerable attention, specially in Anglo-Indian quarters. It was feared that the Congress would go out of the hands of the Moderates and so Anglo-Indian journals who had abused even Sir Henry Cotton and Mr. Gokhale as late as 1904 and 1905 respectively, in a sudden burst of overflowing love, appealed to these very Congressmen not to play into the hands of the Extremists. Some of the Moderates themselves were scared away by Mr. Khaparde's letters. Regarding the main point suggested by the letter, Mr. Tilak said:—[Kesari nth December 1906).
"We are sometimes told not to be dis-heartened. If the Moderates think that we are easily disappointed and lack grim determination, they are entirely mistaken. We have lost faith, not in the ultimate result, but in the dilatory activities of the Congress. To us, the holding of the Congress for three days in the year, the tepid work of the British Congress Committee and the occasional sending of a deputation to England-—seems quite an insufficient work. • Not that we have no faith in 'Constitutional agitation.' We do not want to over-throw the English Government. Political rights will have to be fought for. The Moderates think that these can be won by persuasion. We think they can only be got by strong pressure. Will the Congress exert itself to apply this pressure? That is the point; and if such a pressure is to be applied, the Congress must leave this holiday character and develop into an organisation working continuously and energetically."
All India anxiously awaited to see how the Calcutta Congress would give its decision on this point. Anglo-India wanted also to see whether the differences of opinion between the Old and the New Parties would lead to open and permanent rupture. They wanted the Extremists to be driven out of the Congress. But this was an impossibility. In the first place, the Presidential Chair was occupied by the Angel of Peace. Besides, Bengal was a strong-hold of the 'Extremists' and in the Congress session the New Party commanded a majority. The Presidential address was devoted to the theme of Swaraj. It, therefore, disappointed the Englishman which blamed Dadabhai who "being called upon to quench the flames of hatred towards the British Rule in India, had only used kerosine for that purpose." Mr. Tilak aided by Babu Bepin Chander Pal organised a private meeting of the Delegates of the New Party to discuss the subjects that the Congress should deal with; and at this meeting it was decided to get the Congress adopt three distinct resolutions on (1) Swadeshi, (2) Boycott (3) and National Education. Of these, the last was passed by the Subjects' Committee without any ado. The storm of discussion—hot and acrimonious—centred round the Boycott and the Swadeshi resolutions. At the Benares Congress, Boycott was accepted as a political weapon but only incidentally, in the resolution on the repressive policy of the Government. This was merely a flank movement. Mr. Tilak was not content with it. He wanted to make a frontal attack and after a prolonged controversy and frequent passages at arms with Moderate leaders like Sir P. M. Mehta, he wrung out the words "the Boycott movement was and is legitimate." At the Benares Congress it was only the "Boycott of British goods" that had received the seal of the Congress. Now, at Calcutta it was not merely "economic Boycott" but something more. Boycott Political. At Benares no general reasons were given for the acceptance of Boycott. But at Calcutta, the mistake was rectified; and the preamble to the resolution specifically referred to the fact that Indians had no share in the administration and that their representations to Government went unheeded. There was only one thing wanting in the resolution. The resolution approved of the Boycott Movement as started in Bengal; it did not urge other provinces to follow suit. But Mr. Tilak pointed out that neither did the resolution clearly state that the Boycott was to be confined to Bengal alone.
It is strange but true that in the draft resolution on Swadeshi, discussed in the Subjects' Committee, people were not called upon to purchase Swadeshi goods even at a sacrifice; stranger still that when Mr. Tilak brought the amendment, it was hastily pronounced to have been defeated. Mr. Tilak demanded a poll, which was refused. As a protest, he had to leave the Subjects' Committee accompanied, by nearly sixty members including distinguished Nationalists like Mr. Pal and Babu Ashwini Kumar Dutt. Mr. Tilak wanted to move his amendment in the open Congress. Accordingly he sent notice thereof to the President, who, at last realising the strength of Mr. Tilak's party accepted the amendment and bodily inserted it into the main proposition. Discord was thus timely averted and Mr.Tilak, speaking to the resolution declared that he was pleased to state that some ideas he favoured had been incorporated in the resolution; he further said that he was glad they had come to such a solution because the Anglo-Indians had predicted that the 22nd Congress would probably be the last; he expressed his satisfaction that all differences had been squared, and that both the parties had approached the question in a spirit of conciliation and had met half way.
