The Nation (American magazine)/Volume 123/3194/Abyssinia Appeals to the League
International Relations Section
Abyssinia Appeals to the League
It was hoped that the setting up of the League of Nations would diminish the crimes committed in secret by diplomatists and Foreign Ministers on the plea of serving their own national interests. The Government of Abyssinia, the newest recruit to the League of Nations, is seeking the protection of the League itself against two fellow-members, two supposedly civilized and advanced European Christian Powers, England and Italy to wit, on a charge of aggressive action against a poor, backward, but also Christian, independent state on the mainland of Africa. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, is a man of spotless personal character. In his private dealings he could no more conspire with a neighbor to despoil a poor man than he could rob a church. Yet he has allowed himself to be led by the nose by his own permanent officials at the British Foreign Office and to be hypnotized by Signor Mussolini and the Italian diplomats in this Abyssinian affair. Let it be understood quite clearly that no British Government dare embark on a policy of aggression against Abyssinia by itself if only because British public opinion would not tolerate it. But because more water is needed for the river Nile to serve the purpose of irrigation in Egypt and the Sudan, and because our efforts at the capital of the State of Abyssinia to obtain the necessary concessions for the provision of this extra water had been blocked by the Italians in the old-fashioned manner, the British Foreign Office, headed by Sir Austen Chamberlain himself, has allowed itself to become allied with the most aggressive and imperialistic Power in Europe.
Ever since the eighties of last century the Italians have been seeking, in spite of numerous setbacks, to acquire a recognized protectorate over Abyssinia. Italian policy showed its hand clearly for the first time in 1889 when the Treaty of Uccialli was concluded with King Menelek of Abyssinia by which Italy believed herself to be the "Protector" of Abyssinia. This first step to invasion and annexation alarmed the Abyssinian people and the Italian claim was repudiated. Italy bided her time until 1896 when she invaded Abyssinia only to suffer a crushing military defeat at Adowah. In October of the same year a new treaty of peace was concluded between the Italians and the Abyssinians by which the independence of Abyssinia, or Ethiopia as it is officially styled, was recognized. This, however, was only a step backward in order to leap again. And whenever the forward school has been in the ascendent in the Italian Foreign Office Italy has attempted, sometimes in conjunction with France and England, to interfere with Abyssinian sovereignty.
The history of French relations with Abyssinia has been similar but less aggressive and, therefore, more successful. The French have not attempted military aggression, but, after many efforts, supported in the beginning of the present century by Great Britain and Italy, France obtained a concession to construct a railway line from her port of Jibuti in French Somaliland to the Abyssinian capital. But Britain and Italy received a quid pro quo from the French, of course without the consent of the Abyssinians. In spite of fighting one war against the Abyssinians, when we wisely resisted any attempts of annexation, the British have been solely concerned with the water supply for the Lower Nile.
In its upper reaches the Nile divides itself into two main branches, the Blue and the White Nile. The Blue Nile takes its source at Lake Tsana on Abyssinian soil and flows for some hundreds of miles through the mountain gorges of Abyssinia, afterward joining the White Nile in the Sudan. If the outlet of the Blue Nile from Lake Tsana could be dammed by a great barrage, extra water would be available for irrigation purposes in Egypt and the Sudan The population of Egypt is growing and undoubtedly more water is required for agricultural purposes, while a great new source of excellent cotton is being exploited in the Sudan by British companies and corporations, and for the purpose of Sudanese cotton growing an almost unlimited supply of water can be utilized.
The French, therefore, so far as Abyssinia is concerned, have been contented by the building of their railway and the developing of a considerable trade with a country as large as France and Germany together and of great potential richness. England's one object is to obtain extra water. But the Italian program and ambitions are quite different. To the north of Abyssinia is the poor, barren Italian colony of Eritrea. To the southeast is another barren, almost desert area, under Italian rule, known as Italian Somaliland. Italy, never having abandoned her program of controlling and even annexing the major portion of Abyssinia, has evolved a plan of joining these two poor colonies by a great trunk railway line passing through Abyssinian territory. The Abyssinians will have none of this project. They regard Italian designs with deep suspicion. Abyssinia being an ancient Christian country converted to the faith at about the same time as Ireland, and before England, is not open to the activities of European religious missionaries. This one-time favored excuse for intervention, therefore, in the protection of missionaries is not available where Abyssinia is concerned. But railway construction is another favorite weapon of imperialism. Railways need guards and, as in the case of the Russian Railway through Manchuria, control of the weaker power gradually passes into the hands of the owners and guardians of the railway.
