Treatise of Human Nature/Index
INDEX.
Explanation of signs used.
[Methods], [Wollaston]—words are placed in square brackets which are not actually used by the author: thus Wollaston is not referred to by name.
26 f.=page 26 and following pages.
The references have been grouped under sections and sub-sections simply for convenience of reference: the sections do not correspond to any divisions in the Treatise, and have nothing to do with Hume's own sections.
because invariable by art or praise, and so naturally neglected by politicians, 609.
Abstract—ideas, 17 f.; abstraction does not involve separation, 18, 43; illustration from idea of space, 34; and time, 35; abstract idea of power, 161; of existence, 623.
Accession—and property, 509 f.
Accidents—fiction of, 222.
Action—thought cannot be described as an action any more than as a modification of the soul, 245-6 (c£ 632-3); internal actions opposed to external objects, 465; all actions artificial, 475.
Actions—and truth; actions 'original facts and realities complete in themselves,’ and 'cannot be pronounced either true or false, nor be either contrary or conformable to reason,' 458 (cf. 415); except in an improper sense as obliquely caused by or causing a false judgment, 459.
Actions—and will (v. Will, Necessity)—constant union between motives and actions produces inference from one to the other, in spite of the acknowledged capriciousness of human actions, 401 f., 411, 632-3 (cf. 575); necessity of any action not a quality in the agent, but a determination of the mind of a spectator, 408; actions more voluntary than judgments, but we have no more liberty in the one than in the other, 609.
Actions—merit of, only exists so far as they proceed from something constant and durable in a man, from a character, and thus requires the doctrine of necessity, 411, 575 (cf. 632); only character and actions capable of exciting the peculiar pleasure which is called virtue, 471; 'when we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them;' 'actions are only signs of certain principles in the mind and temper,' the external performance has no merit. 477; we blame a man for not doing an action, as not being influenced by the proper motive of that action, 477; 'the first virtuous motive which bestows a merit on any action can never be a regard to the virtue of that action.' 478; 'no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality,' 479; intention in the agent necessary to morality in the action, 461 and n.
Agent—necessity of an action no quality in the agent, 408 (cf. 632); intention in the agent, 461.
[Agreement]—method of, 300, 301, 311.
Allegiance—v. Government, 539 f.
Ambition—an inferior species of, 300.
Analogy—a third kind of probability, 142, 147; leads us beyond experience, 209; feeling of belief can only be explained by analogy with other feelings, 624.
Ancient—philosophy, 219 f.
Anger—and benevolence, 366; not all angry passions vicious: detectable in form of cruelty, 605.
Animals—reason of, inferred from resemblance of their actions to our own, 176; man superior to animals chiefly from superiority of his reason, 326, 610; theories of mind to be tested by their power of explaining actions of mind in animals and children and common people, 177 (cf. 325); ordinary actions of, imply inference based on experience and belief; 178; identity which we attribute to mind of man like that which we attribute to plants and animals, 253 f.; 'sympathy of parts' of animals to a common end, 257; pride and humility oi, 324, due to same causes as in men, 326, 327; have no sense of virtue and vice, and incapable of relations of right and property, 326; sympathy observable through whole animal creation, 363, 398; love and hatred of, 397; little susceptible of pleasures or pains of imagination, 397; possess will and direct passions in same way as men, 448; animals have no morality, therefore morality cannot consist in a relation: illustration from incest, 468.
Appearance—and existence and reality are for the senses identical, 188 f.; all sensations are felt by the mind as they really are, 189; 'all actions and sensations of the mind must necessarily appear in every particular what they are and be what they appear, 190 (cf. 385, 417, 583, 603, 632); the distinction between appearance and existence due to imagination, 193 f.; we could have no language or conversation 'did we not correct the momentary appearance of things and overlook our present situation,' 582; the appearance of objects to the senses requires to be continually corrected by redaction, 603, and by general rules framed by the understanding, 632.
A priori—a priori anything may be produced by anything, 247; no connexion necessary a priori, 466; a priori argument about modesty, 571.
Arguments—long, reduce proofs to probabilities by diminishing vivacity, 144; except in history where the links are of the same kind, 146.
Artifice—political, not the sole cause of the distinctions we make between vice and virtue, 500, 521, 533, 578.
Artificial—opposed to 'natural' in case of education, 117, and justice, 310 (cf. 474 f.); artificial=result of design and intention; hence all actions artificial, 475, 529; =result of intervention of thought or reflection, 484; artifice=a remedy provided by Nature in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections, 489, 496; artificial opposed to natural virtues, 475, 577, 580; though justice arises artificially yet it does so necessarily, and is not arbitrary, 483-4; the three fundamental laws of Nature, however necessary, are entirely artificial, 536; though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural, 619.
Assent—to any opinion depends entirely on a felt strong propensity to consider anything strongly in a particular light, 265 (v. Belief, Scepticism).
Association—of ideas, by imagination guided by certain principles or qualities of ideas, viz. Resemblance, contiguity, and causation, 11 f., though these are not the infallible nor the sole causes of a union among ideas, 92; impressions associated only by resemblance, 283; association of ideas gives rise to no new impression, and so to no passion, 305, but it assists the passions by forwarding the transition between related impressions, 306; the associations between ideas and impressions assist one another, 284, as in the double relations of impressions and ideas in pride, 286; association-attraction, 289; physiological explanation of, 60; complex ideas called relations, modes, and substances, the result of association, 13; succession to property assisted by it, 513; probability or presumption the result of imperfect association, 130.
Atheism—Spinoza's, the same as the doctrine of the immateriality, indivisibility, and simplicity of a thinking substance, 240 f., 244.
Attraction—mental, compared to natural: its causes inexplicable, 13.
Barrow—cit. 46.
Beauty—pleasure not only its necessary attendant, but its essence: nothing but a form which produces pleasure, 299; natural and moral, 300; can there be a right or a wrong taste in beauty? 547 n: involuntary, 608; derived from sympathy, 364; sense of, produced by sympathy with the pleasure of a possessor in his possession: hence we find beauty in every thing useful, 576; but a thing is still beautiful though actually useful to nobody, 584; sentiments of beauty like those of morals arise either immediately from 'the mere species and appearance' or from reflection on the tendency of things to produce happiness, 590.
Belief (v. Scepticism).
§ 1. The vivacity of a Perception, 86; a strong and steady conception of any idea, 97 n, 101, 103, 116, 119; 'vivacity' distinguished from 'clearness,' since there is as clear an idea of the object in disbelief as in belief but in belief the idea is conceived in a different manner, 96; the force or strength of an idea distinguished from the agitation it produces in the mind: hence the difference between poetry and history, 631 (cf. 419); vivacity not the only difference between ideas: ideas really feel different, 636 (cf. 629); vivacity of impression not the test of truth nor the only source of belief, 143, 144; thus philosophical differs from unphilosophical probability. because it corrects vivacity by rejection and general rules, 146 f., 631.
§ 2. Is a lively idea produced by a relation to a present impression, 93, 97, 98, 209, 626, which relation is produced by custom, 102; belief arises only from causation, not from resemblance and contiguity, 107, though assisted by their presence and weakened by their absence, 113.
§ 3. Belief weakened by a long argument. 144: this a remedy of scepticism, 186 (cf. 218), 268; exception in case of history, 146, and morals, owing to their peculiar interest, 455: imperfect belief the direct result of an imperfect habit or the indirect result of a divided perfect habit, 133 f.; belief which attends probability a compounded effect, 137; unphilosophical probability, 146 f.
§ 4. Belief in existence of an object which arises from relation of cause and effect is no new idea attached to the simple conception of the object. 623 (cf. 66 f.); (a) it is not the idea of existence attached to the idea of the object, for we have no abstract idea of existence, 623; (b) it is not an idea at all: if it were, a man could believe what he pleased, since the mind has the command over all its ideas. 624 (cf. 184); belief is 'merely a certain feeling or sentiment' which depends not on the will, and which alone distinguishes fact from fancy. 624, 153; it is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures, 183 (cf. 103), and is not a simple act of thought, 184. But it is not a feeling or impression distinguishable from the conception, for (a) there is no distinct impression which attends every distinct conception of matter of fact, 625; (b) a vivid idea accounts for everything; (c) the cause of the firm conception explains all there is to be explained, 626; (d) the influence of a firm conception on the passions accounts for all effects of belief, 625 (cf. 119); the feeling which distinguishes belief from conception is only a firmer conception, 627; vagueness of terms, force, vivacity, solidity, firmness, steadiness, 629.
§ 5. Belief in existence of body (g.v.), 187; continued existence of perceptions not only supposed but believed, aog; belief whether in senses and imagination or in reason never justifiable; carelessness and inattention the only remedy for sceptical doubt, 218 (cf. 186, 268, 146, 632).
§ 6. Influence of belief on the passions, 119, 625, on imagination, e.g. in poetry, no; reaction of imagination on belief, 123.
Benevolence.
§ 1. A calm desire or passion, 417; 'strictly speaking, produces good and evil, and proceeds not from them,' 439.
§ 2. Conjoined with love by the 'original constitution of the mind,' by 'nature,' by an arbitrary and original instinct: but 'abstractedly considered' this conjunction is not necessary; there is no contradiction in supposing love joined to a desire of producing misery, 368; an instinct originally implanted in our natures like love of life and kindness to children, 417, 439.
§ 3. 'No such passion in human minds as a love of mankind merely as such, 481; man in general not the cause but the object of love and hatred, 482; public benevolence not the original motive to justice, 480, nor private benevolence, 482; 'strong extensive benevolence' would render justice unnecessary, 495; we must only expect a man to be useful in his own sphere, 602.
§ 4. The merit of benevolence depends on our possession of a fixed unalterable standard by which we praise and blame, 603; love immediately agreeable and hatred painful to the person actuated by it, hence we praise the passion which partakes of the former and blame that which partakes of the latter, 604; the transition from love to love peculiarly easy, hence the peculiar merit of benevolence in all its shapes and appearances, 605; not praised from prospect of advantage to self or others, 604.
Berkeley—theory of abstract ideas, 17.
Body.
1. Its real nature undiscoverable, only its external properties knowable, 64; power and necessity not qualities of bodies but of perceptions, 166.
§ 2. A. ''Tis vain to enquire whether there be body or not: that is a point we must take for granted in all our reasonings,' 187. But why do we believe in the existence of body? i.e. (a) why do we attribute continued existence to perceptions when they are not present to the senses? (b) why do we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception? 'the notion of external existence when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions' is absurd, 188 (cf. 66 f.) The sense can never give rise to the opinion of a continued and distinct existence. 189-193; nor the reason: therefore Imagination must be the source, 193; it is only to certain perceptions we attribute continued existence, 192, and we do so not because of their involuntariness and vivacity but because of their peculiar constancy ar: coherence, 194-197; confusing coherence with continuance, 198. and constancy or resemblance at different times with identity, 199-204; supporting this by the further supposition of distinct existance, 205; a supposition which does not imply any contradiction to the nature of the mind and which we believe, 209; though it is contrary to the plainest experience, 210.
B. To avoid this 'difficulty philosophers distinguish between perceptions and objects, which view retains all the difficulties of the vulgar view, together with some peculiar to itself, 211-213; it ascribes the interruption to perceptions, the continuance to objects. 215; 'tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or our senses-either to accept or reject the continued and distinct existence of perceptions, that is, of body, 218.
C. Our idea of a body admitted to be nothing but a collation of sensible qualities which we find constantly united, and this compound we regard as simple and identical, though its composition contradicts its simplicity and its variation its identity, 219; to avoid these contradictions imagination has feigned an unknown, invisible, and unintelligible something called substance or matter, 220; but 'every quality being a distinct thing from another, may be conceived to exist apart, and may exist apart, not only from every other quality, but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance,' 222; 'the whole system is entirely incomprehensible, and yet is derived from principles as natural as any of those above-explained,' 222.
§ 2. The modern philosophy by its distinction between primary. and secondary qualities, instead of explaining the operations of external objects annihilates them and reduces us to the most extravagant scepticism concerning them, 228; if colours, sounds, etc., be merely perceptions, there remains nothing which can afford us a just and consistent idea of body, 229 (cf. 192); there is no impression from which the idea of body can be derived—not touch, 'for though bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is quite a different thing from the solidity, and they have not the least resemblance to each other,' 230; there is a direct opposition between arguments from cause and effect and arguments which persuade us of the continued and independent existence of body, 231 (cf. 266.)
Calm—passions, to be distinguished from weak, 419 (cf. 631), confounded with reason, 417, 437 (cf. 583).
Cartesian—argument on power or efficacy, 159; argument to God, 160.
Cause.
§ 1. Impressions the cause of ideas because constantly conjoined with and prior to them, 5; one object the cause of another when it produce either the actions and motions or the existence of the other, or when it has a power of producing it, is (cf. 172).
§ 2. Cause and etfcct a quality of ideas producing association, 11, 101; causation associates ideas but not impressions, 283; a natural as well as a philosophical relation, 15, 94; definitions of cause as a natural and philosophical relation, 170; property a particular species of causation, 310, 506.
§ 3. Causation a relation which is a source of probability (cf. 124, 153) discovered by reasoning, because 'the mind goes beyond what is immediately present to the sense,' 73 (cf. 103, 141); it is the only relation which 'inform us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel,' 74.
§ 4. The origin of our ideas of causation to be found in some impressions, 74 (cf. 165); but there is 'no one quality which universally belongs to all beings and gives them a title' to be called causes: therefore the idea must be derived from some relation among objects, 75; now the relations of contiguity (cf. 100) and succession in time are essential to that of causation, 76 (but relation of causation exists between taste or smell and colour of a fruit because they are inseparable, though coexistent in general and also contemporaneous in their appearance in the mind, 237, 238); also the relation of 'necessary connexion,' 'for an object may be contiguous and prior to another without being considered as its cause,' 77 (cf. 87); but it is impossible to discover directly the impression from which the idea of necessary connexion is derived, 77.
§ 5. [Law of Causation.] So we ask indirectly (a) why a cause is always necessary, i.e. 'why it is necessary that everything whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause,' 78 f., 157 (cf. 172); this is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain, 79; it is not contradictory or absurd to separate the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, 80; weakness of Hobbes' and Clarke's demonstration of necessity of a cause, 80, of Locke's argument, 81, of the argument from cause and effect being correlative, 82; this opinion therefore based on 'observation and experience,' 82; this leads to the further question (b) 'why we conclude that such particular causes have such particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to the other,' 82.
§ 6. A. The argument from effect to cause requires somewhere an impression of the senses or memory, 83 (cf. 97), or of the imagination, which in some cases produces belief; which is only the vivacity of a perception, 85, 86; it is only by experience that we can pass from the impression to the idea: when we consider the constant conjunction of two objects in a regular order of succession and contiguity, 'without further ceremony' we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other, 87 (cf. 102, 149, 153); but constant conjunction can never give rise to any new idea such as necessary connexion, it only gives rise to an inference: does this inference give rise to necessary connexion? 88 (cf. 155, 163).
B. [Uniformity of Nature.] This inference or transition from impression to idea does not arise from experience through reason, for that would require the principle of the uniformity of nature, viz. that the future will resemble the past, which is provable neither demonstratively, 89, nor probably, for probable reasoning itself assumes the principle, 89 (cf. 104, 105, 134); nor can we justify the inference by arguments from production, power, or efficacy: such arguments either circular or have no end 90 (cf. 632). Thus even when experience has informed us of the constant conjunction of two objects' 'tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason why we should extend that experience beyond those particular instances which have fallen under our observation,' 91 (v. § 7. B).
C. The inference then depends solely on the union of the ideas in the fancy by three general principles—resemblance (97, cf. 168); contiguity (100, cf. 168); and causation, 92 (cf. 101, 109), which = 'habitual union in the imagination,' 93; thus causation as a natural relation is the basis of causation as a philosophical relation, 94, cf. 11, 15, 101, 170 (v. § 7. C.).
§ 7. A. [Belief.] The conclusion of all reasoning from cause and effect is a belief (q. v.) in the existence of an object, which is the same as the idea of the object, only conceived in a different manner. 96 (cf. 34, 37, 153, 623); this manner='with additional force or vivacity:' a belief='a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression' by means of custom, 97 (cf. 102), the impression communicating to its related idea a share of its own force or vivacity, 98; there is nothing in the whole operation but 'a present impression, a lively idea, and a relation or association in the fancy between the impression and the idea,' 101; experimental proof of this, 102: thus 'all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation,' thus (cf. 132, 141, 149, 173 f.), 405-6, 458.
B. Inference from past experience does not imply reflection on it, still less 'the formation of any principle concerning it,' such as that of the uniformity of nature, 104 (v.§ 6. B.); but in some cases reflection on past experience 'produces the belief without the custom,' or rather 'produces the custom in an oblique and artificial manner, e. g. in discovering a particular cause by one experiment, 104; but in this case custom has already established the principle 'that like objects placed in like circumstances will always produce like effects' (cf. 89, 90, 134), and this habitual principle 'comprehends' the connexion of the ideas which is not habitual after one experiment, 105.
C. Belief arises only from causation, 107; custom and the relation of cause and effect give our ideas as much reality as those of the memory and senses—indeed, realities may be divided into two classes—the objects of the memory and the senses, and the objects of the judgment, e.g. the idea of Rome, 108; the effect of the relations of contiguity and resemblance when single is uncertain, for they can be feigned arbitrarily and are subject to caprice, whereas custom is unchangeable and irresistible, 109; in arguments from cause and effect we employ principles of imagination, which are permanent, irresistible, and universal, 225 (cf. 231, 267); the objects presented by the relation of cause and effect are 'fixed and unalterable,' the mind cannot hesitate or choose the idea to which it shall pass from a given impression, 110 (cf. 175, 461 n, 504); still resemblance and contiguity augment the vivacity of any conception, III f.; the want of resemblance especially weakens belief and overthrown what custom has established, 114.
D. Two kinds of custom, q. v. one indirectly giving vivacity to an idea by producing an easy transition from an impression, the other directly introducing a lively idea into the mind and so producing belief, 115; this done by education, 116, which, however, is an artificial and not a natural cause, and so not regarded by philosophers as an adequate ground of belief, 'though in reality it be built on almost the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects, 117 (cf 145 f.); education 'a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion,' 118.
E. Reasoning from causation is able to operate on our will and passions (q. v.), 119; as belief excites the passions so the passions excite belief; 120; a lively imagination, madness, and folly influence the judgment and produce belief by enlivening the ideas just as completely as inference and sensation, 123; causation where united with contiguity and resemblance produces sympathy, 318, 320; an action 'obliquely' caused by a judgment, 459; reason can never cause a passion but is perfectly inert and inactive, 458, 415-416 (cf. 103).
