Tweed's Case/Opinion of the Court
Cotton in bales to a large amount was purchased by the plaintiff from different owners of the same, for which he paid a fair market value, as appears by the bills of sale exhibited in the record, amounting in the whole to four hundred and ninety-five bales; [?] that he shipped the same for his own account, to his own agents in New Orleans, and that he paid the freight on the same, and the other expenses and insurance. Testimony was also introduced by the plaintiff showing that the cotton was raised by planters in an adjoining State, and that they continued to possess it until it was sent to market; that the cotton had never been captured by, or surrendered to our army; that none of it was the property of the Confederate States, nor had it ever been destined for their use.
Prior to those transactions a contract had been made between a supervising special agent of the Treasury Department and the plaintiff, that the plaintiff should engage in the business of collecting captured and abandoned cotton in that district. By that instrument it was agreed between the parties that the plaintiffs should furnish all money necessary to purchase the cotton, and all the assistance required for the purpose, and all the requisite transportation, and that he should use all proper efforts to make the purchases and to transport and deliver the same to the other party, at the port of New Orleans, in good shipping order, with receipted bills of sale from the holders, at a cost not exceeding three-fourths of its market value, and free and discharged of all cost of purchase and expense of transportation. In consideration of which the other party agreed to pay and deliver to the plaintiff three-fourths of the cotton, of average quality, as compensation in full for his services, and all costs and expenses. Efforts were made by the plaintiff to make such purchases, but it appears that he soon found that there was no cotton of that description within the said district, and having learned that the contract had been revoked by the Treasury Department, he determined to proceed no further under that agreement.
Property of the kind, however, was seized by another party, to whose transactions it becomes necessary to advert, in order to a full understanding of the present controversy. He, the said other party, published a notice for the claimants of cotton to appear and make oath of their ownership, stating that if they failed to do so he would seize it as captured property. Such property was seized by that party, claiming to be an agent to collect captured and abandoned property, but the evidence introduced tended to prove that his seizures were causeless and oppressive. Some of the cotton seized under those circumstances, and which remained in the hands of the agents of the party making the seizures, the plaintiff admits he purchased, from the owners of the same, having been previously informed by a supervising treasury agent that no evidence had been produced to affect the claims of the owners, and that it was safe to make the purchases, and it appears that the cotton was shipped to New Orleans with his other shipments. All of these transactions took place while the other party to the written agreement was a supervising special agent, but he was soon after superseded, under the instructions of the Treasury Department, and the defendant in the present suit was appointed in his place.
Enough is remarked to show the origin of the controversy, as the defendant insisted that the written agreement between his predecessor and the plaintiff was applicable to all the cotton which the plaintiff had purchased and shipped, and that he, as the successor of the other party to that agreement, was entitled to hold one-fourth of the cotton so purchased and shipped, for the United States.
Pursuant to that claim the defendant made a division of the cotton, and delivered three-fourths of the same to the plaintiff and retained one-fourth of the whole amount. Demand of the other one-fourth having been refused, the plaintiff instituted the present suit to recover the residue of the cotton, being one hundred and twenty-three bales, valued at the sum of $17,500. Service was made, and the defendant appeared and made defence.
Proceedings in the meantime took place under the last paragraph of the petition, in which the plaintiff prayed that a writ of sequestration might be issued, directed to the marshal, requiring him to take the cotton in question into his possession, and to hold the same subject to the order of the court, and he also prayed for judgment decreeing that the cotton is his property, and that the same be delivered to him, or that he have judgment for the value, with interest from judicial demand, and with privilege upon the property sequestered. Process of sequestration was accordingly issued by the court, and it appears that it was duly served and executed by the marshal.
Exceptions to the proceeding were filed by the defendant, in which he alleged: (1.) That the cotton is captured property, and that it was at the time the writ of sequestration was issued, and that the property, as such, was in his possession and custody for the use and benefit of the United States. (2.) That the Circuit Court is without jurisdiction of the case, as the property sequestered is de facto and de jure captured property under the acts of Congress, and that it should be dealt with as the law provides.
He also filed an answer, in which he denied that the plaintiff was the owner of the property, and set up the same defence as in his preliminary exceptions. Subsequently the district attorney intervened, and alleged that the United States were the sole owners of the cotton, and prayed that their claim might be allowed and adjudged good, and that the proceedings instituted by the plaintiff may be disallowed and dismissed. Application was made by each party to bond the property, but the application of the plaintiff was granted and that of the defendant was denied.
