The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 2/Introduction

by Luigi Carlo Fraina

INTRODUCTION

 

The important characteristic of the program of the Bolsheviki is that it is an expression of general revolutionary Socialist policy; it is particular in applying itself to the concrete problems of the Russian Revolution, but international in the scope of the universality of its general principles.

Bolshevism, as an expression of Socialism, is not a peculiar Russian product; it prevails in all nations where the proletariat and Socialism are in action,, and it represents everywhere the revolutionary opposition equally to Capitalism and moderate, opportunistic Socialism. Nor is the program of the Bolsheviki a spontaneous and temporary development of the peculiar conditions prevailing in Russia during the Revolution of 1917; this program in its fundamentals was developed prior to, during, and subsequent to, the Revolution of 1905, and rigidity adhered to by the Bolsheviki. Until .the; Revolution of 1917, the program of the Bolsheviki was a brilliant formulation of revolutionary Marxian Socialism; during the Revolution, it was a brilliant performance in applied revolutionary tactics.

A determining phase of the Russian Revolution was the implacable struggle waged between the moderate and the revolutionary Socialists. It was the decisive struggle of the Revolution. Nor was this struggle determined by peculiarly Russian conditions; these conditions simply brought it to a violent climax. The struggle between the moderate and revolutionary Socialists is in action throughout the International Socialist movement; the movement everywhere is split into warring groups, and the struggle between the Socialist factions is often as bitter as the struggle against Capitalism itself. The fundamental issues in dispute are in general the same as the issues between the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki. Moderate Socialism, which is dominant and which acted with the imperialistic governments during the war, represents the old labor movement, hesitant, interested in middle class reforms, controlled by reactionary skilled labor and animated by the petty bourgeois ideology; and moderate Socialism, in its extreme social-patriotic expression, represents a conscious, counter-revolutionary compromise with Imperialism. The revolutionary Socialists, on the contrary, represent the new facts of the labor movement, as determined by the epoch of Imperialism and the emergence to consciousness and action of the great industrial proletariat, the masses of unskilled labor. Imperialism, in its form of expression as State Capitalism, has united into one reactionary bloc all layers of the ruling class, including skilled labor; this unity has swept along with it the dominant Socialism, representing skilled labor and the small bourgeoisie. Under the conditions of imperialistic State Capitalism, the old conditions and ideology of democracy are passing away, and the struggle becomes the clear-cut one of Socialism against Capitalism,—the immediate struggle for the Social Revolution. This was the attitude of the Bolsheviki, the conviction that Imperialism has objectively introduced the social revolutionary era, and that the proletariat must act accordingly.

The upper and the lower bourgeoisie, which previously struggled each against the other, the strength of the lower bourgeoisie determining the expressions of radical bourgeois democracy, are now united in reaction, united by the imperative necessity of national and class solidarity in the struggles of Imperialism. This reactionary unity of the bourgeoisie is characteristic of all large nations. But in Russia this fact was at the same time emphasized and obscured by the existence of Czarism. The reactionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie was emphasized by weakening its struggle against Czarism in fear of the revolutionary proletariat, the action of which alone could overthrow Czarism, and by its desire to retain Czarism in the form of a capitalistic autocracy useful in the struggle against its proletariat and its international imperialistic rivals. The reactionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie was obscured by the fact that it was compelled to criticize Czarism in the attempt to make Czarism conform to capitalistic requirements, as the autocracy did in Germany; this developed an amorphous "liberalism" of the bourgeoisie which temporarily deceived the masses. This deception was emphasized by the moderate Socialists who argued that as the revolution was a revolution against Czarism, it was necessarily a bourgeois revolution. But the social and economic conditions of twentieth century Russia were not by any means similar to those of eighteenth century France. Then, the bourgeoisie was the consciously revolutionary force; now, it was the industrial proletariat. The historic milieu was a new one.

The insistence upon Russia being ripe only for the bourgeois revolution ignores a number of factors that completely alter the problem.

The central factor is the existence of Imperialism, which not only makes a national democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie in semi-feudal, capitalistic countries incompatible with the requirements of modern Capitalism, but which equally makes Europe as a whole ripe for the immediate revolutionary struggle for Socialism. Imperialism determines Capitalism in a reactionary policy; but, simultaneously, it creates the conditions under which the proletariat may express its revolutionary action for the overthrow of Capitalism.