§ 8. [Probability] A. Arguments from cause and effect not probable in the ordinary sense of the word, since they are free from doubt and uncertainty though based on experience, 124; two kinds of probability, one founded on chance, the other on causes, 124.
B. Chance, the negation of cause,=total indifference or absence of determination in thought; all chances equal, 125; the calculation or combination of chances implies a mixture of causes among the chances, 126; the question, 'how is a thing probable?'=the question what is the effect on the mind of a superior number of equal chances? 127; the vivacity of thought or the original impulse to come to a conclusion is split up into a number of impulses, and the probability of chances is the victory of one combination of there separate impulses over all others, 129; 'what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and concealed cause, 130.
C. i. Probability of causes=(a) imperfect experience-i.e. a habit of transition not yet complete, (6) assurance modified by contrariety in experience, (c) uncertainty or contrariety of events not due to contingency in the causes but to the secret operation of contrary causes, 'since the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary,' 132 (cf. 404, 461 n); this contrariety results in a hesitating belief, (a) by weakening our habit of transition, 132; (b) indirectly, by dividing and afterwards joining in different parts that perfect habit which makes us conclude that instances of which we have no experience must necessarily resemble those of which we have,' 135 (cf. 105); probability 'a superior vivacity arising from the concurrence of a superior number of views,' 137; it is that amount of vivacity which remains when you have subtracted the vivacity produced by an inferior number of experiments from that which is produced by a superior number, 158.
ii. Two great principles of all arguments from causation. (a) no object in itself can afford a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it, (b) constant conjunction of objects affords us no reason for drawing an inference concerning any objects beyond those of which we have experience, 139; the belief that a certain future event will occur derived from an operation of the fancy which extracts from the balance of experiments a single lively idea, 140; but a voluntary repetition of experiments does not produce this lively idea since 'these separate acts of the mind are not united by any common object producing them,' 140, ch xxii, xxiii; the minute differences in probabilities not felt, e.g. the difference between ninety-nine and one hundred experiments: our preference of the greater number based on general rules, 141, cf. 146, 173 (but cf. 103).
iii. Analogy, a third kind of probability of causes, where the resemblance of the present object to one of the objects conjoined is weak, and the transition correspondingly weak, 142.
D. Unphilosophical probability=(a) diminished assurance resulting from a diminished vivacity of the related impression owing to time or distance: such difference in degree of evidence not admitted as solid or legitimate, otherwise the force of an argument would vary from day to day, 143; we are also the victims of such probability when (b) we allow ourselves to be more influenced by a recent than a remote experiment, 143; (c) by a short and simple argument than by a long and complicated one, 144 (cf. 185); (d) when we are prejudiced and led into analogical reasoning by general rules, 146 f.; does belief thus 'consist only in a certain vivacity conveyed from an original impression,' or is it something different from that vivacity 145 (cf.§ 7 A, B.); [legitimate belief=vivacity justified by reflection and general ruler, 146 f. (cf. 173)] though general rules give rise to prejudice and false reasoning yet they are their only remedy, for by general rules we distinguish in an antecedent between essential and accidental circumstances: this distinction generally attributed to the judgment and the confusion to the imagination, though both judgment and imagination are the slaves of custom, 149; 'when we find that an effect can be produced without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoined with it,' 149 (cf. 87, 248).
E. The several degrees of assurance or belief are (a) that of 'knowledge' or 'demonstration' (b) that of memory, (c) that of 'judgment,' derived from the relation of cause and effect, arising from perfectly constant conjunction of two objects and exact resemblance of the present object to one of them, 153; (d) that of probability, in all cases of which there is less vivacity, for whatever reason it may be, and so less assurance, 154 (cf. § 7).
§ 9. [Idea of necessary connexion or Power, 155 f.]
A. The idea of power or efficacy not derived from reason nor any single experience, 156: account given by Locke, 157, Malbranche, 158, the Cartesian, 159, the proper result of whose speculation is that we have no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object, 160; the idea cannot be derived from any unknown quality of matter, 160; we can have no general idea of power if we have no particular idea of it, 161; so we have no clear idea of power as belonging to any object or being: when we talk of it we only use words without any determinate idea, 162 (cf. 172, 311); we have no idea of any being endowed with power, still less with infinite power, 149; idea of power not copied from feeling of energy in our own mind and so transferred to matter, 632.
B. Only the multiplicity of resembling instances can produce the idea, and even this can only do so indirectly, for the repetition does not discover anything new in the related objects, 163; nor does it produce anything new in them, 164; but it does produce a new impression in the mind which is the 'real model' of the idm of power, viz. 'a determination to pass from an object to its usual attendant,' which is an 'impression of reflection,' 165 (cf. 155, 74, 77).
C. Thus 'necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects,' 165; just as the necessity by which twice two=four 'lies only in the act of understanding by which we compare these ideas.' Power and necessity are qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, not perceived externally in bodies, 166 (cf. 408); propensity of the mind to 'spread itself on external objects,' 167; we are driven by our nature to seek for an efficacious quality in objects, which yet really lies only in ourselves, 266; still the operation of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning, e.g. the contiguity, succession and resemblance of objects 'is independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding,' 168; 'the uniting 'principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects,' 169 (cf. 636).
Two definitions of cause, 170.
§ 10. Corollaries: (a) all causes are of the same kind—no distinction between efficient, formal, etc., nor between cause and occasion (in pride and love we distinguish between the quality which operates, the subject in which it is placed, and the object, 379, 185, 330), (cf. 174, 504); (b) only one kind of necessity—no distinction between physical and moral necessity: also no medium between chance and an absolute necessity, 171 (cf. § 8. C.); the distinction between power and the exercise of it invalid, 172 (cf. 12); but admissible in morals, 311 (v. Power); (c) no absolute or metaphysical necessity that every beginning of existence should be attended by a cause, 172 (cf. § 5); (d) 'we can never have any reason to believe that an object exists of which we cannot fonn an idea,' 172.
§ 11. Rule by which to judge of causes and effects, 173 f. (cf. 146); anything may produce anything,' i.e. 'when objects are not contrary nothing hinders them from having that constant conjunction on which the relation of cause and effect totally depends,' and only existence and non-existence are contrary, 173-341; 'the same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause: this principle we derive from experience,' 173 [methods of induction, 174]; 'an object which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect,' 174; these rules easy to invent, but hard to apply, especially in morals, where the circumstances are very complicated, and where many of our sentiments are 'even unknown in their existence,' 175 (cf. 110); difficult to distinguish the chief cause out of a number, 504; no multiplicity of causes in nature, 282, 578; uncertainty and variety of causes in the natural world, 461 n (cf. 110).
§ 12. Matter the cause of our perceptions, 246 f.; no reason a priori why thought should not be caused by matter: though there appears no manner of connexion between motion or thought, the case is the same with all causes and edects, 247; matter actually is constantly conjoined with thought and is different from it, and so may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception, 248; a dilemma, showing that we must be content to regard all constantly conjoined objects as causes and effects, otherwise there can be no such cause as God, 248-9 (cf. 149).
§ 13. In plants and animals we suppose 'a sympathy of parts to a common end,' and 'suppose that they bear each other the reciprocal relation of cause and effect,' 259; the mind a system of different perceptions which mutually produce, destroy, and influence one another, 261; the notion of causation or a chain of causes which gives rise to personal identity derived from memory, 261; but it is possible to extend the chain of causes beyond memory, 262.
§ 14. Will (v. Necessity), 400f.; will only a cause, and like other causes has no discoverable connexion with its eilects, 632; in case of actions we have often to suppose contrary and concealed causes, 404, 461 n (cf. 132); the necessity of any action is not a quality in the agent, but a determination of the mind of a spectator, 408 (cf. 166).
Ceremonies—their influence on imagination, 99.
Certainty (v. Probability, Cause, § 8); only four out of seven philosophical relations are objects of knowledge (q. v.) and certainty, 70 (cf. 81, 87, 104); results from experience in arguments from cause and effect, 124 (cf. 153); in particular points not to be denied himself by the sceptic, 273 (v. Scepticism).
Chance—(v. Cause, 5 8) excluded by constant conjunction, 4; and probability, 124 f.; the negation of cause and=total indifference: hence all chances equal, and probability consists in a superior number of equal chances, 125; this combination of chances implies a mixture of cause among the chances, 126; what is the effect of a superior combination of equal chances on the mind, so as to produce belief or assent? 127; each chance=an impulse of the mind, the original impulse being divided into as many impulses as there are chances, 129; probability of chances=the superior vivacity of any superior combination of these impulses, 130; what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and concealed cause, 130; no medium between chance and necessity, 171; 'liberty of indifference'=chance, 407-8 (cf. 125); rules of stability of property depend largely on chance, 514.
Character—possibility of inferring actions from character, 400 f.; something durable and constant in man which gives his actions moral quality, 411 (cf. 477); only character and actions capable of exciting the peculiar pleasure which we call virtue, and that only when 'considered in general,' 472; actions only virtuous as the sign of some quality or character; it must depend on durable principles of the mind which extend over the whole conduct and enter into the personal character, 575 (cf. 349); it is the effect of the character of a person on those who have any intercourse with him which causes our moral sentiments, 582; it is almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article, 608 (v. Identity, § 4).
Chastity—and modesty, 570 f.; their obligation extended by general rules, 573; less obligation to male chastity because less interest, 573.
Choice—'will or choice,' 467.
Civil—opposed to 'natural,' 475 n, 543.
Clarke—on cause, 80.
Cleanliness—611.
Coherence—of our sensations a source of the fiction of their continued existence, 195 f.; =the regular dependence of the changes of our perceptions on one another, 195; of pleasures 'of a somewhat different kind' to that of other impressions, 195; does not lead us to attribute continued existence to our passions, but only to such perceptions as motion, solidity, figure, &c.; we cannot explain the regularity of certain of our perceptions without imagining their continued existence, 196-7; this coherence works through custom, but 'indirectly and obliquely'—i.e. by exciting the propensity of the imagination to continue in the path in which it is travelling and to complete the observed partial uniformity into a complete uniformity, 198 (cf. 237); an irregular kind of reasoning from experience, e.g. coherence enables us to discover relations between objects as opposed to perceptions, 242.
Common—natural, 549.
Comparison—the function of reasoning, 73; men always judge objects more by comparison than from their intrinsic worth or value, 372-5; must be with members of the same species, 378; illustration from history and arts, 379; directly contrary to sympathy in its operation, 593; sympathy requires greater vivacity in the idea than suffices for comparison, 595.
Composite nature of all bodies, 219.
Conception—all acts of understanding, whether reasoning, judgment, or belief, resolvable into conception, 97 n; always precedes and conditions understanding, 164; conception of an object distinguished from belief in its existence only by the greater firmness of the latter, 624, 627.
Conquest—a title to government, 558.
Conscience—or 'a sense of morals,' is 'an active principle of which Reason can never be the cause,' 458; (v. Moral, § 1).
Consent—not the basis of government (q.v.), 542 f.; dwelling in its dominion: not consent to a government, 549.
Constancy—of our impressions a source of the fiction of their continued existence, and afterwards of their distinct existence, 199 f.; constancy of impressions=their resemblance at different times, 199; this resemblance leads us to mistake a succession of related objects for an identical object, as also does the resemblance between the act of mind in contemplating a succession, and the act of mind in contemplating an identical object, 204.
Constant Conjunction—v. Cause.
Contiguity—a relation essential to the idea of causation, 75; an impression enlivens an idea to which it is related by contiguity, 100, 110; not a source of belief as causation is, 107; a relation in 'nature,' independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168; associates ideas, but not impressions, 283.
Its influence on the imagination or fancy, 109; leads to violation of laws of justice and necessitates government, 535; contiguity between cause and object of pride is necessary to produce pride, 304; when united with causation and resemblance produces sympathy, 318, 320; its influence on the passions, 417 f.
Contrariety—a source of relation, 15; one of the four demonstrable relations, and perceived by intuition, 70, 464.
Only obtains between existence and non-existence, 173; no real objects are contrary, 247; pride and humility directly contrary, and annihilate one another, 378: also love and hatred, 330; contrariety of passions results (a) in alternation; (b) mutual destruction; (c) mixture, 441.
In experience produces probability, 131; clue to secret operation of contrary causes, 131, 404.
Convention—to bestow stability on possessions, 489; not a promise, only a general sense of common interest, which sense all the members of the society express to one another,' like that of two men rowing the same boat, 490; convention without promise the source of language, 490; a promise unintelligible before human conventions, 516; convention creates a new motive in the case of a promise, 51:; a source of natural as well as civil justice, 543.
Cooperation—increases man's power, 485.
Copernicus—natural philosophy before, 282.
Courage—duty of largely enforced by artifice, 573.
Cruelty—detestable, 605.
Curiosity—pleases because it produces belief, and removes uneasiness of doubt, 453.
Custom.
§ 1. 'We call everything custom which proceeds from a past repetition without any new reasoning or conclusion'; it operates before we have time for reflection, and is 'a secret operation,' 104.
§ 2. The source of the general representativeness of abstract ideas. 20.
§ 3. (v. Cause, § 7) determines us to pass &om the impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, 97, 170; produced by reflection ' in an oblique and artificial manner, 'in the case of an inference after one experiment, 105 (cf. 197); assures us of the principle of the uniformity of nature, 105, 134; there is a 'full and perfect habit' to transfer the past to the future, 155; scepticism confirms the view that all reasonings from cause and effect are founded on custom, 183 (cf. 140).
Two kinds of, one indirectly producing a vivid idea and belief, the other directly, e.g. education, 116; but the latter an artificial, and not a natural cause, and so regarded by philosophers as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, 117; nor does a voluntary repetition of experiments produce a proper custom. 140.
An imperfect habit a direct source of probability, 130; (v. Cause § 8 C.); a perfect habit divided an indirect source. 133 f., it is 'broken into pieces and diffused' by contrary experience, and reunited afterwards by the concurrence of experience, 135.
A source of unphilosophical probability, and also its only remedy, 146 f; in the form of general rules (q. v.) influences judgment even contrary to present observation and experience, 147; hence causes an opposition between imagination and judgment.
§ 4. (v. Body) the argument from the coherence of our perceptions to their continued existence based on custom, but still is quite different from our arguments from cause and effect, for 'this inference arises from the understanding and custom in an indirect and oblique manner, 197 (cf. 105, 133); no regularity of our perceptions can lead us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects which are not perceived, for this supposes a contradiction, via. 'a habit acquired by what was never present to the mind,' 197, 'this extension of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the cooperation of some other principles,' viz. those of imagination, 198.
§ 5. 'Readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings,' 293; gives us a good opinion of ourselves, because the mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects to which it is accustomed,' 355.
Has great power to increase and diminish passions; has two original effects on the mind: produces a facility in performance or conception. and afterwards a tendency or inclination, 422; facility when too great converts pleasure into pain, 415; increases all active habits, but diminishes passive, 414; source of relation of present possession as a title to property, 503.
Decorum—612.
Definition—of cause, 179; of simple impressions impossible, 277, 319, 399.
Deliberate—distinction between deliberate and casual actions implies doctrine of necessity, 412.
Delivery—symbolical, in transfer of property, (q. v.) 575.
Demonstration—and probability, 31; mathematical demonstrations, 42, 166, not properly demonstrations because founded on inexact ideas, 45 f; implies absolute impossibility of the contrary, 161 (cf. 166); the rules of demonstrative science certain and infallible but faculties liable to err in their application, 180; discovers proportions of ideas considered as such, 448; four demonstrable relations—Resemblance, contrariety, degree in quality, proportions in quantity or number, 464; no matter of fact capable of being demonstrated, 463.
Regards abstract relations of ideas: its province is 'the world of ideas,' while will places us in that of realities: thus demonstration and volition are totally removed from each other, 413; only indirectly influences our actions, 414; why demonstration pleases, 449; opinion 'that morality is susceptible of demonstration,' criticised—no one has ever advanced a single step in this demonstration, 463.
Design—to be inferred in actions of animals, 176; on the part of a person assisting or injuring us increases our love or hatred, because it points to certain qualities in him 'which remain after the action is performed,' and by which we are affected through sympathy, 348-9; all actions artificial as performed from design, 475.
Desire—a direct passion, 438 (cf. 278, 514); arises from good considered simply, 439; 'the mind by an original instinct seeks to unite itself with the good and to avoid the evil, though they be conceived merely in idea, and be considered as to exist in any future period of time,' 438; desire of harm to enemies and happiness to friends, lust, hunger, &c., are direct passions which 'arise from a natural impulse and instinct which is perfectly unaccountable': 'these passions strictly speaking produce good and evil and proceed not from them like the other affections,' 439.
Attends love and hatred, and distinguishes them &om pride and humility which are pure emotions in the soul, 367.
Calm desires often confused with reason, 417; such are benevolence, love of life, kindness to children, which are 'instincts originally implanted in our nature:" also 'the general appetite to good and aversion to evil considered as such,' 417; (cf. 438); calm passions often determine the will in opposition to the violent; ''tis not the present uneasiness alone which determines men:' strength of mind is prevalence of the calm passions over the violent, 418 (v. Passion, § 3).
Difference—a negation of relation: has two kinds, 15; different, distinguishable, separable by thought or imagination—relation of these terms, 18; methods of, and agreement, 300, 301, 311.
Direct—passions (q. v.), 278, 438.
Direction—parallel directions of impressions a source of relation between them: thus pity and benevolence related not by their sensations but by their directions. 381, 384, 394; direction of passions altered by convention, 492, 521, 526.
Distance—discovered rather by reason than senses, 56, 191; not known by angles of rays of light, 636, 638; two kinds of, 59; distance and difference, 393; its influence on the passions, 427 f.
Dogmatism—and scepticism, (q. v.) 187.
Drama, 115; dramatic unity, 122.
Duty v. Obligation, moral.
Education—a kind of custom directly producing belief, 116; an artificial cause and so a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, 117; and moral distinctions, 295: assists interest and reflection in producing moral approbation of justice, 500.
Efficacy—of causes (q.v. § 9), 156; idea of not derived from reason. 157; but from an immersion, 158 f.; of second causes, 160.
Efficient-causes not distinguishable from formal, &c., 171 (v. Cause. § 10).
Eloquence, 611.
Emotion—some emotion accompanies every idea and every object presented to the senses, 373, 393; hence when the emotion increases we imagine that the object has also increased, 374; this explains how objects appear greater and less by comparison with others, 375.
