The Russian Revolution/Chapter 14
XIV.
THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM.
When they carried out their uprising in 1917 the Russian Communists had been long convinced that in order for a proletarian revolution to be successful it would almost necessarily have to extend over several big countries simultaneously.[1] They realized that industry is international in scope; that all the nations are economically dependent upon each other, and that the possibility of a working class republic maintaining itself in one country, while the rest remained capitalist, was almost negligible. Hence, immediately they came into power they set about encouraging the indispensible revolutions in the great states of Western Europe. But their efforts failed: in each case the workers, ignorant and led by timid and treacherous leaders, were unable to rise to the heights of real proletarian revolution. In consequence, the Russians finally found themselves alone, with the admittedly next to impossible task on their hands of making their country a Communist society against the united opposition of the capitalist world.
With this superhuman problem on their hands, the Russian militants have struggled on since the revolution. Always hoping for supporting revolutions to develop in other countries, they have done their utmost to solve the baffling industrial problem with their own means; they rebuilt as best they could the railroad equipment and industrial plants destroyed in the civil wars; they tried to overcome the shortage of skilled labor by creating thousands of technical and vocational schools; they repressed sabotage with an iron hand, not hesitating to even use the firing squad when necessary; they carried on a great campaign to educate the masses to the meaning of the new voluntary labor discipline; they fought the food shortage by rationing systems and all sorts of drives for industrial efficiency.
But with the counter-revolutionary forces raging on many fronts about the best they could do was to partially check the degeneration of industry. Little attention could be given the problem. The supreme energies of the people were devoted to beating back the invaders. The slogan was, "Everything for the Red Army." But now the war is over, and for the first time the revolutionists are really able to take the industrial situation seriously in hand. They are attacking it with the same feverish energy that they did the earlier military problems. The rehabilitation of industry has now become the first order of business for Russia's best brains and idealism.
The first fruits of this concentrated attention upon the industrial problem is what is called the new economic program, the anouncement of which recently caused world-wide comment. This program consists of several measures, the most important of which are: (1), intensified efforts to break the blockade by setting up trade relations with capitalist nations; (2), granting of concessions in Russia to foreign capital; (3), lifting of the strict Government industrial monopoly and the establishment of free trade; (4), abolition of the grain levy and adoption of the grain tax.
These policies were heralded all over the world by counter-revolutionaries as marking the definite end of Communism in Russia and the rebirth of capitalism there. The defenders of private property in social necessities were everywhere highly elated and the radical friends of Soviet Russia correspondingly depressed; because, lacking exact information as to what these policies actually involve and judging them from their face value, the latter were inclined to fear that there might be good grounds for the capitalistic rejoicing. In this chapter I shall try to point out what the new measures are intended to accomplish and whether or not they are liable to bring about a recurrence of capitalism in Russia.
In the preceding chapter we have seen that Russia is suffering from a sort of economic vicious circle, the low production of manufactured articles preventing a sufficient production of foodstuffs, and vice versa. The new economic program is an attempt to hack a way directly out of this vicious circle. It attacks the problem in both its phases, industrial and agricultural, simultaneously. The general plan of it is, on the one hand, to run beyond the poor industrial productive apparatus of Russia and quickly secure an abundant supply of manufactured articles especially to satisfy the needs of the peasants; and on the other hand, to get the peasants to produce a plentitude of food for the city workers in anticipation of receiving such articles in return for it.
The first three measures deal primarily with the industrial phase of the problem. (1), With trade relations established generally, Russia will be able to export the raw and semi-finished materials which she can easily produce in quantity, and to get in exchange the locomotives and other essentials which she needs so badly to put the industries on their feet again. Thus will be avoided the many years' struggle which otherwise would be required to build the equipment necessary to produce all these vital commodities in Russa; (2), by means of foreign concessions large quantities of products, taken in payment for rent and leases, will be thrown into the general stream of commodities in the country and thus serve to diminish the industrial crisis. Kamenev recently declared that the concessions can further the economic emancipation of Russia by assisting materially in the electrification of her industries. This great project can be completed in two general ways: Russia may either struggle along for many years with her impoverished equipment trying to bring it about; or she may buy the materials, etc., from. the capitalist countries. In the latter event she would have to pay world capitalism a tribute of twelve billion dollars, the cost of the electrification work, for her industrial independence. Kamenev urged the concessions as one way in which this tribute might be paid (3), Through the establishment of free trade individual initiative is stimulated. Small industry is invigorated and made to produce a large amount of commodities, which help materially to tide over the crisis until large-scale industry can be organized. Besides large stores of goods, hidden by their owners at the outbreak of the revolution, are drawn from their hiding places and thrown on the hungry market.
