The War with Mexico/Volume 2/Chapter 21
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
XXI
BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO
September, 1846-March, 1847
The revolution of August 4, as already has been suggested, was a complex and inconsistent affair, combining most heterogeneous elements: the popular institutions of 1824 and the autocratic power of the soldier upheld with bayonets; the army and the people, whose relations had always been, and in Mexico always had to be, those of wolf and lamb; the regular troops and the National Guards, who loved each other as fire loves water; General Salas reluctantly taking orders from Citizen Fariás, and both of them doing obeisance to Liberator Santa Anna, whom both distrusted; and all cooperating to revive a federal constitution, which had been found in practice unworkable, and needed, in the opinion of everybody, to be redrawn.[1]
Such a state of things argued insincerity; and in fact many had taken up the cry of Federalism at this time simply because the failure of reactionary designs had made the word a popular appeal, and because—nearly all the former leaders of that school having been crushed by the Centralists—there seemed to be room for new aspirants; while the state of things indicated also that more troubles were soon to arrive, since evidently no final solution of the political problem had been achieved, and such a welter of principles, traditions and methods was a loud invitation to the demagogue and the schemer. Don Simplicio predicted that new stars were to flash out soon in the political heavens, and then disappear before the astronomers would have time to name them; and it added significantly, "The comets will be found to be all tails."[2] In particular the field was open for radical democracy. Calm judgment is never listened to in a period of excitement, and the Mexicans, like the French of 1792, instead of resorting to the practical Anglo-Saxon rule of compromising differences, believed in carrying principles to their logical end. Centralism and monarchical ideas had failed to render the nation happy; democracy was therefore the panacea, and the more of it the better. The demoralized condition of the people promoted this dangerous policy. Referring to all those concerned with public affairs, a thoughtful writer of the day characterized them as ignorant, destitute of honor, patriotism, morality, good faith or principles of any kind, and influenced exclusively by self-interest and ambition ; and naturally men of the opposite kind held aloof in disgust and despair. For these reasons the conservative wing of the Federalists, led by Pedraza and known as the Moderados (Moderates), found itself distanced in the race for support; and the Puros that is to say, pure Federalists and democrats gained the ascendency at once. 3
Their acknowledged leader, as we have seen, was the patriotic though indiscreet Farias, but he was more honest than brilliant, and a man stepped forward now who reversed that description. This man was Rejon. A keen, subtle mind, a bold, unfaltering will, a ready, plausible tongue and a tireless ambition quite indifferent about means, characterized him chiefly, and for the present crisis these were redoubtable qualifications. The Spanish minister once remarked, after conversing with him, that it was impossible to trust a person who possessed no principles except the transient interests of his ambition. And Rejon had another qualification that was no less important. Though unworthy of confidence and everywhere distrusted, Santa Anna counted as an essential factor in all plans, a power that each party felt it must have; and Rejón was believed at this time to represent Santa Anna. 3
The aims and to some extent the methods of the radical faction were borrowed from the United States, but without regard to differences of race, experience and present circumstances. Government, they maintained, should be completely democratic and completely secular ; and they dreamed of this consummation almost voluptuously, as a Mussulman dreams of paradise. They held public meetings, where everybody was free to speak; and in these disorderly gatherings they discussed religious freedom, the seizure of Church property, the reformation of the clergy, the secularization of marriage and education, the necessity of destroying military domination in politics, and the capital punishment of all suspected monarchists. In short, from the conservative point of view, they passed sentence of death on society. Santa Anna did not sympathize with their programme. He wished society to live — for him, and he was conducting now an equivocal correspondence with men hostile to the Puros. But it probably' suited his purpose to have them succeed for a time, and to, have the substantial citizens add to their litany, "From Rejón deliver us, good Lord!" He himself had played the part of: the Lord before now, and was willing to do so again, though he preferred the more terrestrial name of dictator?[3]
