The Railroaders' Next Step—Amalgamation/Chapter 4
CHAPTER IV
THE NEXT STEP—AMALGAMATION
Sooner or later, the unions in all industries and in every country find themselves at the point where they are based upon industrial rather than craft lines. In arriving at this stage of development they ordinarily pass through a more or less lengthy evolutionary process, marked by three distinct phases, which I shall call: (1) isolation, (2) federation, (3) amalgamation.
In the first, or isolation phase, the several craft groups in a given industry act independently of each other, recognizing few or no interests in common. Eventually, however, grace to their own unfolding intelligence, to the growing power of the employers, to the elimination of skill by machinery, and to various other factors, they awaken to the ineffectiveness of this individualistic method, and begin to set up offensive and defensive alliances with each other. This brings them into the second, or federation phase. And, finally, when by the working of the same factors, they perceive their loose federated form, although a big improvement over the previous system, does not develop their maximum power, they gradually fuse themselves together into a unified body along the lines of their industry. Thus they reach the third, or amalgamation phase.
This is the normal course of labor union development, the natural way of building industrial unions. Dozens of industrial unions in Europe have taken it, and our American trade unions are following suite. In common with other groups of unions in the food, clothing, metal, transport, building, printing, and other industries, the railroad unions are now in the secondary, or federation phase of development. That is the significance of their multitudinous local system, divisional and national alliances, which constitute the most elaborate maze of federation ever constructed by unions anywhere. Nor will they stop with federation. They must go on to the next phase, amalgamation. In so doing they will be merely following the dictates of reason and acting in harmony with labor union evolution the world over. It will be the logical and inevitable climax to all the get-together movements, radical and conservative, among railroad men for a generation. Amalgamation of the sixten railroad craft unions into one industrial union that's the railroaders' next step.
The Failings of Federation
The situation is over-ripe for a general amalgamation of all railroad unions. Solidly united and inspired by a boundless voracity for profits and power, the railroad companies are resolved to smash the workers down to slavery. In this unholy task they have the active assistance of every branch of the powerful capitalist class. Common sense demands, therefore, that the enormous army of railroad men be brought to the highest possible state of efficiency in unflinching opposition to our would-be masters. Under the prevailing federated form this cannot be done. Amalgamation is the only solution.
Federation is all right so far as it goes. It marks an important stage in the workers' development from craft to class unionism. It is at once an admission of the ineffectiveness of craft action and a striving for industrial solidarity. Federation always sounds the death knell of pure and simple trade unionism. But the trouble with it is that it does not go far enough. It is essentially only a halfway measure. Afflicted with lingering craft weaknesses, it develops only a fraction of the workers' potential power. Despite federation the employers are still able to play one group of workers against the others and thus beat them all.
Whenever a federation goes into action, whether in concference or in strike, its weaknesses are instantly apparent. The autonomous unions lack cohesion and unity of purpose. The craft point of view prevails. Each union, animated by its particular craft prejudices, and selfishness, looks first to the interest of its own members. Little or no power is conceded to the federation, which is looked upon pretty much as a mere matter of convenience. The idea of the general good remains in the background. Jealousies, squabblings and even betrayals are the order of the day. Consequently united action is out of the question. Federations can neither agree definitely upon a program, nor fight vigorously to put one through.
The Steel Workers' Federation
Railroad men have had a wide experience with federation. But before going into that it may not be amiss to mention something of what happened in the great organizing campaign and strike in the steel industry—for federation always works out the same.
The National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers was a gigantic experiment in federation. It consisted of twenty-four international unions ,numbering over 2,000,000 members. While its work, like that of all federations, was a big improvement over the primitive condition of each union going it alone, still it was afflicted with the customary faults of such organizations. These contributed much to its final defeat.
In the great steel fight the need for the solidarity of labor was imperative. The Steel Trust was solidly united ; its forces worked together like a perfect machine. But not so on the side of Labor—where there should have been unity, harmony and power, there was division, disagreement and impotency. Federation failed to make good. The twenty-four unions never really combined their forces, or organized their many wills into one firm determination to win. From first to last they lacked cohesion and singleness of purpose. And under their federated form of organization not even the great stake of the organization of the steel industry could spur them to unified action.
