The passing of Korea/Chapter 12
CHAPTER XII
THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR
As a whole, the attitude of the Korean has always been a rational and consistent one as between Russia and Japan. He has a greater personal antipathy for the latter because they have come into closer contact; but there is a mysterious dread in his heart which warns him of the Russian. He will never say which he would rather have in power here, but always says, " I pray to be delivered from them both."
Japan began to urge upon the government the necessity of opening Yongampo to foreign trade, but Russia, of course, opposed this with all her powers of persuasion. Great Britain and the United States joined in urging the opening of the port. The United States had already arranged for the opening of the port of Antung, just opposite Yongampo, and for the sake of trade it was highly desirable that a port on the Korean side of the Yalu should be opened. It had no special reference to the Russian occupation of the port, but as pressure was being brought to bear upon the government to throw open the port, it was considered an opportune time to join forces in pushing for this desired end. And it was more for the interest of Korea to do this than for any of the powers that were urging it. Such an act would have been a check to Russian aggression, and would have rendered nugatory any ulterior plan she -might have as regards Korea. But the Russian power in Seoul was too great. It had not upheld the cause of Yi Yong-ik in vain, and the government, while using very specious language, withstood every attempt to secure the opening of the port. At last the American government modified its request, and asked that Wiju be opened ; but to this Russia objected almost as strongly as to the other. There can be little doubt that this uncompromising attitude of Russia on the Korean border confirmed Japan in the position she had already assumed. It was quite evident that the force of arms was the only thing that would make Russia retire from Korean soil.
All through the summer complaints came in from the north that the Russians were working their own will along the northern border, and taking every advantage of the loose language in which the agreement had been worded. Again and again information came up to Seoul that the Russian agents were going outside the limits specified in the bond, but there was no one to check it. It was impossible to police the territory encroached upon, and there is reason to believe that the government chafed under the imposition. At least the telegraph lines which the Russians erected, entirely without warrant, were repeatedly torn down by emissaries of the government, and apparently without check from the central authorities.
In the summer, when the text of the proposed agreement between Russia and Korea anent Yongampo became public, the Japanese government made a strong protest. She probably knew that this was a mere form, but she owed it to herself to file a protest against such suicidal action on the part of Korea. The insolence of the Russians swelled to the point of renaming Yongampo Port Nicholas.
In October the Japanese merchants in Seoul and other commercial centres began calling in all outstanding moneys, with the evident expectation of war. All brokers and loan associations closed their accounts and refused to make further loans. It is more than probable that they had received the hint that it might be well to suspend operations for the time being. From this time until war was declared, the people of Korea waited in utmost suspense. They knew war only as a universal desolation. They had no notion of any of the comparative amenities of modern warfare or the immunities of non-combatants. War meant to them the breaking up of the very foundations of society, and many a time the anxious inquiry was put as to whether the war would probably be fought on Korean soil or in Manchuria. Once more Korea found herself the " shrimp between two whales," and doubly afflicted in that whichever one should win she would in all probability form part of the booty of the victor.
The year 1904, which will be recorded in history as one of the most momentous in all the annals of the Far East, opened upon a very unsatisfactory state of things in Korea. It had become as certain as any future event can be that Japan and Russia would soon be at swords' points. The negotiations between these two powers were being carried on in St. Petersburg, and, as published later, were of the most unsatisfactory nature. Japan was completing her arrangements for striking the blow which fell on the Qth of February. Of course these plans were not made public, but there was conflict in the very air, and all men were bracing themselves for the shock that they felt must soon come. The action of Japanese money-lenders in suspending operations was followed in January by the Korean pawnbrokers, and at a season when such action inflicted the greatest possible harm upon the poor people of the capital, who find it impossible to live without temporarily hypothecating a portion of their personal effects. This, together with the excessive cold, aroused a spirit of unrest which came near assuming dangerous proportions. Some of the native papers were so unwise as to fan the embers by dilating upon the hard conditions under which the Koreans laboured. Their sharpest comments were directed at the government, but their tendency was to incite the populace against foreigners.