Of course property felt the menace, and it had reason to do so. During the latter part of September, 1846, an editorial' in the official journal, commonly attributed to Rejón, intimated that if the rich did not contribute for the war, the people would know where to find their wealth; and even foreign houses' were threatened. The British minister forced a prompt retraction of this language so far, at least, as his fellow-country-' men were concerned; but within two weeks a number of capitalists were invited to loan $200,000 with an intimation that, unless they did so, the money would be taken. Every one understood that the leopard, though now comparatively' silent, had not changed his spots and would not, and hence four élite militia corps, familiarly known as the Polkos, were formed at Mexico to protect life and property. One of these,' called the Victoria battalion, was composed of merchants,' professional men and scions from wealthy families. Another,' which bore the name of Hidalgo, consisted of clerks; and the Bravos and Independencia battalions, made up largely of artisans, represented the industrial interests of the city. The ministry, who desired to exclude such persons from the National Guard, opposed the recognition of these corps; but, supported by Salas, the substantial citizens carried the day
An equally natural reaction caused by radical violence was political. In the hope of welding the Federalists into a harmonious party, the council of government had been revived, and members of both wings had been appointed to it. Santa Anna, in order to establish his particular friend Haro at the head of the treasury, next proposed to transfer Farías from that office to the presidency of the council. This was understood — correctly, no doubt — as a move to eliminate him virtually from the government, and was fiercely denounced; but Santa Anna then remarked that should Salas for any reason drop out, the president of the council would take his place at the head of the government, and Pedraza could have the post in case Farías preferred to remain as he was.[4] This put a new look on the matter, and the programme was carried out; but the Puro attacks upon their rivals continued to excite bitter resentment. When it was arranged that Farías and Pedraza should publicly shake hands, and crowds gathered to witness the amazing ceremony, it failed to occur. The Moderados belonging to the council resigned; the body ceased to enjoy prestige and influence; and Farías lost all official power. Naturally some of the blame for this result was laid to the charge of the Pedrazists. Partisan rancor grew still more savage. 'The fury of the French revolution was rivalled. "We must finish with our enemies or die ourselves," cried one factional organ; "the scaffold must be raised; we must drink their hearts' blood." Bankhead described the situation as one of "universal terror and distrust."[5]
About the middle of October there came an explosion. Apparently Rejón demanded that Salas initiate the Puro reforms, and the acting Executive, who was not only weak and incompetent but obstinate, resented the pressure, and turned his face toward the Moderados. To the Puros this looked reactionary, and he was charged with a design to prevent Congress from assembling. Next it was required of Salas that he should give way to Farías as the representative of the new régime, and probably there were threats at least of bringing this change about, if necessary, through an insurrection of the populace.[6] Then Salas, with the Hidalgo battalion of which he was the commander, took possession of the citadel. The people, alarmed by rumors that a sack was contemplated, flew to arms; and Rejón found it necessary to moderate his tone.[7]
When the Executive, as was inevitable, dismissed him from office, he submitted; and Santa Anna himself, though his orders to Rejon had been to hold the post whatever Salas might do, found public sentiment at the capital too strong for him, and concluded to accept the change. Rejon's conduct had excited so much dissension and alarm, that his removal gratified all sensible persons at Mexico. The rumors and the disturbance were now attributed officially to agents of the United States, and comparative quiet returned. 3
The aims of Santa Anna and those of the Puros may have been exactly contrary in these events; but both overshot the mark, and they suffered a common loss of prestige. As one method of restoring it, they induced the governors of San Luis Potosi and Queretaro to declare that within their jurisdictions the Liberator would be recognized as head of the nation until the assembling of Congress; but their principal scheme was to carry the Presidential election. Congress, chosen on the first day of November, was to elect, and it consisted chiefly of men termed by well-to-do citizens "the dregs of society" that is to say, poorly educated radicals taken from the masses. 3