The National Committee, like all federations, lacked authority to command the resources and co-operation of its component unions. Instead of the campaign being conducted from one central point, as the situation imperatively demanded, it was practically handled from the twenty-four union headquarters scattered all over the country. It proved impossible to get all the international presidents (who held the reins of power) assembled in one meeting, even in the most critical periods of the movement. Notwithstanding the most desperate appeals, the most gotten together at any one time was seven. The usual thing for the unions to do was to send some minor official without power to act, which of itself condemned the National Committee to powerlessness. Then, when the committee attempted to function through these straw delegates and took important action, word would soon come from some headquarters, far from the scene of action, that they would not go along with the program outlined. Then other unions, hearing of this, would likewise balk, with the consequent collapse of the plan. This was the fate of many vital measures. Constantly the movement was paralyzed. It had to drift along as best it could with only a fraction of the strength of the twenty-four unions behind it.
Jurisdictional fights and craft jealousies embittered the unions and still furthed weakened their co-operation. There was also endless confusion in starting and finishing the strike, many local unions refusing to respond to the National Committee. In one case the officials of the International Union of Steam Operating Engineers deliberately betrayed the whole movement because of a fight with the Electrical Workers over jurisdiction. They ordered their men to disobey the strike call and to remain at work. Similarly, the officials of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers sabotaged the organizing campaign and strike from beginning to end, because of jealousy towards the other unions, if nothing worse. The regular attitude was for each organization to hold back, waiting for the others to take the lead, and fearing that if it stirred the others would take advantage of its good will. This meant paralysis all around; the unions weakest in resources and spirit seemed to set the pace for the rest. Nor could anything change the situation.
In the matter of finances the holding back tendency was particularly noticeable. Although actually with millions in their treasuries, the twenty-four unions gave the National Committee only the beggarly sum of $100,000 to carry on the whole organizing campaign and the strike. If hard-pressed almost any one of them could have done as well alone. Three outside unions, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the Ladies' Garment Workers, and the Fur Workers, contributed more than the twenty-four unions combined; viz., $190,000. Had the twenty-four unions been really united, instead of merely federated, they could, and certainly would have put in fifty times as much money as they did; not to speak of the strength they would have added in other ways. An industrial union of steel workers, under similar circumstances, would have surely defeated the Steel Trust.
Some Foreign Experiences
Federation always demonstrates such defects. The British Labor Movement has just had a disastrous experience with it. There the miners, railroaders, and transport workers were federated together in the world-famous Triple Alliance. The understanding was that if one of the three groups got in serious trouble the other two would rally to its support. The workers thought they had a wonderful weapon in this gigantic labor combination,, numbering about two million people employed in the most vitally necessary industries.
But events sadly undeceived them. The Triple Alliance, when put to the test, collapsed like federations always do under pressure. The trouble started in the Spring of 1921, when the miners were bitterly attacked by the mine owners. They called upon the two affiliated groups of railroads and transport workers to help them. This the latter made a show of doing, going so far even as to call a general strike in support of the miners. But this never materialized. On the contrary, the three great unions, simply because they were separate organizations and manned by timid officials, quarrelled among themselves over the usual technicalities, personalities, etc. and finally declared off the threatened strike. The miners were left to make the fight alone, and the general result was far worse than if there had been no Triple Alliance at all. The affair was a terrific defeat for the whole working class.
Above all the labor movement is a fighting organization, and a successful fighting machine can never be constructed on the basis of federation. This was clearly demonstrated during the World War in the military forces of the Allies. In the beginning the Allied armies were practically federated. But naturally no real concerted action was possible among them, just as it is impossible among federated trade unions and for the same reasons. No general strategy could be developed. When France was making a drive against the Central Powers, England, Italy, Russia and the rest would invariably be doing the reverse of what they should be, and vice versa. Nor could the most pressing danger of defeat put an end to this condition and make the federated armies function effectively. When they had nearly lost the war then the Allies applied the remedy, amalgamation. The several armies were placed under one head. This doubled their power and sounded the death knell of the opposing military forces. Whether in social or military warfare, unity of thought and action can come only through unity of organization. That is the great lesson railroad men have yet to learn.
