The Writings of Carl Schurz/To Grover Cleveland, December 10th, 1884
TO GROVER CLEVELAND
New York, Dec. 10, 1884.
My dear Sir: I gladly respond to your very kind invitation to express to you my views “at length,” and I do so not without a strong feeling of responsibility. The anxiety of which you speak, I fully understand and share. Permit me first a few remarks on the general aspect of the situation.
I said in my letter of November 15th that in my opinion the character and fate of your Administration would be determined by its treatment of the civil service question. In repeating this I do not underestimate the importance of other subjects of public interest with which you will come into contact. But they are mostly subject to legislative action while the practical treatment of the civil service question is the business of the Executive and is, aside from the ordinary routine, likely to be its principal business during the first eight or nine months of the new Administration. The passage of the Government from one party to another is the decisive crisis of administrative reform. If it weathers that crisis successfully, it will live. If the American people have now a change of party in power in which the public interest is the only ruling motive and consideration, an example is set which will have almost the force of law to govern similar events in the future. The man who carries this through will be one of the greatest benefactors of the American people, and you have the opportunity of being that man.
In serving this great end you will at the same time do the best service to your party. There is a new confused migration of political forces going on. They are footloose and restless. Their party allegiance restrains them very little. Both parties, the Republican as well as the Democratic, have come out of the last campaign in a shape very different from that in which we knew them before. The Democratic party won under the banner of reform, aided by the most determined reform-elements coming from the Republican side. If the Democratic party, when in power, should drop that standard for the purpose of winning back the forces that strayed from it in the late contest, it would not fully succeed in accomplishing that purpose, while losing all its moral strength and also the support of the auxiliary forces which made its victory possible. The party now come to power must be a reform-party in order to live, for it is certain that the opposition, as long as out of power, will be the most watchful and vociferous advocate of reform ever seen. The Democrats are not a majority party now. But they can become a majority party if their policy satisfies those Independents and discontented Republicans who have been for some time longing for a new reform-party, that a new party is not needed. In other words, the Democratic party will have to be, in that sense, the new party itself. Then it will be the party of the future and as such in a situation to render very valuable service to the country.
Your own position is essentially the same. Your strength with the people consists in your character and reputation as a reformer, that is to say as a man whose honest purpose it is to put the administrative part of the Government upon a sound business basis. This is what the best part of the people expect you will do. If you succeed in this, your Administration will be voted a general success, although there may be mishaps in other directions. If you fail in this, your Administration will be judged generally a failure. In this one respect you will be closely watched by millions of eyes, and criticism will be sharp, for your past career and your professions of high principle have led the people to expect so much in this direction that every mistake of importance will be liable to be construed as a falling away from your original purpose.
This is one of the disadvantages of having started with a superior reputation. Whenever Arthur did a creditable thing, people would say: “He is after all a better man than we thought he was.” If you should do things not up to the mark, people will be apt to say: “He is after all not as good as we thought he would turn out to be.” And this is part of the material out of which public opinion is made. And public opinion is an important factor, especially when an Administration has to do things for the accomplishment of which it needs the support of public sentiment against a portion of its own party. That you will have a struggle with the spoils hunters in the Democratic party you are no doubt prepared for; and it will be not only with the spoils hunters themselves but with a good many otherwise well-meaning people who think that reform is an excellent thing in theory but should not be carried too much into practice. Your purpose, as I understand it, is, in the first place, faithfully to execute the civil service law in letter and spirit, and secondly, as to the offices not under the civil service law, to make no removals except for “cause,” that cause including cases of the abuse of official position for partisan purposes, and to be governed in your appointments by the interests of the service. This being in its nature executive business, you will have to bear the sole responsibility for it. The opposition to this policy on the part of officeseekers and dealers in patronage, especially Members of Congress, will therefore turn against you, and it can be disarmed only by a decided attitude on the part of the Administration, supported by public opinion, as it will be, if consistent.
If the character of this struggle depended upon your own fidelity and courage alone, I should feel no anxiety at all. But it does not. Neither does it depend upon the mere laying down by the President of certain principles of action. It depends upon the fidelity and energy with which those principles are carried out by the heads of the several Departments. I know from personal experience how the mill works, and that experience has convinced me that no President, however firm and courageous he may be, can succeed in the fight for systematic administrative reform, if he has to carry on the fight against his own Cabinet. More than that: he cannot succeed unless the Cabinet, at least the heads of the principal Departments, are substantially of the same mind with him and support him in good faith and with constant energy.
The problem, I repeat, cannot be disposed of by the mere proclamation of a certain policy. It presents itself in the shape of a multitude of individual cases, but few of which the President will be able to examine himself. A very large number of them, especially in the Post-Office Department, do not come before him at all. In most of the cases which do come before him, he will have to trust the heads of the respective Departments for the information on which he is to act, for the reasons why this man should be removed and the other man should be appointed, while he himself has to bear the responsibility. Now, my experience is that the great danger of a reform Administration consists in the inclination of those engaged in it to admit exceptions to their rules. As soon as this is done every case will be represented as an exceptional one upon all sorts of plausible pretexts; that by this removal or that appointment the party will be greatly strengthened in this or that locality, or the favor of this or that powerful interest can be propitiated, etc., etc. As these exceptions accumulate, the character and credit of the Administration go down and down until finally there is little left but the original good intentions.