Summarising the work of the Calcutta Congress, Mr. Tilak said:—
"The Congress has now in effect laid down that Swaraj or Self-Government is the goal to be ultimately and gradually attained by the Nation and that, while the Nation may pray and petition to the Government as part of the constitutional agitation and seek the redress of grievances or the fruition of political aspirations, the Nation will mainly rely on its own endeavours to accomplish the object. Swadeshi, Boycott, and National Education are the three most potent weapons given into our hands by the National Congress, and with these we must establish Swaraj."
At Calcutta, Lala Lajpat Rai had invited the Congress to Lahore. But imagining that Napgur was a safer place, Sir P. M. Mehta got the venue of the next Congress fixed at Nagpur. It is said that when the Moderate leaders left Calcutta, it was already arranged that Dr. Rash Behari Ghose was to be made President at Nagpur. In the various Provincial Conferences held in the first few months of 1907, attempts were made to go back upon the Calcutta Resolutions and thus prepare the ground for a retrograde step in December. In Bengal, happily there was no such attempt, as both the parties were suijiciently advanced and knew the value of unity. But in the Provincial Conference at Surat, Sir Pherozeshah, taking advantage of Mr. Tilak's absence, tried to overawe the "Extremists" and succeded in dropping the Resolutions on Boycott and National Education. In the Provincial Conference at Raipur (Berar), there was a serious dispute over the singing of such an innocent song, as the "Bande Mataram"; and it was only the presence of Mr. Khaparde that compelled the Moderate leaders to give in. At Allahabad, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, who in the Calcutta Congress had declared that his province would not accept Boycott, refused admittance to about 200 Delegates to the Conference. He put forth the strange plea of inconvenience but presumably he wanted to boycott the supporters of Boycott. All these signs showed how the Moderates were smarting under their "discomfiture" at Calcutta. At Nagpur, a Conference was held on January 27th, 1907, to appoint the Provincial Committee which in its turn met on February 22nd to constitute the Reception Committee. The new constitution of the Congress had practically delegated the work of nominating the President of the forthcoming Congress to the Reception Commitee which by a majority of ¾ had to select the President. It was, therefore, natural that the Moderates and the Nationalists should try to secure greater representation for their Parties on the Reception Committee. Each party tried its level best to secure a majority and on September 1st, it was found that while the Moderates had secured 800 Members, the Nationalists had got about 1800. Finding that Mr. Tilak could not be elected President, the Nationalist gave in only 26 names with-holding the long list of 1800 together with the money (Rs. 45,000) collected at the rate of Rs. 25 per voter. The Moderates demanded this money and on the Nationalists refusing to give it, they proceeded to eject the Nationalist Members from the Executive Committee. This they had no right to do as the Executive Committee was already constituted months back. The Hon. Mr. Chitnavis called a meeting of the Reception Committee without consulting the Executive Committee or Dr. Munje, the joint General Secretary. The meeting (September 22nd, 1907) was a fiasco and the Hon. convener was the object of a hostile demonstration on the part of an angry mob. A compromise was attempted. Dr. Gour, himself a Moderate, proposed that the work of the Congress should begin with Rs. 20,000 collected by the Moderates from the 800 enlisted members of the Reception Committee together with a loan of Rs. 5,000 from each party. The Moderates were obstinate. They were unwilling to allow the NationaUsts single-handed to hold the Congress Session at Nagpur; they were unable or afraid to hold it themselves; they, therefore, did the easiest and most inglorious thing ; they reported to the All- India Congress Committee their inability to hold the Sessions of the Congress at Nagpur. A meeting of the All-India Congress Committee was held at Bombay on November loth, and there, in spite of the protests of Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde, in spite of the willingness of the Nagpur Nationalists to accept any compromise for the sake of the reputation of their City and Province, the venue of the Congress was changed to Surat, one of the strongholds of the Moderates.