End—supposition of a common end of parts assists notion of identity of an object, 257.
Envy, and malice, 372, 377.
Equality—of lines, &c., difficulties of, 45 f.; perfect equality a fiction, 448.
Error—physiological explanation of, 60 f.; resemblance the most fertile source of, 61; illustration from case of vacuum, 62; the source of error where we mistake resembling impressions for an identical object is their resemblance, 202; whatever ideas place the mind in the same or similar dispositions are apt to be confounded, 203; the acts of mind in contemplating an identical object and a succession of related objects are very similar, 204, 254 f.; all except philosophers imagine that 'those actions of the mind are the same which produce not a different sensation: 'hence calm desires confounded with reason, 417 (but cf. 624, 627); confusion of liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, 408; confusion between the impression of morality and an idea, because it is soft and gentle, 470; due to the employment of the weak, changeable and irregular principles of the imagination instead of the permanent, irresistible and universal, 215; obscurity of our ideas our own fault and remediable, 72; discovered by philosophers who abstract from the effects of custom and compare ideas, 223: results from use of general rules and yet can only be corrected by them, 146-149 (v. Cause, § 8. D); does not constitute vice, whether it is caused by or causes an action, 459 f.; mistakes of fact not criminal, 459; mistakes of right not source of immorality, but imply an antecedent morality, 460.
Essential and accidental circumstances in an antecedent confused by imagination and distinguished by judgment by aid of general rules, 148, 149 (cf. 173)
Esteem—for rich and powerful, 357 f., mainly derived from sympathy rather than expectation of advantage, 361 (cf. 616); love and esteem, 608 n.
Evidence—moral and natural, 404, 406 (v. Cause, § 11).
Exemplary—cause, 171.
Exercise—distinction between exercise and possession of power (q. v.) frivolous, but holds a place in the philosophy of our passions, 511, 360 (cf. 12, 172).
Existence.
§ 1. Whatever appears impossible on comparison of certain ideas must be really impossible, 39; of an idea proved by our talking about it, 32 (but cf. 62); 'whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence,' 32; reality of objects of mathematics proved by our possession of a clear idea of them, 43 (cf. 52, 89); 'real existence and matter of fact,' opposed to 'relations of ideas,' 458, 463 (cf. 413); the idea of the existence of an object is the same as the idea of the object, 66 (cf. 94, 153, 623); 'any idea we please to form is the idea of a being and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form,' 67 (cf. 189, 190); idea of external existence as something specifically different from ideas and impressions impossible, 67 (cf. 188): only a 'relative idea' of external objects possible, 68; we have no abstract 'idea of existence and so belief in existence of an object is not the conjunction of the idea of existence to the simple conception of the object. 623. (v. Belief, § 4. 5, Cause, § 7. A).
§ 2. Idea of continued and distinct existence of perceptions (q. v.) not derived from the senses, 188-192, for to the senses there is no distinction between appearance (q. v.) and existence, 189; 'all actions and sensations of the mind must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear,' 190; not derived from reason, 193; but from imagination, which leads to the distinction between appearance and existance, to the idea of continued existence and distinct existence, 194-209, to conceal the contradictions in which suppositions, philosophers have invented the idea of 'double existence' and distinguish between that of objects (q.v.) and that of perceptions, 211; but it is impossible to argue from existence of impressions to that of objects, 212; but this system is the 'monstrous offspring' of two contrary principles, 213; modern philosophy, basing its proof of existence of body on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, renders that existence impossible. 226 f.; all our perceptions may exist separately and have no need ol anything to support their existence, 232 (v. Mind, § 1).
'Existential judgments do not imply union of two ideas, 96 fr.
Expectation—explains distinction between- power and the exercise of it, 313 (v. Cause § 9. B).
Experience—opposed to knowledge and scientific reasoning, 82 (cf. 157): its nature illustrated, 87; the basis of inference, 87; yields certainty in arguments from cause (q.v., § 7. B) and effect, 124 (cf. 623); imperfect and contradicted experience yields probability, 131; contrariety in, due to secret operation of concealed causes, 132; no justification of inference to objects beyond our experience, 139; contrasted with a 'voluntary act of imagination,' experience being united by a 'common object producing them,' while experiments are not, 149; experience and idea of efficacy, 157 f.
Experiment—valid inference after a single experiment, 105 (v. Cause § 7. B); by means of principle of uniformity of nature, 131; 'in arguing to the future every past experiment has the same weight, and 'tis only a superior number of them which can throw the balance on any side, 136; concurrence of experiments 'increases the vivacity of a view,' 138 (cf. 140).
Extension.
§—29 f. a number according to the common sentiment of metaphysicians, 31; consists of indivisible parts, because the idea of such an extension implies no contradiction, 33; idea of extension acquired by considering distance between bodies: is a copy of coloured points and of the manner of their appearance, 34 (cf. 235 f.); distinguished from duration as having co-existent parts, 36; these parts are indivisible ideas copied from impressions of coloured and tangible objects, 38; mathematical definitions and demonstrations opposed in the matter of extension, 42; confusion with distance, 61; theory of Cartesian, 159.
§ 2—and solidify, as primary qualities, 227; if colours; sounds, etc., be merely perceptions, not even motion, extension, and solidity can possess 'real continued and independent existence,' 228 (cf. 192); motion implies a body moving: body resolved into extension or solidity: extension can only be conceived as composed of parts endowed with colour or solidity: colour is excluded ex hypothesi: therefore idea of extension depends for its reality on that of solidity, 228; but solidity can only be explained as dependent on colour, or on extension, 229.
§ 3—and thought: argument from their incompatibility to the immateriality of the soul (v. Mind), 234 f.; only things coloured and tangible are extended, 235 (cf. 34, 38); thus all perceptions, except those of sight and touch, exist and yet are nowhere, are neither figured nor extended, 236, e.g. the taste of a fruit has no local conjunction with its colour or shape except to our fancy, 238; thus the materialists are wrong who conjoin all thought with extension, 259; but on the other hand extension is a quality of certain perceptions, e.g. this table is only a perception, 239; 'the very idea of extension is copied from nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the idea of extension agrees to anything is to say it is extended,' thus there are impressions and ideas really extended, 240.
External—opposed to internal, 166, 167; objects (q.v.) opposed to internal actions, 464; opposed to internal motives, principles, or qualities, 411 f.; no idea of external existence (q.v.) as something specifically different from ideas and impressions, 67 (cf. 188, 211 f.); when an impression is external to our bodies it is not external to ourselves, 190; for our limbs are themselves only impressions: also impressions which are not in extension, e.g. sounds, smells, etc., cannot be external to anything, 191; 'no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately and without the interposition of an image or perception,' 239.
Fact, matter of—truth=agreement 'to real relations of ideas or to real existence and matter of fact,' 458; understanding either compares ideas or infers matters of fact: its objects either relations of objects or matters of fact, 463 (cf. 413); (cf. Cause, § 7); morality does not consist in any matter of fact which can be discovered by the understanding, 468; when you look for the morality of an act, you can only find approbation or disapprobation in yourself: 'here is matter of fact, but it is the object of feeling, not of reason,' 469.
Faculty—fiction of, 224.
Fame—love of, 316 f., explained by sympathy, 316, assists moral approbation of justice, 501 (v. pride, § 2).
Family—a source of pride, 307, beginning of state, 486, patriarchal, not origin of monarchy, 541.
Fancy—and belief (q.v.), 140, 624; illusion of, in the miser, 314.
Feeling.
§ 1. (v. Belief, § 4; Appearance); belief only a certain feeling: there is nothing but the feeling or sentiment to distinguish fact from fancy, and this feeling is only a greater firmness of the conception of the object, 624; it is not distinguishable from the conception, 625, 627; an idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea: this feeling we all a superior force, vivacity, firmness, solidity, and steadiness, 629; ideas distinguished not only by force and vivacity, they really feel different, 636; it is wrong to suppose that those actions of the mind are the same which produce not a different sensation, 417.
2. (v. Moral, § 2); when you pronounce an act vicious you only mean that you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it, 469; 'morality more properly felt than judged of' 470, 589; we do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases: but in feeling that it pleases, we in fact feel that it is virtuous, 471; pleasure includes many different kinds of feeling, 472; moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure excited by a mental quality in ourselves or others, 574; 'a convenient house and a virtuous character cause not the same feeling of approbation, though the source of our approbation be the same:' 'there is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings,' 617; each of the virtues excites a different feeling of approbation in the spectator, and so the fact that the natural abilities and moral virtues excite different feelings of approbation is no reason for placing them in distinct classes, 607.
§ 8. Requires correction by reflection and understanding, 417, 581. 6o3, 672 (v. Sensation, Senses).
Fear—and probability, 440; caused by a mixture of joy and grief. 441 f.
Fiction (v. Belief § 1)—of duration as a measure of rest, 37, 65; of perfect equality, 48; of continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 193 f.; this fiction believed, 209, derived from custom, but obliquely and indirectly, 197; of double existence of perceptions and objects, 211 f., altogether the offspring of the fancy, 216; of substance or matter, 220; of substantial forms, 221; of accidents, 222; of faculties and occult qualities, sympathies, and antipathies in Nature, 224; of personal identity, soul, self, and substance, to disguise the variation of our perceptions, 254, 259; philosophic fiction of 'state of Nature,' 493; poetic, of 'golden age.' 494 (cf. 631); of 'willing an obligation,' 523; of imperfect dominion, 529; examination of, useful in the same way as examination of our dreams, 219.
Final cause, 171.
Fitness—not a principle to be used in assigning property, 502.
Force—and vivacity, vagueness of terms, 105, 629 (v. Belief); differs from agitation, 631 (cf. 419); invalidates promises: a proof that they have no natural obligation, for 'force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope and fear,' 525.
Form—substantial, fiction of, 221.
Formal cause, 171.
Free, will—(v. Necessity, Liberty, Will), 312, 314, 399 f., 6o9.
Freedom.
Friendship—exists side by side with the 'interested commerce of men.' 521.
General (v. Abstract)—idea of power, 161; ideas of pleasure, 425; character and actions 'considered in general' produce a particular kind of pleasure or pain which we call virtue or vice, 412; everything which gives uneasiness in human actions upon the general survey is called vice, 499.
Genius—a magical faculty of collecting appropriate ideas when using general terms, 24.
Geometry (v. Mathematics), 45 f., 71, 72.
God—as prime mover, 159; idea oil derived from an impression, 160; the doctrine of an immaterial thinking substance leads necessarily to Atheism just as Spinoza'a system does, 240 f.; the idea of God derived from particular impressions, none of which contain any efficacy nor seem to have any connexion with any other existence, and so we can have no idea of the efficacy of God as a cause, 248; to regard God as the efficacious principle which supplies the deficiency of all causes is to make him the author of all our perceptions and volitions, good and bad, 249; the order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind, but we can have no idea of God any more than we can of force, 633 n.
Good—general appetite to good, considered merely as such, 417; and evil=pleasure and pain, 276, 399, 438, 439 (v. Moral); three kinds of goods distinguished; internal satisfaction of our minds, external advantages of our body, enjoyment of possessions, 487.
Good humour, 611.
Goodness and benevolence, 602 f.
Golden age—poetical fiction of, contains a valuable truth, 494.
Government.
§ 1. The origin of, 534 f.; necessary to remedy man's inclination to prefer a near to a remote good, and so to violate the laws of property, 534-6; this remedied by making the observance of those laws the nearest interest of a certain few men, 537; though composed of men subject to all human infirmities becomes a composition which is in some measure exempted from all those infirmities, 539; not necessary in all societies: generally arises from quarrels between men belonging to different societies: foreign war without government produces civil war: 'camps are the true mothers of cities,' 540; monarchy arises rather from war than patriarchal authority: the state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and survives long after the first generation: but in it the laws of justice are obligatory, 541.
§ 2. Allegiance or submission to government, 539 f., at first rests on promises which are 'the original sanction of government and the source of the first obligation to obedience, 541; hence the theory that it rests on consent, which is only true of it at first, not in all ages, 542; its principal object is to constrain men to observe the laws of Nature (q.v.) which include the duty to observe promises, the exact performance of which is the effect of government, not its source, 543; there is a separate interest and obligation in obedience to the magistrate and performance of promises, 544; allegiance and performance of promises have thus a separate foundation and a separate moral obligation, 545; government would be necessary in all large societies were there no such thing as a promise, and promises would be obligatory were there no such thing as government, 546; this is also the popular opinion, 547; magistrates themselves do not believe their authority to rest on a promise: if they did, they would never be content to receive it tacitly, 547; subjects believe they were born to obedience, 548; dwelling in its dominions not consent to a government, 548; according to this view there would be no allegiance to an absolute government which yet is as natural and common a form as any, 549; this theory of consent really only proves that our submission to government admits of exceptions, 549; the conclusion is just, but the principles erroneous, 550; the natural obligation ceases when the interest ceases, but the moral obligation continues owing to the influence of general rules, 553; but in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, 552.
§ 3. The objects of allegiance, i.e. our lawful magistrates, at first fixed by convention and a specific promise, 554; afterwards by general rules invented in our interest, 555, viz. those of (a) long possession, 556; (b) present possession, 557; (c) conquest, 558; (d) succession, 559, (e) positive laws, 561; rigid loyalty akin to superstition: controversies in politics generally trivial and insoluble by reason, 561; the English Revolution, 563; resistance more often lawful in mixed than in absolute governments, 564; in no government a right without a remedy, 564; influence of imagination in politics, 565-6.
Habit (v. Custom)—is nothing but one of the principles of Nature, and derives all its force from that origin, 179.
Heroism—nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self esteem, 599.
History—credibility of, 145; links in, are all of same kind, and so the transition easy, the ideas lively, and belief strong, 146; and poetry, 631.
Hobbes—on cause, 80.
Hope—and fear, 440 f.; caused by mixture of joy and grief, 441.
Humility—perfect sincerity in, not to be expected, 598.
Hypothetical arguments, 83.
Ideas.
§ 1. Origin and classification of, 1 f.; derived from impressions from which they differ only in vivacity, 1 (cf. 106, 629); Locke's use of the term too wide, 2; simple and complex, 2 (cf. 13); simple ideas exactly represent simple impressions, but complex ideas and impressions do not exactly correspond, 3 (cf. 231); impressions causes of ideas, because constantly conjoined and prior, 5; an exception to this in the case of a series, 6; primary and secondary, 6; give rise to impressions of reflexion, 7 (cf. 165, 289); the question of innate ideas the same as that of the precedence of impressions, 7, 158, its importance, 33, 74, 161; of memory more lively than those of imagination, 8 f., the former 'equivalent to impressions,' 82; the idea of an idea, 106; obscure as compared with impressions, 33; obscurity of; our own fault and remediable, 72; the mind has the command over all its ideas, 624, 629; the fact that we talk and reason about an idea no proof that we have it, 62 (cf. 32); not infinitely divisible, 27, 52; every lively idea agreeable, 353; attended with some emotion, 373, 375, 393.
§ 2. A. Association of (q.v.), 10; on three guiding principles, resemblance, contiguity, and causation (q.v.), 11 f. (cf. 92), 283 f., 305 f,; physiological explanation of, 60.
B. Associated with impressions and enlivened by them, 98, 101 (cf. 317); associations of ideas and impressions assist one another, e.g. in double relation of impressions and ideas, 284, 286, 380; association of, gives rise to no new impressions, only modifies the ideas, and so produces no passions, 305; law of transition between, viz. from faint to lively, from remote to contiguous, 339; hence easy to pass from idea of another person to idea of self, but not conversely, except in case of sympathy (q.v.), 340; law of ideas opposed to that of impressions, 341-2 (cf. 283), but yields to it when there is a conflict, 344-5; an idea converted into an impression in sympathy by relation, 317 f.; never admit of a total union: can only be conjoined, not mixed, while impressions and passions can be mixed, 366; related ideas liable to be confused (v. error), 60, 62, 203, 264; related in animals as well as men, 327.
§ 3. A. Reasoning, judgment, conception, and belief (q.v.), only particular ways of conceiving ideas, 97 n (cf. 164), reasoning merely on operation of our thoughts or ideas, and nothing ever enters into our conclusions but ideas or fainter conceptions, 625 (cf. 73, 183).
B. Abstract relations of, opposed to experienced relations of objects, 414, 463; the world of ideas the province of demonstration (q.v.); the world of realities that of the will, 414; truth a proportion of ideas considered as such, i.e. not as representative, 448, 458; four demonstrable relations, 464; is morality a demonstrable relation? 456, 463. 496.
C. Truth belongs only to ideas as representative, =agreement of ideas considered as copies with those objects which they represent, 415; =the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence, 448, 458; understanding either compares ideas or infers matters of fact, 463.
§ 4. abstract or general, 17 f.; are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive signification, 17; the particular circumstances are not discarded but retained, 18; every idea determinate in quality and quantity, and individual, 19; abstract ideas therefore individual in themselves, 20; and become 'general in their representation' because annexed to a name which revives a certain custom of surveying other individuals to which it is applied, 20-24; no abstract idea of power, 161; nor of existence, 623 (cf. 66 f.).
§ 5. of space and time, 33 f.; derived from the manner in which impressions appear, 34, 37 (cf. 96); mathematical, 45 f., 52, 72; of existence and external existence, 66 f.; of causation, 74 f., and necessity, derived from an impression of reflexion, 155, 165; of body, 229 f., and substance, 232; of extension, itself extended, 239; of self, 251 f. (v. Identity); of God, 248; of mother person. of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious,' 329; of another's affection, though it be not actually felt by any one (v. Sympathy). 370 (cf. 385).
Identity.
§ 1. The most universal relation, 14; discovered rather by perception than reasoning, except when discovered by relation of causation, 74; a relation which does not 'depend upon the idea' and hence only a source of probability, 73; of impressions produces a stronger connexion than the most perfect resemblance, 341.
§ 2. A. The 'principium individuationis' 200 f.; one object only gives idea of unity, a multiplicity of objects the idea of number: Time or Duration the source of idea of identity, 200; 'an object is the same with itself'='an object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another:' the 'principium' is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object through a supposed variation of time, 201.
§ 2. B. The identity of a mass of matter is preserved for us (a) when the variation is small in proportion to the whole, and gradual, 256; (b) when the parts combine to a common end, and especially when there is a 'sympathy of parts' as in an organism, 257; (c) when the object is naturally variable—e.g. a river, 258.
