The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Starcke - The Conscience
I. Preliminary Remarks. — On the one hand we see the possibility, be it real or merely theoretical possibility, that men may live as consistent egoists with untroubled inner satisfaction. On the other hand we see the exquisite absurdity of admitting that any one's selfishness could be to him a matter of conscience, a duty. All moral precepts as such must be able to move the conscience. The conscience is a feeling of a particular kind; as hope, fear, love, etc., are distinct feelings, so is conscience a distinct feeling which must have its own conditions. For the study of these conditions it makes no difference whether the commands of conscience are mistaken or legitimate. The sciences of logic and aesthetics study the conditions under which the particular feelings of logical and aesthetic pleasure arise, and then analyze the objective relations which really, and not by the mere fancy of the individual, contain these conditions. The science of ethics has but to follow the path indicated, and not to trouble itself with endless reflections concerning the possibility of a demonstration of the desirability of conscientious living. II. Analysis of Conscience. — Among civilized as among primitive nations, among adults as among children, experience shows us characters which are very heroic in enduring every kind of physical pain, and yet tremble before the same pains when they are incurred as punishment. Punishment is pain inflicted by a natural manifestation of our fellow-men's displeasure. If simple apprehension of suffering causes one feeling, and apprehension of the same suffering due to other men's displeasure causes a different feeling, this latter circumstance must be regarded as at least one of the principal causes of the particular character of the second feeling. The bad conscience, as distinguished from fear of punishment, must therefore be defined as a feeling of uneasiness at having incurred the displeasure of other men. How, then, may conscience hold to be right what is condemned by the whole world? The independence here claimed by the individual cannot be said to be indifference to the effect of our actions upon the interests of others; it can only mean that in the valuation of our actions we do not care whether others are in fact pleased or displeased, but whether they have reason or not to be pleased or displeased with our conduct. In itself the inner authority does not signify more than this, that the man is guided by his own insight as to what constitutes a valid ground for the censures of his fellow-men. What mankind will feel happy in doing cannot be stated in any general, objectively valid way; but we may show with sufficient accuracy what rules of conduct men would be glad to see others follow towards them. The conscience is always a state of feeling connected with the idea of what others should reasonably be pleased to see us do towards them. III. The Growth of the Conscience. — Life in society is the absolutely indispensable condition of the distinction between praiseworthy and blamable acts. Every one who is the object of respect and reverence may feel a general security and confidence that he will meet with no hinderance from his fellows, but he may follow his impulses and work for the accomplishment of his desires. When the desire to live in peace and to sleep in security takes possession of the mind, the conscience arises and becomes the judge of all our particular inclinations. What we shall then ask of our emotions is whether they entitle us to the respect or contempt of other men. The case is the same with the religious feelings. What God sees reason to command or forbid we feel bound by the conscience to do or to forbear. Man's relations to God are simply a new kind of society. Religion has aided the growth of the conscience, especially with regard to its capital point, viz., independence of the real relations between the individual and his neighbors. It has done this by constituting a society by the side of, or rather above, the real human society. A mind indifferent to the respect and contempt of others and a mind caring only for what the feelings of others actually are are alike devoid of conscience. The pleasure of felt harmony with the society about us consists mainly in the tendency it has to increase the volume and freedom of all our mental activities. But if we win respect without reason we can put but small reliance on its permanence. The moral code is the whole sum of our experience, accumulated and sifted through the ages, of what constitutes a good reason why our fellow-men should be satisfied or dissatisfied with us.