Alerady the people were in an angry mood. Repres- sion was at work in several part of India. Bombay was comparatively quiet. Far in the South, Rajmahendri, Cocoanada were seething with discontent. More important still were the events in the Punjab, where the mistaken and short-sighted policy of the Bureaucracy in trying to pass into Acts two Bills — the Colonisation Bill and the Land Alienation Act Amendment Bill — - endangered the rights of the people over their lands and made the discontent acute. The abnormal increase of Land Revenue in the Rawalpindi District, the in- crease of the Canal rates on the Bari-Doab Canal, touched the pockets of even the poorest cultivators and thus created a grave situation. The Editor and the Proprietor of the Punjabee were prosecuted and in May 1907 Lala Rajpat Rai and Sirdar Ajit Singh were deported. This deportation created a storm of indignation and convinced the country of its helplessness in defending its birth-rights. In Bengal, the Editor of Yugantar was sent to goil. The Editor of the Sandhya refused to conduct his defence because " he did not think that in carrying on the God-appointed mission of Swaraj he was in any way responsible to the aUen rulers." Babu Arabindo Ghosh was arrested on a charge of sedition, and on November ist, 1907 the Seditious Meetings Act was passed, despite the opposition of the Hon. Mr. Gokhale and of the Hon, Mr. Rash Behari Ghosh, and it was rumoured that the liberty of Press was also on the point of being taken away.
On November 11th, 1907, Lala Rajpat Rai and Sirdar Ajit Singh were released. This news, welcome in each respect, tended to make the Congress " confusion worse confounded." At once, as if by instict, the cry went round that Lajpat Rai was the fittest man to preside. At Surat on November 21st, the Reception Committee was formed and the office bearers of the Congress were appointed. To prevent many of the Congress-men in Maharashtra from attending the meeting, it was announced that the Presidential Election would be made •on November 24th. Though thus out-manoeuvred, the young Nationalists of Surat and adjoining places stoutly suggested the name of Lala Lajpat Rai for the Presidential post. Mr. Gokhale argued, coaxed, appealed ; and when every device proved unavailing, he removed the velvet glove from off his mailed list, and challenged the younger Nationalists to secure Lala Lajpat Rai's election in the face of the packed majority of the Moderates. The Nationalists were in a fix. They could not allow the Hero of the hour to be humiliated by the unworthy tactics of the Moderates. Silently and sullenly they allowed Dr. Rash Behari Ghose to be ' unaniomously ' elected President.
The selection of Dr. Ghose for the Presidential chair -was only part of a wider plan of going back upon the position accepted at Calcutta and of permanentlj?? shutting out the ' Extremists ' from all future sessions- of the Congress. The Indu Prakash and the Indian: Social Reformer clearly hinted this purpose and the whole conduct of the Moderate leaders all over India in the eventful months of 1907 clearly strengthens this belief. It was the duty of the Moderates and especially that of the Hon. Mr. Gokhale who was entrusted with the work of drafting the resolutions to publicly declare if this belief was incorrect and unfounded.* A list of the headings of the subjects likely to be taken up for discussion by the Surat Congress was of&cicially published a week or ten days before the date of the Congress Sessions. This list did not include the subjects of Self-Go vemment, Boycottp National Education on all of which distinct and sepa- rate resolutions were passed at Calcutta in 1906. This- omission naturally strengthened the suspicion that the. Bombay Moderates really intended to go back from the position taken up by the Calcutta Congress in these matters. The Press strongly commented upon this omission and Mr. Tilak, who reached Surat on the morn- ing of the 23rd December, denounced such retrogres- sion as suicidal in the interests of the countrj^ more, especially at the present juncture, and appealed to the Surat public to help the Nationalists in their endeavours. to maintain at least the status quo in these matters. The next day, a Conference of about five hundred Nationalist Delegates was held at Surat under the Chairmanship of Shrijut Arabindo Ghose, where it was.
- We are indebted for the bulk of the contents of the next
8 Pages to the closely-reasoned document published by th©- Nationalist Leaders soon after the break-up of the Congress. decided that the NationaUsts should prevent the attempted retrogression of the Congress by all Constitutional means even by opposing the election of the Pre- sident, if necessary ; and a letter was written to the Congress Secretaries requesting them to make arrangements for dividing the house, if need be, on every con- tested proposition, including that of election of the President.
