The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Review: Simmel - Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie

by Frank Thilly

Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie. Eine erkenntnisstheoretische Studie von Georg Simmel, Privatdozent der Berliner Universität. Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1892. — pp. x, 109.

In spite of the telling influence of Critical Philosophy, the Philosophy of History has only reluctantly loosened itself from its dogmatic moorings. Here the Kantian reform has been wholly ignored for a long time, by philosophers who substituted for the old dogmatic metaphysic of nature a kind of metaphysic of historical occurrence. Fichte's attempt to see in history the realization of a certain principle and Hegel's desire das historische Geschehen zu begreifen are examples of this tendency. But philosophy has not to explain history. Its task lies a step behind this business; to it belongs the work of showing what historical knowledge is, and how it is possible. In emphasizing this as the problem to be solved, Dr. Simmel removes the standpoint of the Philosophy of History from the dogmatic to the critical stage, and herein lies the fundamental merit of his book. The science becomes epistemological and justifies its right to exist as a separate discipline. To describe as its object the discovery of the general tendencies and evolution of occurrences, the unification of certain phenomena, would be to appropriate for it a territory which is the rightful property of the science of history itself. A theory of historical knowing, on the other hand, will be found to be a necessary and useful part of the general theory of knowledge, especially since history has been furnishing the raw material for a large number of unwarranted metaphysical speculations. Dr. Simmel deserves credit for introducing us to a study which should claim the attention of historians as well as philosophers.

In the first chapter the author shows that this science has to determine the psychological a priori, which enables us to hypostasize as the background of historical events certain psychical processes, and to lay down the rules according to which this procedure takes place. We must know all the a priori conditions of historical knowledge and test their claims.

The second chapter examines the notion of law. A law declares that the appearance of certain phenomena has for its unconditional effect the appearance of certain other phenomena; it gives the cause acting in particular phenomena. Hence there can be no special laws for complicated phenomena like historical events; these must be reduced to their simplest terms. The so-called historical laws are in reality no laws at all, but mere statements as to the apparently regular succession of certain phenomena, these phenomena themselves being the effects of a multitude of forces concealed from us. Such laws are, however, useful in that they serve as points of orientation (Orientirungspunkte), enabling us to arrive at the knowledge of the real laws. But philosophy is not concerned with the discovery of laws; it examines and attests their epistemological value.

In the last chapter, which might be termed in Kantian language a transcendental Dialectic of the Philosophy of History, Dr. Simmel discusses the application of certain metaphysical categories, such as teleology, value, etc., to the given facts of history. While denying their title to exact knowledge, he nevertheless reveals in how far their use is justifiable. They are forms of reflection superadded to the facts, wholly subjective factors, surmises. Thus, when we speak of the progress of the race, we are introducing a subjective idea into reality. Indeed, it will depend altogether on the purely subjective evaluation of a certain idea whether we see progress in history or not. This idea also presupposes the existence of an original force or substance, a unified subject which persists through all the vicissitudes of life and is, as it were, the bearer and the cause of the psychical processes underlying the external facts. Now, though these categories have no worth as principles of knowledge, they still possess a practical value which makes it impossible to discard them. The historian is governed by an idea of value, when he subjects the immense mass of events to the sifting process, selecting some, neglecting others. It is an illusion to suppose that we can altogether dispense with these conditions and restrict ourselves entirely to the facts. The bare facts themselves, unrelated to some idea accounted valuable by us, would carry no interest with them. There is no historical reflection which does not "go behind the returns." Even the materialistic conception of history is not free from these unavoidable prejudices. When it interprets every historical movement as a phenomenon provoked by the conflict of economical interests, it sets up a principle which we cannot read out of the empirical data themselves. It passes from our conscious acts to a substratum of the unconscious. Considered as explanatory principles, all these speculations continue to be worthless, but in so far as they satisfy certain moral, aesthetical, and religious impulses, they are not without their use.

Dr. Simmel's book is a welcome contribution to the Philosophy of History. Notwithstanding the difficult nature of the subject, the author succeeds in stating his conclusions in a manner both lucid and suggestive. Occasional examples drawn from historical and economic literature aid in making clear certain points that might otherwise seem obscure to some. The reader will encounter no difficulties except, perhaps, in the second chapter, the abstruseness of whose subject-matter requires earnest application on the part of the student. One might, therefore, possibly demand a little more clearness and precision in this connection. Thus there can be no doubt that the writer sees no theoretical impossibility in the detection of real historical laws, yet his language is at times not definite enough to satisfy a person reading the book for the first time.

Frank Thilly.