Unsuccessful in that, the defendant next filed a peremptory exception to the right of the plaintiff to recover in the suit, in which he alleged that the plaintiff was not and never was the owner of the property; that he never owned but a two-thirds interest in the same; that the other third interest is, and throughout has been in another party. Hearing was had and the court overruled the peremptory exception and entered a decree recognizing the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the property. Whereupon the defendant sued out a writ of error and the cause was transferred to this court, where the judgment was reversed becaus the record did not contain any stipulation in writing waiving a trial by jury, and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. [1]
Pursuant to the directions of the mandate the cause came in order for further proceedings, and leave was granted to the defendant to amend his answer, which he did by setting up, in a more formal manner, the defences mentioned in his preliminary exception and in his former answer. Evidence was introduced by both parties, and the jury, under the instructions of the court, returned their verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Four exceptions were taken at the trial, and the questions which those exceptions present are the only questions open in the case for re-examination. They relate to the instruction given by the court to the jury, and the three requests for instruction presented by the defendant which the court refused to give.
By the bill of exceptions it appears that the court instructed the jury, in substance and effect, as follows: That if the jury believe that the cotton was not captured by the army, nor surrendered to the national forces; that it was not abandoned property nor ever the property of the Confederate States, but that it was raised on the plantations of private individuals and that it was held and possessed by the owners as private property until the purchase of the same by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff purchased the same on his own account from such private owners, and that he held the same until it was taken by the defendant, and that the defendant did not take, hold, or possess it under color of any law or statute of the United States or any authority of his office or color of the same, but of his own will, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Reasonably viewed it is clear that the instruction given covered every allegation of the claim and every ground of defence set up both in the preliminary exception and in the amended answer. Instructions given by the court at the trial are entitled to a reasonable interpretation, and if the propositions as stated are correct they are not, as a general rule, to be regarded as the subject of error on account of omissions not pointed out by the excepting party, as the party aggrieved, if he supposes the instructions given are either indefinite or not sufficiently comprehensive, is always at liberty to ask that further and more explicit instructions may be given, and if he does not do so he is not entitled to claim a reversal of the judgment for any such supposed error. [2] Courts are not inclined to grant a new trial merely on account of ambiguity in the charge of the court to the jury, where it appears that the complaining party made no effort at the trial to have the point explained. [3] Where the court charge the jury correctly upon all the ingredients of the cause of action and upon all the matters of the defence, it is not error in the court to refuse to instruct as requested by either party, even though the proposition presented is correct as an abstract proposition. [4]
Beyond all doubt evidence was introduced by the plaintiff tending to prove every proposition involved in that instruction, and it is equally clear that the evidence was of a character to warrant the finding of the jury. Suppose that is so, still it is insisted by the defendant that the instruction is erroneous, because it assumes that the plaintiff, notwithstanding the written agreement to which he was a party, could make such purchases on his own account, but the bill of exceptions shows that there was no property to be purchased of the kind specified in the written agreement, and that the plaintiff, having ascertained that the authority of the other party had been revoked, determined not to act under the agreement; that the plaintiff purc ased the cotton on his own account, and paid the whole of the purchase-money, and that none of the cotton had ever been captured by our army or surrendered to our military authorities, and that none of it was the property of the Confederate States or had ever been abandoned by the owners.
Tried, as the case was, by a jury, it was certainly proper that the court should submit the whole evidence to their determination; and it is clear that the jury by their finding have affirmed every proposition involved in the instruction in favor of the plaintiff. Such being the fact, the rule is that where the instructions given to the jury are sufficient to present the whole controversy to their consideration, and the instructions are framed in clear and unambiguous terms, it is no cause for the reversal of the judgment to show that one or more of the prayers for instruction presented by the losing party, and not given by the court, were correct in the abstract, as the refusal of the court to give the instructions as requested under those circumstances could not work any injury to the party making the request, and therefore cannot be regarded as error. [5] What more the defendant could properly have it is difficult to see, as the court submitted every inquiry of fact involved in the instruction to the judgment of the jury, and they, having returned their verdict for the plaintiff, it follows that the theory of fact assumed in the instruction is established as true, unless a new trial is granted by the court which tried the cause, or by the direction of this court for error of law. Taken together, the charge and the verdict, as perfected by the judgment, afford a presumption that the theory of fact assumed in the instruction is true, unless the contrary is stated in the bill of exceptions, or it appears that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant the court in submitting the questions to the jury. [6]
Three requests for instructions were made by the defendant, to the effect following:
1. That a writ of sequestration would not lie if the defendant held the cotton in question as deputy general agent of the Treasury Department, under the acts of Congress relating to captured or abandoned property.