All through the month the various foreign legations were bringing in guards to protect their legations and their respective nationals, and this very natural and entirely justifiable action was resented by the government. It protested time and again against the presence of foreign troops, as if their coming were in some way an insult to Korea. The officials in charge thereby showed their utter incompetence to diagnose the situation correctly. It was well known that the disaffection among the Korean troops in Seoul was great, and that the dangerous element known as the Peddlers' Guild was capable of any excesses. The unfriendly attitude of Yi Yong-ik and Yi Keun-tak towards western foreigners, excepting Russians and French, together with their more or less close connection with the Peddlers, was sufficient reason for the precautionary measures that were adopted. But the native papers made matters worse by ridiculing both the government and the army. At one time there was considerable solicitude on the part of foreigners, not lest the Korean populace itself would break into open revolt, but lest some violent faction would be encouraged by the authorities to make trouble, so little confidence had they in the good sense of the court favourite. It was fairly evident that in case of trouble the Japanese would very soon hold the capital, and it was feared that the violently proRussian officials, despairing of protection at the hands of Russia, would cause a general insurrection, hoping in the tumult to make good their escape. It was felt that great precautions should be taken by foreigners not to give any excuse for a popular uprising. The electric cars diminished their speed so as to obviate the possibility of any accident, for even the smallest casualty might form the match which would set the people on fire.
About the 2Oth of January the report circulated that Russia had proposed that northern Korea be made a neutral zone and that Japan exercise predominant influence in the south. This was only an echo of the negotiations which were nearing the breaking point in St. Petersburg, and it confirmed those who knew Japan in their opinion that war alone could settle the matter. On the following day the Korean government issued its proclamation of neutrality as between Russia and Japan. This curious action, taken before any declaration of war or any act of hostility, was a pretty demonstration of Russian tactics. It was evident that in case of war Japan would be the first in the field, and Korea would naturally be the road by which she would attack Russia. Therefore, while the two were technically at peace with each other, Korea was evidently induced by Russia to put forth a premature declaration of neutrality in order to anticipate any use of Korean territory by Japanese troops. At the time this was done the Foreign Office was shorn of all real power, and was only the mouthpiece through which these friends of Russia spoke in order to make their pronouncements official. It was already known that two of the most powerful Koreans at court had strongly urged that Russia be asked to send troops to guard the imperial palace in Seoul, and the Japanese were keenly on the lookout for evidences of bad faith in the matter of this declared neutrality. When, therefore, they picked up a boat on the Yellow Sea a few days later and found on it a Korean bearing a letter to Port Arthur asking for troops, and that, while unofficial in form, it came from the very officials who had promulgated the declaration of neutrality, it became abundantly clear that the spirit of neutrality was non-existent. It must be left to the future historian to declare whether the Japanese were justified in impairing a declared neutrality that existed only in name, and under cover of which the Korean officials were proved to be acting in a manner distinctly hostile to the interests of Japan.
All through January the Japanese were busy making military stations every fifteen miles between Fusan and Seoul. All along the line small buildings were erected, sufficiently large to house twenty or thirty men. On the 22nd of January General Ijichi arrived in Seoul as Military Attache of the Japanese Legation. The appointment of a man of such rank as this was most significant and should have aroused the Russians to a realising sense of their danger; but it did not do so. Four days later this general made a final appeal to the Korean government, asking for some definite statement as to its attitude toward Russia and Japan. The foreign office answered that the government was entirely neutral. Two days later the Japanese landed a large amount of barley at the port of Kunsan, a few hours' run south of Chemulpo, and a light railway of the Decauville type was also landed at the same place. On the 20th all Korean students were recalled from Japan.