The last measure deals with the agricultural phase. (4), By the substitution of the grain tax for the grain levy the peasants are encouraged to produce more food-stuffs. Under the grain levy everything was taken from them except barely enough for them to live on; whereas under the grain tax they have to give up only a certain percentage of their crops. The rest is left for them to dispose of as they see fit. The more they raise the more they have. This is an incentive to production, so direct that even the dull-witted peasants can comprehend it.
The additional mass of machinery and other commodities secured through foreign trade, concessions, and small free-trade industry will be used to rehabilitate the industries generally and to satisfy burning needs of the workers and peasants. And the large surpluses of grain originating as a result of the new tax system will serve to relieve the food shortage in the cities and also as an important basis for foreign trade. Just as decreasing production in the two spheres of industry and agriculture reacted unfavorably upon each other constantly,and finally developed the vicious circle above-described, so it is calculated that the gradually increasing production in these two spheres will influence one another favorably until finally the vicious circle is broken altogether, and Russia, with great reserves in her control, is able to march rapidly forward to abunding prosperity. That is the purpose of the new economic policies of Soviet Russia.
The new economic program is esentially capitalistic: it is an attempt to use some of capitalism's own weapons temporarily against itself. That there is danger in this for the revolution cannot be denied, but it is a peril that must be run because the workers in other countries have failed to support Russia by dethroning their masters. The world's capitalists hope and believe that the danger will be fatal, and many revolutionaries dread that they may be right. But the Russian Communists, keen realists and with all the facts in their hands, are sure that they can offset it and achieve the end they have in mind. Let us examine for a minute just what this danger is and what means will be used to combat it:
International trading, as proposed, is not a serious menace. It will be closely controlled by the Government and can hardly furnish vantage ground for a new capitalism to take root. Nor will the concessions present grave difficulties. The foreign exploiters going in will insist upon and no doubt get ample guarantees of protection, but their projects will be hedged around with legal restrictions isolating them and limiting their baneful political influence. Moreover, and this is the decisive factor, the Communists will arrange matters so that the capitalists must produce their own social antitoxin. That is, as fast as the concessionaries build plants and fill them with workers, the Communists, by organizing the latter industrially and politically, will give them a power sufficient not only to overcome that of the employers involved, but also to lend considerable support to the general proletarian social structure. Hence, we get the interesting result that the more capitalists go into Russia, and the larger they swell the ranks of the working class, the stronger will become the workers' republic. There is little to fear from the concessionaries. Speaking of them recently, Kamenev said: "Capital in Russia will dig its own grave with every extra shovelful of coal and with every bucketful of petroleum that we obtain by its help."
But if international, trade and concessions do not constitute real dangers, the establishment of free trade and its helpmeet, the grain tax, certainly do. They give private individuals the right again to manufacture and deal in social necessities. They will result in a great growth of small-scale production and the strengthening of petty-bourgeois sentiment. They are equivalent to injecting the worst kind of capitalist poison straight into the body of proletarian Russia. But the revolutionary tacticians are sure that the latter is strong enough to withstand the nauseous dose. Everything will be done to prevent contagion, and to make only good come from the vaccination. The luxuriant crop of small producers and dealers, both industrial and agricultural, will be organized into co-operatives, and thus their activities will be kept largely within proletarian bounds. The great basic industries will be free of the infection. They will remain in the hands of the Government, and will be developed along purely Communist lines.
