Thompson v. White Water Valley Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

132 U.S. 68

Thompson  v.  White Water Valley Railroad Company

From the above brief statement of the case, it is clear that the decree of the court below must be affirmed. The claims of the complainants, whatever validity and force may be given to them as liens upon the earnings of the section of road from Cambridge City to Hagerstown, between the parties agreeing to such liens, are entirely subordinate to the rights of the bondholders under the mortgage of the White Water Valley Railroad Company, executed for their benefit to trustees on the 1st of August, 1865. That mortgage was made before the claims of the complainants had any existence. It covered the entire property of the company then owned by it, including its line of railway from Hagerstown, in Wayne county, to Harrison, in Dearborn county, and all property appertaining to the road which it might afterwards acquire. The validity of mortgages of that character by railroad companies upon property which may be subsequently acquired is not an open question now. It has been affirmed by adjudications of the highest courts of the states, as well as by this court. Indeed, in a majority of cases, mortgages by such companies upon their roads and appurtenances have been executed for the purpose of raising the necessary means to construct the roads; and sometimes, indeed, when the lines of such roads had only been surveyed. In Railroad Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459, 481, there were several deeds of trust which in terms covered afteracquired property, each of which was similar in its character to the one in this case; and the court held that they estopped the company, and all persons claiming under them, and in privity with them, from asserting that they did not cover all the property and rights which they professed to cover. Said the court: 'Had there been but one deed of trust, and had that been given before a shovel had been put into the ground towards constructing the railroad, yet if it assumed to convey and mortgage the railroad which the company was authorized by law to build, together with its superstructure, appurtenances, fixtures, and rolling stock, these several items of property, as they came into existence, would become instantly attached to and covered by the deed, and would have fed the estoppel created thereby. No other rational or equitable rule can be adopted for such cases.' See, also, Porter v. Steel Co., 122 U.S. 267, 283, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1206, and cases there cited. The decision in the case of Railroad Co. v. Cowdrey also covers the only plausible position of the complainants,-that they have a lien upon the earnings of the section because with their moneys the road over it was constructed. But the work was not done at the request of the mortgagees, but upon a contract with the lessee of the road, which had stipulated, as one of the considerations of the lease, to construct that part of the line. With those contractors the bondholders, secured by the mortgage of August 1, 1865, had no relations, and incurred no obligation to them. In the case cited, it was contended that priority should be given to the last creditor for aiding to conserve the road. But the court answered that this rule had never been introduced into our laws, except in maritime cases, which stand on a particular reason; that, by the common law, whatever is affixed to the freehold becomes part of the realty, except certain fixtures erected by tenants, which do not affect the question; and that the rails put down upon the company's road become a part of the road. Here the same rule applies; and not only the rails, but those permanent fixtures which are essential to the successful operation of the road, become a part of the property of the company, as much so as if they had existed when the mortgage was executed. The doctrine that a vendor, not taking security for the price of realty sold by him, holds in equity a lien upon the property for such price, is not controverted, but it has no application to the present case. The only right which the complainants possessed was that which was recognized by the decree,-a right to redeem the property from the sale under the mortgage; a right which they were allowed to exercise within a specific period,-but, they declining to do so, the bill was properly dismissed. Decree affirmed.

Notes