§ 3. The constancy of our impressions, i.e. their resemblance at different times, makes us consider them individually the same, 199, 202, 253 f.; a succession of related impressions places the mind in the same disposition as does an identical object, 203, and so we confound succession with identity, 204; two kinds of resemblance produce this confusion, 204 n; but this supposed identity is contradicted by the obvious interruption of our perceptions. and we avoid it by the fiction of their continued existence, 205 f.; and further by the fiction of substance or matter, 219 (cf. 254, f.), (v. Body, § 2, Existence, § 2).
§ 4. A. Personal identity or the idea of self, 251 f.; impressions never felt as distinct from ourselves, 189; how far we ourselves are the object of our senses a very difficult question, 190; externality to our body or our limbs is not externality to ourselves, 191; no impression of Self from which the idea of a simple and identical person can be derived, 251, 189 (v. Senses) (cf. 633); we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; a man is 'a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement, 252, 634; the identity which we attribute to the mind analogous to that which we attribute to plants and animals: imagination causes us to mistake a succession of related objects for an identical object, 254; we hide the interruption by feigning a soul, self, or substance, or 'imagine something unknown and mysterious connecting the parts beside their relation,' 254; the identity which we attribute to the mind of man is a fictitious one; it cannot run the different perceptions into one, and it is no real bond between them, 259; it is only an idea arising from an easy transition produced by resemblance and causation, 260, 636; memory as the source of these relations not only discovers but produces the identity, 261, but still we extend the chain of causes beyond memory, 262; the same explanation to be given of the simplicity as of the identity of the mind, 263 are self and substance the same thing? 635; there is no satisfactory theory to explain the principles that unite our successive impressions in our thought or consciousness, 636; we must 'distinguish between, personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves,' 253.
B. Self—the object of pride and humility, 277, 286; the existence of ourselves durable, 293; 'self or that succession of related ideas and impressions of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness, 277; 'that connected succession of perceptions which we call self,' 277; 'self or that individual person of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious,' 286; 'the qualities of our mind and body, that is, self,' 303; 'the idea, or rather impression, of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person that 'tis not possible to imagine that anything can in this particular go beyond it,' 307, 320, 339, 340, 354, 427; the relation between our self and another person the foundation of sympathy (q.v.), 318, 322, 359; easy to pass from idea of another person to idea of self, but not the reverse way, 340; self love not love in the proper sense, 329, 480.
Imagination—contrasted with memory, 8 f., 86, 93, 97 n, 628 (cf. 265), with memory and reason, 117, with experience, 140, with judgment, 148-9, with understanding, 97, 267 (cf. 182); has power to transpose and change ideas, 10, 92, 629; chiefly occupied in forming complex ideas, 10; associates ideas on certain principles. to; which are sometimes 'permanent, irresistible, and universal,' at others weak, changeable, irregular, and not even useful in conduct of life, 225 (cf. 148); and so leads us into directly contrary opinions, 266 (cf. 231); the understanding='the general and more established properties of the imagination, 267; this activity of imagination only natural as a malady is natural, and so rejected by Philosophy, 216; passes from obscure to lively ideas, 339; but conversely in the case of the passions, 340-345 (cf. 509 n); vibration of, between two ideas, constitutes a perfect relation, 355; extends 'custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions,' 197; continues in its course even when its object fails, like a boat under way: completes an imperfect uniformity, 198, 213, 237; source of general rules, 371, 385, 504 n; little influenced by abstruse reasonings, 185, 268; more affected by what is contiguous than what is remote, hence government becomes necessary, 535; and the passions, 340 f.; by a great effort enables us to sympathise with an unfelt feeling, 371, 385-6; converts an idea into an impression in sympathy (q.v.) 47; source of rules which determine property, 594 n, 509 n, 513, 531, 559, 566; animals little susceptible of pleasures or pains of imagination, 397.
Immortality—of soul, 114.
Impressions (v. Idea, Feeling, Senses, Sensation).
§ 1. Of sensation and reflexion: the latter derived principally from ideas, the former 'arise in the soul originally from unknown causes,' 7, 84; original impressions depend on physical and natural causes, 275; the determination of the mind to pass from the idea of an object to that of its usual attendant an impression of reflexion, 165, 275; pains and pleasures original impressions, passions secondary or reflective, 276; reflective, divided roughly into calm and violent, passions being violent and divided into direct and indirect, 276; simple and complex, 2; an exception to the rule that every simple idea has a preceding impression, 6; simple and uniform impressions undefinable, 277, 329; will an internal impression, 399; impressions which give rise to sense of justice not natural but artificial, 497; impression of extension itself extended, 239.
§ 2. Cannot be presented by the senses as anything but impressions: must necessarily appear what they are and be what they appear, 190; not felt as different from ourselves or as copies of anything else, 189; not felt as external to ourselves, 191; how far there is an impression of ourselves, very doubtful, 190, 251 (cf. 307, 320, v. Identity, § 4. A); impression of self always present and lively, 317.
§ 3. Three classes of, conveyed by the senses, (a) figure, bulk, motion, and solidity; (b) colours, tastes, smells, heat, etc.; (c) pains and pleasures: all these as felt and as far as the senses are judges are the same in the manner of their existence, 193; but to the first and sometimes to the second kind we attribute continued existence, while the third kind we regard as merely perceptions, 194 f.; 'all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such,' 194, 251; distinction of modern philosophy between impressions which do and do not resemble the qualities of the objects which produce them, 226 f.; no impression from which idea of body can be derived: touch cannot give it us, 'for though bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is quite a different thing from the solidity, and they have not the least resemblance to each other, 230.
§ 4 (v. Idea, § 2). Only associated by resemblance, 283, 343; one impression related to another 'not only when their sensations are resembling but also when their impulses or directions are similar or correspondent, 381, 384, 394; identity of impressions produces a stronger connexion than the most perfect resemblance, 341; impressions and passions capable of an entire union, as opposed to ideas, 366; double relation of impressions and ideas, 286, 381 (v. Pride); no new impression and so no new passion produced by association of ideas, 305, law of transition of, 342; opposed to that of idea; 342; an idea converted into an impression in sympathy, 317, even when the impression is not felt by any body, 370, 385.
§ 5. Whether it is by our impressions or ideas we distinguish between virtue and vice, 456 f. (v. Moral, § 1, 2); the impression which distinguishes virtue and vice often mistaken for an idea because it is soft and gentle, 470.
Indifference=chance, 125, 408; liberty of, confused with liberty of spontaneity, 407.
Indirect—and direct passions, 276; or oblique effect of custom, 197.
Indolence—why excused, 587.
Inference—(v. Belief, Cause), does not necessarily require three ideas, 97 n.
Infinite—divisibility of space and time, 26 f., of points, lines, etc., 44, of quantity, 52.
Inhesion—no idea of substance or inhesion, 234.
Instinct—'reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which arises from past experience' 179; as opposed to reflection=imagination as opposed to reason, 215; benevolence, love of life, kindness to children, instincts originally implanted in our natures, 417; the mind by an original instinct seeks to unite itself with the good and to avoid the evil, 438; direct passions often arise from an unaccountable instinct, 439.
Intention, 348, 349, 413, 461 and n.
Interest (v. Justice)—sentiments from interest and morals apt to be confounded, 473; imposes a natural as opposed to a moral obligation, 498, 546; and promises (q.v.), 519 f.; the source of the three fundamental 'laws of nature,' 526; and allegiance (v. Government), 537 f,; and chastity, 573.
Internal—opposed to external (q.v.), 464, 478 (v. Body, Identity).
Intuition—a source of knowledge and certainty, perceiving three out of four demonstrable relations, viz., resemblance, contrariety, and degree in any quality, 70; does not inform us of necessity of a cause to a beginning of existence, 79.
Joy—and pride, 190; a mixture of, with grief produces hope and fear, 441 f.
Judgment.
§ 1. Does not necessarily imply union of two ideas, 96 n: only a form of conception, 'we can form a proposition which contains only one idea,' 97 n; judgments are 'perceptions,' 456; only judgments can be unreasonable, not passions or actions, 416, 459; morality more properly felt than judged of, 470; our judgments less voluntary than our actions, 609.
§ 2. The object of the judgment a system of realities, 108; confusion between judgment and sensation in vision, 112; opposed to imagination, as employing general rules to distinguish essential from accidental circumstances in an antecedent, 147-149; and understanding provide a natural remedy for the selfishness of men by altering the direction of the passions, 489, 493; as contrasted with memory has merit or demerit.
Justice.
§ 1. Produces pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, 477; the motive to acts of justice cannot be regard to their justice, 477-480; nor can it be concern for our private interest or reputation, since pure self-love is the source of all injustice, 480; nor regard to public interest, 481, 495; for there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind merely as such, 482; nor private benevolence, or regard to the interests of the party concerned, 482; 'hence we must allow that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily, from education and human conventions, 483 (cf. 530); artificial, but not therefore arbitrary: its rules are the result of the 'intervention of thought and conception,' which however is so obvious and necessary that it is really quite as natural as anything else, 484; its rules may be called 'Laws of Nature,' if by 'Nature' we mean 'common to or inseparable from any species, 484, 526; though a human invention, yet as immutable as human nature, because based on so great an interest, 620.
§ 2. How the rules of justice and property are established by the artifice of man, 484 f.; though society increases man's power, ability, and security, 485, yet in a savage state he is not sensible of this, and so cannot produce society: but the natural appetite between the sexes and concern for common offspring makes the first beginning, 486; both the natural temper and outward circumstances of man adverse to society, viz. his limited generosity, 'for each man loves himself better than any other single person,' and the instability and scarcity of such goods as can be possessed, 487; 'uncultivated nature' could never remedy this: justice at this stage can only mean possession of the usual passions, viz. selfishness and partiality, so the 'idea of justice is no remedy,' 488; the remedy is not derived from Nature but from artifice; or rather, 'Nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections,' 489; men remedy the instability of possessions by a convention, this restraint not being contrary to, but in the interest of the passions, 489, 516; this convention not a promise, 'only a general sense of common interest, which sense all the members of the society express to one another,' like that of two men rowing a boat, 490; after this arises immediately the idea of justice, also those of property, obligation, and right, which are unintelligible without the former, 491; vanity, pity, and love, being social passions, assist, 491; in this convention it is only the direction of the passions which is altered: there is no question of the goodness or wickedness, but only of the sagacity or folly of man, 492; since this convention is so simple, the savage state must be very short, and 'man's very first state and situation may justly be esteemed social;' the 'state of nature' a philosophic fiction, 493; as the golden age' is a poetic, though it expresses a great truth, 494; 'strong, extensive benevolence' cannot be the original motive of justice, since it would render it unnecessary, 495; nor can reason, 496; the impressions which give rise to the sense of justice not natural, but arise from artifice, otherwise no convention would be necessary, 497; the connexion of the rules of justice with interest is singular, for a single act of justice is often contrary both to public and private interest, 497 (cf. 579).
§ 3. Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice? 498; interest the natural obligation to justice, the sentiment of right and wrong the moral obligation, 498; by sympathy we take a general survey, and perceive that injustice always brings uneasiness, hence the sense of moral good and evil follows upon injustice, 499; 'self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice, but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue,' 500; political artifice assists this approbation, but can never be the sole cause of the distinction we make between vice and virtue, 500, 533; education and interest in our reputation also assist, 501; 'though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural,' 619.
§ 4. The vulgar definition of justice, 'a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due,' supposes right and property independent of justice, which is absurd, 526-7; justice and injustice do not admit of gradations, therefore not naturally either virtuous or vicious, since 'all natural qualities run insensibly into each other,' 530; the laws of being universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be derived from nature, 532; government required to enforce justice, 535-538; both natural and civil, derived from conventions, 543; the moral obligation to, not so strong between states as between individuals. because the natural obligation is weaker, 569; differs from the natural virtues, because in them every single act is good, 579 (cf. 497).
Knowledge—opposed to probability, 69 f.; opposed to 'observation and experience,' 81, 87; defined as 'the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas,' as distinguished from that which arises from 'proofs,' i.e; arguments from cause and effect, and that which arise from probability or the calculation of chances, 104: from the assurance arising from memory, causation, and probability, 153; only four out of seven philosophical relations objects of knowledge and certainty, 70; three of these perceived by intuition, the fourth by mathematical reasoning, 73; but all knowledge degenerates into probability when we consider the fallibility of our faculties, 180 (v. Scepticism); of men superior to that of animals, 326.
Labour—division o, increases man's ability, 485; theory that a man has property in his labour, 505 n.
Language—arises from convention without promise, 490.
Law—implies doctrine of necessity which alone explains responsibility, 411; rules of justice may be called 'Laws of Nature; 484; laws of nature invented by man, 520, 526, 543; positive, a title to government, 561; laws of nations and of nature, 567.
Liberty (v. Necessity), 400 f.; madmen have no liberty, 404; can only=chance, 407; confusion between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, 'between that which is opposed to violence and that which means a negation of necessity and causes,' 407; false sensation of liberty: fallacious experiment to prove it, 408; the doctrine of, and religion, 409; and choice, 461 n; 'it is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free,' 609.
Liveliness—of impressions, 98 f., 119; vagueness of term, 105 (v. idea).
Locke—his misuse of word 'idea,' 2; cited, 35; argument to prove necessity of a cause, 81; on idea of power, 157.
Logic—rules of, 175.
Love.
§ 1. And hatred, 329 f.; explained in same way as pride (q.v.) and humility; their object is 'some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious,' 229 (cf. 482); 'some person or thinking being,' 331; experiment to confirm this, 332; transition from love to pride easier than that from pride to love, 339.
§ 2. Difficulties in this theory, 347 f.; we do not love or hate a man unless either the quality in him which pleases or displeases us be constant and inherent in him, or unless he does it from design which points to certain permanent qualities in him which remain after the action is performed, 348 (cf. 609); the man's design affects us by sympathy with his esteem or hatred of us, 349; we love relations and acquaintance apart from any direct pleasure they afford us, 352; because our connexion with them is always giving us new lively ideas by sympathy, and every lively idea is pleasant, 353; sympathy with others is agreeable 'only by giving an emotion to the spirits, 354.
§ 3. Always attended with a desire, which distinguishes it from pride, which is a pure emotion in the soul, 367; its conjunction with a desire is arbitrary, original, and instinctive, 368.
§ 4. Between the sexes, derived from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions, 394; produces the first rudiments of society, 486.
§ 5. Self-love not love in proper sense, 329; self-love the source of all injustice, 480; 'no such passion in human minds as love of mankind merely as such,' 481; 'man in general' or human nature the object but not the cause of love, 482; a social passion, 491; dejects the soul like humility, 391; love and hatred of animals, 397; love of truth, 448 f.
§ 6. Virtue-power of our mental qualities to produce pride and love, 575; why the same qualities in all cases produce both pride and love, humility and hatred, 589; we praise all passions which partake of love, e.g. benevolence, because love is immediately agreeable to the person actuated by it, 604; and because the transition from love to love is peculiarly easy, 605; praise and blame a fainter love and hatred, 614; love and esteem, 608 n.
Loyalty—rigid, akin to superstition, 562.
Malbranohe—on power, 158, 249.
Malesieu, 30.
Malice—and envy, 371 f.; is pity reversed: the misery of others gives us a more lively idea of our own happiness, 315; against ourselves, 376; mixture of with hatred by means of relation through parallel directions, 380 f.
Man—his need of society, 485; 'man in general' not the cause but only the object of love and hatred, 481; no question of original goodness of man but only of his sagacity, 492; human nature composed of affections and understanding which are requisite in all its actions, 493; superior to animals (q.v.) chiefly by superiority of his reason, human nature the 'only science of man,' 273; a man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions, 252, 634 (v. Identity. § 4)
Material—cause, 171.
Mathematics—mathematiml points, nature of ideas of, 38 f.; definitions of, consistent with theory of indivisible parts of extension, though its demonstrations are inconsistent with it, 42; objects of, really exist because we have clear ideas of them, 45; demonstrations of geometry not properly so called, because founded on ideas which are not exact, 45 f., e.g. idea of perfect equality in geometry a fiction, 48; right lines, 49; plane surfaces, 50; inferior exactness of geometry to that of arithmetic and algebra, 71; value of geometry, 72; no mystery in ideas which are objects of mathematics since copied from impressions, 13; mathematical necessity depends on an act of the understanding, 166; demonstrations of only probable, especially when long, 180; subject to imagination, 198 (cf. 48).
Matter.
§ 1.—and force according to Cartesians,159; or substance, fiction to support the simplicity and identity of bodies, 219 f. (v. body); homogeneity of in Peripatetic philosophy, 221; implies powers of resistance, 564.
§ 2.—and mind (q.v.) 232 f.; the greater part of beings exist out of local relation to extended body, i.e. have no local conjunction with matter, 135; the materialists wrong in conjoining all thought with extension, as also are those who conjoin it with a simple indivisible substance, 239, as does Spinoza who supposes a unity of substance in which both thought and matter inhere, 241 (ctl 244).
—or motion as the cause of our perceptions, 246 f.; a priori no reason why matter should not cause thought, 247; as a matter of fact we find matter or motion has a constant conjunction with thought, 'since every one may perceive that the different dispositions of the body change his thoughts and sentiments,' 248; thus matter may be and is the cause of thought and perception, 248.
§ 3.—actions of, necessary, but only through a determination of the mind produced by constant union, 400; 'I do not ascribe to will that unintelligible necessity which is supposed to lie in matter, but ascribe to matter that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will, 410.
Matter of fact-the conclusion of all reasoning from cause and effect, 94; opposed to relations of ideas, 463 (cf. 413); (v. Fact).
Memory—and imagination, 8 f., 108, 117 n (cf. 265, 370 n, 628); has no power of varying order and position of simple ideas, 9; but this property not perceivable by us, so the difference between it and imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity, 85; ideas of, equivalent to impressions, 82, 83; attended by belief, 86; the system of impressions or ideas of memory is real, and is contrasted with that system which is the object of the judgment, 108; assurance derived from, almost equals that of demonstration or knowledge, and superior to that derived from arguments from cause and effect, 153; a source of belief in continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 199, 209; not only discovers but produces personal identity, 261, though from another point of view the converse is true, 262; 'of all faculties has least vice or virtue in its several degrees,' 370 n; though extremely useful yet is exerted without any sense of pleasure and pain, and so has no merit while the judgment always has, 613.
Merit (v. Moral)—implies something constant and durable in the man, and thus requires the doctrine of necessity, 411; depends on motives (q.v.), 477 f.
Metaphysics, 31, 32, 190.
[Method]—of agreement and difference, 300, 301, 311, 332.
Mind (v. Identity, § 4).
