The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter VII

by Émile de Kératry

 

CHAPTER VII.

Fatal Decree of October 3—Its real Bearing—Empress Charlotte'! Letter—Decay of Mexican Resources—Inaction of Mexican Officials and consequent Disasters—Extent of French Occupation—Statement of the National Army.

NOW comes on to the stage the famous decree of October 3, 1865, which has cost so many tears. It is deeply important to establish its real origin, as well as its exact import. We must, first of all, say that there is cause for painful surprise that the ministers who countersigned this decree, and subsequently abandoned Maximilian in order to take refuge in France, have not as yet raised their voice to defend the memory of the sovereign who himself conceived and signed this fatal bando; for in full council, and from the very lips of the emperor, they had learnt the truth.

As soon as the news that Juarez had crossed the frontier at Paso del Norte reached Mexico, there was great joy at the palace. The army then held all the strong positions. The disappearance of the republican chief afforded a hope of an abatement of hostilities on the part of the so-called liberal party, now driven into a corner and left without a head. Maximilian, who believed that he was the bonâ fide choice of a people wearied out with disorder and turmoil, felt a pride in his regenerating character, and flattered himself that the Juarists were completely overthrown, and that by paying honour to the vanquished party, he should deal a decisive blow against the rebellion, which would henceforth be countenanced by none but bands of brigands. He then brought before his council the project of offering Juarez the presidency of the supreme court, and his own sincere desire of rallying round him all the illustrious men in the country.

As a means of opening negotiations, he drew up the decree of October 3. At the beginning of this decree, he laid it down that the republican cause had lost its last support, and the preambles were a homage paid to the character of Juarez. As to the decree itself, it certainly was only directed, in the intention of the emperor, against those persons whose only aim was to shelter their brigandage under the republican flag. This fatal decree, the original minutes of which may be consulted, was written entirely by Maximilian's own hand, although he had a secretary at his side. All the ministers who countenanced the idea affixed their signatures to it. The marshal alone did not sign it. Before investing it with any official character, Maximilian thought it right to consult the marshal. The answer returned from our head-quarters was that, in the first place, the preamble so flattering to the president (who was opposed by France as an enemy) appeared to be directed against the intervention; also, that, apart from this painful interpretation, the decree itself was useless, as courts-martial were acting which had the guarantee of the cognisance of the French officers; besides, that it was impolitic, because it rendered Mexicans amenable to Mexicans, and that all the odium in it would fall upon the person of the sovereign, whose most precious attribute was the right of mercy and pardon. The emperor, with the entire approbation of his five ministers, persisted in his original idea—that of attaching Juarez by this public declaration emanating from the throne,—and took no notice of the above remonstrance. At the last moment, the commander-in-chief, whose duty it was as head of the two armies to execute the decree, asked and obtained the addition of an article fining any hacenderos convicted of having taken care of and concealed the arms and horses of the rebels.

This decree of October 3, which was about to rekindle the civil war by gratifying private malice, was the suicide of the monarchy, led away, as it was, by chivalrous illusions and by the traditions of civilised countries. Juarez, who had never abdicated his rights, repulsed any overture of reconciliation, and the ostracism directed against the 'outlawed republicans' caused a great sensation in the United States, where it stirred up anger against a prince and princess who were, in fact, generous to an extreme. For, many a time, outbursts of feeling on the part of the imperial family, whose good faith it was easy to beguile, had injuriously curbed the justice of our courts-martial. Such is the history of this fatal day's work, which must no longer continue to be a stain on the memory of the noble victim of Queretaro.

There was a moment, at the birth-time of the empire, when a part of the population, as much from weariness of disorder as from spontaneous sympathy for the new sovereigns, was inclined to make an earnest trial of a monarchy. This precious moment vanished away, ere the crown, for want of an initiative spirit, knew how to profit by it. The following letter, written by the Empress Charlotte, an intelligent and large-hearted princess, who had taken an active part in the direction both of political and military affairs, shows clearly that too little value was set upon the Indian element, and also manifests the decided feeling of the crown not to allow the Mexican treasury to be ruined, in the conviction that the French finances would provide for everything. This letter proves also that palace intrigues, hostile to the French officers, had been fermenting round the throne since the beginning of the monarchy.

Mexico, September 16, 1864.

