The Writings of Carl Schurz/To Charles Sumner, November 14th, 1861
TO CHARLES SUMNER
Madrid, Nov. 14, 1861.
My dear Friend: First let me thank you for the glorious speech you have delivered before the Massachusetts convention. I agree with you on every point and expect shortly to fight by your side.
Mr. Perry[1] has shown me the letter he mailed to you on the 11th inst. It does honor to his heart. Since he has advised you of what I have done and asked you to take an interest in this matter, I think it due you that you should know all. I have no doubt the President will show you the letter I addressed to him. These lines will furnish you the commentary.
Looking at the ensemble of our affairs, the state of the case seems to me utterly desperate; and what makes matters worse, a large majority of the people and the Government seem to indulge in the most unwarrantable delusions as to the means by which the rebellion can be overcome. Suppose our armies to be numerous and good, our resources to be ample, the spirit of the people to be most enthusiastic; suppose even we win victories in the field—and yet all these things are not sufficient to overbalance the immense advantage of the defensive position of the Confederates. Six or eight months ago it might have been possible to bring about a reaction in the South by a rapid succession of victories. That is now out of the question. The Union feeling in the seceding States is not only paralyzed but I fear almost exterminated. For a year they have practically maintained their independence; they not only love it but are already accustomed to it. We are already regarded as foreign enemies, even by many of those who originally did not desire the dissolution of the Union. Our Government has shown itself unable to protect the Unionists of the South; nothing more natural than that they should consider themselves released of their obligation towards that Government; a few determined spirits always excepted, but they stand alone. Every day that passes without decisive results consolidates secession in itself. We must make up our minds to conquer the South as we would conquer a foreign country;—a thing so much more difficult as this is not a war of armies but of the people, where the advantages are all on the side of the defensive. The idea of starving them out is utterly absurd. Their resources are inferior but better used; besides, standing on the defensive, they have them near at hand. To annihilate their armies and to beat the rebellious spirit thoroughly out of them will, it seems to me, in the ordinary way of warfare, require more time than our own resources will permit us to spend upon it,—and perhaps also more military strength than we possess. Thus the war bids fair to assume the character of the Carlist war in Spain; that is to say, thoroughly exhaust and demoralize the country and finally leave the advantage with the defensive,—unless we avail ourselves of the only thing which is sure to settle the business quickly and definitely. We must proclaim the emancipation of the slaves. You know well that my opinions in relation to slavery are sufficiently decided. And yet, in point of principle, I would not be anxious to see the emancipation measure adopted so suddenly, for I think slavery will perish at all events in consequence of this struggle. But if we want to save the Union it seems to me utterly indispensable to avail ourselves of this most powerful weapon without delay.
What I hear from the United States leads me to believe that the Administration is strongly opposed to this policy. I have some reason to suspect that some of its members still hope for a change of public opinion, a spontaneous reaction in the South. If the war is to be conducted upon such ideas, I fear thousands of lives and hundreds of millions will be spent in vain. Our victories, if indeed we should be lucky enough to achieve any, will be useless butcheries and neither the gallantry of our armies nor the enthusiasm of the people will be able to save us. This being my view of things, it is impossible for me to sit still, eat diplomatic dinners, repose upon distinguished consideration and wait for news from America. I, too, feel some responsibility in what is going on there. After having contributed my share to the election of Mr. Lincoln, it is incompatible with my way of thinking to enjoy the comforts and luxuries of a distinguished position while the country is on the road to wreck and ruin. It is my duty to stand or fall with our cause. My present intention is this. I shall return to the United States under all circumstances. If on a careful survey of the state of things at home I find my impressions confirmed, I shall help you and our friends who think as we do, in urging Mr. Lincoln on to decisive measures; and if that be found impossible, work upon public opinion in every way possible so as to force the Administration into the right course.
I was about to offer my resignation pure and simple to the President, when Mr. Perry made an effort to dissuade me from that step. He thinks that a change in this legation will prejudice our interests here, and in this he is probably right. The American Legation in Spain was never more respected than at this moment. I had to overcome all kinds of prejudices when I arrived here; but by patient labor and discreet conduct I have conquered them all and succeeded to turn the very things which seemed to be against me, to account. I have proposed a conciliatory course throughout and thus, without concealing my principles, gained the confidence of the Spanish Government and of the leading statesmen. Thus my influence is firmly established here. A change in the legation would be received with regret, and perhaps even with distrust at the present moment. If I should receive leave of absence for a limited time, the service would hardly suffer. Mr. Perry would as chargé d'affaires steadily follow the course I have adopted. He is a man of great diplomatic ability, prudent and very well versed in Spanish affairs. This is the principal reason why I modified my original intention and presented to the Government the alternative of giving me a leave of absence or accepting my resignation. Another reason is that a resignation pure and simple for political grounds might be looked upon as a demonstration against the Administration, and I do not deem it desirable that I should be placed into an antagonistic position as long as it can be avoided.
While under these circumstances it would seem the wiser course for the Government to give me a leave of absence, I shall also receive my letter of recall with gratitude. I shall never cling to the advantages of an official position, which might hinder me in following the dictates of my conscience. If you feel like doing anything for me, urge the Government to enable me at once to return, by immediately granting either leave or recall. By this you will greatly oblige me.
Please regard this letter as a confidential one as far as the exposition of my views on home affairs and my intention is concerned. As I shall have to explain these matters to the Government immediately after my arrival in the United States you will readily understand why I should not like to be anticipated. In case my resignation be accepted my enemies may possibly try to create the impression that I was forced to offer it by the difficulties of my diplomatic position or something of that kind. My defense in that respect, if any should be necessary, I must entrust to my friends.
Permit me a word to you as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If it can possibly be done, put off the action of the Senate on any other matters with which Spain is concerned until my arrival at Washington. I may be able to give you useful information.
Will you have the kindness to give me your views on the state of affairs at home in reply to this letter? If you write soon and send your letter by the State Department it will reach me before my departure, and I should feel greatly indebted to you.
- ↑ Horatio J. Perry, secretary of Legation at Madrid.