§ 1. A. 'Is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations (cf. 636) and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity or identity,' so there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind, nor in conjoining an object to the mind, 207 (v. Identity, 251 f.); 'is a kind of theatre: there is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different:' but the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us, for 'they are the successive perceptions alone which constitute the mind,' 253; compared to a republic or commonwealth, 261; 'the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, and influence one another,' 261.
B. Is like a string instrument, the passions slowly dying away, 441 (cf. 576); only qualities of the mind virtuous or vicious, 574; some 'durable principles of the mind required for virtue or vice, 575; the minds of all men similar in their feelings and operations, 576; has the command over all its ideas, and so belief cannot be an idea, 624; 'it is almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article,' 608; the intellectual world has no such contradictions as the natural: 'what is known concerning it agrees with itself, and what is unknown we must be content to leave so,' 232; 'the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known,' 366 (cf. 175).
§ 2. A. Its immateriality, 232-250; we have no idea of the substance of the mind because no impression, 232; if substance means something which can exist by itself, then perceptions are substances, 233: nor have we any idea of inhesion, 234; the question concerning the substance of the mind is absolutely unintelligible, 250.
B. Its local conjunction with matter: it is argued that thought and extension are wholly incompatible and therefore the soul must be immaterial, 234; now it is true that the greater part of beings exist and yet are nowhere, viz. all objects and perceptions except those of sight and touch, 335, and others to which imagination gives local position, 237; hence the materialists wrong who conjoin all thought with extension (q.v.), 239; yet there are impressions and ideas really extended, 240; the doctrine of the immateriality, indivisibility, and simplicity of a thinking substance is a true atheism and will justify all Spinoza's infamous opinions, 241; Spinoza says the universe of objects is a modification of a simple subject, theologians that the universe of thought is a modification of a simple substance, 242; both views unintelligible and equally absurd, 245-4, and result in a dangerous and irrecoverable atheism, 244; it is just the same if you call thought an action instead of a modification of the soul, 245, 246; the cause of our perceptions may be and is matter (q.v.) and motion, 247-8.
Miraculous—opposed to 'natural,' 474.
Miser—illustration from, 314.
Modes—a kind of complex ideas produced by association, 13; and substances, 17; Spinoza's theory of modes or modifications compared with that of the 'theologians,' 242-4 (v. Mind, § 2 B).
Modesty, 570 f.
Monarchy—originates in war, not in patriarchal government, 541.
Moral.
§ 1. Moral distinctions not derived from reason, 455 f.; 'is morality like truth discerned merely by ideas and by their juxtaposition and comparison?' is virtue conformity to reason, 456; (a) 'since morals have an influence on the actions and affections it follows they cannot be derived from reason,' 457, because reason is wholly inactive and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience or a sense of morals, 458 (cf. 415 f.); (b) since passions, volitions and actions are 'original facts and realities complete in themselves, they cannot be either true or false, contrary or conformable to reason, 458; (c) though an action can improperly be called false as it causes or is obliquely caused by a false judgment, yet this falsehood does not constitute its immorality, 459: for (i) as caused by a false judgment, such errors are only mistakes of fact and not a defect in moral character; a mistake of right again cannot be the original source of immorality, for it implies an antecedent right and wrong, 460; (ii) as causing false judgments—such false judgments take place in others not in ourselves, and another man's mistake cannot make my action vicious, 461 (cf. 597); Wollaston's theory would make inanimate objects vicious, since they also cause mistakes, 461 n; and if no mistake is made, then there is no vice, 461, 462 n; the argument also is circular, and leaves unexplained why truth is virtuous and falsehood vicious, 462 n; (d) morality is neither a relation of objects nor a matter of fact, and therefore not an object of the understanding, 463 f.; (i) it is not a demonstrable relation, 464 and n; there exists no relation which lies solely between external objects and internal actions, 465; all the relations we can find in ingratitude exist also between inanimate objects, 466; and all which belong to incest exist also between animals, 467; every animal is capable of the same relations as man, 468; also it is impossible to show how any relations could be universally obligatory, 465-6; (ii) morality is no matter of fact which can be discovered by the understanding, 468; it is impossible to discover in wilful murder the matter of fact or real existence which you call vice: you can only find a sentiment of disapprobation in your own breast, 'here is a matter of fact but it is the object of feeling not of reason,' 469 (cf. 517); 'when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it (cf. 591); vice and virtue therefore may be compared to colours, sounds, heat and cold, which according to the modern philosophy are not qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind, 469 (cf. 589); this discovery in morals of great speculative but little practical importance, 469; each of the virtues excite u different feeling of approbation, 607; approbation or blame 'nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred,' 614; 'a convenient house and a virtuous character cause not the same feeling of approbation, though the source of our approbation be the same,' 'there is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings,' 617.
§ 2. Moral distinctions derived from a moral sense, 470 f. (cf. 612); morality more properly felt than judged of, though this feeling is so soft and gentle that it is confounded with an idea, 479; we distinguish virtue and vice by particular pleasures and pains; 'we do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases; but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner we in effect feel that it is virtuous,' 471, 547, 574; this particular kind of pleasure feels different from all other pleasures: it is only excited (a) by the character and sentiments of a person, 472, 575 (cf. 607, 617); (b) and only by these when considered in general without reference to our particular interest, 473 (cf. 499) (v. Sympathy); (c) it must have the power of producing pride (q.v.), 473 (cf. 575); it is not produced in every instance by an 'original quality and primary constitution,' 473: whether these principles are natural depends on the different senses of 'natural,' 474-5; it is at all events most unphilosophical to say that virtue is the same with what is natural, 475; it only remains to show 'why any action or sentiment upon the general view and survey gives a certain satisfaction and uneasiness,' 415 (cf. 591) (v. Sympathy).
§ 3. A. Moral approbation. Sense of right and wrong different from sense of interest, 498 (cf. 523); in society the interest which leads to justice becomes remote but is perceived by sympathy with others, 499; and since everything which gives uneasiness in human actions upon the general survey is called vice, hence the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice, 499; self interest the original motive to the establishment of justice, but a sympathy (q.v.) with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue, 500, 553; political artifice can only strengthen not produce this approbation: nature furnishes the materials and gives us some notion of moral distinctions, 500, 573 (cf. 619).
B. our sense of virtue like that of beauty rests on sympathy, viz. sympathy chiefly with the pleasure which a quality or character tends to give the possessor, 577; though our sympathies vary, yet our moral judgments do not vary with them; for 'we fix on some steady and general points of view, and always in our thoughts place ourselves in them whatever may be our present situation,' 581 (cf. 602); thus we only consider the effect of the character of a person on those who have intercourse with him and disregard its effect on ourselves, 582 (cf. 596, 602); again, though a character produces no actual good to any one with which we could sympathise, we still consider it virtuous, 584; owing to the influence of general rules (q.v.) on imagination, 585; we always regard benevolence as virtuous because we judge by a 'general and unalterable standard,' 603: through sympathy the same man is always virtuous and vicious to others who is so to himself, and through it we are even able to blame a quality advantageous to ourselves if it displeases others, 589 (cf. 591).
C. The sentiments of virtue and vice arise either from the 'mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind or of particular persons,' 589; the latter the most important source of our judgments of beauty and virtue; but wit is 'a quality immediately agreeable to others,' 590; some qualities called virtuous because immediately agreeable to the person who possesses them, 590; four different sources of the pleasure we feel in the mere survey of qualities, 591; we deliberately exclude our own interest and only admit that of the person or his neighbours which touches us more faintly than our own, 'yet being more constant and durable' counterbalance the latter even in practice, 591; an action only approved as the sign of some 'durable principles of the mind' (v. Character), 575.
D. 'Any quality of the mind is virtuous which causes love or pride, 575 (cf. 473); pride and humility are called virtuous and vicious according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to others without any reflections on their tendency, 592; 'the utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue as well as its agreeableness to others,' 596; our own sensations determine the vice and virtue of any quality as well as those sensations which it may excite in others, 597 (cf. 461, 582, 591); we praise the passions akin to love because it is immediately agreeable to the person actuated by it, 604; we praise characters akin to our own because we have an immediate sympathy with them, 604 (cf. 596); not all angry passions vicious though disagreeable, 605.
§ 4. Why do we distinguish natural abilities from moral virtues? 606 f. (v. Natural); both are mental qualities which produce pleasure and have an equal tendency to procure the love and esteem of mankind, 607; reasons suggested are, (1) that they produce a different feeling of approbation; but so does each single virtue, 607 (cf. 611); (2) that they are involuntary; but many virtues and vices are equally involuntary, and there is no reason why virtue should not be as involuntary as beauty, 608; also even if the virtues are voluntary they are not therefore free, 609; but still virtues or the actions proceeding from them can be altered by rewards or praise, while natural abilities cannot, hence the distinction made between them by moralists and politicians, 609; 'it belongs to Grammarians to examine what qualities are entitled to the denomination of virtue,' 610; memory of all faculties has least vice or virtue in its several degrees, because it is exerted without any sensation of pleasure or pain, 612.
§ 5. 'There is just so much virtue and vice in any character as every one places in it, and 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken,' there is a moral obligation to submit to government because every one thinks so, 547; 'the general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases, but in this of morals it is perfectly infallible,' and none the less so because it cannot explain the principles on which it is founded, 552; can there be a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty? 547 n.
§ 6. A. Morality depends on motives (q.v.), 'virtuous actions derive their merit from virtuous motives and are considered as signs of those motives,' 'we must look within to find the moral quality,' 'the external performance has no merit,' 417, 575; but 'no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality,' 479 (cf. 518. 523).
B. Passions (q.v.) are moral or immoral according as they are exercised or not with their natural and usual force, 483-4; before society exists, morality=the usual force of the passions, e.g. selfishness and partiality are virtuous, 488 (cf. 518); 'every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, which must be judged of in great measure from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind,' 488; 'all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions,' 532 (cf. 547, 552, 581).
§ 7. Doctrine of necessity not only harmless to morality but essential to it, 409-412 (cf. 375) (v. Necessity, Will); moral philosophy, 175, 282; abstruse speculations in morals carry conviction owing to the interest of the subject, 453.
Moral and natural—beauty, 300; evidence, 404, 406; obligation, 545 (v. Natural).
Moral and physical, 171.
Moral obligation, 517, 525, 547, 569 (v. Obligation).
Motion—Cartesian theory of God as prime mover, 159; cannot be real if we accept the modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 128 f.; or matter, the cause of our perceptions, 246 f.; 'we find by comparing their ideas that thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience that they are constantly united,' which are 'all the circumstances which enter into the idea of cause (q.v.) and effect,' 248.
Motive.
§ 1 (v. Necessity, § 400 f.). Actions have a constant union with motives, temper, and circumstances, 400, hence an inference from one to the other, 401; desire of showing liberty a motive of action, 408; force not essentially different from any other motive, 525; the influencing motives of the will, 413 f.; reason alone can never be a motive to the will, 414 f.
§ 2. 'When we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them' (v. Character), when we blame a man for not doing any action we blame him as not being influenced by the proper motive of that action, 477 (cf. 483, 488, 518, where a virtuous motive appears aa a usual passion on any occasion): 'the first motive that bestows merit on any action can never be a regard to the virtue of that action but must be some other natural motive or principle,' 478 (cf. 518); 'no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality,' though afterwards the sense of morality or duty may produce an action without any other motive, 479, 518; the motive to acts of justice or honesty distinct from regard to the honesty, 480 f., is sense of interest directed by reflection, 489; when this interest becomes remote and general and only felt by sympathy it becomes moral, 499; 'self-interest the original motive to the establishment oi justice, but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue, 500 (v. Justice).
Names—common: their function in forming ideas of substances, 16, in making abstract ideas generally representative, 20; used without a clear idea, 162.
Nationality—sense of, 317.
Nations—Laws of, 567 f.; the moral obligation to observe them not so strong as in the case of individuals, 569; 'national and private morality,' 569.
Natural—
§ 1. Opposed to philosophical relations, 13, 170 (v. Cause, § 6 C); opposed to normal: our false reasonings are only natural as a malady is natural, 226; opposed to artificial (q.v.), 117, 475, 489, 526, 619; opposed to original, 280, 281; =original, 368; opposed to miraculous, 474; opposed to rare and unusual, 549 (cf. 483); opposed to civil, 528; our civil duties chiefly invented for the sake of our natural, 543; and moral evidence, 404, 406.
§ 2. and moral obligation (q.v.), 475 n, 491; no natural obligation to perform promises. 516 f.; there is only a natural obligation to an act when it is required by a natural passion, when we have an inclination towards it as we have to humanity and the other natural virtues, 518, 519, 525 (cf. 546); natural obligation=interest, 551; moral obligation varies with natural, 569; most unphilosophical to say that virtue is the same with what is natural, 475; the natural virtues or vices are those which have no dependence on the artitice and contrivance of man. 574f. (cf. 530); those qualities which we naturally approve of have a tendency to the good of mankind, and render a man a proper member of society, 578 (cf. 528); e.g. meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, equity, 578; the good which results from the natural virtues results from every single act, while it does not result from single acts of justice, 579 (cf. 497); natural abilities, why distinguished from moral virtues, 606 f. (v. Moral, § 4).
Nature—
§ 1. Operations of, 'independent of our thought and reasoning,' viz. relations of contiguity, successions, and resemblance, 168; complexity of, 175; few and simple principles in, 282, 473, 528 (cf. 578); natural world more full of contradictions than intellectual, 232.
§ 2. 'By an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel,' 183; compels the sceptic to assent to the existence of body, 187; determines the object of pride, 286-8; not opposed to habit, for 'habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin,' 179; inconstancy of human nature, 283; opposed to interest and education as origin of virtue, 295; nature=the original constitution of the mind, an arbitrary and original instinct, 368 (cf. 280-1); =that which is common to or inseparable from any species, 484.
§ 3. The state of Nature, a philosophic fiction, 493; like the poetic fiction of a golden age. 494; in a state of nature no property and no promises, 501; man's very first state and condition may justly be esteemed social, 493; Laws of Nature, 484, 520, 526, 543 (v. Justice, § 1); not abolished by laws of nations. 567.
Necessary—connexion (v. Cause), § 6 A, § 9 C, § 10.
Necessity—and Liberty of the Will, 400 f.
§ 1. Operations of external bodies necessary and determined by an 'absolute fate:' this necessity only a determination of mind produced by constant union, 400 (cf. 165); our actions have a similar constant union with our motives and circumstances, and therefore a similar necessity, 401; nor does the acknowledged capriciousness of human actions remove the necessity, for (1) contrary experience either reduces certainty to probability or makes us suppose contrary and concealed cause, the apparent chance or indifference only being due to our ignorance, 404 (cf. 130, 132); (2) madmen are generally allowed to have no liberty, though there is no regularity in their actions, 404; moral evidence implies an inference from actions to motives, 404; also the easy combination of natural and moral evidence, 406; Liberty thus can only=chance, 407.
§ 2. Three reasons for the prevalence of the doctrine of Liberty. (1) Confusion between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, 407 (cf. 609); (2) a false sensation or experience of the liberty of indifference: the necessity of an action is not a quality in the agent but in the spectator (cf. 165): and liberty is only an absence of determination in the spectator's mind, and=indifference, which is often felt by the agent but seldom by the spectator, 408; false experiment on part of agent to prove his liberty, 408; a spectator can generally infer our actions from our motives and character, and when he cannot it is due to his ignorance. 408; (3) religion, 499 (cf. 271, 241). 'I do not ascribe to will that unintelligible necessity which is supposed to lie in matter, but ascribe to matter that intelligible quality … which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will,' 410.
§ 3. Further, this kind of necmsity essential to religion and morality, without it there could be no law, no merit or demerit, no responsibility, 411 (cf. 575); no distinction between ignorantly and knowingly, between deliberately and casually, no forgiveness or repentance, 412; voluntariness of natural abilities and moral virtues compared, 608 f.; a mental quality need not be entirely voluntary in order to produce approbation in the spectator, 609; 'free will has no place with regard to the actions no more than the qualities of men'; 'it is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free (cf. 407); 'our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other,' 609.
Object.
§ 1. Distinguished from cause of pride and humility, 277, 286, 287, 304, 305, 55° (cf. 482); of love and hatred, 529, 551.
§ 2. (v. Body, Coherence, Constancy, Custom, Existence, § 3, Identity, Perception).
A. Experiences united by a common object which produces them, 140; animals cannot feel pride in external (q.v.) objects, 326; idea of self nothing without perception of other objects, and so compels us to turn our view to external objects, 340.
B. The question of the existence of external objects=the questionof the continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 188; the vulgar think that perceptions are their only objects, 195, 202, 206, 209, and yet some perceptions they regard as merely perceptions, others they regard as having continued and distinct existence, 192; this distinction due to imagination, 194, which leads us to mistake a succession of resembling impressions for an identical object, 205, 254; philosophers invent the double existence of objects and perceptions, 211 f.; but even if objects exist differently from perceptions you can never argue from the existence of the latter to that of the former, 212, still less to their resemblance, 216, 217; the modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities annihilates external objects and reduces us to a most extravagant scepticism concerning them, 226-251.
C. When external objects are felt they acquire a relation to a connected heap of perceptions which we call the mind, 207; 'no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately and without the interposition of an image or perception,' 'this table which now appears to me is only a perception,' 259; 'the idea of a perception and of an object cannot represent what are specifically different from one another,' we must either conceive an external object as a relation without a relative or make it the very same with an impression or perception, 241; hence whatever relations we can discover between objects will hold good between impressions, but not conversely, 242.
Obligation.
§ 1. Unintelligible without an antecedent morality, 462 n (cf. 491); universal, of virtue not explained by those who derive morality from reason, '’tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it,' 465-6; impossible to will an obligation, 517, 523, 524; a new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise, and 'the will never creates new sentiments,' 518; obligations do not admit of degrees, 529; though we imagine them to do so, 531.
§ 2. Interest the natural obligation to justice (q.v. § 3), the sentiment of right and wrong the moral obligation, 498; of promises (q.v.), not natural, 516; when an action or quality of the mind 'pleases us after a certain manner we say it is virtuous, and when the neglect or non-performance of it displeases us after a like manner we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it,' 517; there is only a natural obligation to an act when it is required by a natural passion, but there is no natural inclination leading us to perform promises as there is leading us to humanity and the natural virtue, 518, 519 (cf. 546); interest the first obligation to performance of promises: afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs and creates a new obligation, 522, 523; the fact that force invalidates promises shows they have no natural obligation, 525; obligation of allegiance, 541 (v. Government, § 2); there is a separate interest and therefore a separate obligation in obedience to the magistrate and the performance of promises, 544; and also there is a separate moral obligation in each, 546; there is a moral obligation to submit to government because every one thinks so, 547; the natural obligation to allegiance ceases when the interest ceases, but the moral obligation continues owing to the influence of general rules, 551; the strength of the moral obligation varies with that of the natural, 569, 573.