In the meanwhile, a press-note was issued by the Reception Committee to the effect that the statement that certain resolutions adopted in 1906 were omitted from the Congress Programme prepared by the Surat Reception Committee was wholly unfounded ; but the draft resolutions themselves were still with-held from the public ; on the morning of the 25th December, Mr. Tilak happened to get a copy of the draft of the proposed Constitution of the Congress prepared by the Hon. Mr. Gokhale. In this draft, the object of the Congress was thus stated : " The Indian National Congress has for its ultimate goal, the attainment by India of Self-Government similar to that enjoyed by the other members of the British Empire. Mr. Tilak, addressing a meeting of the Delegates the same morning, at the Congress Camp, explained how this Constitution was devised to exclude the Nationalists from the Congress by making the acceptance of this new creed an indispensable condition of the Congress membership. Mr. Tilak further stated in plain terms, that if they were assured that no sliding back of the Congress would be attempted, the opposition to the election of the President would be withdrawn. The Delegates at the meeting were asked to sign a letter to Dr. Ghose requesting him to take up the four old resolutions for reaffirmation.
Lala Lajpat Rai who arrived at Surat on the morn- ing of 25th, saw Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde in the afternoon and intimated to them his intention to arrange for a Committee of a few leading Delegates from each side to settle the question in dispute. Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde having agreed, he went to Mr. Gokhale to arrange for the Committee if possible ; and Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde returned to the Nationalist Conference which was held that evening. At this Conference, a Nationalist Committee consisting of one Nationalist Delegate from each Province was appointed to earry on the negotiations with the other side ; and it was decided that if the Nationalist Committee failed to obtain any assurance from the responsible Congress Officials about status quo being maintained, the Nationalists should begin their opposition from the election of the President. For the retrogression of the Congress was a serious step, not to be decided upon by a bare accidental majority of any party either in the Subjects' Committee or in the whole Congress as then constituted, and the usual acceptance of the President would have under such circumstances greatly weakened the point and force of the opposition. No kind of intima- tion was received from Lala Lajpat Rai on the night of the 25th, or the morning of the 26th December regarding the proposal of a joint Committee of reconciliation proposed by him, nor was a copy of the draft resolutions supplied to Mr. Tilak or any delegates to enable them to judge if sHding back from the old position was really intended. On the morning of the 26th December, Mr. Tilak and the other NationaHst leaders went to Babu Surendra- Nath Banerjea at his residence, and informed him that the NationaHst opposition to the election of the President would be withdrawn if (i) the Nationalist Party were assured that the Status quo would not be disturbed, and (2) if some graceful allusion was made by any one of the speakers on the resolution about the election of the President, to the desire of the public to have Lala Lajpat Rai in the chair. Mr. Bannerjea agreed to the latter proposal as he said he was himself to second the resolution ; while as regards the first, though he gave an assurance foi himself and Bengal, he asked Mr. Tilak to see Mr. Gokhale or Mr. Malvi, the Chairman of the Reception Committee. A volunteer was accordingly sent in a carriage to invite Mr. Malvi to Mr. Ban- erjea's residence, but the volunteer brought a reply that Mr. Malvi had no time to come as he was engaged in religious practices. Mr. Tilak then returned to his Camp to take his meals as it was already about 11 a.m.; but on returning to the Congress Pandal one hour later, he made persistent attempts to get access to Mr. Malvi but could not find him anywhere. A little before 2-30 P.M., a word was brought to Mr. Tilak that Mr. Malvi was in the President's tent, and Mr. Tilak sent a message to him from an adjoining tent asking for a short interview. Mr. Malvi replied that he could not see Mr. Tilak as the Presidential procession was being formed.
These facts will explain the position of the two par- lies, when the Congress commenced its proceedings on Thursday the 26th December, at 2-30 P.M. No assurance from any responsible official of the Congress about the maintenance of the Status quo being obtained, Mr^ Tilak sent a slip to Babu Surendranath,initimatingthat he should not make the proposed allusion to Lala Lajpat Rai in his speech. He also requested Mr. Malvi to supply him with a copy of the draft resolutions, if ready, and about 3. p.m. he got it, though the reporter of the Advocate of India got it on the previous day.