The bourgeois democratic revolution is not an indispensable necessity at all stages of the development of Capitalism ; it occurs at particular stages and under certain conditions, and may be dispensed with, as in Germany. Imperialism negates democracy, projecting a new autocracy necessary to maintain the proletariat in subjection, expressing the requirements of concentrated industry, and indispensable in the armed struggles produced by imperialistic competition. Without a revolutionary, class conscious proletariat in Russia, there would in all probability have been no overthrow of Czarism. The Russian middle class had neither the will nor the homogeniety of class to overthrow Czarism; the larger bourgeoisie wished to convert Czarism into an instrument of its own. The situation, after the abortive revolution of 1905, was shaping itself as in Germany, where the imperialistic bourgeoisie compromised with and accepted autocracy as an instrument for promoting its brutal class interests. The requirements of Imperialism are incompatible with bourgeois democracy, with the paltry democracy of the bourgeoisie in its earlier "liberal" era. What other meaning is there in the international reactionary trend away from democracy and toward autocracy?

Distrust of the bourgeoisie land of the bourgeois liberals runs as a red thread through the policy of the Bolsheviki: the Revolution must depend upon the proletariat and peasantry alone. The overthrow of Czarism was a bourgeois revolution, in the sense of overthrowing a feudal regime and introducing the democratic republic; but it was a bourgeois revolution made without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie, made, organized and directed by the proletariat.

But the problem of whether or not the Russian Revolution was a bourgeois revolution was a practical problem, and not, as misinterpreted by the Socialist moderates, an abstract one in historical theory. It is indisputable that an agrarian revolution was in "the order of the day" in Russia, and yet the bourgeoisie did all in its power to prevent an agrarian revolution. This was simply one problem of the Revolution which determined the Revolution in a merciless struggle against the bourgeoisie, not as a matter of theory but as a matter of practice. It was through the force of these practical problems, land, peace, the organization of a democratic state, that the Russian Revolution was converted definitely and consciously into a proletarian revolution. While the pedants piled theory upon history and history upon theory to prove the impossibility of a proletarian revolution, life itself and the stress of its struggles proved the pedants conclusively wrong.

Out of these practical requirements of the Revolution arose the uncompromising, unifying slogan of the Bolsheviki—"All Power to the Soviets!" And this slogan did not arise at the moment when the Bolsheviki were the majority in the Soviets, but from the first day of the Revolution, when they were an apparently hopeless minority. This insistence of the Bolsheviki upon power to an institution in which they were a minority should dispose of the slanderous charge that their's was a "rule or ruin" policy. The slogan, "All Power to the Soviets." was an expression equally of class policy and of the facts of the Revolution, in which the Soviets constituted the only actual, durable and revolutionary power. The Revolution, operating exclusively by means of the Soviets, would proceed logically on its course of reconstruction, unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly; for the Soviets, representing exclusively workers and peasants, would be compelled by the force of circumstances to introduce revolutionary measures, as a necessity of practice and not of theory. Separate the Soviets, and consequently the workers and peasants, from an alliance with and dependence upon the bourgeoisie, emphasize the proletarian class struggle and class policy, and the Revolution was an assured success.

"All Power to the Soviets" would constitute a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat; but the dictatorship would equally have to represent the peasantry, otherwise in could not prevail. The peasantry dominated the situation. Temporarily seduced by the ideology of the petite bourgeoisie, the peasantry constituted the basis of support for the Provisional Government and for the moderates in the Councils; but, should the peasantry break away from its alliance with the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the Soviets could prevail. The problem was whether the peasantry should accept the guidance of the reactionary bourgeoisie or of the revolutionary proletariat.

The moderates in the Councils argued that the proletariat was not strong enough of itself to direct the Revolution; that Russia with its mass of peasantry and primitive industrial development "was not yet ripe" for Socialism, and that, accordingly, a proletarian dictatorship was impossible. The Bolsheviki maintained as against this that Socialism was a problem of immediate revolutionary issues, that the proletarian revolution was a process which might consist of a series of revolutionary struggles, in which the decisive factor was the class power of the proletariat. The peasantry, argued the Bolsheviki, is a mass which must depend either upon the bourgeoisie or the proletariat: it is not itself capable of directing the Revolution; but it is not inevitable that the peasantry should depend upon the bourgeoisie; organize a campaign to split the mass of the peasantry by intensifying the agrarian class struggle of pauperized peasant against propertied peasant, align the proletarian peasantry with the revolutionary industrial proletariat by convincing it of the reactionary and perfidious character of the bourgeoisie, and the revolutionary proletariat will dominate the situation.

The Bolsheviki succeeded in securing the co-operation of the impoverished peasantry with the proletariat; and this is the greatest single achievement of the Revolution. The Russian proletariat succeeded in doing what the Paris Commune had attempted—the unity of proletariat and peasantry against the bourgeoisie.