Sufficient has already been remarked to show that there was no evidence in the case to warrant the court in submitting such a question to the jury as an independent instruction, and the exception is accordingly overruled. [7]
2. That the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction by virtue of the writ of sequestration to direct the cotton to be taken from the possession of the defendant, if the jury find that the same, at the time the writ issued, was in his possession as such agent, under color of the acts of Congress relating to captured and abandoned property.
But the defendant had no right to seize the cotton in question, as the evidence showed that it had never been captured nor abandoned, and that the title to the same had become vested in the plaintiff by purchase from the private owners. Proof to show that the theory of the defence in that behalf is correct was entirely wanting. On the contrary, the defendant himself testified that he had no evidence at all to affect it as captured or abandoned property at the time the suit was instituted, which is certainly sufficient to show that the instruction requested was properly refused, as it is settled law that it is error in the court to give an instruction when there is no evidence in the case to support the theory of fact which it assumes. [8]
3. That the defendant, if he held the possession of the cotton, as such agent for the collection of captured or abandoned pr perty, had the right to retain the same, and that the plaintiff could not recover the property except by suit in the Court of Claims.
Throughout the several propositions of the defence, the theory of fact is constantly interwoven that the defendant held the cotton under color of the acts of Congress relating to captured and abandoned property, but it is clear that a party cannot be held to have acted under color or by virtue of an act of Congress which did not confer any authority upon him, or any other person, to perform the act which is in controversy. [9] Neither an officer nor an agent can properly be said to have acted under color of a law which neither gave him nor any other person authority to do the act in question, nor can an officer be said to have acted under the authority of his office unless he has some appearance of right to it and is in possession and acting in that capacity, as the acts of a mere intruder or usurper of an office, without any colorable title, are undoubtedly wholly void both as to individuals and the public. [10] Whenever a person sued sets up a defence that he was an officer or an employ e of the government acting under color of law, it plainly devolves upon him to show that the law which he invokes authorized the act in question to be done, and that he acted in good faith; but nothing of the kind is shown in this case. Instead of that he admits in his own testimony that he had no evidence at all to affect the cotton as captured or abandoned property.
Apart from that defence the theory is also constantly set up that the plaintiff during that period could not purchase cotton of the owners even though it was neither captured nor abandoned property, as he was, by virtue of that agreement, an agent of the United States, to which two answers may be made, either of which is sufficient to show that the theory is unfounded and without merit: (1.) Because the agreement does not contain any stipulation that the plaintiff should devote his whole time to the business of the agency, nor any other of a character to prohibit him from purchasing cotton from the private owners if the same was not included in the category of the cotton described in the written agreement. (2.) Because the written agreement never in fact became operative, as the plaintiff, not finding any such cotton in the district specified, never made any such purchases.
Nothing need be added in respect to the ruling of the court in denying the motion in arrest of judgment, as the motion raises the same questions as those involved in the prayers for instruction presented by the defendant and which were refused by the court.
Mention has already been made of the fact that the United States intervened in the suit, and the record shows that their claim was subsequently dismissed and that they also sued out a writ of error and removed the whole proceeding into this court, which is number 136 on the calendar.
All that is necessary to add upon the subject is, that the principal suit having been decided in favor of the plaintiff, the proceeding in intervention must necessarily fall with the defence set up by the defendant in that suit.
JUDGMENT IN EACH CASE AFFIRMED.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY, with whom concurred Mr. Justice DAVIS, dissenting.
Notes
[edit]- ↑ Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Wallace, 425.
- ↑ Castle v. Bullard, 23 Howard, 189; Rogers v. The Marshal, 1 Wallace, 654.
- ↑ Locke v. United States, 2 Clifford, 580; Express Co. v. Kountze, 8 Wallace, 353.
- ↑ Mills v. Smith, 8 Wallace, 27.
- ↑ The Schools v. Risley, 10 Wallace, 115; Law v. Cross, 1 Black, 536; Tome v. Dubois, 6 Wallace, 555.
- ↑ Russell v. Ely, 2 Black, 580; State v. Hopkins, 5 Rhode Island, 58; Murray v. Fry, 6 Porter (Indiana), 372; Day v. Raguet, 14 Minnesota, 283.
- ↑ United States v. Breitling, 20 Howard, 254.
- ↑ Id.; Goodman v. Simonds, Ib. 359.
- ↑ Reynolds v. Orvis, 7 Cowen, 272; Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johnson, 40; King v. Bedford, 6 East, 369; Britton v. Butler, 9 Blatchford, 462.
- ↑ Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Connecticut, 593; People v. White, 24 Wendell, 525; Carleton v. People, 10 Michigan, 258; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 579.
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