The Congress opened with the address of Mr. Malvi, the Chairman of the Reception Committee. After the address was over, Dewan Bahadur Ambalal Sakarlal proposed Dr. Ghose to the Chair in a speech, which, though evoking occasional cries of dissent, was heard' to the end. The declaration by the Dewan Bahadur as well as by Mr. Malvi that the proposing and second- ing of the resolution to elect the President was only a formal matter, led many to believe that it was not im- probable that the usual procedure of taking votes on the proposition might be dispensed with. And when Babu Surendranath, whose rising on the platform seems to have reminded many of the Midnapur Con- ference where he was instrumental in getting the Na- tionalist party headed by Srij. Arabindo Ghose practi- cally ejected with Police aid, commenced his speech, there was persistent shouting and he was asked to sit down. In spite of his numerous efforts, he could not go on and so the Session had to be suspended for the day. It is unjust to suggest that this hostile demons- tration was pre-arranged by the Nationalists as what they had decided to do was silently and solidly to vote against the election.
At about 8 P.M., the late Mr. Chunilal Saraya, Manager of the Indian Specie Bank and Vice-Chairman of the Surat Reception Committee, accompanied by two other gentlemen, went in his un-ofhcial Capacity and on his own account, to Mr. Tilak and proposed that he intended' to arrange for a meeting that night between Mr. Tilak and Mr. Gokhale at the residence of a leading Congressman to settle the diSerences. Mr. Tilak agreed and requested Mr. Chunilal if an interview could be arranged, to fix the time in consultation with Mr. Gokhale adding that he (Mr. Tilak) would be glad to be present at the place of the interview at any hour of the night. Thereupon, Mr. Chunilal left Mr. Tilak, but no word from him was received by the latter that night.
On the morning of Friday the 27th, (iia.m.) Mr. Chunilal Saraya again saw Mr. Tilak and requested him to go in company with Mr. Khaparde to Prof. Gaj jar's bungalow near the Congress pandal where, by appoint- ment, they were to meet Dr. Rutherford, M.P., who was trying for a reconciliation. Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde went to Prof. Gajjar's, but Dr. Rutherford could not come there owing to other engagements. Mr. Tilak then decided, as no settlement was arrived at privately owing to every leading Congressman being unwilling to take am^ responsibility in the matter upon himself, to propose that the business of the election of the President should be adjourned and a Committee of one leading Moderate and one leading Nationalist from each Congress Province wdth Dr. Rutherford's name added, be appointed to consider and settle the differences existing between the two parties, both of which should accept the Committee's decision as final and then proceed to the unanimous election of the President. Prof. Gajjar and Mr. Chunilal under- took to convey the proposal to Sir P. M. Mehta or Dr. Rutherford in the Congress Camp ; after half an hour they returned and told Messrs. Tilak and Khaparde that nothing could be done in the matter.
It was about 12-30 at this time and on the receipt of the above reply, Mr. Tilak wrote the following note to Mr Malvi, Chairman of the Reception Committee : —
Sir, — I wish to address the delegates on the proposal of the election of the President after it is seconded. I wish to move an adjournment with a constructive proposal. Please announce me.
Yours Sincerely,
B. G. TILAK.
Deccan Delegate {Poona).