Insufficiency of Railroad Federation
But railroad workers have no need to look afield for weaknesses of federation. The history of our own organizations is replete with such. One of many illustrations that may be cited was the great Illinois Central-Harriman Lines strike. That affair was a glaring illustration of the divided authority and lack of solidarity produced by federation. There was the customary manifestations of craft selfishness at the expense of the general interest; the same unwillingness of the various organizations to concede the necessary control to the federation; the same planlessness and confusion in financing and directing the walkout. It was truly said that there were nine craft strikes, rather than one general strike. From first to last the various officials, jealous of their respective prerogatives, quarrelled bitterly among themselves. Charges of indifference, sabotage, and sell-out flew back and forth between them. Torn with dissention, the whole movement constantly faced disruption. Under such circumstances, so typical of federation, a really effective strike was altogether out of the question. All chances for victory went glimmering. Defeat resulted.
But could a more damning argument be found against federation than our present situation? The employers have declared war to the knife against the unions. And the latter, despite the many federations, are cringing under the blow, unwilling and incapable of helping each other. The railroad owners select one union or group of unions after the other and give them a beating, while the others, safe from attack for the moment, refuse to go to the attacked ones' assistance. Thus the transportation unions stand about shrugging their shoulders while the shop unions have their national agreement taken away from them. And in turn the shop unions consider it none of their funeral when the Stationary Firemen, Maintenance of Way, and other groups lose the eight-hour day. Thus it goes, with the companies defeating us piecemeal, one section after another. Divide and conquer is the eternal motto of the exploiter. And never was it put more effectively into practice than it now is as against the railroad workers.
If we should be forced into a strike, as well we may, how would it go with us then? We are ill-prepared for such a vital struggle. The chances are, if present indications do not lie completely, that only a group of the unions would strike, and the others, with characteristic craft selfishness, would stay at work and thus help defeat the strike. But even if all the sixteen unions should strike together, which is most unlikely indeed, the situation would be critical for us. Chronically divided by their craft character, the organizations would go into the fight with a fraction of possible efficiency. Instead of a homogenuous machine, we would have sixteen autonomous unions, each with its own set of officers and each its own will; sixteen sets of organizers working at cross purposes with each other and creating endless confusion; sixteen different strike relief systems, with the disruptive condition of the richer ones paying high benefits and the poorer ones none; sixteen headquarters scattered all over the country dabbling in the management of the strike and quarreling with each other.
Under such circumstances, inevitable in the present state of our organization, limitless confusion, disharmony, and weakness would result. A properly conducted strike, one that would bring out the real power of the workers and give them better than a desperate chance to win, would be impossible. It would be the steel strike and the Illinois Central-Harriman Lines strike all over again, only this time on a far larger scale. Of course, such a strike might be won. But if victory did come it would be due to the weight and stragetic position of the workers, and not to the skill shown in organization. And the winning would amount to only a fraction of what it would if the workers were really united. But the strike might also be lost. This is the chance that cannot be taken. If we are going to have a general struggle the workers must go into it properly organized and prepared to effectively support each other to the limit.
Federation must give way to amalgamation, just as isolation gave way to federation. There is no other way out of it. In the phase of isolation the unions, in spite of their handicaps, made considerable headway and abolished many abuses. In federation they have vastly increased their power and established conditions that amount to a semi-revolution in the railroad industry. But infinitely greater tasks lie ahead, tasks that will demand the utmost unanimity of purpose and action from the whole army of railroad workers. And this unanimity federation cannot give. So long as the unions remain autonomous bodies, each with its own set of officers, just that long will they stand first for their respective craft interests, to the detriment of the general welfare, and just that long will real unity among railroad men be impossible. This can only be had when the unions are all amalgamated into one body. Then the resultant organization, with one set of officials, one interest and one goal, will develop such tremendous power that the workers will be able to make real progress on the long, hard road to emancipation.