The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 3/Chapter 7
VII
AFTER THE UPRISING
(Lenin)
The recent suppression of Pravda, until now, was only an "incidental" fact, not sanctioned by the legal action of the government; now, after the 16th of July, Pravda is formally suppressed by the government.
When this suppression is regarded from a historical point of view, in relation to the whole course of events and the process of preparing and realizing this measire of suppression, it sheds a remarkably brilliant light upon the "constitutional" aspect of Russia, and upon the danger of constitutional illusions.
It is known that the Cadet party, with Milyukov and the paper Retch at the head, has been demanding the repression of the Bolsheviki since April. In the most varied form, from the "governmental" articles of Retch to the repeated demands of Milyukov to "make arrests" (of Lenin-and-the-other-Bolsheviki) this demand for repression constituted one of the most important, if not the most important, measures in the political program of the Cadets during the Revolution.
Long before the intentional and fabricated, the abominable and slanderous accusations of Alexinsky & Co., the accusations made in June and July of the Bolsheviki being German spies and receiving German money; long before even the slanderous accusations of "armed resistance" and of mutiny, which were contradicted by universally known facts and published documents—long before all that, the Cadet party was making a systematic, persistent demand for the repression of the Bolsheviki. If this demand is now realized, what opinion must we have of the honesty and conceptions of those people who forget or pretend to forget the actual class and party origin of this demand? How can we help stigmatizing it as rank falsification or as unbelievable political stupidity, if the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki now attempt to present the situation as if they believe that the opportunity appearing on July i6 for the repression of the Bolsheviki was merely "incidental" or "unusual?" After all, there are limits to the corruption of unquestionable historic truths.
It is sufficient to compare the movement of May 2 and 3 with that of July 16 and 17, to be convinced immediately of their similarity: the mass outburst of dissatisfaction, the impatience and action of the masses, the provocative shots from counter-revolutionary gangs, the dead on the Nevsky, and especially the howls of the bourgeoisie and Cadets that "those Leninites were shooting on the Nevsky;" the acute and bitter character of the battle between the proletarian mass and the bourgeoisie; the complete confusion of the petty bourgeois class, Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, the hesitation in their politics and on the question of political power in general—all these objective facts characterize both the movement of May 2–3 and the movement of July 16–17. And events in June and the July offensive show us in another form the same class alignment. The course of events is perfectly clear: the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie becoming continually more acute, particularly because of the influence on the masses of the petite bourgeoisie, and in connection with it the most pertinent historic events determining the dependence of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki upon the counter-revolutionary Cadets. These events are: the coalition ministry of May 18 n which the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have proved to be servants of the bourgeoisie, involving themselves more and more in compromise and agreements with the bourgeoisie and in a thousand "favors" to them; postponing the most urgent revolutionary measures; and, again, the resumption of the offensive at the front. The offensive meant an unavoidable resumption of the imperialistic war, a gigantic strengthening of the influence, power and role of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, the extensive growth of chauvinism among the masses, and, last but not least, the transfer of power, first the military and then the political power in general, to the counter-revolutionary heads of the army.
Such is the course of historic events, deepening and sharpening class antagonisms, from May 2–3 to July 16–17. and permitting the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie to carry out, after the 17th of July, that which on May 3 was indicated with such clarity as its program and tactics, its immediate aim and its "clean" means for attaining this aim.
There is historically nothing more petty, theoretically nothing more pitiful, and practically, nothing more ridiculous, than the middle class sobs concerning the 17th of July (indulged in, by the way, by L. Martov), concerning the fact that the Bolsheviki contrived to bring about their defeat, and so on and so forth. All these sobs, all the conclusions that "there should not have been" any participation in the July 16–17 movement (participation which was for the purpose of imparting a "peaceful and organized" character to a perfectly legal state of discontent and activity of the masses!)—all this verges on apostasy if emanating from the Bolsheviki, or is characteristic if emanating from the petite bourgeoisie, the manifestation of its habitual indecision and intimidation. In fact, the movement of July 16–17 was a development of the movement of May 2–3 and its subsequent period, as inevitable as that summer follows spring. It was the unquestionable duty of the proletarian party to remain with the masses, trying to give a more peaceful and organized expression to their just demands and action, not to sweep aside, not to wash their hands of it all, in the manner of Pontius Pilate, on the pedantic pretext that the masses were not organized to the last man and that excesses might follow. (As if there were no excesses on May 2–3! As if there was ever in the history in the world a single mass movement without excesses!)
After July 17 the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki were so completely involved and entangled with the bourgeoisie that they could no longer disguise the fact that they were prepared for cooperation with the counter-revolutionary Cadets (for purposes of repression, slander and the hangman' policy). The Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki were completely swallowed in the swamp of counter-revolution because their actions during May and June, their acceptance of the coalition ministry and support of the policy of the offensive, led directly to the swamp.