Occasion—and cause, no distinction between, 171.
Occupation—and property, 505 f.
Original—and secondary impressions, 275-6; distinguished from natural, 280, 281; whether virtue founded on original principles, 295; original constitution of the mind=nature, 368 (cf. 372); original instinct of the mind to unite itself with the good, 438.
'Ought' not distinguished from 'is,' nor explained by popular morality, 469.
Passions.
§ 1. Are secondary impressions (q.v. § 1) or impressions of reflection, i.e. they proceed from some original impression of sensation, 'either immediately or by the interposition of its idea,' 275 (cf. 7. 119); reflective impressions are calm or violent; the passions of love, joy, pride, and their opposites belong to the violent class, though the division is not exact, 276; divided into direct and indirect: the direct, e.g. desire, aversion, grief; joy, hope, fear, despair, security, arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure; the indirect, e.g. pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, pity, envy. malice, generosity, proceed from the same principles but by conjunction of other qualities, 276 (cf. 438).
§ 2. The indirect passions (v. Pride). Conversion of the idea of a passion into the very passion itself by sympathy (q.v.) 319 (cf. 576); association of ideas can never give rise to any passion, 305-6; law of the transition of passions opposed to that of the imagination and ideas, since passions pass most easily from strong to weak, 341-2; in case of conflict the law of the passions prevails over that of the imagination, 344-5, but its scope is less, since passions are associated only by resemblance, 343: passions 'susceptible of an entire union,' 366 (cf. 441); '’tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure which determines the character of any passion but the general bent or tendency of it from beginning to end,' 385 (cf. 190); a transition of passions may arise from (1) a double relation of impressions and ideas, (2) a conformity in tendency and direction of any two desires; when sympathy with uneasiness is weak it produces hatred by the former cause, when strong it produces love by the latter, 385 (cf. 420); any emotion attendant on a passion easily converted into it, even though contrary to it and with no relation to it, 419; double relation of impressions. and ideas only necessary to production of a passion, not to its transformation into another, 420 (cf. 385); hence passions made more violent by opposition, uncertainty, concealment, absence, 421-2; custom has most power to increase and diminish passions, 422; imagination influences the vivacity of our ideas of good and ill, and so our passions, 424, especially by sympathy, 427; influence of contiguity and distance in space and time, 427 f.; indirect passions often increase the force of the direct, 439; hope and fear caused by a mixture of grief and joy, 441; contrariety of passions results in (1) their alternate existence, (2) mutual destruction, (3) mixture, 441 (cf. 278); this depends on relation of ideas, 443; probability and passion, 444 f.; love of truth and curiosity, 448 f.; vanity, pity, and love, social passions, 491.
§ 3. A. Will (q.v.) and the direct passions and Reason (q.v.), 399 f.; will and direct passions exist and are produced in animals in the same way as in men, 448; will an immediate effect of pleasure and pain but not strictly passion, 399 (cf. 438); passions never produced by reasoning, only directed by it; they arise only from the prospect of pain or pleasure, hence reason can never be any motive to the will, 414, 492, 521, 526 (v. Moral, § 1); reason can never dispute the preference with any passion or emotion, thus 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,' 415, 457-8; 'the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition or the insufficiency of any means, our passions yield to our reason without any opposition,' 416; passions cannot be contrary to reason or truth, since they are original existences and not representative, 415, 458; they can only be contrary to reason so far as accompanied by some judgment, and then it is not the passion but the judgment which is unreasonable; '’tis not contrary to reason to prefer any acknowledged lesser good to any greater,' 416.
B. Calm passions or desires often confounded with reason because they produce little emotion, e.g. benevolence, and love of life, and general appetite to good and aversion to evil considered as such,' 417 (cf. 437); calm passions often determine the will in opposition to the violent; '’tis not the present uneasiness alone which determines men;' 'strength of mind'='prevalence of the calm passions above the violent,' 418; calm passions to be distinguished from weak, violent from strong; a calm passion is one 'which has become a settled principle of action,' 419 (cf. 631); the affections and understanding make up human nature and both are requisite in all its actions, 493; our passions often refuse to follow our reason, 'which is nothing but a general calm determination of the passions founded on some distant view or reflection,' 583.
C. Desire and direct passions, 438; 'arise from good considered simply, and aversion is derived from evil,' 439; 'besides good and evil, or in other words pain or pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse and instinct which is perfectly unaccountable,' e.g. desire of punishment to enemies and happiness to friends, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites; 'these passions strictly speaking produce good and evil, and proceed not from them like the other affections,' 439.
§ 4. Passions praised and blamed according as they are exercised with their natural and usual force, 483; our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course ofonr passions, 484; in the condition of man before society, selfishness and partiality are the usual passions and therefore praiseworthy, 488; 'every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions,' 488; a natural passion or inclination towards an act constitutes a natural obligation to do it, 518; 'all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions,' 532; praise and blame nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love and hatred, 614 (v. Moral, § 1).
§ 5. Personal identity as it concerns our passions to be distinguished from personal identity as it concerns our thought and imagination, 253; philosophy of our passions distinguished from strict philosophy in the matter of 'power,' 311.
Patriarchal theory of origin of government, 541.
Patriotism—306; anti-patriotic bias explained, 307.
Perception.
§ 1. Divided into impressions and ideas (q.v.), 1; simple and complex, 2; opposed to reasoning as passive to active, 'a mere passive admission of the impressions through the organs of sensation,' 73; may be and is caused by matter or motion, 246 f.; includes judgment, 456.
§ 2. Continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 187 f. (cf. 66), (v. Object); belief in this not derived from senses, 188-193; nor reason, 193, but imagination, 194 f.; it is the coherence and constancy of certain perceptions which makes us suppose their continued existence, 194, and distinguish between their existence and appearance, 199; the opinion of their distinct and continued existence is 'contrary to the plainest experience,' 210; the philosophic distinction between perceptions and objects is only 'a palliative remedy' and contains all the faults of the vulgar system with some of its own, 211; impossible to reason from existence of perceptions to that of objects, still more to their resemblance, 216, or to the resemblance of particular objects and perceptions, 217; our senses tell us that perceptions are our only objects, imagination tells us that our perceptions continue to exist even when not perceived, reflection tells us that this is false and yet we continue to believe it, 214; the vulgar make no distinction between perceptions and objects, 193, 202, 206, 209; though they consider that some of their perceptions have a continued and distinct existence and that some have not but are 'merely perceptions,' 192; the externality of our perceptions to ourselves not felt, 190-191; 'our idea of a perception and an object cannot represent what are specifically different from each other,' 241; the interposition of a perception or image necessary to make an external object known to the mind, 239; all discoverable relations of objects apply also to perceptions but not conversely, 242.
§ 3. All perceptions except those of sight and touch 'exist and yet are nowhere,' i.e. are neither figured nor extended and have no place, 236; perceptions do not exist like mathematical points, 239; extension a quality of perception, i.e. some perceptions are themselves extended. 40 (v. Extension, § 3).
§ 4. A perception can very well be separate from the mind, since the mind is only 'a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations,' 207; our resembling impressions are not really identical nor their existence continued, 210; 'all our perceptions may exist separately and have no need of anything to support their existence, 233, 633; all particular perceptions may exist separately and so are not necessarily related to a self or person, 252; when we look intimately into ourselves we never can find anything but some particular perceptions, 252, 456, 634; a man only a bundle of particular perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement,' 252; 'they are the successive perceptions which constitute the mind; no real bond perceived by understanding between perceptions, 259; yet the different perceptions which constitute the mind are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, and influence one another, 261; there is no satisfactory theory to explain the principles that unite our successive impressions in our thought or consciousness, 636 (v. Mind § 1).
Peripatetic fiction of sympathies and antipathies in nature, 224.
Person—(v. Identity, § 4, Mind). The object of love and hatred 'some other person of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious,' 329 'some person or thinking being,' 331; easy to pass from idea of another person to idea of self, but not the reverse way except in sympathy (q.v.), 340.
Philosophy (v. Scepticism).
§ 1. 19, 76, 78, 143, 165, 282; experimental and moral, 175: moral and natural, 282; contradictory phenomena to be expected in natural philosophy but not in mental, since 'the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known,' 366 (cf. 175); speculative and practical, 451; compared to hunting, 451; strict philosophy rejects the distinction between power (q.v.) and the exercise of it, but 'in the philosophy of our passions' there is room for it, 311; used as equivalent to 'reason,' 193; and religion, 250 (cf. 272); character of a true philosopher, 13.
§ 2. Philosophical opposed to natural relation, 14, 69, 73 f., 170 (v. Cause, § 6. C); 'unphilosophical probability,' 143 f. (v. Cause, § 8. D).
§ 3. A. Ancient, 219 f.; its fiction of substance or matter, 219; peripatetic, its distinction between substantial forms and substance, 221, 527; ancient, employs principles of imagination which are changeable, weak, and irregular, 'nor so much as useful in the conduct of life,' 225, 227.
B. Modern, 225f.; bases its belief in body (q.v.) or external objects on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 226; but by this system, 'instead of explaining the operation of external objects we utterly annihilate them and reduce ourselves to the most extravagant scepticism concerning them,' 228.
C. The opinion of true philosophers much nearer to that of the vulgar than is that of the false, 223; philosophers who 'abstract from the effects of custom and compare ideas' discover that there is no known connexion between objects, 223; false philosophers arrive at last by an illusion at the same indifference which the people attain by their stupidity, and true philosophers by their moderate scepticism, 224; all except philosophers suppose that those actions of the mind are the same which 'produce not a different sensation,' 417.
D. Philosophic fiction of 'state of nature,' 493.
§ 4. Only to be justified by 'the inclination which we feel towards employing ourselves after that manner,' 270; to be preferred as a guide in our speculations, for if it is just it only presents us with 'mild and moderate sentiments.' and if extravagant it is harmless, 271; errors in religion are dangerous, those in philosophy only ridiculous, 272.
Physical—and moral necessity, no distinction between, 171; physical and moral science, 175.
Pity—a secondary affection; arises from sympathy, 369; malice is pity reversed, 375; being painful is related to benevolence, which is pleasant, by similarity or correspondence of their impulses or direction, 381; a social passion, 491.
Place, 235 f. (v. Extension, § 3; Mind § 2).
Pleasure.
§ 1. and pain, a kind of impression to which no one attributes continued existence; they are regarded as 'merely perceptions,' 192; though just as involuntary and violent as other kinds: but they are not as constant as some others, 194; and though they have coherence it is 'of a somewhat different nature,' 195.
§ 2. and pain arlse originally in the soul or body, whichever you please to call it, 276 (cf. 324); the pleasure which we receive from praise arises through sympathy, 324; arises from sympathy alone which provides us with lively ideas, since every lively idea is agreeable, 353-4; and pain produce direct passions immediately, 276, 399, 438; 'good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain,' 439; and pain chief actuating principles of the human mind; without these we are in a great measure (cf. 439) incapable of passion or action, desire or volition, 574; why the pursuit of truth pleases, 448 f.; includes many different sensations, 472.
§ 3. and pain, 'if not the causes of virtue and vice at least inseparable from them,' 296; not only the necessary attendant but the essence of beauty, 299; and wit, 297 (cf. 590, 611); virtue and vice, a particular pleasure and pain excited by characters and actions considered generally, 472; moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure excited by a mental quality in ourselves or others, 574; this pain or pleasure may arise from four different sources, 591; each of the virtues excites a different feeling in the spectator, 607; transition from pleasure to love easy, 605; the pleasure of approbation can be excited by a quality which is not entirely voluntary in the possessor, 609 (v. Moral § 2-4; Sympathy, § 3. A)
§ 4. The only justification of philosophy, curiosity, or ambition to know is, that 'I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure if I did not gratify them,' 271; the most pleasant guide in our speculations to be preferred, 271.
Poetry—120, 131; poetic fiction of golden age. 494; and history: poetical enthusiasm and serious conviction differ through reflection and general rules, 631.
Points—mathematical, reality of, 32; ideas of, 38; coloured and solid, 40; physical, 40; penetration of, 41; finite divisibility of, 44.
Political—artifice can never be the sole cause of the distinction we make between virtue and vice, 500, 533, 578, an only alter the direction of the passions, 521.
Politics—controversies in, 'incapable of any decision in most cases, and entirely subordinate to the interests of pence and liberty,' 562.
Possession—long, a title to government, 556; present, 503, 557; first, 505; =power of using a thing, 506.
Power (v. Cause, § 9); distinction between power and its exercise inadmissible, 172; but though 'in a philosophical way of thinking' frivolous, it yet obtains in the philosophy of our passions, 311; the distinction not based os scholastic doctrine of free will, 312; sense of, compared with false sensation of liberty, 314; =possibility or probability of an action as discovered by experience; =anticipation or expectation of its being done, 313; the power of riches to acquire property{=}}the anticipation or expectation of the actual acquirement, 315 (cf. 360).
Praise—and blame, nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love and hatred, 614.
Prejudice—produced, and yet can only be corrected by general rules, 146 f.
Prescription—and property, 508.
Pride and Humility, 277 f.
§ 1. A. are indirect violent impressions of reflection, 276; being simple and uniform are indefinable, 277; pure emotions in the soul, and so distinguished from love and hatred, which are always attended by a desire, 367.
B. have the same object, viz. self, 371; which cannot however be their cause, 278 (cf. 443); in their cause distinguish between the quality which operates and the subject on which it is placed, e.g. in a beautiful house, beauty is the quality, the house 'considered as a man's property or contrivance' is the subject, for the subject must be something related to us, 179 (cf. 290); they have self as their object by a natural and also original propety, 280; their causes are natural but not original, 281-3.
C. Every cause of pride by its peculiar qualities produces a separate pleasure: the subject is either part of ourselves or something nearly related to us, 285; the object is determined by an original natural instinct and is self; pride is a pleasant feeling, 286; hence the pession is derived from a double relation of impressions and ideas: the cause is related to the object, the sensation which the cause separately produces to the sensation of pride: the one idea is easily converted into its correlative, and the one impression into that which resembles it, and these two movements mutually assist one another, 286; anything that gives a pleasant or painful sensation and is related to self can cause pride or humility, as the case may be, 288, 303.
D. These statemmts limited: (1) the relation between the subject and self must be close, closer than joy requires, 290; (2) the agreeable thing or subject must be peculiar to ourselves, 291 (cf. 302), (3) and evident both to ourselves and others, 292, (4) and constant and durable, 293 (cf. 302); (5) the passion is much assisted by general rules or custom, 293: a man can be proud and yet not happy, for these are many real evils which make us miserable, though they do not diminish pride, 294.
E. Besides 'the qualities of our mind and body, that is self,' any object particularly related to us can cause pride, 303; resemblance between cause and object seldom a foundation of either pride or humility, 394; the relations of contiguity and causation are required, 305: and also an association of impressions, 306; pride in country or birthplace, in travels, in friends and relations, 307; in family, 308; in property, 309, which is a particular species of causation, 310; in riches, 311, 312 (v. Power); the opinions of others also produce pride by means of sympathy (q.v.), 316-322.
F. Pride of animals, 324, due to same causes as in men—but they can only be proud of their bodies, not of their mind or external objects, since they have no sense of virtue and are incapable of the relations of right and property, 326; but the causes operate in same manner, 327; experiments to confirm this theory, 332 f.
G. Transition from pride to love not so easy as from love to pride, 339; the mind more prone to pride than humility, hence more pride in contempt than humility in respect, 390; pride and hatred invigorate the soul, love and humility deject it, 391 (cf. 295).
§ 2. A. Virtue and vice the most obvious causes of pride and humility because they always produce pleasure and pain respectively: thus the virtue of humility exalts, and the vice of pride mortifies us, 295 (cf. 286, 391); other qualities, such as wit, also produce pride because their essence is to please our taste, 297; pride not always vicious nor humility virtuous, for pride=the pleasure of self-satisfaction, and humility the reverse, 297; beauty also produces pride, 299, 300, as does that which is surprising, 301; health not a cause of pride because not peculiar nor constant, 302 (cf. 291).
B. Virtue and vice distinguished from pleasures produced by inanimate objects, by their power of exciting pride and humility, 473 (cf. 288); all qualities which produce pleasure also produce pride and love: therefore virtue and the power of producing pride, vice and the power of producing humility and hatred, are to be considered as equivalent with regard to our mental qualities: 'any quality of the mind is virtuous which causes love or pride,' 575; the same qualities always produce pride and love, humility and hatred, owing to sympathy, 589.
C. The vice and virtue of, 592 f.; they are called virtuous or vicious according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to others without any reflections on their tendency, 592; this due to sympathy and comparison, 593; sympathy causes pride to have in some measure the same effect as merit, but comparison causes us to hate it, and pride appears vicious to us, especially if we are ourselves proud, 596; pride advantageous to the possessor as increasing his power, and also agreeable, 597 (cf. 295, 391, 600); humility only required in externals, 598; heroic virtue is steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, 599 (v. Moral, § 2. A, 3. D; Sympathy, § 2, 3).
Primary and secondary qualities, 226-231 (v. Body).
Private—and public duties, 546; the proportions of private and national morality settled by the practice of the world, 569.
Probability (v. Cause, § 8)—and possibility, 133, 135; used in two senses: (1) including all evidence except knowledge, and so including arguments from cause and effect; (2) confined to uncertain arguments from conjecture, and distinguished both from knowledge and proof or arguments from cause and effect, 124; probable reasoning nothing but a species of sensation, 103; two kinds of, viz. uncertainty in the object itself or in the judgment, 444; general rules create a species of, which sometimes influences the judgment and always the imagination, 585; all knowledge degenerates into probability by consideration of the fallibility of our faculties, 180; but ever this estimate of our faculties is only probable, and this new probability diminishes the force of the former, and so a third probability will arise, and so on, ad infinitum, till at last we have a total extinction of belief and evidence, 182; a certain amount of probability is however always retained owing to the small influence which subtle doubt have on our imagination, so that our belief is really only affected by the first doubts, 185; the only remedy for scepticism is carelessness and inattention, 218 (v. Scepticism); explains distinction between power (q.v.) and its exercise, 313; probable reasoning influences direction of our passions, 414; influence of on our passions, 444 f.