The proceedings of the day commenced at i P.M., when Babu Surendranath was called upon to resume Ms speech seconding the election of the President. Babu Surendranath was calmly heard by all and he duly finished his speech. As Mr. Tilak got no reply to his note, he sent a reminder. Still Mr. Malvi was silent. Mr. Tilak, therefore, proceeded to go up the platform immediately after Babu Surendranath. But he was held back by a Volunteer. Mr. Tilak, however, asserted his right to go up and succeeded in getting to the platform just when Dr. Ghose was moving to take the President's chair. It is not true that " by the time Mr. Tilak came upon the platform and stood in front of the President, the motion of the election of Dr. Ghose had been passed." As Mr. Tilak stood up on the platform he was greeted with shouts of disapproval from the members of the Reception Committee on the platform and the cry was taken up by other Moderates. Mr. Tilak repeatedly insisted upon his right of addressing the delegates and told Dr. Ghose when he attempted to interfere that he was not properly elected. Mr. Malvi said that he had ruled Mr. Tilak'samendmentoutof order, to which Mr. Tilak replied that the ruling, if any, was wrong and that he had a right to appeal to the delegates on the same. By this time, there was a general uproar in the Pandal, the Moderates shouting at Mr. Tilak and asking him to sit down, and the Nationalists demanding that he should be heard. At this stage, Dr. Ghose and Mr. Malvi said that Mr. Tilak should be removed from the platform ; and a young gentleman holding the important office of a Secretary to the Reception Committee touched Mr. Tilak 's person with a view to carry out the Chairman's order. Mr. Tilak pushed the gentleman aside and again asserted his right of being heard, declaring that he would not leave the platform, unless bodil}' removed. At this stage, Mr. Gokliale asked the above-mentioned gentleman not to touch Mr. Tilak's person. But there were others who were seen threatening an assault on his person, though he was calmly standing on the platform facing the delegates with his arms folded over his chest.
It was during this confusion that a shoe, hurled on to the platform hit Sir P. M. Mehta on the side of his face after touching Babu Surendranath Banerjea, both of whom were sitting within a yard of Mr. Tilak on the other side of the table. Chairs were now seen being lifted to be thrown at Mr. Tilak by persons on and below the platform and some of the Nationalists, there- fore, rushed on to the platform to his rescue. Dr. Ghose in the meanwhile twice attempted to read his address but was stopped by cries of * No, No ' from all sides in the Pandal and the confusion became still worse. It was now found impossible to arrest the pro- gress of disorder and the proceedings were then suspen- ded sine die.
Dr. Ghose's speech, though undelivered in the Con- gress Pandal, had been by this time published in the Calcutta papers and telegrams from Calcutta, received in the evening, showed that in the speech he had made an offensive attack on the Nationalist Party. This added to the sensation in the Nationalist Camp that evening but the situation was not such as to preclude all hope of reconciliation. Shrijut Motilal Ghose, Mr. A. C. Mitra, Mr. B. C. Chatterjee and Lala Harkisen Lai tried their best to bring about a compromise and if possible to have the Congress Session revived the next day. They went to Mr. Tilak on the night of the 27th and the morning of the 28th to ascertain the views of his party and to each of them Mr. Tilak gave the following assurance in writing : — SuRAT, 2Sth December, 1907.
Dear Sir ; — With reference to our conversation and principally in the best interests of the Congress, I and my party are prepared to waive our opposition to the election of Dr. Rash Behari as President of the 23rd Indian National Congress, and we are prepared to act in the spirit of forget and forgive provided, firstly the last year's resolutions on Swaraj, Swadeshi, Boycott and National Education are adhered to and each expressly re-afi&rmed, and secondly such passages, if any, in Dr. Ghose's speech as may be offensive to the Nationalist Party, are omitted." Your's etc., B. G. TILAK.
This letter was taken by the gentleman to whom it was addressed to the Moderate leaders but no compromise was arrived at, as the Moderates were all along bent upon the retrogression of the Congress at any cost. A Convention of the Moderates was, therefore, held, in the Pandal, the next day, where the Nationalists were not allowed to go, even when some of them were ready and offered to sign the declaration required. On the other hand, those, who did not wish to go back from the position taken up at the Calcutta Congress and honestly desired to work further on the same lines, met in a separate place the same evening to consider what steps might be taken to continue the work of the Congress in future. Thus ended the proceedings of the 23rd Indian National Congress amidst confusion and in bitterness, leaving the parties more estranged than ever, thus making easy the task of those who were unfriendly to the cause of Indian freedom.
Let us now examine a little minutely Mr. Tilak's contention, that the Congress autocrats were bent upon a retrograde step by tampering with the four Calcutta resolutions, on Swaraj, Swadeshi, Boycott and National Education. These resolutions had been unanimously accepted at Calcutta after a long and heated discussion between the leaders of both the parties. Resolutions like these passed as a compromise between two parties could not be altered even in the drafts by any one only because that gentleman has been entrusted with the work of drafting the Congress Resolutions. At the Calcutta Congress (1906) it was resolved that the sys- tem of Government obtaining in the Self-Governing British Colonies should be extended to India ; at Surat though this resolution was almost repeated still this was set up as the ultimate goal, evidently meaning that it was to be considered as out of the pale of practical politics. What offended the Nationalists still more was the draft constitution of the Congress in which the goal of the Congress was defined as follows : —
"The Indian National Congress has for its ultimate goal the attainment by India of self-government similar to that enjoyed by other members of the British Empire * * *. It seeks to advance towards- this goal b}^ strictly constitutional means, by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration * * *."