In view of the circumstances, with the workers, retaining absolute control of the Government, the Army, the great industries, the press, the schools, etc., it is very unlikely that any dangerous capitalist class can grow in Russia from the workings of the new economic program. Granted that these measures are a risky experiment, and one that would not be undertaken unless the need were so great; but the Russian Communist leaders know what they are about. Consider their solution of the officer problem in the Red Army: When they put the ex-czarist officers in command, as they were compelled to do because the workers knew nothing of military science, a loud howl went up that this was wildest folly; that the old imperialists, again in charge of the armed forces, would soon turn them against the revolution and defeat it. Yet this calamity did not occur—the Communist military commissars prevented it. Nor will the much-feared and much-hoped-for collapse of the Soviet regime come about as a result of the economic policies. All that will happen is that Russia will get the additional volume of production upon which she is counting, and upon which the fate of the revolution depends. The Communist Party will take care of whatever capitalist class there may develop.
There are critics of Soviet Russia, however, who will disagree violently with this conclusion. They maintain that even under the rigid industrial control existing until the adoption of the new economic program a large body of rich speculators, the widely-advertised new Russian bourgeoisie, have been able to develop, and that now the lid is lifted and trading made legal, this sprouting capitalist class will flourish like weeds and soon choke out the few remaining delicate tendrils of Communism.
While in Russia I made a special effort to locate this famous new bourgeoisie. But it proved too elusive for me. In fact, I am prepared to say that it does not exist, and for two very good reasons. The first is that in present-day Russia there is at hand no privately-owned industrial or commercial mechanism sufficiently extensive to sustain such a class—90 per cent of the industries being owned by the Government, and most of the remaining 10 per cent consisting of workers' co-operatives. And secondly, there is no way to store up accumulated wealth in substantial amounts—it cannot be invested in stocks and bonds, for there is none of either; nor in land, buildings, and industries, for these are not on sale; nor in money, for this has already depreciated 15,000 times and is constantly falling faster. How, then, can there be a capitalist class—with no means to "earn" its wealth and no way to keep it after it gets it? The whole thing is impossible. That many crafty individuals have been able to take advantage of the social upheaval by speculating and stealing and have amassed a store of gold, jewels, and other valuables, is undeniable. But to dignify them with the name of the new bourgeoisie is ridiculous. There is no real capitalist class in Russia now, nor is there liable to be one there in the future.
So far, the new economic program has been successful in accomplishing the things expected of it. The blockade is being broken; international trade is developin; streams of machinery and manufactured products are flowing to Russia’s impoverished industries and people—in the six weeks just preceding my departure from Russia 58 ships, loaded with vital necessities, arrived in Petrograd from abroad. Several concessions of timber and other raw material supplies have already been leased out, and many more are under negotiation. Small-scale industries are springing up all over the country and sending a fresh flood of products into the needy market. But most important of all is the effect produced upon the peasants. Unquestionably they have been tremendously stimulated by the substitution of the grain tax for the grain levy. This Spring they put in an exceptionally large acreage of crops, and worked diligently to produce a harvest which, to begin with, promised to be large enough to solve half of Russia's tremendous difficulties. But the drought came on and ruined it. This has dealt a deadly blow to the success of the new program. It means that the food shortage must continue for an indefinite time, and with it the inseparably connected industrial crisis. It is a great calamity. Had there but been a good crop this year the backbone of the industrial problem would have been broken and the revolution placed out of all danger.
But the Russian workers are not discouraged; they are fighting doggedly on in the face of the new difficulties. They are fired with a boundless confidence in themselves, kindled by the accomplishment of many "impossibilities." When they took hold of the Government the world said they could not maintain it for three weeks; yet here they are now, four years later, stronger politically than every. When they were distitute of organized armed forces and surrounded by a multitude of enemies the world said that they could not defend themselves and would be crushed; but they built up the Red Army and drove back all their foes. And thus it will be with their present overwhelming industrial problem: the world, always a pessimist, says it is insoluble and will ruin the revolution; but even as the Russian workers achieved the political and military "impossibilities," and made everyone admit it, so they will one day accomplish the industrial "impossibility" and make everyone admit that also. In my judgment the famine has not defeated the Rusian revolution; it has merely delayed for a while its final, full realization.
- ↑ Once when talking with a very prominent Russian Communist, and after we had reviewed the many industrial wants of the country, he expressed a widely-held opinion when he said, "After all, the only thing that Russia really needs is a revolution in Germany." The thought being that with the workers of Germany and Russia united in revolution; the ones possessing a magnificent industrial equipment and the others boundless natural resources, a proletarian economic block would be created that could sustain itself against the capitalist world.