The New Europe/Volume 4/Number 45/Austria: A Study in Confusion

by Vladimír Nosek

Austria: A Study in Confusion

Political chaos reigns in Vienna. The picture of Austrian confusion presented in these pages on 19 July (see The New Europe, No. 40) still holds good. Emperor, Government, and Peoples are in a state of unexampled disarray owing to the conflicting claims of the nations composing the Dual Monarchy.

The first stumbling-block for Dr. Seidler was the project of a parliamentary Sub-Committee for the revision of the Constitution. It almost brought about a split of the Slav bloc owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Czechs. The Jugoslavs and Ruthenes apparently agreed to take part ip the Sub-Committee while the Czechs were by no means unanimous in the matter, though it was a question of tactics rather than of principle. The Czech Socialists and Clericals lead by Šmeral and Hruban were in favour of going to Vienna, not for the purpose of negotiating a compromise, but in order to emphasise the unanimous Czech demand of 30 May for the union of all Czechs and Slovaks in an independent, democratic, Bohemian State. On the other hand, the Radicals, led by Dr. Stransky and the ex-Minister Pražek, who finally won over the Young Czechs and Agrarians and thus gained a majority in the Bohemian Club, advocated “passive resistance” on the ground that any further negotiations with Austria were futile and dangerous, as the Czech question was of an international character and could therefore be decided only at the Peace Conference. The Narodni Listy (Dr. Kramař’s organ, which took a conciliatory attitude, wrote on 29 July:—

“Even the worst sceptic has in mind our boldest and highest national aim (of independence), and if he disagrees with the optimist, it is only on the question of how to attain it.”

The question was finally referred to the National Council, which postponed a decision indefinitely, thus practically endorsing the Radical policy of passive resistance. These dissensions among the Czechs caused the Jugoslavs and Ruthenes to abstain from a common Slav Conference which was to be held at Prague at the end of July. The Radical Lidove Noviny apologised to the Jugoslavs by explaining the anxiety of the Czechs to keep aloof from Austrian politics, on the ground that the Constitution Sub-Committee would be made the stepping-stone to a Coalition Cabinet which the Czechs could never enter without fatally compromising their prospects of independence at the Peace Conference; while the participation of other Slavs in Austrian politics, in return for temporary concessions, would hardly affect the question of the ultimate liberation of the Poles, Ruthenes, and Jugoslavs, and their re-union with their kinsmen beyond the frontiers of the Monarchy. Thus, for the time being, the proposal for a revision of the Constitution was buried.

The next test of Seidler’s statesmanship was the formation of a permanent Parliamentary Cabinet. On 31 July the Bohemian Club was invited to send two representatives to the Cabinet in return for autonomy “in accordance with the principle of national self-determination.” This offer was rejected not only by Mr. Stanek, the President of the Bohemian Club, but also by the Czech Socialist leader, Mr. Šmeral, who also had an interview with Dr. Seidler. On 6 August the Polish Club passed a resolution declaring that the formation of a parliamentary government was “unreal” at present, that no Pole would enter it, and that, in the words of their declaration of 16 May, a united and independent Poland with an access to the sea remained their unalterable demand. A similar resolution was adopted by the Jugoslav Club on 7 August, declaring the solidarity of all Southern Slavs with the Czechs and supporting their refusal of national autonomy within the existing provincial boundaries. They further declared that “the absolutist régime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the oppression of the Jugoslavs in Austria constituted an insurmountable obstacle to parliamentary collaboration with a governmental majority.” And as to the Germans, only the Nationalists—National Verband—who were promised four seats, were in favour of Seidler’s proposal, while the Social Democrats and Christian Socialists opposed it. Thus the prospect of a Parliamentary Cabinet supported by an organised Government majority faded, and the only alternative was, therefore, the appointment of a permanent bureaucratic Cabinet. Dr. Lederer, the Viennese Correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, rightly points out that neither Emperor Charles nor his advisers have yet succeeded in taking even the first steps towards a new order in Austria. We commend the statement to confiding English Austrophils.

A still better analysis of the present situation in Austria is given by Prince Lichnowsky—late German Ambassador in London—in the Berliner Tageblatt on 29 July. Discussing the possibility of the exclusion of Galicia and Dalmatia from Austria, which would give the Germans an absolute majority in the Reichsrat, he declares that “the preservation of Austria from Teschen to Trieste as a uniform State in which every nation could freely develop, yet where the first and leading role would be played by the Germans is for us a question of the utmost political importance.” With regard to the demand of the Bohemian Club, he says that “the enlarged kingdom of Bohemia would, if the Bohemian State-right is realised, possess a similar position to that of Hungary in 1867. . . . We should see a State springing up between Bavaria and Silesia which would exhibit Russian, French, Polish, and British sympathies, but never any pro-German feelings.” With regard to the Germans of Bohemia, he declares that “the Slav demand for so-called ‘equal rights’ of both languages in all parts of Bohemia means the appointment of Czech as well as German officials, and this the Germans unconditionally reject. This sums up the position now and as it was before war broke out. The war has only accentuated national dissensions instead of placating them for the benefit of the State. The Government appears, therefore, to be confronted with a problem which cannot possibly be solved to the satisfaction of both parties, as they are faced with the choice of the bitter opposition of either the Germans or the Czechs. The traditional system of dodging and muddling through (das Fortwursteln und Durchfretten) usually results in the opposition of both parties. For the solution of this question also the result of the war ought to be of great and perhaps decisive importance, and it is significant that the Czech National Council rejects all participation in the revision of the Constitution, and wants to bring the Czech question before the Peace Conference, and thus to make it an international question.” The writer states in conclusion that “the Austrian Germans, whom we may divide into a court aristocracy with Anglo-Roman culture and taste, a capitalist bourgeoisie steeped in Jewish influence, and a Nationalist, Socialist and Christian-Social democracy, ought to be able to preserve the German character and the unity of Austria if they hold together. They need Germany’s support, without which they cannot exist unless they are treacherous to German interests. No other political attitude is possible for them. A renewal of the Great-German plan under the leadership of Vienna need be feared as little as an anti-German Coalition in which Austria would participate.” Such is the situation at the present moment. The Austrian Germans are resolved to remain Prussia’s Allies, for they need her support in order to be able to oppress the Slavs. On the other hand, the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs perfectly understand each other and are determined, with the aid of the Allies, to achieve their national unity and independence of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. In these circumstances can any sober man continue to plead for the preservation of the greatest realm which Germany has annexed during the war, namely, Austria-Hungary? And can anyone doubt that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy is inevitable in view of the demand of its own peoples?

V. Nosek.