The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Paulhan - La responsabilité
Responsibility is not a question of causality, of free will or determination, but of finality. It rests on the solidarity of the diverse tendencies forming the individual. A person is responsible for his acts in so far as he is their cause. But this is not enough. There must be harmony between the different tendencies of the ego, between this particular tendency and this particular act, between the act and its consequences. The greater this systematization, the greater the responsibility. Intention is neither the necessary nor sufficient condition of moral responsibility. A man may utter an insulting remark without wishing to arouse another's wrath; but if the word expresses the person's sentiments, there is, between the personality and the act, an agreement which creates responsibility. Only in so far as intention implies a co-ordination of physical elements, a direction of different elements towards a common end, can it be said to contribute to responsibility. Of effort the same may be said. This, which like all psychical phenomena has its psychological conditions, shows the individual's ability to resist tendencies not in accord with his ego as a whole. It proves how well organized the personality is. If the effort be suppressed, and the organization remains the same, responsibility, merit, and demerit are not diminished. The better organized the personality is, the less effort is needed. Thus far we have considered the ego as an organized whole. It is, however, not so complete a system; the various psychical elements are not always closely united with each other. What makes up responsibility in this case? The reply is: Every psychical element is responsible for its logical consequences, for other psychical phenomena produced by it according to the law of systematic association. "The responsibility of psychical elements is in inverse ratio to the responsibility of the whole ego, it is inversely proportional to the solidarity of each of the elements with the sum of the others." Responsibility in morbid and abnormal states is also measured by the co-ordination of the phenomena. Where the personality is completely dissolved, the acts resulting from it have no moral significance. There is no coherence between the madman's ideas, nor between his ideas and his acts. But if certain parts of his mental organization remain co-ordinated, he is to be held responsible for the deeds attributed to these. Similarly, in cases of hypnotism, double personality, etc., each separate personality may be made responsible. The affected person is responsible for whatever necessarily follows from the intact psychical organization. P. next considers the individual in his relation to society. It is an indisputable fact that a large part of a man's personality is the product of social influences. If the perversity of the individual represents the logical results of the regular functioning of a social system, then the latter is more or less responsible. Thus an organization whose system of correction tends to vitiate those who undergo it must be responsible for the effects of such punishments. Still, it is not the only responsible party; the individual too comes in for his share. Just as society has been the object of physical, social, and individual influences, and yet is responsible for what it has done, so also the individual, though not responsible for the vicious social system which perverts him, remains when once perverted responsible for this alteration. Suppose a person changes his nature, let the cause be what it may. The responsibility of the original personality as compared with the second would be proportional to the degree of co-ordination between them, and especially between the first and the causes of the change. So when social influences develop in an individual tendencies already existing in him, the original personality bears every whit as much responsibility for this difference and its consequences as society. If a man's crime is the expression of his character, the suppression of the latter may be necessary. Society has produced the assassin, the assassin has committed the murder; each is responsible for his deed. We may apply the same law here as above. The greater the responsibility of society, the less that of the individual, and conversely. The stronger and better organized the elements, the less their acts are subordinated to the general life of the whole, the greater is their responsibility, and vice versa. Individual responsibility is inversely proportional to social responsibility. Where the individual and society are equally well organized, and where the acts of the individual are in teleological accord with social acts, there rests a common responsibility. Responsibility establishes a solidarity between the ego, its acts, and their consequences. This implies a rigorous determination. Indeterminism signifies pure chance; what place could responsibility have in such a scheme? It would make morality uncertain. Determinism is the postulate of morality as well as of science. We may call a volition free that conforms to all the tendencies of one's nature, one that systematizes or co-ordinates our desires and acts. Such freedom lies at the basis of responsibility. Personality, liberty, finality, systematization, responsibility, define the same general fact: the co-ordination, the teleological unity of psychical elements.