This appeared to ensure a Puro triumph, yet there were serious difficulties. Rejon had been discredited, and the former administration of Farias had left painful memories. Besides, it was feared that his election would offend Santa Anna, who of course was not on very cordial terms now with the tribune of the people, and preferred to have a weak man like Salas, with whom satisfactory relations had grown out of the Rejon episode, continue in power. At one time Almonte seemed to be the Puro favorite; but finally it was decided to cast the Presidential vote for Santa Anna, who could not legally hold the chief political and the chief military offices at the same time and would no doubt remain with the army, and to elect Farias to the Vice Presidency as the actual executive. 3
Even this combination, however, met with strong and unexpected opposition. The conservatives and moderates were naturally against it; certain states for the voting was done by these quasi sovereignties as units could not forgive Santa Anna for past misdeeds, and the powerful Church party looked upon Farias as Antichrist. Finally Escudero of Chihuahua, whose delegation held the balance of power, opened negotiations with Farias, and that gentleman declared in writing his willingness to "join loyally" with any one who desired "in good faith the welfare of the country." Holding this instrument a weapon, should there be need of it in their hands, a number of the Moderados, who realized his honesty, vigor and good intentions, and believed now that he would give them a share in the administration, accepted the Puro candidates, and on December 22 by a narrow majority these were elected. The news produced a commotion; but without encountering serious opposition Farias took up the reins of government at once. 3
His primary aim was to support the war. This he intended; to do because he felt an ardent patriotism, but other reasons also lay in his mind. Abominating the military class, he desired to have as many as possible of the corrupt officers left on the field, and he designed to keep the army so busy, that it would not be able to prevent the states, which were generally Federalist and democratic in sentiment, from organizing their strength, and making sure that no tyrannical central power would ever raise its front again. But the first requirement for military operations was money. Farias had, therefore, to take up immediately the financial problem, and he found it most difficult. 3
Of all the fields of Mexican misgovernment the worst had been the treasury, for it not only required a care and a good judgment that were peculiarly foreign to the national temperament, but provided opportunities for illegitimate gains that were most congenial. During Spanish rule the needs of the country had been fully met, and about nine millions a year, almost half of the revenues, left as a surplus. Under Iturbide a financial system which three centuries of able administration had built up was despised, and with mines abandoned, agriculture discouraged, commerce paralyzed, honesty relaxed, taxes diminished for the sake of popularity, and expenses increased for the sake of glory, the foundations of ruin were promptly laid. The logical superstructure soon mounted high in the shape of two British loans, which bound Mexico to pay about twenty-six million dollars in return for about fifteen, a large part of which was practically thrown away by her agents. 5 The expulsion of the rich and thrifty Spaniards, the costs of civil wars, in which the nation paid for both sides, unwise and unstable fiscal systems, borrowing at such rates as four per cent a month, incredibly bad management,[8] and methods of accounting that made it impossible for the minister of the treasury to know the actual state of things, were enough to complete the edifice; but they were supplemented with peculation, embezzlement, multiplication of offices, collusion between importers and customhouses, and systematic smuggling winked at by half-starved officials. Revenue after revenue was mortgaged, and by 1845 the government found itself entitled to only about thirteen per cent of what entered the treasury.[9]
Since the beginning of hostilities our blockade, assisted by new methods of wholesale smuggling, had greatly reduced the income from duties, which had always been the principal reliance; the adoption of the federal system had given the best part of the internal revenue to the states; and the residue was almost wholly eaten up by the officials. The foreign debt amounted now to more than fifty millions and the domestic debt was nearly twice as great. Every known source of income had been anticipated. Freewill offerings had proved illusory. By ceasing to make payments on account of the debt in May, 1846, the government had largely increased its income, of course, but it had forfeited all title to financial sympathy; and the high officials, who robbed the treasury still in this time of supreme distress, had stripped it of all title to respect.[10]