Promises—The convention which establishes justice not a promise. 490; none in a state of nature, 501; obligation of, 516 f.; the rule which enjoins performance of, not natural because (1) a promise unintelligible before human conventions, (2) even if intelligible would not be obligatory, 516; the act of mind expressed by a, not a resolution or desire to perform anything, nor the willing the action, 516, nor the willing the obligation, 511, 518, 513, 524: we have no motive leading to their performance distinct from a sense of duty, 518 (cf. 478, § 522); there is no natural inclination to their performance as there is to be humane, therefore fidelity is not a natural virtue, 519; the rule to observe, is required to supplement the laws of nature concerning stability or transference of property, 520 (cf. 526); we create a new motive by a form of words or symbol by which we subject ourselves to the penalty of never being trusted again if we fail in fidelity: but interest the first obligation to their performance, 522; afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest and becomes a new obligation, 523; but the form of words soon becomes the chief part of the promise, which leads to certain contradictions, 524; the fact that force invalidates, shows they have no natural obligation, 525; performance of, a third fundamental law of nature invented by man, 526, its obligation antecedent to government: they are the original sanction of government and the source of the first obligation to obedience, 541; but allegiance quickly gets an obligation of its own, and so all government does not rest on consent, 543; the moral obligations of promises and allegiance different, as well as the natural obligations of interest, 545 (cf. 519) (v. Government, Obligation).
Property.
§ 1. A very close relation and the most common source of pride, 309; definition ot; 310; a particular species of causation, 310; animals incapable of the relation of property, 326; a quality perfectly insensible and even inconceivable apart from the sentiments of the mind, 515 (cf. 509); the quality which we call property is no sensible quality of the object, no relation of the object, but an internal relation, i.e. some influence which the external relations of the object have on the mind and actions, 527; admits of no degrees, 529, except in the imagination, 531.
§ 2. And justice (q.v. § 2) their origins, 484 f.; none in a state of nature, 501; unintelligible without an antecedent morality, 462 n, 491; a moral not a natural relation, 491; none independent of justice, 526.
§ 3. The rule that property shall be stable requires further determination by other rules, 502; that property shall be suitable to the person not one of these, 502; the rule that every one shall continue to enjoy what he is at present possessed of rests on custom, 503; imagination always the chief source of such rules, 504 n, 509 n; the utility of this rule confined to first formation of society, 505; afterwards the chief rules are those of (1) occupation or first possession: this not based on man's property in his labour, 505 n; impossible to determine where possession begins and ends, 506; its extent not determinable by reason or imagination, 507; (2) prescription or long possession: since property in this case is produced by time, it cannot be any real thing in the object but only the offspring of the sentiments, 509; (3) accession, 509, which can only be explained by imagination, which in this case proceeds from great to little, contrary to its usual course, 509-510 ns; small objects become accessions to great, not conversely, 511 n; illustration from rivers, confusion, and commixtion, 512 n; Procius and Sabinus, 513 n; (4) succession, assisted by association and ideas, 510, largely depends on imagination, 513 n; in transference of, by consent, 514, delivery required, 515; but since property is insensible delivery can only be symbolic, which resembles the superstitious practices of the Catholics. 515 (cf. 524); stability and transference of, laws of nature, 526 (cf. 514); the relation which determine, too numerous to proceed from nature, and also they are changeable by human laws, 528.
Proof—assurance derived from arguments from cause and effect; some times included under probable reasoning, sometime not, 124 (cf. 103); sensible distinguished from demonstrative, 449.
Proportion—'of ideas considered as such,' one kind of truth, 448; in equality or number, a demonstrable relation, 464.
Proposituri—(v. Judgment).
Prudence—tries to 'conform our actions to the general usage and custom,' 599; placed by some moralists at the head of the virtues, though only a 'natural ability,' 610.
Public—opposed to private (q.v.), 546, 569.
Punishment—can only be justified by doctrine of necessity, 411.
Quality—a source of relation, 15; degree in a demonstrable relation perceived by intuition, 70, 464; power, and necessity, and extension, qualities of perceptions, 166 f., 239; unknown qualities possible, 168 (cf. 172); our idea of a body, a collection of ideas of sensible qualities, 219; 'every quality, being a distinct thing from another, may be conceived to exist apart and may exist apart not only from every other quality but from that unintelligible chimaera of a substance,' 222; fiction of occult quality, 224; distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 226-231 (v. Body); sensible or secondary qualities, 227; the quality which operates distinguished from the subject in which it is placed in the cause of pride (q.v. § 1, Cause, § 10), 279, 330; permanent qualities in a person 'which remain after an action is performed,' 349; we are only to consider the quality or character from which the action proceeded, 575; only mental qualities virtuous or vicious, 607; natural qualities, 530.
Quantity—and number a source of relation, 14; proportion in quantity or number a demonstrable relation, 70, 464.
Reality (v. Existence)—two classes of realities, one the object of the memory and senses, the other of the judgment, 108; 'we commonly think an object has a sufficient reality when its being is uninterrupted and independent of the incessant revolutions of which we are conscious in ourselves, 191: will places us in the 'world of realities' as opposed to the 'world of ideas' which is the province of demonstration, 414; truth=an agreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter offact, 448.
Reason.
§ 1. Distinctions of, e.g. between figure and body figured, 25, 43; not reason but custom determines us to pass from the impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, 97; opposed to imagination, 108, 268; opposed to experience, 157; three kinds of, knowledge, proofs, and probability, 124; can never give rise to idea of efficacy since (1) it can never give rise to any original idea (cf. 164); (2) as distinguished from experience can never make us conclude that a cause is necessary to every beginning of existence, 157 (cf. 79, 172); of animals, inferred from the resemblance of their actions to man's, 176 (cf. 610); 'is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls,' 179; scepticism with regard to, 180 f., can only be cured by carelessness and inattention, 218, 269; informs us of distance or outness, 191; does not distinguish between different kinds of perceptions, 192; neither does nor can ever give us an assurance of the continued and distinct existence of body, 193; reason or reflection in conflict with imagination or instinct, telling us that all our perceptions are interrupted, 215 (cf. 266); opposition between reason and the senses, or rather between arguments from cause and effect, and arguments which convince us of continued and independent existence of body, 231, 266; shows us the impossibility of giving the taste of a fruit local relation to its shape, etc., 238; opposed to imagination: 'we have no choice left but between a false reason and none at all,' 268; is the discovery of truth and falsehood, 458; either compares ideas or infers matters of fact: it is concerned either with relations of objects or matters of fact, 463 (cf. 413); argument from 'pure reason,' opposed to argument from authority, 546; chief ground of superiority of men to beasts, 610 (cf. 176).
§ 2. A. Reason and will, 413 f.; can never be any motive to the will, 414 (cf. 457); can never prevent volition, and 'is and only ought to be the slave of the passions,' 415; a passion cannot be contrary to reason, '’tis not unreasonable to prefer my acknowledged, lesser good to my greater,' 416 (cf. 458); calm desires or passions confused with reason, 417, 437, 536, 583 (v. Passion, § 3).
B. Moral distinctions not derived from reason, 455 f.; reason is 'perfectly inert,' and 'can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience or a sense of morals,' 457, 458; actions can be neither true nor false, contrary or conformable to reason, 458; virtue and vice are neither relations nor matters of fact, they are objects of feeling not of reason, 463-9 (v. Moral, § 1).
Reasoning—a comparison of two objects and discovery of their constant or inconstant relations, properly employed in the absence of at least one object from sensation, 73; opposed to perception, 73, 87, 89 (cf. 103); does not require three ideas, e.g. we infer a cause immediately from its effect, and this is the strongest kind of reasoning, 97 n; resolvable into conception, 97 n; implies antecedent possession of ideas, 164; probable, nothing but a species of sensation, 103; (cf. 73, 625); influence of reasoning from cause and effect on will, 119; and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception which 'tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy, 184; the conviction which arises from subtle reasoning diminishes in proportion to the effort required to enter into it, 186 (cf. 455); demonstrative and probable: the province of the former is 'the world of ideas' as opposed to the 'world of realities.' 413; is merely an operation of our thoughts and ideas, and nothing can enter into our conclusions but ideas or fainter conceptions, 625 (cf. 103).
Rebellion (v. Resistance).
Reflection—impressions of, 7, 84, 276; cannot destroy belief, 184; 'reason or reflection,' 215; artificial=that which is the result of reflection, 484; changes directions of passions, 492; on tendency of characters and passions to produce happiness, the chief source of moral sentiments, 589; continually required to correct appearance of objects to our senses, 603.
Relation. `
§ 1. A. Relations a class of complex ideas produced by association, 13; defined and divided into philosophical and natural, 14 (cf. 94, 69, 170); seven sources of philosophical relation, 14; physiological explanation of, 60; of causation, an impression of reflection, 165; perfect, between two objects implies a 'vibration of imagination,' i.e. an equal ease in passing from either to the other, 355; contiguity, succession, and resemblance independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168; impossible to found a relation except on some common quality, 236.
B. Four kinds only of philosophical relation are 'objects of knowledge and certainty' and 'the foundation of science,' as 'depending solely upon ideas,' and unalterable so long as the ideas continue the same, 69 (cf. 413, 463); viz. resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, which are discoverable at first sight by intuition, 70, and proportions in quantity or number, which can only be settled precisely by arithmetic and algebra, and less precisely by geometry, 71.
C. Discovery of constant or inconstant relations of two objects by comparison, the function of all reasoning, 73; discovery of relations of time and place and identity the work of perception rather than reasoning, 73; three inconstant relations which depend not upon the idea and they are only probable, 73; the discovery of causation the special work of reasoning, for it is the only relation of its class which can be traced beyond our senses and informs us of existences and objects which we do not see or feel, 74 (cf. 103); causation a natural as well as a philosophical relation, 15, 94 (v. Cause, §§ 2, 3); property a very close relation, 309, 310; animals incapable of relations of property and right, 326; but relation of ideas and impressions exists for animals, who show 'an evident judgment' of causation, 327.
D. Contiguity, resemblance, and causation not only transport the mind from the impression to the idea but also convey the vivacity of the former to the latter, 98 f. (v. Sympathy); only causation a source of belief, 107; resemblance employed in all arguments from cause and effect, 142; exact resemblance of the present object to one of the two constantly conjoined objects necessary to arguments from cause and effect, 153; also resemblance of all past instances to one another, 163 f. (v. Cause, § 7 C, § 9 B).
§ 2. Ideas related by contiguity, causation, and resemblance, impressions only by resemblance, 283, 343 (cf. 381); double relation of impressions and ideas, 286, 381 (v. Pride); of ideas opposed in direction to that of impressions, 339; identity (q.v.) produces a stronger relation than the most perfect resemblance, 341; relation of ideas forwards that of impressions, since its absence alone is able to prevent it, 380; one impression may be related to another not only where their sensations are resembling, but also where their impulses or directions are similar or correspondent, 381; thus pity which is painful is related to benevolence which is pleasant, 382, 384; parallel direction of desires is a 'real relation,' 394; a transition of passions may arise either from a double relation of impressions and ideas or a conformity in direction and tendency of any two desires, 385; double relation of impressions and ideas only necessary to production of a passion not to its transformation into another, 420; the predominant passion swallows up the inferior even without any relation, 419; of ideas, explains mixture of grief and joy in hope and fear, 443.
§ 3. vice and virtue not relations, 463 f.; if they are any of the demonstrable relations, then inanimate objects are virtuous and vicious, since they are susceptible of these relations, 464; to say that reason discovers such an action in such relations to be virtuous does not make virtue a relation, 464 n.; if they are relations, these relations must be solely between external objects and internal actions: but there are no such peculiar relations, 465; thus all the relations which we discover in ingratitude between men are found between inanimate objects, and those of incest between animals, 466-7; even if there were such relations it would be impossible to show their universal obligatoriness and effect on action, 465-6 (cf. 496); property a moral not a natural relation, 491.
Religion—and philosophy, 250; 'errors in religion are dangerous. those in philosophy only ridiculous,' 272; a cause of the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty, tho' that of necessity is not only harmless buteven essential to it, 409 f.; a 'blamable method of reasoning' to condemn a doctrine because it is dangerous to religion, 499 (cf. 241, 271 f.); based on miracles. 474.
Repentance—and forgiveness require doctrine of necessity, 412.
Resemblance (v. Relation)—a source of association, 11; a source of philosophic relation, 14; a demonstrable relation, discovered by intuition, 69, 70, 413, 463: between an impression and an idesa enlivens the latter, 99, 110 (cf. 142 f., 163 f.); illustrated, from pictures and ceremonies, 100; not a source of belief because it does not compel the mind, 107; but assists belief, and want of it destroys belief, 113; used in all arguments from cause and effect, 142; in analogy, 142; produces a new impression in the mind, 165; independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168: the most fertile source of error, 61; of our perceptions at different times=constancy, and makes us consider our resembling impressions as individually the same, as one single identical impression, 199: this belief the result of another resemblance, viz. between the act of mind in contemplating an identical object and in contemplating a succession of resembling objects, 202, since 'ideas which place the mind in the same or a similar disposition are very apt to be confounded, 203, 204 n, 253 f. (v. Identity, Error); we can never argue from existence of perceptions to their resemblance to objects, 217; an impression must resemble its idea, 232; depends on memory, 261, and produces notion of personal identity (q.v.), 253 f., 261; impressions associated only by resemblance, 283, 343; between cause and object of pride not sufficient to produce it, 304-5; a cause of sympathy, 318, 320; identity of impressions produces a stronger connexion than the most perfect resemblance, 341.
Resistance—right of, not based on origin of government in consent, 549; passive obedience an absurdity, 552; impossible for philosophy to establish any particular rules to tell when resistance is lawful, 562; more often lawful in mixed than absolute governments, 564.
Respect—and contempt, 389; a mixture of love and humility, 390.
Responsibility—requires doctrine of necessity, 411.
Revolution—the English, 563.
Riches—311; esteem for the rich, 357, arises chiefly from sympathy with the imagined satisfaction of the owner, 359-362 (cf. 616).
Right—animals incapable of relation of right, 326; implies an antecedent morality, 462 n, 491.
Rules.
§ 1. Rules to judge of cause and effect. 173 f. (cf. 149, 631) (v. Cause, § 11); of demonstrative science certain and infallible but in the application of them our faculties are liable to err, 180.
§ 2.—General, 141; a source of unphilosophic probability or prejudice, 146; influence judgment even contrary to present observation and experience, 147; used by judgment to distinguish between essential and accidental circumstances, 149 (cf. 173); set in opposition to one another, for it is only by following general rules that we correct the prejudice resulting from them, 149; illustrated by satire, 150; and law of honour, 153; correct appearances of the senses and make the difference between serious conviction and poetical enthusiasm, 631-2; their influence on pride, 293, 598; require a certain uniformity of experience and a superiority of positive over negative instances, 362; their influence on imagination in sympathy, 371; able to impose on the very senses, 374, cf. 147; all ordinary general rules admit of exceptions, but those of justice are inflexible and therefore highly artificial, 532; preserve moral obligation long after the natural obligation has ceased, 551; settle title to government, 555; largely extend duty of modesty, 573.
§ 3. Correct the variations in our sympathies and so give steadiness to our sentiments of morals, 581 f. (cf. 602); cause us to find beauty and virtue in things and acts which are not actually any good to any one, 584 f.; create a species of probability which always influences the imagination, 585, and so remove the contradiction between the extensive sympathy on which our sentiments of virtue depend and that limited generosity which is natural to man and the source of justice, 586.
Salic law, 561.
Satire, 150.
Scepticism.
§ 1. With regard to the reason (q.v.), 180 f.; consideration of the fallibility of our faculties reduces all knowledge to probability and ultimately produces a total extinction of belief and evidence, 180-3; but such total scepticism impossible; 'nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel,' 185; it only shows us that all reasonings are founded on custom and that belief is not a simple act of thought but a kind of sensation, 'which 'tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy,' 184; we always retain a certain degree of belief, because effort to understand sceptical subtleties weakens their power, 185; and so the force of all sceptical arguments is broken by nature, 187, 268; the expeditious way which some take with the sceptics, saying that they employ reason to destroy reason, is not the best answer to them, 186; does not justify dogmatism, but they are mutually destructive, though happily nature does not wait for that consummation, 187.
§ 2. With regard to the senses, 187 f.; just as the sceptic is compelled to reason and believe, so by nature he is compelled to assent to the existence of body (q.v.): 'it is vain to ask whether there be body or not,' 187; shows us (1) that the senses afford no justification for the belief in body, 188; (2) that this belief is the result of an illegitimate propensity of imagination, 193 f.; (3) that the philosophic system of a double existence of objects and perceptions is a monstrous offspring of two opposing systems, 313; (4) that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities destroys external objects altogether, and results in an extravagant scepticism, 228; moderate, of the true philosopher leads to the same indifference as the stupidity of the vulgar or the illusions of the false philosopher, 224.
§ 3. In general, 263 f.; the only criterion of truth, the only reason for assent to any opinion, is 'a strong propensity to consider objects in that view under which they appear to me;' this due to imagination worked on by experience and habit; memory, sense, and understanding all founded on imagination or the vivacity of our ideas 265; but imagination leads us to directly contrary opinions, 266, cf. 231; and yet we cannot rely solely on 'the understanding, that is, the general and more established principles of imagination,' for understanding alone entirely subverts itself, 267 (cf. 182 f.); we are saved from this total scepticism only by the week influence of abstruse reasonings on the imagination, 268 (cf. 185); yet we cannot reject all abstract reasoning—we have no choice but between a false reason and none at all,' 268; nature supplies the ordinary remedy of indifference, and my scepticism shows itself most perfectly in blind submission to senses and understanding, 269; we can only justify scepticism or philosophy by our inclination towards it; because 'I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure if I did not pursue them,' 270; since we cannot rest content with every-day conversation and action, we ought only to deliberate about our choice of a guide, and choose the safest and most agreeable, viz. Philosophy, whose errors are only ridiculous and whose extravagances do not influence our lives, 271; all we want is a satisfactory set of opinions, and we are most likely to get them by studying human nature, 272; 'a true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophic doubts as well as of his philosophic convictions, and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction which offers itself upon account of either of them;' nor will he deny himself certainty in particular points, 273.
Scholastic—doctrine of free will, 313.
Self (v. Identity, § 4, Mind, Sympathy).