I have somewhat digressed, apparently, from my theme of the suppression of Pravda to the historic evaluation of the 17th of July: but that is only apparently, since in reality we cannot understand the one without the other. The suppression of Pravda, the arrests of Bolsheviki and other persecutions, represent nothing more or less than the realization of the program of counter-revolution and the Cadets in particular, if we consider the main aspect of the affair and the course of events.
It is most instructive, now, to consider just by whom and by what means this program was realized.
Consider the facts. On July 15 and 16 the movement gathers strength, the masses are agitated and inflamed by the inactivity of the government, the high cost of living, the collapse of the July offensive. The Cadets leave the ministry, playing for time and issuing an ultimatum to the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, leaving it to those "who are in power," though possessing no power, to liquidate the military defeat and the discontent of the masses.
The Bolsheviki, on July 15–16, abstain from action. This was acknowledged even by the representative of Dyelo Naroda in relating the incidents of July 15 in the Grenadier regiment. In the evening of July 16, the movement gets beyond bounds, and the Bolsheviki issue a proclamation about the necessity of imparting to the movement "a peaceful and organized" character. On July 17, the provocative shots of counter-revolutionary gangs increase the number of victims on both sides. We must emphasize that the promise of the Soviet Executive Committee to investigate the events, to issue bulletins twice daily, etc., remained an empty promise! Exactly nothng was done by the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, who did not even publish a casualty list of both sides.
On the night of July 17, the Bolsheviki issued a proclamation concerning the cessation of hostilities, and the same night it was published in Pravda. But, the same night, there arrives a counter-revolutionary army at Petrograd (evidently at the call or with the sanction of the Social-Revolutionists, Mensheviki and their Soviets, concerning which "delicate" point there has been a strict silence after the necessity of secrecy had passed). And on the same night, there begin massacres of the Bolsheviki by companies of Junkers, etc., acting under the instruction of the commander Polovtzev and the General Staff. On the night of July 18, they suppress the Pravda, on the 18th and 19th they destroy its printing shop, kill a worker, Voynoff, in broad daylight.
They hunt for and arrest the Bolsheviki and disarm the revolutionary regiments.
Who did all this? Neither the government nor the Soviets, but a counter-revolutionary military band gathered around the General Staff, acting in the name of "counter-espionage," putting into circulation the fabrications of Pereverdeff and Alexinsky to "arouse the savagery" of the troops, etc. The government is nowhere. The Soviets are nowhere. They tremble for their own fate: they receive a series of communications that the Cossacks may come and massacre them.
The "Black Hundred" and the Cadet press having instituted organized persecutions of the Bolsheviki, begin a persecution of the Soviets. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki bound themselves hand and foot to these counter-revolutionary policies; and, like chained men, they called or "permitted a call" of counter-revolutionary troops to Petrograd and that bound them still more. They sank completely into the detestable counter-revolutionary swamp. Like cowards, they dismiss their own committee appointed to investigate the "affairs" of the Bolsheviki. They delivered the Bolsheviki to the counter-revolution. They participate, meekly, in the funeral of the dead Cossacks, and thus kiss the hands of the counter-revolutionists. They are chained men; they are at the bottom of the swamp. They toss about desperately: they give the Premier's portfolio to Kerensky: they arrange a "Zemstvo Assembly," or the "coronation" of a counter-revolutionary government in Moscow; Kerensky discharges Polovtzev.
But these tossings remain tossings, not in the least changing the situation. Kerensky discharges Polovtzev, but at the same time legalizes and makes formal Polovtzev's measures, his policy. Kerensky suppresses Pravda, introduces the death penalty for soldiers, forbids the right of assemblage at the front, continues the arrests of Bolsheviki (including even Alexandra Kollontay)—all according to the program of Alexinsky.
The "constitutional" condition of Russia is defined with amazing clarity: the offensive at the front and the coalition with the Cadets in the rear sweep the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki into the swamp of counter-revolution. In fact, the government power passes into the hands of the counter-revolution, into the hands of a military band, with the government of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov as merely a screen for it: the government is forced indirectly to legalize the measures and the policy of the military counter-revolution.
The compromise of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov with the Cadets has a secondary, if not a very remote significance: whether the Cadets will gain by this compromise; whether Chernov and Tseretelli will hold out "alone," the question will not be changed. The basic and decisive fact remains: the turning of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki to the counter-revolution, the direct consequences of their whole policy since May 18.
The cycle of party development is completed. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki tumbled down from step to step—from "confidence" in Kerensky during the period March 12 to May 18, who chained them to the counter-revolution, to the 18th of July when they landed at the bottom.
A new stage opens. The victory of the counter-revolution causes disapointment among the masses in the parties of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and opens the way for their accepting the policy of the revolutionary proletariat.