The government, therefore, had no real credit. Men who made this kind of gambling their business would now and then furnish a little money for a brief term at an exorbitant rate. In February, 1846, for example, a loan was placed at a total sacrifice of about thirty-seven per cent. But when the treasury was authorized to borrow fifteen millions in a regular way, nobody cared to furnish any part of the sum. New taxes were equally vain. In October, 1846, the government imposed a special war "contribution" in order to save the Mexicans, it explained, from becoming foreigners in their own country, like the Spaniards of Florida; and the chief result was to enrage a handful of persons, who found they had been silly enough to pay while almost everybody else had laughed. In November a forced loan was demanded of the clergy, but the project aroused such opposition that substantially it had to be given up. The whole gamut of methods, even violence, has been tried in vain, said the ministry in December. Business was dead, confidence gone, capital in hiding or sojourning abroad; and if by good luck a bag of silver dropped into the treasury, it seemed to evaporate instantly. Financially, reported the Spanish minister, the situation of the country was "truly frightful."[11]
To make it more, not less, frightful, there did exist one vast accumulation of riches. This was the property belonging to the Church. No one could seriously deny that the nation had authority to use, in a time of dire need, funds that had been given to the organization in days of plenty, for this was a principle of Spanish law, and the Crown had exercised the right without so good an excuse. There was also a particular reason in the present instance, for the wealth of the Church, aside from articles used in worship, consisted mainly of land, and, as virtually no land tax existed in Mexico, it was escaping the common burden a burden, too, that was peculiarly for its advantage, since in the case of American conquest it was bound to lose its exclusive privileges. Besides, there was the saying of its Founder, "Freely ye have received, freely give."[12]
Very naturally, then, people had been casting their eyes for some time at the riches of the Church. In June, 1844, El Siglo XIX, the most thoughtful newspaper of Mexico, had suggested raising funds for the Texas war by mortgaging some of its property; and a few months later Duff Green, then on the ground, had expressed the opinion that Mexico would have to choose between that resource and forced loans. In July, 1845, the correspondent of the London Times dropped a similar hint in that journal, and in the course of the year it became a popular idea, that the Church could perform a great public service, and at the same time vastly strengthen its own position, by providing means for the anticipated war against the United States. In October, 1846, the Monitor Republicano suggested once more a mortgage of ecclesiastical property; and at one time the government actually decided upon the measure. Bankhead admitted that he could see no other resource. These hints were not, however, acted upon by the clergy; and after many long discussions they would only agree to advance $10,000 or $20,000 a month for a limited period. This was to insult the nation, exclaimed the Monitor Republicano.[13]
Charged now with full responsibility, Farías met the issue squarely. Not only was he determined to carry on the war, but the letters of Santa Anna had been, and were, most urgent. November 7 the General demanded that "no step" should be neglected, if it could "help to prevent the name of Mexican from soon becoming the object of ridicule and contempt for the whole world." "Do not reply that the government cannot obtain funds," he wrote later; "This would be saying that the nation has ceased to exist ... so rich a nation cannot lack money enough to support its independence, nor can the government say that it has no authority to look for the money.[14]
These letters evidently referred to ecclesiastical property, and they were followed up at New Year's with almost daily communications of the same tenor. Such fearful urgency had a good excuse, for the government was now sending him no funds.[15]
It had none. Although Farías kept faith with Escudero, the Moderados as a party showed the radical chief no mercy; the Centralists loathed the apostle of federalism; all conservatives detested the typical democrat, and the clericals abominated the extinguisher of titles. All the old ladies thought him worse than Luther, and many of every kind and condition rebelled at his brusque and tactless ways. No person of substance would lift a finger to support his measures. A cloud of distrust, passion, hostility and mortal hatred — mostly an emanation from the whole wretched past of the country — grew thicker about him each day. Raise money he could not. Moreover he probably felt little desire to do so by any of the ordinary methods. One of his cardinal principles was the necessity of destroying the fuero, the political strength and the intellectual domination of the Church by reducing its wealth; and now the demand of Santa Anna, the army and the nation that funds be provided for the war, appeared to make this policy opportune and even irresistible.[16]