General,—My opinion is asked on the subject of the enclosed letter, but, as it has to do with generals, I want in the first place to know your opinion. For my part, I believe it is nothing but an intrigue which proves the very contrary of that which is sought to be shown.

Be kind enough to give me the requisite information, and send me the paper after you have read it, for M. Velasquez wishes me to give him an answer to-morrow.

It will fall upon you to deal with various questions with which we are occupied in the council. The most important is the pacification of the Sierra. The prefect of Talancingo has some ideas about it which are not bad. It seems to me that by sending some detachments to a fixed post, and some others to make expeditions, good results will be produced. Only in this case, I would ask you to give me notice, so that the civil authorities may arrange measures to co-operate with yours in helping on the undertaking.

If it were possible to arrange beforehand certain movements, keeping them in the meantime as secret as possible, I think it would produce great results, and the passage of the troops might be followed by some kind of organisation.

As for the Indians who are desirous to defend themselves against the Plateados, you must tell me if you think that it is necessary to provide them with arms. This sort of thing begins to get too frequent, and as for money, the government have resolved not to give any to anyone.—Believe, general, &c., Charlotte.

I hope that you know all about the army for the 16th, and also that it will be reviewed as soon as I return to the palace, and before the reception of the authorities. You did not give me any memorandum as to it on Sunday.

In two months the reorganisation of the Mexican army, laboriously carried out by the French authorities, was again endangered by the government itself. As to the political and departmental management, it appeared in a deplorable state. The ministerial delays, extending even to personal questions and the forwarding of orders, had allowed even the best-disposed districts to fall back into their original apathy. The difficulty was to choose men who were capable of inspiring confidence. No stimulus seemed to excite them, and patriotism had not yet woke up. No one among the imperial party gave any thought to save the commonwealth in spite of the noble example of personal self-denial, set by the imperial family. Wherever the French were numerous, they came in contact with authorities who were either unfavourably disposed or unprovided with proper instructions. In a word, all the trouble fell on our officers, who found themselves compelled, in the interests of the country, to gradually make preparations against every contingency. Disgusted also at seeing functionaries slumbering in disgraceful carelessness, or discrediting and discouraging publicly those of their countrymen, who still clung to the empire as a means of safety, our officers ended by taking in hand the most trifling business in the various localities where they were carrying on their military duties. The fear was lest everything should drift away down the flood of insurrection which had taken its source from the American frontier, and was now rolling down from north to south.

It will not do to impute to Maximilian the responsibility of all the decay through which the empire was about to succumb; money, the sinews of war, was already deficient. As the French government had resolved, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, opposed by public opinion, to found a firm dynasty in Mexico, was it not wrong in having paid to its ally only forty millions out of two enormous loans—loans by which it had realised, through its own receivers-general, the sum of five hundred millions lent by imprudent subscribers who had been allured and then deceived? Was it not from the very outset a mere ushering into the world a still-born kingdom? Our minister of foreign affairs was kept too well informed, by the reports emanating from our head-quarters, to be able to deceive himself as to the real situation of Mexico. Yet, with a policy full of inconsistency, the cabinet of the Tuileries allowed its work to crumble away from the first beginning, by refusing to it the resources which were indispensable. At the end of 1865, the Mexican treasury was getting very low, and the bad financial administration stimulated an increase of the deficit, which, however, could never have been made up by the strictest control; for the receipts, even if they had been regularly collected, would not have exceeded ninety millions of francs, whilst, without noticing the sinking fund, the expenses swallowed up one hundred and fifty millions at least. Never, however, was the want of money more stringently manifested.

Certain military positions on the shores of the Pacific were no longer tenable. Among other places, the climate of Acapulco had exercised so deadly an influence on the French force who defended this port that the commandant, D'Assas, was compelled to propose the formation of a battalion recruited on the coast of Tehuantepec among the natives, who were accustomed to the tropical sky. Further away, Parras justly demanded reinforcements; for this industrious place had given an example, alas too rare, of energy and self-sacrifice which, if it had been generally followed, would have saved the empire. The inhabitants of this town had voluntarily taxed themselves to the amount of about eighteen thousand piastres, to raise a troop of 400 men; and this was done at the instigation of an energetic prefect. They now found themselves at the end of their resources, and their soldiers were consequently disbanded, leaving the inhabitants exposed to the reprisals of the liberals. The minister of war, not being well informed, questioned the authenticity of this disquieting news which had reached the emperor. The evidence was, however, too strong when the cries of distress sent up from this part of the territory made their way to Mexico.