But for the outbreak of the great war the economic partition of Abyssinia would have proceeded unchecked But from 1914 to 1918 there was a hiatus. The great war having come to an end, the British renewed their pressure at the Abyssinian capital for the Lake Tsana irrigation concession. Italy offered her support to Great Britain in return for British assistance in obtaining her railway building concession. Linked up with this request, the Italians asked both the British and the French to recognize an exclusive Italian economic interest in the whole of the west of Abyssinia. This Italian offer was rejected at the time by the British Foreign Office as it was felt to be dangerous to allow any foreign Power to be placed in a position to obtain control of the head waters of the Blue Nile. Let it here be noted that the British objection was not to the Italian penetration into Abyssinia and the infringement of the sovereignty of an independent state but was based only on the ground of the water rights. In 1925 the negotiations between the Italians and the British were resumed. The bargaining went on in secret and the Abyssinian Government was not consulted at all. But in the meantime the French had become thoroughly alarmed, and in 1923 they sponsored Abyssinia's application for membership in the League of Nations. This application was resisted, secretly of course, by the British and Italian governments. But they dare not come out into the open and Abyssinia was admitted to full membership.
Her joining of the League of Nations made not a tittle of difference to Italian policy. Nor did it make any apparent difference in British policy toward Abyssinia. Instead of openly applying for leave to barrage Lake Tsana and agreeing to pay a suitable royalty to the Abyssinian Government, the British Foreign Office attempted to obtain its water-rights by allying itself with the Italian demands.
This was the prime blunder. By December, 1925, the British and Italian governments were in accord. Italy undertook not to interfere in any way with the Nile water; and England not only undertook to support the Italian demand for leave to construct the railway but recognized the exclusive economic dominance of Italy in the west of Abyssinia. Not till June of the present year was the unfortunate Abyssinian Government apprized of this secret agreement. The response of that Government was immediate. A note of protest was dispatched at once to the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the matter has now to be thrashed out before the Council.
And where has this latest example of secret diplomacy led? If Italy wishes to construct her railway she will have to fight her way into the country. Whatever the award of the Council of the League of Nations, the Abyssinians are thoroughly alarmed and will fight to the last before giving in. They are well armed, the country is extremely difficult, the northern and western portions being mountainous, and the inhabitants make good soldiers. A victorious war with Abyssinia, wiping out the memory of Adowah, might suit the Fascist Government of Italy, but the British people will never permit a pound to be spent or a British soldier to be killed in any such unworthy enterprise.
As for the perfectly honest desire of the British to obtain extra water for the Sudan and Egypt, by omitting to bargain for the necessary rights in a straightforward manner we have put back the possibility of obtaining this extra water indefinitely. Once more secret diplomacy has overreached itself. It would not have been difficult to come to an agreement with the Abyssinian Government by fair and open methods. We have now placed formidable obstacles in our way. If Egypt requires the extra water the British Government must retrace its steps, renounce the agreement with Italy, and start over again.[1] The only alternative is to abandon the attempt to obtain the extra water from the Blue Nile and to carry out similar irrigation schemes on the White Nile. The White Nile lies entirely in British-controlled territory, and many engineers consider it superior to the Blue Nile for irrigation purposes.
- ↑ A note of protest sent to the Secretariat of the League by the Abyssinian Government and forwarded to Italy and England by the League drew replies from both governments earnestly denying any intention to exert coercive pressure on Abyssinia. The Italian note, summarized in the Manchester Guardian for August 14, protests that the agreement constitutes "solely an arrangement between the Italian and British governments with a view to coordinating certain of their economic interests, and that any such arrangement is subject to the decision of the Abyssinian Government and to the recognition by the latter that these interests harmonize with those of Abyssinia and promote civil and economic development."—The Editor The Nation.
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