The peasantry was not by any means a homogenous mass. One part consisted of prosperous owners of land, petty proprietors, an agricultural bourgeoisie created by the agrarian reform program of Stolypin which dissolved the old peasant community—a group obviously realizing its interests in a conservative, bourgeois agrarian policy introduced on the basis of the bourgeois system and capitalistic accumulation. With the abolition of serfdom in 186I, the peasants were apportioned certain lands, which remained fixed as the years passed, and diminished proportionately as the peasant population increased. The peasants were compelled to increase their holdings by purchase, and in 1882 the Czar's government organized for the purpose the State Agricultural Bank. But only the richer peasants could afford to purchase, and the mass of the peasants became more and more impoverished. These peasants were in debt, compelled to work on the great estates at ruinous wages. These conditions transformed the bulk of the peasants into an agricultural proletariat; and an industrial proletarian psychology filtered into the peasantry by means of the fact that during the winter months masses of peasants went to the cities to work in the factories. This great mass of the peasantry, designated by Lenin as "semi-proletarians," was determined in a struggle against the bourgeois peasants; and only through their awakening to consciousness and action could the agrarian revolution be assured.

The Bolsheviki in their agrarian policy emphasized means, while the other Socialist groups neglected the immediate means necessary to establish an ultimate agrarian program. The Social-Revolutionary Party, pluming itself on representing the peasantry, prated of the "socialization of the land," but neglected the fact that the agrarian revolution could be accomplished only by means of an agrarian class struggle equally against the agricultural bourgeoisie, the nobility and the financial bourgeoisie, a class struggle acting in accord with the struggle of the industrial proletariat against Capitalism and Imperialism. The Bolsheviki, accordingly, tried by all means in their power to intensify the agrarian class struggle, to awaken to consciousness and action the great mass of the impoverished, proletarian peasantry. Councils of Farm-Workers' Delegates were organized, representing the agricultural wage-workers. Other means were adopted of rescuing the mass of the peasantry from the domination of the wealthier peasants. All this, together with the chicanery of the Provisional Government on the land question, aroused the action of the peasants. And the unifying feature of this program was the slogan of the Bolsheviki calling upon the peasants not to wait for the Constituent Assemly, but to seize the lands immediately through their Soviets and put into operation the agrarian revolution.^[1]

This awakening of the proletarian peasantry had to be directs to the channels of co-operation with the industrial proletariat, the acceptance of the guidance of revolutionary Socialism. The Bolsheviki argued in this way: The peasants want the land, they want the abolition of hired labor on the farms. Capital, through the banks, has great financial interests in the lands that are to be confiscated without compensation; in case of a partial division on the basis of capitalist property, the financial interests of capital will inevitably get control of the land through loans, etc., and all the evils of private ownership prevail. The peasants can not get the land except through immediate seizure, the abolition of private ownership, and the nationalization of the banks and lands. This procedure, however, emphasized the Bolsheviki, means a relentless struggle against capital and the bourgeoisie, the creation of a revolutionary proletarian dictatorship representing exclusively the interests of the workers and pauperized peasants. This dictatorship would proceed with gradual measures for the complete overthrow of the rule of capital, based upon the immediate handing over of the land to the peasants and establishing workers' control over industry, and operating through a democratic state of workers and peasants, functioning, however, as a dictatorship in relation to the other classes.

The Bolshevist attitude toward peace was determined by the class struggle: they objected not to war, but to the character of the particular war being waged and to the class in control of its direction and purposes. The peace propaganda of the Bolsheviki was in accord with the policy of revolutionary Socialism; it was in no sense a pacifist propaganda, but a propaganda of classs war using the opportunity of an imperialistic war to develop the proletarian revolution and overthrow the bourgeoisie. Pacifism depends upon existing social relations and the bourgeois governments to introduce a democratic peace; the Bolshevist attitude emphasized that pacifism inevitably promotes Imperialism, that during a war the proletariat must use all its forces to overthrow the government and establish its own supremacy. Having established a dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionary Socialism will then proceed to act upon the problems of war and peace according to its own policy and the facts of the prevailing situation. And the action of a proletarian dictatorship might conceivably be the promotion of a revolutionary war, or the conclusion of a temporary peace; in either case, the facts of the whole international and national situation must determine the immediate policy adopted.