On the 1st of February the Russians appeared to be the only ones who did not realise that trouble was brewing, otherwise why should they have stored fifteen hundred tons of coal and a quantity of barley in their godowns on Roze Island in Chemulpo harbour on the 2nd of that month? On the 7th the government received a despatch from Wiju saying that several thousand Russian troops were approaching the border, and that the Japanese merchants and others were preparing to retire from that place. The same day the foreign office sent to all the open ports ordering that news should be immediately telegraphed of any important movements.
The Japanese legation
Having arrived at the point of actual rupture between Japan and Russia, it is necessary, before entering into any details of the struggle, to indicate the precise bearing of it upon Korea. Japan has always looked upon Korea as a land whose political status and affinities are of vital interest to herself, just as England once looked upon the Cinque ports, namely, as a possible base of hostile action, and therefore to be carefully watched. One of two things have therefore been deemed essential, either that Korea should be thoroughly independent or that she should be under a Japanese protectorate. These two ideas have animated different parties in Japan and have led to occasional troubles. There is one radical faction which has consistently and persistently demanded that Japan's suzerainty over Korea should be established and maintained, and it was the unwillingness of the Japanese authorities to adopt strong measures in the peninsula which led to the Satsuma Rebellion. Another large fraction of the Japanese, of more moderate and rational view, are committed to the policy of simply holding to the independence of Korea, arguing very rightly that if such independence is maintained and the resources of the country are gradually developed, Japan will reap all the material advantages of the situation without shouldering the burden of the Korean administration or meeting the violent opposition of the Koreans, which seizure would inevitably entail. It is this latter policy which has prevailed, and according to which Japan has attempted to work during the past three decades. It is this which actuated her during the period of China's active claim to suzerainty and at last caused the War of 1894, which supposedly settled the question of Korea's independence. But following upon this came the encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and the adoption of a vigorous policy in Korea. Japan's efforts to preserve the intrinsic autonomy of Korea were rendered abortive partly through mistakes which her own representatives and agents made, but still more through the supineness and venality of Korean officials. The subjects of the Czar at the capital of Korea made use of the most corrupt officials at court, and through them opposed Japanese interests at every point. Furthermore, they made demands for exclusive rights in different Korean ports, and succeeded in encroaching upon Korean sovereignty in Yongampo. The evident policy of Russia was to supplant Japan in the peninsula, and no reasonable person can fail to see that it was their ultimate plan to add Korea to the map of Russia. The cause of the war was, therefore, the necessity laid upon Japan of safeguarding her vital interests, nay, her very existence, by checking the encroachments of Russia upon Korean territory.
But before submitting the matter to the arbitrament of the sword, Japan exerted every effort to make Russia define her intentions in the Far East. With a patience that elicited the admiration of the world she kept plying Russia with pertinent questions, until at last it was revealed that Russia intended to deal with Manchuria as she wished, and would concede Japanese interests in southern Korea only, and not even this unless Japan would engage not to act in that sphere as Russia was acting in Manchuria.
All this time the Japanese people were clamouring for war. They wanted to get at the throat of their manifest foe; but their government in a masterly way held them in check and kept its own secrets so inviolable as to astonish the most astute diplomatists of the day. At last, when the hour struck, Japan declared for war without having weakened the enthusiasm of her people, and without giving occasion to adverse critics to say that she had yielded to popular importunity. When she communicated to Russia her irreducible minimum, one would think that even the blind could see that war was certain to follow soon. But even then, if there is any truth in direct evidence, the great majority of the Russians laughed the matter aside as impossible. The moderation and self-control of Japan was counted to her for hesitation, so that when the moment for action came, and Japan sprang upon her like a tigress robbed of her whelps, Russia cried aloud that she had been wronged. Already on the morning of the 7th Baron Rosen's credentials had been handed back to him in Tokyo. The evening before this the Japanese Minister had left St. Petersburg. This in itself was a declaration of war, but forty hours elapsed before Japan struck the first blow. During those hours Russia had ample time in which to withdraw her boats from Chemulpo, even though the Japanese refused to transmit telegrams to Seoul. A fast boat from Port Arthur could easily have brought the message.