So then, the reform of the existing system of adminis- tration and not its gradual replacement by a popular system v<^as to be the immediate object of the Congress. The sting of this seemingly innocent constitution lay in the fact that it sought to convert the National Con- gress into a party organisation. As the acceptance of this creed was the condition of the membership of the Congress, the Bengal ' Extremists ' who had repudiated the ideal of Colonial Self-Government were to be shut out of the Congress. When the goal of the Bengal
- Extremists * viz, " Independence (absolute autonomy)
by peaceful means" was declared perfectly legal not only by the Law Courts* of Bengal but also by Lord Morley, what right had the Moderates to shut out an important and law-abiding section of Indian poli- ticians from the Congress ? Mr. Tilak has been often blamed for " coquetting with the views of the Bengal School of Extremist politicians " — these are Mr. Gokhale's words — but though four or five times at the most, in 1907-08 he has defended the ideal of his Bengal colleagues and followers y still he has consistently preached the ideal set up by Dadabhai Naoroji. If this is to be called inconsistency, what shaU we say of those who at Calcutta accepted without demur the National Education Resolution, and who at the very next Provincial Conference at Surat declared that they did not understand what National Education meant ?
The draft resolution about the ' Swadeshi movement * did not contain the words * even at a sacrifice.' Mr. Gokhale later explained that this omission was * unin- tentional ' and we readily accept his word but the effect of this omission was that the very soul of the resolution was taken out.
Mr. Gokhale has admitted that the changes made by him in the Boycott resolution were intentional. He
- As late as 1909, Mr. Beachcroft, the Judge who tried Srj.
Arabindo Ghose and the Maniktola conspirators in the Ahpore Bomb Case wrote in his judgment " Independence is an ideal with which no true Englishman would quarrel." This judicial pronouncement was specially significant in view of the fact that Srj. C. R. Das, Counsel for Srj . Arabindo Ghose had repeatedly declared on behalf of his client that if preaching independence was a crime, Srj. Ghose was willing to suffer any punishment that might be awarded to him. declared that they were rendered necessasy by the unfair and unjustifiable attempt made by Bapu Bepin Chunder Pal from the Congress platform in 1906 and by Mr. Tilak and others in the Press throughout 1907, to construe the phraseology employed in the Calcutta resolution as approving Boycott of all forms of association with the Government. Now, what is the exact wording of the Calcutta resolution ? After recounting the reasons, the Congress declared that " the Boycott movement inaugurated in Bengal was and is justifiable." Mr. Gokhale in his draft resolution changed the wording from *' Boycott movement " to the " Boycott of foreign (British) goods." As Babu Bepin Chunder Pal said " We in Eastern Bengal and Assam have not only tried to boycott British goods , but all honorary offices and association with Government " and the words' 1" Boy- cott Movement" were comprehensive enough to include these phases of Boycott while the wording adopted by Mr, Gokhale was evidently narrow.
Regarding the last resolution, the Calcutta Congress said " the time has arrived for the people earnestly to take up the question of National Education * * and to organise a system of education * * on National lines and under National control." Mr. Gokhale's draft concluded with the words " organize an indepen(^ent system of education," thus leaving the very vital words " on National lines and under National control." Mr. Gokhale might have thought that verbal changes were made here and there to remove ambiguity or to improve the phraseology. Is it not, however, wiser to retain a phraseology, however defective from the literary standpoint than endanger the peace and harmony of the Congress? But if these changes were really vital—as has been clearly shown—is it not proper to put the whole responsibility of the Surat episode on the heads of those Congress autocrats who, for the sake of a petty scheme of administrative reforms were willing to discard the friendship of their political colleagues and create a situation which made it easy for the Bureaucracy to "make short work of the Extremists"?