In one word, if you want to have a reform Administration, you must have, at least at the head of the three great “patronage” Departments, the Treasury, the Post-Office and the Interior, men who understand reform as you do, who believe in it as you do, who are willing to fight for it as you are and who will not be swerved from their purpose by any political seduction, even if they should be prospective candidates for the Presidency—the severest trial to which the political virtue of a public man can be exposed. At least they should not be much below this standard; for if your Department-Chiefs look upon your reform policy as a mere amiable hobby to be humored for a while, and if they say to the politicians wanting patronage: “We should be glad to accommodate you, but you know the President has some singular notions in his head, and you must be patient”—your reform policy is doomed. You must be able absolutely to depend upon them as to their governing motives as well as their ability practically to deal with such things, and this requirement is most imperative just at the start, for then the pressure and the struggle will be severest and the character of your Administration will then virtually be determined.
On this point I cannot express myself too strongly, for I know from experience what I am speaking of. Neither will this matter admit of much experimenting. If you make any serious mistake in your first choice for the Cabinet, the consequences will make themselves felt immediately, for the call for decisive action is upon you at the very beginning. And, moreover, you will not find it as easy as might be imagined to get rid of a man who is once in your Cabinet.
There is another general point of view which I would commend to your consideration. It can hardly be expected that the starting of a new Administration should pass off entirely without accidental blunders. They will not hurt you much if you have the confidence of the country to such an extent that an occasional mistake will be ascribed to accident rather than to questionable motives. It must not be forgotten that you are a comparatively new man on the National field, not yet as well known and as confidentially trusted elsewhere as you are in this State. In this respect the impression produced by the general character of your Cabinet will be of great importance to you. It may win and strengthen confidence, or it may start suspicion and distrust. Your party, too, makes a sort of first appearance in the National Executive. Much depends upon the manner of that appearance. Your Cabinet will be its first introduction. Under such circumstances, it seems to me, you should have in that Cabinet only men well known to the American people, men of generally recognized standing and esteemed character. There should be none among them about whom any intelligent citizen would have occasion to ask: “Who is this man? Why was he selected for so important a place?” For, when such questions can be asked, others are certain to follow, such as these: “What are the influences that may have induced the President to select just him? Who are his friends, or what are the interests behind this man that were so potent with the President?” and so on. This would not be well; under existing circumstances it might be positively harmful, for such impressions sometimes go deep and last long, and they might endanger that confidence which you will need and which upon your own merits you would be certain to win.
Another consideration which is looked upon as important in the formation of a Cabinet is that of locality. Of course, no one section of the country ought to be designedly favored, but geographical reasons should after all not stand too much in the way of more important ones. The principal thing is the quality of the men. Of the four members of Washington's Cabinet two were from Virginia. In Jefferson's Cabinet there were for several months three men from Massachusetts, two of whom he kept. Grant's Cabinet had two men from Massachusetts at the same time, and, if I remember rightly, five of the seven members from States east of the Alleghany mountains. There is always some geographical grumble which, however, lasts only a day or two, while, if there is a well-founded grumble about the character or ability of a Cabinet Minister appointed perhaps just to satisfy geographical considerations, it lasts as long as he is in office. There seem to be certain superstitious notions, that the Secretary of the Navy should be from the seaboard, the Secretary of the Treasury from New York, the Secretary of the Interior from the West, etc., but such notions have really nothing in sound reason to support them and are usually urged only to bolster up certain candidates for the respective places. The only really important thing is to get the right men.
On the whole, if I were in your place, I would not be in a hurry. If by the middle of February you have finally made up your mind as to who shall be in your Cabinet, you will have done much better than a good many of your predecessors, some of whom had to make up their Cabinets in part after their inauguration. You certainly want time to inform yourself and to look at the problem from various points of view. I see from the papers that you have consulted Mr. Bayard, as Mr. Stetson told me you would, and I am glad of it, for it would be difficult to find anywhere a better man to consult.
I hope you have not misunderstood what I said to Mr. Stetson about the impracticability of my responding to your wish that I should visit you at Albany. I assure you it was not in any sense a question of pride with me, but merely one of expediency. I have no doubt you, as well as myself, would prefer to avoid the various interpretations which inevitably would follow such a visit. But I scarcely need tell you that I shall always be most sincerely glad to serve you with such suggestion or information as may come from me, and I highly appreciate that confidence on your part which calls them forth. There are matters of detail which it might perhaps be more convenient to talk than to write about, and I need not add that if an interview can be arranged in a manner not liable to the objections mentioned, I shall embrace the opportunity with very great pleasure.
This letter has grown much longer than I intended; but you are partly at fault yourself, having called for an expression of my views “at length.”—Very sincerely yours.