Jump to content

The Prince (Byerley)/Chapter 18

From Wikisource
3919107The Prince (Byerley) — Chapter 18James Scott ByerleyNiccolo Machiavelli

CHAP. XVIII.

Whether Princes ought to be faithful to their Engagements.

İt is unquestionably very praiseworthy in princes to be faithful to their engagements; but among those of the present day, who have performed great exploits, few of them have piqued themselves on this fidelity, or have been scrupulous in deceiving those who relied on their good faith.

It should, therefore, be known, that there are two modes of warfare; one of which is by laws, the other by force. The first is peculiar to men, the other is common to us with beasts; but when laws are not powerful enough, it is very necessary to recur to force: a prince ought to understand how to fight with both these kind of arms. This doctrine is admirably displayed to us by the ancient poets in the allegorical history of the education of Achilles, and many other princes of antiquity, by the centaur Chiron, who, under the double form of man and beast, taught those who were destined to govern, that it was their duty to use by turns the arms adapted to each of these species, seeing that one without the other cannot be of any durable advantage. Now those animals whose forms the prince should know how to assume are the fox, and the lion. The first can but feebly defend himself against the wolf, and the other readily falls into the snares that are laid for him. From the first, a prince will learn to be dexterous, and avoid the snares; and from the other to be strong, and keep the wolves in awe. Those who despise the part of the fox, understand but little of their trade; in other words, a prudent prince cannot nor ought not to keep his word, except when he can do it without injury to himself, or when the circumstances under which he contracted the engagement still exist[1] I should be cautious of inculcating such a precept if all men were good; but as they are all wicked, and ever ready to break their words, a prince should not pique himself in keeping his more scrupulously, and it is always easy to justify this want of faith. I could give numerous proofs of it, and shew how many engagements and treaties have been broken by the infidelity of princes; the most fortunate of whom has always been he who best understood how to assume the character of the fox. The object is to act his part well, and to know how in due time to feign and dissemble; and men are so simple and so weak, that he who wishes to deceive easily finds dupes.

One example, taken from the history of our own times, will be sufficient. Pope Alexander VI. played during his whole life a game of deception; and notwithstanding his faithless conduct was

extremely well known, he was in all his artifices successful. Oaths and protestations cost him nothing; never did a prince so often break his word, nor pay less regard to his engagements. This was because he knew perfectly well this part of the art of government. (Vide Appendix C.)

There is therefore no necessity for a prince to possess all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is indispensible that he should appear to have them: I will even go so far as to say, that it is sometimes dangerous to make use of them, though it is always useful to seem to possess them. It is the duty of a prince most earnestly to endeavour to gain the reputation of kindness, clemency, piety, justice, and fidelity to his engagements. He aught to possess all these good qualities, but still to retain such power over himself as to display their opposites whenever it may be expedient. I maințain it that a prince, and more especially a new prince, cannot with impunity exercise all the virtues, because his own self-preservation will often compel him to violate the laws of charity, religion, and humanity. He should habituate himself to bend easily to the various circumstances which may from time to time surround him. In a word, it will be as usefuļ to him to persevere in the path of rectitude, while he feels no inconvenience in doing so, as to know how to deviate from it when circumstances may require it. He should, above all, study to utter nothing which does not breathe kindness, justice, good faith, and piety: the last quality is however that which it is most important for him to appear to possess, as men in general judge more by their eyes than by their other senses.. Every man can see, but it is allotted but to few to know how to rectify the errors they commit by the eyes. We easily discern what a man appears to be, but not what he really is; and the smaller number dare not gainsay the multitude, who besides have with them the strength and the splendor of government. Now when it is necessary to form a judgment of the minds of men, and more especially of those of princes, as we cannot have recourse to any tribunal, we must attend only to results: the point is to maintain his authority; let the means be what they may, they will always appear honourable, and every one will praise them: for the vulgar are always caught by appearances, and judge only by the event. Now, the vulgar comprehends almost every one, and the few are of no consequence except when the multitude know not on whom to rely.

A prince who is now on the throne, but whom I don't chuse to name, always preaches peace and good faith; but if he had observed either the one or the other, he would more than once have lost his reputation and his dominions[2]

  1. The reader will remember the circumstances in which Machiavelli was placed, and that all those maxims which appear revolting are only intended for a prince who is a conqueror and a usurper, and therefore he inculcates them; he must not forget that it was against most cruel and most numerous tyrants, a thousand times more false and pertidious than their conqueror, that he deemed it his duty to put sụch arms into the hands of his prince as should effectually defend him against the perfidies of his enemies. The utility of this advice was therefore peculiarly adapted to the time and circumstances in which it was written; and he himself felt strongly, that he might seem to equivocate, one may say, in giving this counsel and supporting it by such very weak props. In fact, he has recourse to a fable and a miserable allegory; but the political writers who have followed him, in presenting similar maxims in an absolute way, and as applicable to all times, places, and princes, have by not understanding him done all the mischief which they have attributed to him, or rather these culpable princes have committed the evil without reading him; for to that end there is no need of the instruction of a centaur. It would be easy to prove, even by examples, that the success of perfidy cannot be durable, and that moral laws which exclude not prudence may be usefully applied to internal and external policy. It should first be observed, that this point cannot be settled or appreciated by the success of one man during his life, or of several men during their lives, but, to develope it effectually, it is from the life of a people that these calculations should be made: now the life of a people is the period of its duration as a people.—Note of the French Translator Guiraudet.
  2. He alludes to Ferdinand V. King of Arragon and Castille, who by such means acquired the kingdoms of Naples and Navarre. (Vide Appendix D.)