A committee of Congress reported against the plan of borrowing on the security of Church property; but that signified little, for no practical substitute was offered. There were fears that the army would break up. There were fears that for self-protection it would proclaim a dictatorship or march upon the capital. Santa Anna's warning and threatening communications were shown to Congress. The legislators tried to evade the issue, but they were told that all the responsibility rested upon their shoulders; that it was for them to choose between the salvation and the ruin of the fatherland; and on January 7 they grappled with the problem. Behind them tireless, uncompromising, inexorable the Executive insisted upon action; and behind him stood Santa Anna, demanding the same thing and promising to support it.[17]
The session lasted virtually until January 11. The debates were hot, and they were bitter. To make use of the Church lands, it was argued, would invade the rights of property, lay upon one class of society the general burden, and, should the lands be sold, involve a tremendous loss of values, since there was little ready money in the country, and few would have the means and inclination to purchase. The country must be saved, answered Rejón, Juárez and their allies; is there any other resource? — point it out. "If the Yankee triumphs," cried one speaker, "what ecclesiastical property or what religion will be left us?" And upon these principal themes were played an infinite number of variations in all the possible tones of Mexican eloquence and fury.[18]
Just before midnight on the ninth, however, the turmoil ceased; the handsome chamber of the Deputies became still. High above the throne in front glimmered pallidly the sword of Itúrbide; in letters of gold, on the semi-circular wall at the rear, all the names of the Beneméritos of Mexico reflected the subdued light; shadows filled the galleries; exhausted members half-slumbered in their chairs, and others talked wearily here and there in groups; but the stillness was momentous, for the first article of a new law had been passed, authorizing the Executive to raise fifteen millions, for the purposes of the war, by pledging if necessary, even selling property vested in the Church.[19] Minor discussions followed. The religious, charitable and educational work of the clergy was guarded completely; many provisions designed to hamper the realization of the main purpose were accepted in order to conciliate opposition; and at length, on January 11, the plan became law.[20] "The crisis is terrible" wrote the minister of relations two days later, and well he might. All the fierceness and intrigues of partisan politics, all the cunning of high and low finance, all the subtleties of priestcraft and all the terrors of a haughty Church came into play.[21] Freely we have received, but we will not give, and anathema to him who takes, was in effect the dictum of the prelates. For a time it looked as if no official would venture, at the peril of excommunication, to promulgate the law; but Farías and Juárez found a man, and he was appointed governor of the Federal District, in which lay the capital, for that purpose. Then came protests from the "venerable" clergy, complaints from state governments, mutinies of troops, and civilian insurrections organized by priests. Cries of "Viva la religión! Death to the government!" resounded in the streets of the capital. Ministers of state were hard to find, and they soon went out of office. Minor officials resigned so rapidly they could hardly be counted. Santa Anna, after hailing the law as the salvation of the country, turned against it. Moderados in Congress, encouraged by the outcry, hurled epithets harder than stones at the Puros.[22]
On the other hand some of the Deputies, the regular troops at the capital, who expected to profit by the law, the comandante general of Mexico, the National Guards and the democratic masses rallied to the support of the government; and Farías, his long head erect, and his face, always thoughtful and sad, now anxious but set, appealed to the patriotism of the nation, made the most of his authority as chief of the state, and held to his course with inflexible energy and courage. Not only was he determined to have the law respected, but he demanded that it should be made effective. Chaos was the result. "When we look for a ray of hope," said El Republicano, "we discover nothing but alarms, anxieties and every probability of social dissolution." "Furious anarchy," was Haro's description of the scene. There must soon be a crash, he added; "the Devil is running away with us."[23]