It was on the 6th and 7th that reports circulated in Seoul that the Japanese were landing large bodies of troops at Kunsan or Asan or both. These rumours turned out to be false, but beneath them was the fact that a fleet was approaching Chemulpo. The question has been insistently asked why the Russian Minister did not inform the commanders of these Russian vessels, and see to it that they were clear of the harbour before these rumours were realised. The answer as given is that the Russian Minister had no control over these boats. They had their orders to remain in Chemulpo and they must stay. One would think that there would be at least enough rapport between the civil and military (or naval) authorities to use the one in forwarding the interests of the other.
Even yet the Russians did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation; but they decided that it was time to send notice to their authorities in Port Arthur of what was rumoured at Chemulpo. So the small gunboat Koryetz made ready to move out. Her captain, Belaieff, proposed to the Russian Consul that the Russian steamship Sungari, which was in port, should go with the Koryetz and thus enjoy her protection, but the agent of the company which owned the steamship strongly objected to her leaving the neutral port at such a time. He evidently realised in part the acuteness of the situation. So the Sungari remained at her anchorage and the Koryetz steamed out of port at two o'clock in the afternoon. Now, the harbour of Chemulpo is a somewhat peculiar one, for in one sense it is landlocked and in another it is not. It is formed by islands between which there are many openings to the open sea, but most of these are so shallow that ships of medium draught do not dare attempt them.
There is but one recognised entrance, and that is from the southwest, or between that and the south. This entrance is several miles wide, and in the centre of it lies Round Island. When the Koryetz arrived at the exit of the harbour, she suddenly found herself surrounded by torpedo-boats. The only witnesses of what occurred at this point are the Japanese and the Russians, and we can only give their accounts. The Russians say that the Japanese launched four torpedoes at the Koryetz, and when within ten feet of her side they sank. Another statement is that a shot was fired on board the Koryetz, but it was a mere accident. The Japanese claim that the Koryetz fired first. If we try to weigh the probabilities it seems impossible that the torpedoes of the Japanese should have missed the Koryetz if the torpedo-boats were as near as the Russians claim. On the other hand, the admission on the part of a single Russian that the first gun was fired on the Koryetz, even though by accident, is rather damaging, for it is more than singular that an accident should have happened at that precise time. It is a tax on the credulity of the public to give this lame excuse.
In any case it makes little difference who began the firing. The Japanese had already seized the Russian steamer Mukden in the harbour of Fusan, and the war had begun. The Japanese doubtless held with Polonius, that if it is necessary to fight, the man who strikes first and hardest will have the advantage. The Koryetz turned back to her anchorage and the Russians became aware of the extreme precariousness of their position. Whatever attitude one may take toward the general situation, it is impossible not to extend a large degree of sympathy to these Russians personally. Through no fault of their own they were trapped in the harbour, and found too late that they must engage in a hopeless fight in order to uphold the honour of the Russian flag. But even yet it was not sure that the neutrality of the port would be ignored by the Japanese. Lying at anchor among neutral vessels in a neutral harbour, there was more or less reason to believe that they were safe for the time being.
About four o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th of February, which fell on Monday, three Japanese transports entered Chemulpo harbour from the south, convoyed by cruisers and torpedoboats. They seemingly took no notice of the two Russian boats lying at anchor, and were evidently sure that the Russians would not fire upon the transports. It would be interesting to know whether the Japanese were relying upon the declared neutrality of the port in thus venturing, or whether they felt sure that their own superior strength would keep the Russians still, or whether, again, they were certain that the Russians had orders not to fire the first gun. But it is bootless to ask questions that can never be answered. Here is where the assailant has the advantage. He can choose the time and method of his attack. We may surmise that, had the Russians divined the intentions of the Japanese and had foreseen the outcome, they would have acted differently, but divination of Japanese intentions does not seem to be Russia's strong point.
