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The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Wundt - Hypnotismus und Suggestion

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The Philosophical Review Volume 1 (1892)
edited by Jacob Gould Schurman
Summary: Wundt - Hypnotismus und Suggestion by Anonymous

Phil. Stud. = Philosophische Studien

Anonymous2658307The Philosophical Review Volume 1 — Summary: Wundt - Hypnotismus und Suggestion1892Jacob Gould Schurman
Hypnotismus und Suggestion. W. Wundt. Phil. Stud., VIII, I, pp. 1-86.

In higher stages of hypnotism the phenomena observed are, the so-called 'automatism of command,' suggested hallucinations, insensibility of the skin to otherwise painful impressions, and post-hypnotic effects. The explanation of these facts has thus far proved unsatisfactory. As a rule, the physiological explanations use known psychological data and construct from them unknown and hypothetical physiological processes. We have a series of psychical symptoms visibly connected with each other, from which we may conclude to certain central changes. The most that can be done, however, in this relation is to fashion an hypothesis concerning the physical processes running parallel to the psychical processes. On the other hand, certain psychological interpretations attempt to base the whole of psychology on the one fact of suggestion, thus deriving the known from the unknown. The phenomena are explained by 'sympathy' or 'double consciousness,' theories which are closely allied to certain occultistic conceptions. Schmidkunz, Taine, Pierre Janet, Dessoir, and Moll have offered such pseudo-explanations. We must seek for an explanation of all these facts in the laws of consciousness. W. regards it as established that 'suggestion,' the awakening of ideas by words or acts, is the chief if not the only cause of hypnotic states. Suggestion is association plus a simultaneous contraction of consciousness to the ideas aroused by the association. Given such a contracted consciousness, the rise of ideas follows the usual laws of association. The chief problem is this, How does this concentration of consciousness arise, which gives to these ideas their overpowering force? An examination of states analogous to the hypnotic condition throws light on the subject. The dreamer as well as the hypnotized subject shows a diminished sensibility to all impressions lying outside of a certain circle of ideas which, for the time being, have sway over consciousness. The absence of other psychical forces which would oppose these one-sided associations is the peculiar trait. On the other hand, the stimuli which do act produce an intensified reaction. Considering the matter physiologically, we may say that the diminution of the general sensibility is compensated by an increase in special sensibility. If a large portion of the central organ is in a state of functional latency, the excitability of the functioning part is more intense. The excitability of a central element depends not only on its condition at the moment of excitation, but also on the condition of the other elements connected with it. An excitation occurring in adjacent parts lowers its own excitability, while a state of latency there favors an explosion of energy in the affected part. Ganglionic cells accumulate latent energy, and may, when excited, liberate and transmit energy. In sleep an immense amount of energy is accumulated. Its discharge at a certain point causes an increased transmission from all neighboring points that are in a state of tension. This explains the heightened excitability in sleep. This principle of neuro-dynamic compensation is strengthened by the principle of vaso-motor compensation. The same principles act in hypnotism. Here, however, the central organ not being in a state of exhaustion, the neuro-dynamic compensation is more energetic. Hence the ease with which functional intensity is transmitted to motor-centres. The command to perform an act awakens in the hypnotized subject an idea of the act. Now, even in normal consciousness, every idea of a movement is in consequence of the firm association between the sight and word image and the muscle sensations, accompanied by an impulse to execute that movement. But the normal consciousness suppresses this impulse, while the hypnotic condition cannot resist it, because the counteracting forces are absent. Similarly, a visual idea aroused by a word takes absolute possession of the mind, the thought that it is not reality but imagination cannot arise. Its intensity is raised to the strength of sense-perceptions. All voluntary acts in the hypnotic state possess the character of impulses. Attention is passive, giving itself up to the prevailing motives. The central physiological condition of this degradation of will to passive willing is the suppression of the innervation of the apperception-centre. Sense-impressions reach the sense-centres, but cannot awaken processes in the apperception- centre, because the forces in both are latent. But when a certain impression partially succeeds in overcoming the obstruction in the apperception-centre, the energy liberated from this is transmitted to the sense-centre or motor-centre whence the impulse came. Post-hypnotic states are brought about by the recollection of associations that have been made by preceding suggestions, and are now awakened by one of the members of the association. The entire state of consciousness to which a certain idea belongs is renewed by the reproduction of this idea. Hypnotism cannot become, as has been held, an experimental method. There can be no psychological experimentation without careful self-observation, and this is impossible in the case of the hypnotic subject. Hypnotism belongs to the sphere of medicine, the physician being the only person who should be permitted to practise it, and then only for therapeutic purposes. An unrestricted exercise of this privilege is to be condemned out of regard for physical and ethical health.