Peaceful interests were not, however, entirely forgotten amid this turbulence. During the second week of January Moses Y. Beach, proprietor and editor of the New York Sun, arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana. He carried a British passport. Besides his wife Mrs. Storms, a remarkably clever newspaper woman, accompanied him. Presumably she was to play the part of secretary, for Beach had large financial enterprises in mind, and confidential clerical assistance would certainly be necessary. For some reason letters were written from Cuba to Santa Anna and the authorities at Vera Cruz denouncing him as an American agent; and the party had to go through with a tedious examination of three days, for the comandante general had been expressly ordered to watch all suspicious foreigners hailing from the United States. But the ordeal was passed satisfactorily, and on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth of January Beach arrived at the capital. Letters from Roman Catholic prelates of the United States and Cuba gave him a confidential standing at once in the highest Church circles; his project of a canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec excited the lively interest of Santa Anna's particular friends; and his plan for a national bank brought him into friendly relations with Farías and the other Puro leaders.[24]
Still, the presence of this agent of civilization did not restore tranquillity. On February 4 the government contrived by shrewd management to put a law through Congress, which in effect gave it autocratic power to raise five millions, and thus cut through the complications and restrictions that had rendered the action of January 11 substantially inoperative. The wrath of the Church blazed afresh. At all hazards Antichrist must be put down. Already they had concluded to supply Santa Anna with money, in return of course for his aid against Farías, and now they opened negotiations with the Moderados. This party, however, thought it would be good tactics to divide the Puros by supporting Farías, provided he would let them control his policy, and they so proposed; > but the impracticable fellow, who was battling for principles and not place, declined the offer. Finally the Puros themselves, realizing that all the other factions were against their chief, decided that under his leadership they could not succeed, and resolved to throw him overboard.[25]
While they were casting about for a method, a certain Person advised the clericals to offer an organized resistance against the laws of January 11 and February 4, and circumstances made that course easy. General Peña y Barragán, suspected of conspiring against the government, was placed under temporary arrest, and this made him eager to head a revolution. Farías, understanding that the Independencia battalion could not be trusted, ordered it to Vera Cruz, imagining that it would not refuse to march against the enemy. But on various more or less valid pretexts it did so; the other three élite battalions joined with it; and on February 27 they declared that Farías and Congress, having lost the confidence of the nation, had forfeited their authority, demanding at the same time the annulment of the "anti-religious" laws.[26] Amidst the ringing of bells and burning of gunpowder, the city echoed with the cries, "Death to Gómez Farías! Death to the Puros!" Cannon were soon at the street corners, and the usual scenes of a Mexican insurrection, fatal chiefly to peaceful residents, were presently on exhibition. The clergy, there is ample reason to believe, paid the costs, and priests left the confessionals to herald this new crusade in the streets.[27]
After about nine days of indecisive skirmishing, however, the clericals felt discouraged. The nation had not rallied to their cause as they had expected. The sum of $40,000 was required for the next week of fighting, and they hesitated. But again a. certain Person urged them on. The awkwardly drawn Plan was reduced to one article — Farías must be deposed. On that almost all could agree. Monarchists, Centralists, Santannistas, Clericals, Moderados, Puros were for once in happy unison. Salas reappeared with some troops to take revenge on his old enemy. And yet with epic heroism Farías, never faltering and never compromising either his official dignity or his personal character, held firmly on With his few soldiers and such of the populace as he could arm. Again the battle raged, and again the innocent fell. But who was it that directed this tempest? Who was the mysterious Person, overwhelming the government of Mexico with darkness and confusion at this critical hour? He was Moses Y. Beach, agent of the American state department and adviser to the Mexican hierarchy. Permission had been given him to bring about peace, if he could; and, unable to do this, he seized the opportunity to help Scott.[28]