Selfishness—of man much over-estimated, since it is 'rare to meet any one in whom the kind affections taken together do not overbalance the selfish;' still each man loves himself better than any other single person, 487: a source of justice, 487 f., 494, 500; contradiction between the extensive sympathy, which is the source of our sentiments of morals, and the limited generosity, which is natural to man, and the source of justice, removed by general rules, 586; self-love, 480.
Sensation (v. Feeling)—opposed to reasoning, 89; probable reasoning nothing but a species of sensation, 103; confusion between, and judgment in vision, 112; 'tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure which determines the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency of it from beginning to end, 385; all except philosophers imagine 'that those actions of the mind are the same which produce not a different sensation,' 417; our own sensations determine the vice and virtue of any quality as well as those sensations which it may excite in others, 597 (cf. 469 f.).
Sense—moral, the source of moral distinctions, 470 f. (v. Moral, § 2); a very plausible hypothesis that the source of all sentiments of virtue is 'a certain sense which acts without reflection, and regards not the tendencies of actions and qualities,' 612.
Senses—scepticism with regard to, 187 f. (v. Scepticism, § 1); cannot tell us of continued existence of perceptions for that would mean that they operate when they have ceased to operate, 188; nor of their distinct existence, neither as models of impressions (q.v.), since they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give as the least intimation of anything beyond, 189, nor by an illusion, since all sensations are felt by the mind as they really are, 189, 190 (cf. Appearance); also to present our impressions as distinct from ourselves the senses would have to present both the impressions and ourselves at the same time, 189; whereas it is very doubtful how far we ourselves are the object of our senses, 190 (v. Identity, § 4); as a matter of fact the senses only present impressions as external to our body, which is not the same as external to ourselves, 191; again sight does not really inform us of distance or outness, but reason, 191; three kinds of impressions conveyed by, 192 (v. Impressions); so far as the senses are judges all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence, 193; 'founded on imagination or the vivacity of our ideas,' 265; require continual correction, and we could have no language or conversation 'did we not correct the momentary appearances of things and overlook our present situation, 582, 603; appearances of, corrected by the understanding, 632 (cf. 189).
Sensible—proof, opposed to demonstrative, 449.
Shaftesbury, 254.
Simplicity—supposed, of bodies leads to fiction of substance, 219.
Society (v. Justice, § 2)—necessary to supply men's wants, 485; in instance produced by natural appetite between sexes, 486; and afterwards by reflection on common interest leading to a convention which is not a promise, 487; this reflection so simple and obvious that the savage state cannot last long, and 'man's very first state and condition may justly be esteemed social,' 493; 'state of nature' a philosophic fiction, 493; vanity, pity, love, social passions, 491; no promises before society, 516; government not necessary to all societies, but arises from foreign war, 540; the stale of, without government, 'one of the most natural states of men,' and survives long after the first generation, but no society can be maintained without justice, 541; as ancient as the human species, and the laws of nature as ancient as society, 543; social virtues, 578.
Solidity—a 'primary quality,' 227; cannot possess 'real continued and independent existence' if colours, sounds, etc. be regarded as merely perceptions,' 228; our 'modern philosophy' leaves no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity, nor consequently of matter, 239; =impossibility of annihilation, but this implies some real object to be annihilated, 230; no impressions from which idea of, can be derived: not from touch for (1) 'tho' bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is quite a different thing from the solidify, and they have not the least resemblance to each other,' 230, (2) impressions of touch are simple impressions. idea of solidity is compound, (3) impressions of touch are variable, 231.
Soul (v. Mind)—immortality of, 114; 'soul or body whichever you please to call it,' the place in which pleasures and pains arise, 276.
Space (v. Extension, § 1)—a source of philosophic relation, 14; infinite divisibility of, 29 f.; extension consists of indivisible parts, because such an idea implies no contradiction, 33; summary of argument, 39; objections answered, 40 f.; origin of our idea of, 33 f.; idea of, a copy of coloured poi its and of the manner of their appearance, 34: the parts of, are impressions of coloured and solid atoms, 38; no vacuum, 40; idea of vacuum, 53 f.; explanation of way in which we fancy we have an idea of empty space, 62 fl; parts of, coexistent, 427; qualities of, in relation to the passions, 429 f.
Spinoza—his hideous hypothesis almost the same with that of the immateriality of the soul, 241 f.; his theory of modes, 242; his system and that of the theologians have all their absurdities in common, 243-4.
Spontaneity—liberty of, opposed to violence, 407 (v. Necessity, § 2).
Standard—of morals fixed and unalterable, owing to intercourse of sentiments in society and conversation, 603 (cf. 581) (v. Moral, § 3. B).
Strength—vagueness of term, 105, 629; of mind=prevalence of calm passions over violent, 418; of a passion to be distinguished from its violence, 419 (cf. 631).
Subject—and substance, 242 f.; in which the quality is placed distinguished from the quality which operates, the two together forming the cause, 279, 285 (v. Pride).
Substance.
§ 1. A. Substances, a class of complex ideas produced by association, 13; idea of substance, a collection of simple ideas, united by imagination, which have a common name assigned to them, 16.
B. Fiction of, to support; the supposed simplicity and identity of bodies, 219 f.; 'an unintelligible chimaera,' 222; peripatetic distinction of substance and substantial form, 221; the whole system incomprehensible, 222; no impression from which the idea of it can be derived, 232 (cf. 633); definition of, as 'something which may exist by itself,' 'agrees to everything which can possibly be conceived,' 233.
§ 2. Of the soul, 232 f.; (v. Mind), 'the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible,' 250; impossible to conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance, just as it is to conjoin all thought with extension, 239; 'the doctrine of immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism,' and is the same as Spinoza's doctrine of the unity of substance in which both thought and matter inhere, 240 f.; theory of mode and substance of Spinoza and theologians compared, 243-4; are self and substance the same? 635.
Success makes us take pleasure in ends which originally were not pleasant, 451.
Succession.
§ 1. Independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168; confounded with identity, 204, 254 f.; self a succession of perceptions, 277; no satisfactory theory to explain principles that unite our successive impressions in our thought or consciousness, 636 (v. Time, Identity, § 3, 4).
§ 2. And property, 505, 513; and government, 559; aided by imagination, e.g. the claims of Cyrus, 560.
Superstition—and philosophy, 271.
Surprise, 301.
Sympathy.
§ 1. A. (v. Identity, § 4), explained by the conversion of an idea into an impression, 317, 427; the idea or impression of self is always present and lively, 317, 330 (cf. 340); so any object related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, 317; now other people very closely resemble ourselves (cf. 359, 575); so this resemblance makes us easily enter into their sentiments; the relations of contiguity and causation assist, and all together convey the impression or consciousness of one person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, 318, 320; and thus the idea of another's sentiment or passion may be 'so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion,' 319; since all ideas are borrowed from impressions, and only differ from them in vivacity, this difference being removed, the ideas of the passions of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, 319 (cf. 371); relations produce sympathy by means of the association between the idea of another's person and that of our own, 322 (cf. 576); in sympathy the mind passes from idea of self to that of another object, which is contrary to the law of transition of ideas; it does so because 'ourself independent of the perception of every other object is in reality nothing,' so 'we must turn our view to external objects and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us or resemble us,' 349; every human creature resembles ourselves and by that means has an advantage over every other object in operating ou the imagination, 359; 'the minds of men are mirrors to one another,' 365; we only infer the passion with which we sympathise from its external signs (cf. 371); 'no passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind,' all the affections readily pass from one person to another, as motion between strings equally wound up, 576.
§ 1. B. The source of pity, 369 f.; 'the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises by a transition from affections which have no existence,' 370 (cf. 319, 584); 'we carry our fancy from the cause, misfortune, to the usual effect, sorrow; first conceive a lively idea of his passion and then feel an impression of it, the imagination being here affected by the 'general rule' 371 (cf. 319); 'we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others which are not in being and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination,' 385; this requires a great effort of imagination which must be assisted by some present lively impression, 386.
C. Arises from two different causes, (1) a double relation of impressions and ideas, (2) parallel direction of impulses, thus when sympathy with uneasiness is weak it produces hatred by the former cause, when strong it produces love by the latter, 385: also since we judge of objects by comparison more than as they are in themselves, an opposite passion sometimes arises by sympathy to that which is felt by the other person, 375 (cf. 589); often takes place under the appearance of its contrary, e.g. when contradiction increases my passion, for the sentiments of others can never affect us but by becoming in some measure our own: comparison directly contrary to sympathy in its operation, 593; requires greater force and vivacity in the idea which is converted into an impression than does comparison, 595; of a partial kind, 'which views its objects only on one side,' 371; double, 389; a double rebound of, 602.
§ 2. Is found in all men, and is the source of uniformity of temper in men of the same nation, 317; assists love and hatred, 349; a cause of love of relations, and acquaintance, because by it we are supplied with lively ideas, and every lively idea is agreeable, 353; with others, is agreeable only 'by giving an emotion to the spirits,' 354; the chief cause of our esteem for the rich, which is often disinterested, 358, 361, 616; observable through whole animal creation, 363, 398; especially in man, who can form no wish which has not a reference to society, 363; even in pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, lust, the soul or animating principle is sympathy, 363; source of beauty, 364; hence we find beauty in everything useful, 576; a reason why utility is necessary to make truth pleasant, 450.
§ 3. A. The reason why other men's judgments influence us, 320; the source of the pleasure we receive from praise, 323; with the opinion of others makes us regard our own unjust acts as vicious, 499: with public interest, the source of the moral approbation which attends justice, 500; sense of beauty depends largely on our sympathy with pleasure of the possessor of the object or quality, 576; in the same way often produces our sentiments of morals; is the source of the esteem which we pay to all the artificial virtues,' 577; it also gives rise to many of the other virtues, viz. to all those which we approve because they tend to the good of mankind, 578; we have no extensive concern for society except by sympathy, 579; makes us approve of qualities beneficial to the possessors, even though they be strangers, 586 (cf. 591); explains fact that the same qualities always cause pride and love, 589; enables us to survey ourselves as we appear to others and even to disapprove of qualities advantageous to ourselves, 589; the source of the vice and virtue which we attribute to pride and humility, 592; 'so close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches than he diffuses on me all his opinions and draws along my judgment in a greater or less degree,' hence I naturally consider a man in the same light as he considers himself, 592; causes pride to have in some degree the same effect as merit, 595; we have an immediate sympathy with characters similar to our own, 604; the chief source of moral distinctions, 618; and a very noble source, more so than any original instinct of the human mind, 619.
§ 3. B. Objections (1) that sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem: hence our esteem proceeds not from sympathy, 581; (2) even though a mental quality produces no good to any one yet we still esteem it virtuous: 'virtue in rags is virtue still,' but there can be no sympathy with a good of mankind which docs not exist, 584 (cf. 370, 371); this due to 'general rules': we make it a rule to sympathise 'only with those who have any commerce with the people we consider,' 583 (cf. 602); 'the contradiction between the extensive sympathy on which our sentiments of virtue depend, and that limited generosity which is natural to man and the source of justice,' removed by supposing the influence of 'general rules,' 586.
Taste—the only judge of wit, 297; can there be a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty? 541 n.
Theologians—their doctrine of a thinking substance a true atheism, and the same as Spinoza's, 240 f; their system and Spinoza's have all their absurdities in common, 243.
Thought (v. Mind, Matter)—its relation to extension, 234 f.; the materialists wrong who conjoin all thought with extension, 235; as also their antagonists who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance, 239, whether they regard it as a 'modification' or 'mode,' 243, or as an 'action' of the thinking substance, 244; can be and is caused by matter or motion, 'since everyone may perceive that the different dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments,' 248; 'by comparing their ideas we find that thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience that they are constantly united,' and therefore the one is the cause of the other, 248.
Time (v. Succession)—a source of philosophic relation, 14; infinite divisibility of, 29 f.; essence of, that its parts are never coexistent. therefore composed of indivisible moments, 31 (cf. 429); idea of, derived from the succession of our perceptions of every kind, 35; no idea of time alone, 36; idea of, not derived from any particular impression, whether of sensation or reflection, but from the manner in which impressions appear, 37 (cf. 96); ideas of time or duration applied by a fiction to unchangeable objects, 37 (cf. 65); indivisible moments of, filled with some real object or existence, 39; hence no empty time, 40, 65; annihilated by assertion of coexistence of cause and effect, 76; or duration, intermediate between unity and number, and hence the source of the idea of identity, 201; relation of 'coexistence in general' distinguished from relation of 'contemporaneity in appearance to the mind,' 237; contiguity and distance in, 427 f.; produces nothing real, therefore property, being produced by time, is not any real thing in the objects, but is the offspring of the sentiments, 515.
Touch—impressions of, not source of idea of solidity, 230-1; impressions of sight and touch, source of our idea of extension and space, 235; and are the only ones which are themselves 'figured and extended,' 236 f.
Tragedy, 121.
Truth—and poetry, 121; criterion of, to be found in feeling (q.v.), 265; we cannot hope for a true, but only a satisfactory set of opinions, 272; or reason, contradiction to, consists in the disagreement of ideas considered as copies with those objects which they represent, 415; two kinds of (1) the discovery of proportions of ideas considered as such, (2) the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence, 448; truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Thus since passions, volitions, and actions are 'original facts and realities complete in themselves,' they cannot be either true or false, 458 cf. 415; only judgments can be true or false, 416, 458; an action improperly called true as joined with a true judgment, 459; love of, and curiosity, 428 f.; why truth pleases; (1) because it requires exertion and attention, (2) because it is useful, though utility only acts here through sympathy and by fixing our attention, 449-51.
Understanding—acts of, 97; subsequent to conception and conditioned by it, 164; contiguity, succession, and resemblance independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168; never observes any real connexion among objects, 260; founded on imagination or the vivacity of our ideas, 265; we cannot adhere solely to the understanding, that is, to the general and more established properties of the imagination,' for 'understanding, when it acts alone according to its most general principles entirely subverts itself,' 267 (cf. 182 f.); opposed to imagination. 371 n; remedies the incommodiousness of the affections, 489, by changing their direction, 492; understanding, as well as the affections, necessary to all the actions of human nature; the philosophers who invented the 'state of nature' considered the effects of the latter without those of the former, 493: corrects appearances of the senses, 632.
Uniformity of nature—indemonstrable, 89; the foundation not the result of probability, 90; the principle oil based on custom, 105, 133, 134; the basis of inference after one experiment, 105; a source of probability indirectly, 135 (v. Cause, § 6. B).
Unity—distinguished from identity, 200.
Usual—=natural (q.v.), 483, 549; the usual force of the passions a standard of praise, 483, 488.
Utility—makes truth agreeable, but only by sympathy, 450; a source of beauty, 576; a source of our sentiments of morals through sympathy, 577.
Vacuum—idea of, 53 f., 638 (v. Space).
Vanity—a 'social passion,' 491.
Violent—impressions of reflection divided into calm and violent, the passions being violent, 276; violent to be distinguished from strong passions, and calm from weak, 419.
Vivacity—alone distinguishes impressions from ideas, 1 (cf. 319); vagueness of the term 105 cf. 629; communicated by an impression to its related idea, 98 f., 119; and unphilosophical probability, 144; every kind of opinion or judgment which amounts not to knowledge is derived entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and these qualities constitute in the mind what we call the belief of the existence of any object, 153 (v. Cause, § 7); of our ideas or imagination the basis of all assent, and the foundation of the senses, memory, and understanding, 165; not a ground of the distinction of our impressions into 'mere perceptions,' and perceptions that have a continued and distinct existence, 194; every lively idea agreeable, 353; not the only difference between ideas; ideas really feel different, 636; synonymous with force, solidity, firmness, steadiness, 629.
Virtue (v. Moral).
Vision—sight does not inform us of distance or outness, but reason, 191; sight and touch give us our ideas of extension, 235; only impressions of sight and touch are figured and extended, 236 f.
Volitions—are original facts and realities, so neither true nor false, conformable nor contrary to reason, 458; an immediate effect of pain and pleasure, 574 (v. Will).
War-foreign, the source of Government, 540.
Will.
§ 1. A. An exertion of converts power into action, 12 (cf. 172); influenced by vivid ideas of pleasure and pain, 119; scholastic and popular doctrines of, 312; and motive, 312; inconstancy of will of man, 313; and direct passions, 399 f.; not strictly passion, though an immediate effect of pleasure and pain: 'by will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perceptions of our mind:' this impression indefinable, 399 (cf. 518); volition a direct passion, 438; 'the will exerts itself when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body,' 439; volitions as original existences neither true nor false, reasonable nor unreasonable, 458; 'will or choice,' 467: possessed by animals, 468; will=character or something durable or constant in man, 411, 412 (cf. 348, 575).
B. Willing an obligation strictly impossible, 517; the will never creates new sentiments and therefore cannot create a new obligation, 518 (cf. 399); but we feign the willing an obligation in order to avoid contradictions, 523.
§ 2. A.. Liberty and necessity of, 400 f. (v. Necessity); false sensation or experience of liberty by the agent who feels the easy movement of his will on either side, and imagines that the will is subject to nothing, and makes a fallacious experiment to prove it, 408; 'I do not ascribe to will that unintelligible necessity which is supposed to lie in matter, but I ascribe to matter that intelligible quality … which the most rigid orthodoxy must allow to belong to will, 410; the will only a cause, and like other causes has no discoverable connexion with its effects: we can never see the connexion of a volition with a motion of the body, still less with an action of the mind, 651; we only perceive the constant conjunction of the actions of the mind as we do of those of matter, 653.
B. Influencing motives of, 413 f.; reason (q.v.) alone can never be any motive to the will: demonstration is concerned with the world of ideas, 'will always places us in that of realities:' probable reasoning only directs a desire or aversion which already exists, 414; reason incapable of preventing volition, 415; reason and passion can never dispute for the government of the will and of actions, 416; calm passions often determine the will in opposition to the violent, 418, 419.
§ 8. Natural abilities not distinguished from moral virtues because involuntary, 608 f.; for (1) most of the virtues are equally involuntary; indeed it is almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article, 608 (cf. 624); (2) no one will assert that a quality can never produce pleasure or pain to the person who considers it unless it be perfectly voluntary in the person who possesses it, 609 (cf. 548-9); (3) free will has no place with regard to the actions no more than the qualities of men: 'it is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free;' 'our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other,' 609: belief not an idea, because the mind has the command over all its ideas, 614.
Wit—true, distinguished only by taste, i.e. by resulting pleasure, 297; a quality immediately agreeable to others, and so virtuous, 590; and eloquence, 611.
[Wollaston]—Theory of vice as tendency to cause false judgments, 461 n.
THE END.