The Bolsheviki proceeded upon the theory that the proletarian revolution was the only adequate Socialist answer to the imperialistic war, and one of their objectives was to assist in developing the proletarian revolution in Europe. Unlike the moderate Socialists, however, who everywhere aspired and worked for a revolution in the enemy country, the Bolsheviki struggled for their own proletarian revolution as the only acceptable revolutionary Socialist tactics and the only adequate means of inspiring the proletariat of the other nations to revolt. Revolutions are not determined by mathematical considerations, but by opportunity; and the Socialist must create his own opportunity and use it whether the other nations act or not.

Imperialism means, generally, Capitalism at the climax of its development, Capitalism ripe for the introduction of Socialism. The west European countries are ripe for the Socialist community; they have the material basis in the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism which is indispensable for the complete establishment of Socialism. These countries must act for the Social Revolution; their proletariat must be encouraged to initiate the revolution against Capitalism. This is precisely what the Bolsheviki meant by "a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism." Not in Russia alone, but throughout Europe, the proletariat must be called to revolutionary action, Russian revolutionary Socialism using its power and strategic position to arouse that international proletarian class struggle which would transform itself into the Social Revolution. Two forces are necessary to establish Socialism: the material—Capitalism in the fullness of its development of the forces of production; the dynamic—a revolutionary, class conscious proletariat. The material force exists in west Europe, but not fully in Russia; the dynamic exists in Russia, but, as yet, not in west Europe. Now, consider Europe as one great social arena, as it is in fact. The revolutionary energy of the Russian proletariat, uniting with the impulse of a war that is developing intense revolutionary currents, might conceivably arouse the European proletariat to initiate the Social Revolution.

It is clear, accordingly, that the program of the Bolsheviki did not depend upon any one single feature. There are Socialists, for and against the Bolsheviki, who for motives of their own separate the Bolshevist policy into two phases, internal and international, agreeing with one and disagreeing with the other, in accordance with the peculiar considerations dominant in their purposes. This constitutes an absurdity—it is either a negation of Socialist policy or a result of unclear thinking. The policy of the Bolsheviki, internally and internationally, was determined by the requirements of Socialism and the class struggle; of the immediate requirements of the Russian Revolution and of the international struggle for peace; of the necessity for promoting the proletarian revolution in Russia and of assisting in developing the proletarian revolution in Europe as the climax of the war. It was this full-orbed character of the Bolshevist program, realized through uncompromising adherence to revolutionary Socialism and the class struggle, that, when their efforts for a revolution in the Central Empires temporarily failed, did not leave them stranded and helpless, but able to concentrate on the internal development of their own revolution as a preparation for the day when the international revolutionary struggle against Capitalism might break loose.

In action, the central feature of Bolshevist policy is its emphasis upon mass action as the dynamic means of the proletarian revolution. In a crisis, and it is only in a crisis that a revolution develops, the government controls rigidly all the normal methods of action; through mass action the proletariat sweeps away the barriers of authority, rallies and unites the workers for action and the conquest of power, sweeps into the maelstrom of revolt all the physical and moral forces of the proletariat. Through mass action, the masses are awakened to consciousness and action, become the arbiters of their own destiny: no revolution is a revolution unless the masses actively and consciously step forth upon the stage of events. The revolution cannot operate within the orbit of legality: legality may become the expression of the accomplished facts of the revolution, it is never the mechanics of the revolution itself. Legality is the ideology of the ruling class; action the ideology of the revolutionary class. The first requirement is action that will produce accomplished facts.—revolutionary action, the seizure of revolutionary power through dynamic and creative mass action. It is a process of struggle. Otherwise, the revolution withers with compromises.

***

Sources: Chapter I, from an article on "Louis Blancism," in Pravda (April); II, from a pamphlet, "Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution;" and from an article in Pravda on "Workers and Peasants;" III, IV, V and IX, from "Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution;" VI, "The Collapse of the International," from The Communist, 1915; VII. "Disarmament," from the Sbornik Sotzial-Demokratia. Note: chapters VI and VII, written before the Revolution, are included because they are indispensable in understanding fundamental phase of the program and policy of the Bolsheviki.

L. C. F.

1. In a report concerning a unification meeting of Socialist groups, published in 1906, Lenin argued against the confiscation of Lands as a party demand. Lenin favored the seizure of lands by the peasants; later the Constituent Assembly, or a similar body, would ratify the seizure and "confiscate" the lands. Confiscation, argued Lenin, is a juridical process, and must be preceded by the revolutionary action of seizure, Lenin, accordingly, favored seizure as a general revolutionary principle of action; during the Revolution of 1917, the problem of seizure had an immediate practical importance—the resumption of agricultural production to prevent starvation and crush the conscious sabotage practized by the rich peasants.