The time had now arrived for the Saviour of Society to appear, since all rational persons were desperately tired of the vain struggle; and Peña y Barragán wrote to Santa Anna, begging him to take possession of the Presidential chair. Congress did nothing, for many Deputies — fearing that it might act in a manner contrary to their sentiments — remained away from the chamber, and a quorum could not be assembled; but when Pedraza was arrested by the government, a large group of Moderado members, feeling that Santa Anna's "victory" at Buena Vista had confirmed his power, addressed him to the same effect as Peña; and the Liberator, giving his best corps barely four days of repose, and explaining his departure from the north as one more sacrifice on the altar of his country, set out with a substantial body of troops for Mexico.[29] Along his route women made wreaths and threw them before his feet. Men of every faction acclaimed him; and from Querétaro to the capital the road was filled with carriages, in which all sorts of persons desiring to reach his ear strove to outdo one another in despatch.[30]
On the first news of the insurrection Santa Anna's impression had been that its ulterior aim was hostile to him,[31] for his partisans at the capital supported the government; and, as a Puro envoy confirmed this impression, he promised Farías military aid; but then appeared Moderado agents with strong assurances and probably with stronger financial arguments, and he went over, though not openly, to their side of the controversy. Both parties were ordered by him to discontinue hostilities, and both did so at once; for, as the clergy had now shut their strong boxes, the insurgent officers were anxious to reëstablish a connection with the national treasury, while the regulars of Farías would not disobey Santa Anna. After the President's arrival at Guadalupe Hidalgo a Te Deum was celebrated there in honor of his triumph over the Americans; and the next day, March 23, amidst real demonstrations of joy, he formally superseded Farías, while a certain Person[32] — diligently but vainly sought after by the police — was hastily making his way through the mountains in the direction of Tampico.[33]
Apparently Santa Anna had experienced the luckiest of turns. Precisely when the Americans had shattered his plans, and he found himself buried in the northern deserts with a broken, starving army,[34] this insurrection gave him a splendid occasion for making a triumphal march to the capital amid plaudits of gratitude and admiration, and he now found himself at the summit of prestige and power.[35] In reality, however, his situation was by no means entirely satisfactory. Understanding that the Puros — who in reality had served him with substantial good faith and therefore stood highest in his present sympathy — had lost their dominant position, he allied himself with their opponents; but the Moderados disliked and distrusted him still, and he received at least one distinct notice that by taking their side he was placing himself gratuitously in the hands of his enemies. The Puros did not feel extremely grateful to him for merely avoiding an open break with them; and, although it seemed wise to join in the acclamations lest some worse thing befall them, they were already sharpening their arrows against him. Indeed, they were believed to be sharpening their daggers, and he took full precautions. The clergy had trembled and recoiled on hearing that his arms had triumphed against the Americans, and the Saviour of Society now appeared to lean toward them — or toward their strong boxes; but they knew him well enough to foresee, as they soon realized, that he intended to extort ample compensation for all the favor shown them.[36]
Such was the inner state of things, and the external course of events proved not less interesting. The effect of the insurrection upon the progress of the war, as we shall presently see, was notable, and in substance it produced a counter-revolution in domestic politics. As Farías was no more willing to resign than to compromise, some disposition of him seemed necessary, for Santa Anna would evidently have to take the field again shortly, and it would not have been expedient, whatever the rights of the case, to let. the executive power fall back into his control. It was therefore decided to abolish the Vice Presidency; and in this way fell on April Fool's Day the noblest but most unpopular man in the country.[37] At the positive dictation of Santa Anna General P. M. Anaya, a Moderado, was then elected substitute president, while the raging Puros raged in vain. The clergy succeeded, by offering two millions of real money, in persuading Santa Anna to annul the laws of January 11 and February 4; but the day before he did this, Church property worth twenty millions was placed by Congress — theoretically, at least — within the reach of the government.[38] Not many weeks before this, Don Simplicio had announced, "There will be presented an original tragi-comedy entitled 'All is a farce in our beloved Mexico,'" and now J. F. Ramírez, who had been minister of relations when the hated law passed, exclaimed in.bitterness of heart: All of us, without an exception, have been acting in a way to deserve the contempt and chastisement of cultivated nations; "we are nothing, absolutely nothing, with the aggravating circumstance that our insensate vanity makes us believe that we are everything."[39]