The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Review: Murray - An Introduction to Ethics

by Jacob Gould Schurman

An Introduction to Ethics. By J. Clark Murray, LL.D., F.R.S.C., Professor of Philosophy, McGill College, Montreal. Boston, De Wolf, Fiske & Co., 1891. — pp. vii, 407.

This volume will make as admirable a text-book for beginners in Ethics as the author's Handbook of Psychology has already approved itself for beginners in Psychology. Professor Murray has the rare capacity for writing good elementary text-books. He knows thoroughly the subjects on which he writes; he is luminous and orderly in his expositions; his style is attractive, and at times it almost glows with literary feeling; and his sense of proportion is so faultless that as a rule he says just what beginners ought to know and leaves unsaid what would only confuse them. It is a high compliment to the earlier manual that students have been known to re-read it for holiday entertainment solely; and the present volume seems to maintain the same high level.

The work is composed of two books. The first book (pp. 9-138), after a glimpse at Man Natural, discusses Man Moral, treating the Moral Consciousness, in three chapters, as Cognition, as Emotion, and as Volition. The second book (pp. 139-407), which is devoted to Ethics Proper, — for the first book gives the Psychological Basis of Ethics, — falls into three parts. The first part (pp. 141-240) examines the Supreme Laws of Duty, under the heads of Epicurean and Stoical Theories, especial attention being given to the Utilitarianism of Mill, though the author himself accepts the Kantian principle, of which a short account is given. The second part (pp. 241-346) is devoted to a classification and description of moral obligations. These are (1) the personal duties of bodily, intellectual, and moral culture, and (2) the social duties of Justice and Benevolence (the latter is very briefly discussed). The third part (pp. 347-407) treats of Virtue, — as an intellectual, an emotional, and a volitional habit.

In the first book the two chapters on the Cognitive and the Volitional Moral Consciousness are of the greatest interest. The former leaves nothing to be desired, either in matter or manner. It is a history of the growth of moral cognition, an analysis and speculative interpretation of it, and a criticism of the empirical theory to which Professor Murray opposes the transcendental. It is all so well done that one would not suppose there was so much to do until one tried it. The quintessence of a copious literature (intuitional, utilitarian, and transcendental), it is not merely the quintessence, but also the author's independent elaboration and estimation of the material. On the other hand, the chapter on Volition seems less satisfactory. The author is a libertarian. He may be correct in saying that what alone renders the action of will on the material world intelligible is "the independence of self on the universe of not-selves" (p. 133). But I submit that more might have been made of the ethical and of the psychological arguments, and that beginners would have found them more satisfactory. Indeed, it is rather surprising, since Professor Murray insists that the ego is a centre of intelligent activity, that no reference is made to Wundt's discovery of the shortening of reaction-time by attention. Furthermore, it might have been considered, whether the liberty vindicated by Professor Murray's argument (which is essentially that of Green, as indeed he indicates) is a liberty that enables the agent to do otherwise than he does; for it is no less than this that our moral experiences crave, and anything short of it is, from the ethical point of view, sheer determinism. Lastly, the necessitarian argument is stated without its strongest modern re-enforcement, namely, the law of the conservation of energy and the consequent indispensableness (as it would seem) of interpreting all our movements (and therefore voluntary movements) in accordance with mechanical principles.

The discussion of Utilitarianism in Book II is introduced with some clarifying paragraphs on the psychology of pleasure. The arguments against the theory are clearly and concisely put, being obviously the product of large reading and independent reflection. Felicitous use is made of the concessions of Mill in his Utilitarianism, though no mention is made of the passage which really carries Mill over into the camp of his opponents; namely, the admission of a native sense of dignity which obliges us to reject lower pleasures for higher. It is unfortunate that other theories of duty are treated so much less fully than the Utilitarian. The little that is said of the Kantian doctrine is so good that one wishes there had been more; and, as this is the author's own standpoint, more might reasonably have been expected. I cannot but think it a mistake that the mechanico-evolutionary theory of duty, which has been the reigning theory in the sphere dominated by English thought, has not received more explicit consideration. Students would have been helped by learning what "natural selection" could and could not do for Ethics; and how its function could be interpreted in an idealistic theory of morality.

In treating of Duties and Virtue, to which the rest of the volume is devoted, Professor Murray is at his best. He not only defines, analyzes, and classifies moral concepts, but he shows their concrete application to the principal spheres of human obligation, and sketches, in brief but telling outlines, the history of their development. At the same time he never loses sight of the truth that moral obligation points rather to a general spirit of life than to specific acts. The tone of the book, which is everywhere intellectually stimulating, is in this part morally bracing as well. Altogether, Professor Murray has produced a text-book for beginners in Ethics, which is far ahead of any similar work we now possess.

J. G. S.