The New York Times/1899/10/20/Mr. Schurz's Policy

MR. SCHURZ'S POLICY.

No one can read the address of Mr. Schurz at Chicago without the conviction that it is the sincere and deliberate statement of the views of an able and patriotic man, views sustained by profound study and wide experience. It is well also for all of us to remember that this experience includes years of signal service to our country, and that on any subject involving the honor, prosperity, and safety of the Republic there is no American who is more completely entitled to a respectful hearing than Mr. Schurz.

Nor can it be denied that in his account of the facts that have resulted in the present situation he laid bare some very serious inconsistencies and errors, which the President and his friends would do well carefully and candidly to consider. It is unquestionably true that we have failed to present ourselves to the Filipinos in the character of friends and liberators, and have assumed the character of conquerors and enemies. Exactly how this came about the Administration hs never made known to the American people. As we must, sooner or later, reverse this process, and succeed in winning the confidence of the islanders, it is of the last importance that the President should study the means by which that can be accomplished. He would clearly do well by beginning with the study of how the situation was reached that is now to be changed. Whatever the cause, there has been a miscarriage, and in the reasons for it, which the President alone can fully know, is likely to be found the clue to the future.

Meanwhile, Mr. Schurz has a proposition to make as to that future, and it is the following:

We have often been taunted with having no positive policy to propose. But such a policy has more than once been proposed, and I can only repeat it.

In the first place, let it be well understood that those are eggregiously mistaken who think that if by a strong military effort the Philippine war be stopped, every thing will be right, and no more question thing will be right and no more question about it. No, the American trouble of conscience will not be appeased, and the question will be as big and virulent as ever, unless the close of the war be promptly followed by an assurance to the islanders of their freedom and independence, which assurance, if given now, would surely end the war without more fighting. We propose, therefore, that it be given now. Let there be at once an armistice between our forces and the Filipinos. Let the Philippine Islanders at the same time be told that the American people will be glad to see them establish an independent government, and to aid them in that task as far as may be necessary; that, if the different tribes composing the population of the Philippines are disposed, as at least most of them, if not all, are likely to be, to attach themselves in some way to the Government already existing under the Presidency of Aguinaldo, we shall cheerfully accept that solution of the question, and even, if required, lend our good offices to bring it about; and that meanwhile we shall deem it our duty to protect them against interference from other foreign powers — in other words, that with regard to them we mean honestly to life up to the righteous principles with the profession of which we commended to the world our Spanish war.

And then let us have in the Philippines, to carry out this programme, not a small politician, nor a meddlesome martinet, but a statesman of large mind and genuine sympathy, who will not merely deal in sanctimonious cant and oily promises with a string to them, but who will prove by his acts that he and we are honest; who will keep in mind that the Government is not merely to suit us, but to suit them; that it should not be measured by standards which we ourselves have not been able to reach, but be a government of their own, adapted to their own conditions and notions — whether it be a true republic, or better, or a dictatorship like that of Porfiro Diaz in Mexico, or an oligarchy like the one maintained by us in Hawaii, or even something like the boss rule we are tolerating in New York and Pennsylvania.

There are two essential features in this proposition. The promise to the Filipinos of “freedom and independence,” and the promise to “protect them from interference from other foreign powers.” We shall not at the present time consider the very important points involved in the offer to accept conditionally the government of Aguinaldo, or the obvious difficulties accompanying the ascertainment of the wish of the islanders as to that Government. We desire simply to call attention to the fact that the President could not make such an offer to the Filipinos except subject to the approval of Congress, and the further fact that the proposed policy involves rather a change of methods than one of avowed purposes.

The President in his recent speeches has repeatedly said that the Filipinos will have all the freedom and self-government consistent with the preservation of order and the maintenance of our obligations and duties to other nations. What Mr. Schurz proposes is all the freedom and independence consistent with a protectorate. Now the difference between a protectorate of the Philippine Islands in their present condition, so far as that is known, and an actual exercise of sovereignty for the purpose of giving the people of the islands all the self-government that they can safely use, is really a very difficult one to define, and in practice one that is pretty sure to vanish. If we assume to forbid all interference with the “independent” Government that may be established with our consent and aid, we must also assume the responsibility for the action of that Government. If we are to be responsible for its action, we must be in a condition in some degree to control such action. The absolute independence of the Government is, in either case, impracticable. In reality, therefore, the proposition of Mr. Schurz does not differ essentially from the professed policy of the Administration. The avowed object of both is substantially the same. Whether the Administration is carrying out its avowed object and how its methods should be changed in that regard are important questions that deserve careful consideration.

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