The marshal, seeing the full necessity of protecting these towns on the Pacific, as important places both in a military and commercial point of view, ordered our fleet (whose devotion was put to a cruel test in these dangerous waters) to provision Manzanillo, so that our men-of-war might be able to take advantage of their voyages along the coast from Manzanillo to Acapulco, to bring food, meat, and medicines to the garrison. As to Parras, the head-quarters authorities, being desirous of relieving the population, caused four free companies to be raised, and consented that their pay should be guaranteed by the French treasury, as an advance. No opportunity was lost of helping any of the energetic inhabitants. But there was a just limit which our commander-in-chief was not entitled to pass. For, unless he betrayed his duties as a Frenchman, he was obliged to regard the safety of his soldiers as well as the wishes of the imperial family. Now, article 2 of the treaty of Miramar, which Maximilian had signed in full knowledge of the facts, stipulated that, after the throne had been taken possession of, 'our expeditionary corps should be reduced to an effectif of 25,000 combatants, including the foreign legion.' Moreover, this number was to be still further reduced in proportion as the Mexican troops became organised.

In contradiction to this double clause, the French army had always been above the number of 28,000 men, notwithstanding the return to Europe of the brigade of General Lhériller. Besides, this brigade, which only consisted of about 4,000 fighting men, was succeeded by the Austrian legion, 8,000 bayonets strong; the forces were thus increased, instead of being diminished. But yet the marshal could not, even with this force, occupy effectively an extent of about eighteen hundred leagues, and thus abandon weak French detachments to all the hazards of desertion and want. These, however, were the tactics to which the Emperor Maximilian was inclined, whose tendencies to scattering the military forces did not cease to show themselves; to have yielded to them would have been to overlook the share of responsibility which would fall on our head-quarters in case of any check.

The city of La Paz, the capital of Lower California, is situated about 500 leagues from Mexico, and any communication with this distant point presented very great difficulties. Nevertheless, it was occupied in 1865 by the interventionary forces, who only left after they had assisted in the political and military organisation of the country. This city, after the departure of our forces, again pronounced in favour of the Juarists. When Maximilian heard the news, he wrote as follows to the commander-in-chief:—

Mexico, December 17, 1865.

Marshal,—I have just learned that a counter-revolution has broken out at La Paz, and that the imperial authorities have been obliged to leave. This revolt has been effected by about a hundred men.

Although the political importance of Lower California maybe inconsiderable, this counter-revolution will produce the very worst effect on public opinion both in the United States and in Europe, by giving rise to the idea that, so far from pacifying the country, we are, on the contrary, losing territory. I therefore desire to know if it will not be possible to send to La Paz a French company whose presence in the port will suffice to re-establish order and preserve this province to the empire.—Your very affectionateMaximilian.

How could we leave an isolated company, at such a great distance from the centre of action, at a time when the French were already occupying Acapulco, Guaymas, and Mazatlan on the Pacific, and Matamoros, Tampico, Vera Cruz, Alvarado, Sisal, and Campeachy on the Gulf, all dangerous and unhealthy posts, where even the Mexican troops did not stay for long? It must be understood also that, although financial resources began to diminish to an extent which caused anxiety, the Mexican minister of war could not plead as an excuse for the insurrectionary movements, which were now assuming a decided shape, that he was in want of soldiers to oppose to the rebels; the fact was that he either left the troops unemployed or did not know how to employ them effectively. Tranquillity was insured in every place which saw the gleam of the French bayonet. A glance at the official and veracious list of the forces which the empire had at its disposal at this time—critical by the curtailment of our expeditionary corps—will suffice to prove their adequacy.

On December 31, 1865, the Mexican army reckoned in its ranks—without mentioning a considerable and well-furnished body of artillery—of the national troops (including regulars and the temporary and municipal troops), 35,650 foot soldiers, horsemen, and artillerymen, with 11,073 horses. Of foreign troops—Belgians, 1,324; Austrians, 6,545, with 1,409 horses. This makes 12,482 horses, and an effective military force of 43,520 men.

A force like the above, assisted by the French, was capable, as we have seen, of ensuring the triumph of the empire if only its managers had remained on good terms with one another and full of energy. But, to use the just language of the minister of state—'God had not ordained it.'