As soon as the Japanese came to anchor, preparations were made for the immediate landing of the troops, and the cruisers and torpedo-boats that had convoyed them in left the port and joined the fleet outside. This fleet consisted of six cruisers and several torpedo-boats. The Asama and the Chiyoda were the most powerful of the cruisers, the former being nearly half as large again as the Variak.
Night came on, and throughout its long hours the Japanese troops, by the light of huge fires burning on the jetty, were landed and marched up into the town. When morning came, everyone was in a state of expectancy. If there was a Japanese fleet outside, they doubtless had other work on hand than simply watching two Russian boats. Nor could they leave them behind, for one of them was Russia's fastest cruiser, and might steam out of the harbour at any time and destroy Japanese transports. Knowing, as we do now, that an immediate attack on Port Arthur had been decided upon, we see that it was impossible to leave these Russian boats in the rear. Japan had never recognised the neutrality of Korea, for she knew that the declaration was merely a Russian move to embarrass her, and she never hesitated a moment to break the thin shell of pretence.
About ten o'clock a sealed letter was handed to Captain Rudnieff of the Variak. It was from the Japanese Admiral, and had been sent through the Russian Consulate. It was delivered on board the Variak by the hand of Mr. N. Krell, a Russian resident of the port. This letter informed the Russian commander that unless both Russian boats should leave the anchorage and steam out of the bay before twelve o'clock the Japanese would come in at four o'clock and attack them where they lay. Captain Rudnieff immediately communicated the startling intelligence to Captain Belaieff of the Koryetz and to the commanders of the British, American, French and Italian war-vessels. We are informed that a conference of the various commanders took place, and that the Russians were advised to lie where they were. The British commander was deputed to confer with the Japanese. This was done by signal, and it is said that a protest was made against the proposed violation of neutrality of the port and that the neutral boats refused to shift their anchorage. But all complications of this nature were avoided by the determination of the Russians to accept the challenge. This they deemed to be due their flag. It is not improbable that they now foresaw that the neutrality of the port would not avail them against the enemy. By remaining at anchor they could only succeed in involving France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States, and there would be sure to be those who would charge the Russians with cowardice. If this was to begin the war, it must at least prove the dauntless courage of the servants of the Czar. So the commander of the Variak ordered the decks cleared for action. It has been stated that he would have preferred to have the Koryetz stay at her anchorage, for by a quick dash it was just possible that the swift Variak alone might be able to evade the Japanese and run the gauntlet successfully. But the commander of the Koryetz refused to listen to any such proposition. If the only honour to be gotten out of the affair was by a desperate attack, he was not going to forego his share of it. He would go out and sink with the Variak. So the Koryetz also cleared for action. It was done in such haste that all movables that were unnecessary were thrown overboard, a topmast that would not come down in the usual manner was hewn down with an axe, and by half-past eleven the two vessels were ready to go out to their doom. It was an almost hopeless task an entirely hopeless one unless the Japanese should change their minds or should make some grave mistake, and neither of these things was at all probable. The Russians were going to certain destruction. Some call it rashness, not bravery, but they say not well. The boats were doomed in any case, and it was the duty of their officers and crews to go forth and in dying inflict what injury they could upon the enemy. To go into battle with chances equal is the act of a brave man, but to walk into the jaws of death with nothing but defeat in prospect, is the act of a hero, and the Japanese would be the last to detract from the noble record that the Russians made. Time has not yet lent its glamour to this event, we are too near it to see it in proper proportions, but if the six hundred heroes of Balaclava, veterans of many a fight, gained undying honour for the desperate charge they made, how shall not the future crown these men who, having never been in action before, made such a gallant dash at the foe? And herein lies the intrinsic damnableness of war, that causes which will not stand the test of abstract justice can marshal to their support the noblest qualities of which men are capable.