U.S. Department of the Army No Gun Ri Review Report/Chapter 1

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Many have called the Korean War^[1] the "Forgotten War". Neither history nor its many veterans and victims has forgotten this terrible conflict. Fifty years ago, more than 20 nations united in the defense of the South Korean peoples' independence against the aggression of expansionist communist North Korean forces. Today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a thriving and prosperous democracy with a large and well-developed economy, while around the world the communist ideology has been discredited and largely abandoned.

As always, freedom is not free. Our South Korean and other United Nations allies suffered grievous losses. Included in this testament of sacrifice are the more than 36,000 Americans^[2] who gave their lives as a demonstration of America's commitment to the security and future of the South Korean people.

During his visit to No Gun Ri in January 2000, the Secretary of the Army listened to the Koreans' stories first hand, which, he said, "allowed us to witness their concerns and to express our regret for their sufferings." The manner in which this inquiry pursued the facts, no matter where they led, and in full cooperation with the Republic of Korea government, will only help to strengthen the close relations between the two countries.

I. The Associated Press (AP) Special Report^[3]

On September 29, 1999, the Associated Press reported that American soldiers "machine-gunned hundreds of helpless civilians" under a railroad bridge in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, ROK, in July 1950, in the early days of the Korean War. Significantly, the AP stated that “[s]ix veterans of the 1^st Cavalry Division said they fired on the refugee throng in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, and six others said they witnessed the shootings.” According to the AP, the United States (U.S.) veterans agreed on the time, place, and the preponderance of women, children, and old men among the victims. In their original report, the Associated Press interviewed Mr. Edward Daily, who was identified as a veteran of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. Mr. Daily's military service is discussed in Chapter 4. However, U.S. military records indicate that Mr. Daily was a member of 27th Ordnance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, and not a member of H Company, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, in July 1950. Mr. Daily's unit was not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950.

The AP report acknowledged that none of the U.S. veterans gave a complete and detailed account of what happened in the vicinity of No Gun Ri nearly 50 years after the fact. The report also noted discrepancies in the statements of the veterans concerning whether the refugees beneath the bridge initiated the firing and whether they later found a few disguised North Korean soldiers among the dead. In another part of the article, however, the AP stated that U.S. soldiers "corroborated the core of the Koreans' account: that American troops kept the refugees pinned under the bridge in late July 1950, and killed almost all of them." In a related article published on December 29, 1999, the Associated Press reported that "American jets attacked groups of Koreans in civilian clothes on suspicion they harbored enemy infiltrators."

II. The Koreans' Account^[4]

The Korean account, derived from their September 10, 1997, petition to President Clinton, stated that on July 25, 1950, U.S. soldiers evacuated approximately 500–600 villagers from their homes in Im Gae Ri (sometimes spelled Imkae-ri, Imkyeh-ri, and Im Ga Ri) (see ① in Figure) and Joo Gok Ri (sometimes spelled Jugok-Ri) (see ② in Figure). The villagers said U.S. soldiers escorted them towards the south. That evening the American soldiers then led all of the villagers into a nearby dry streambed and ordered them to stay there that night (see ③ in Figure). During the night the villagers witnessed a long parade of U.S. troops and vehicles moving towards Pusan.

At dawn on July 26, the villagers found that the U.S. soldiers had left the area. The villagers continued south on their own, following the Seoul-Pusan road. According to their statements, when the villagers reached No Gun Ri, they were stopped by U.S. soldiers at a roadblock and ordered onto the railroad tracks, where their bodies and personal belongings were searched (see ④ in Figure). The Koreans state that, although no prohibited items (e.g. weapons or other military contraband) were found, the Koreans alleged that the soldiers ordered an air strike / strafing upon the villagers via radio communication (see ⑤ in Figure). Shortly afterwards, planes flew over and dropped bombs and fired machine guns, killing approximately 100 villagers on the railroad tracks in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Those that survived sought protection in a small culvert underneath the railroad tracks. Then the U.S. soldiers drove the villagers out of the culvert and into the larger tunnels nearby. The Koreans state that the U.S. soldiers then fired into both ends of the tunnels over a period of days (July 26–29, 1950), resulting in approximately 300 additional deaths (see ⑥ in Figure).

III. Purpose of the Review

On September 30, 1999, the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Army to lead a review to "determine the full scope of the facts surrounding [these] press reports." The Secretary of Defense memorandum is at Enclosure 1 (Enclosures are found at the end of this chapter). In a memorandum dated October 15, 1999, the Secretary of Defense further clarified his earlier instructions. The process would include "review of the documentation, conduct of interviews, any additional research necessary to provide a full and comprehensive review of the facts, and preparation of a report" for subsequent presentation to the public. The Secretary of Defense memorandum is at Enclosure 2.

On October 25, 1999, the Secretary of the Army directed The Inspector General to conduct a thorough review that pursues every reasonable lead to determine the facts and to provide a report. The Inspector General then formed the No Gun Ri Review Team (U.S. Review Team). This report reflects the facts uncovered by that review. From these facts, the report subsequently develops, analyzes, assesses, and portrays the conditions and circumstances leading up to, and culminating in, the events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950. The U.S. Review followed a four-phased concept plan that served as a road map for the review. The Secretary of the Army Memorandum is at Enclosure 3 and the Concept Plan is at Enclosure 4.

IV. Scope of the Review

The primary focus of the Review was to determine and report the facts regarding the actions of U.S. ground and air forces in and around the Yongdong-Hwanggan area of Korea during the final week of July 1950.^[5] The preceding efforts to discover these facts were incomplete and inadequate. The U.S. Army had on two previous occasions addressed the allegations of a U.S. killing of Korean civilians in the No Gun Ri area in late July 1950. One, referenced by the AP, was an October 6, 1997, U.S. Army Claims Office response to a Korean government agency. The reply, stating that there is not "any evidence to show that the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was in the area where the incident allegedly occurred," was based on faulty research and was incorrect.^[6] The other, conducted by the U. S. Army Center of Military History, was severely limited in scope and did not fully address the concerns raised by the Koreans.^[7] Neither of these earlier efforts were properly planned and conducted. In 1994, the ROK government had also conducted a review regarding these same allegations. The resulting report was short and inconclusive.^[8]

The AP report provided some limited general, historical context regarding the condition of the U.S. Army at the time of the alleged incident. However, their interviews with veterans and textual research focused primarily on the actions of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Similarly, the Koreans uniformly attributed their allegations to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment.

In order to meet the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army mandate of thoroughness, the U.S. Review Team cast a wide net in its effort to determine and report what actually happened in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. This effort required a comprehensive understanding of the events, to include their military and historical context, that occurred on the Korean peninsula both prior to and through the first months of the Korean War. Therefore, the review included a methodical examination of the historical records of the U.S. forces that operated in the Korean theater from the company / troop level all the way up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Review Team researched the tactical air operations of the U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Navy, and the allied Air Forces. The U.S. Review Team interviewed hundreds of U.S. Korean War veterans that were assigned to ground and air units operating in the area of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team obtained some materials of Korean origin from the U.S. Archives that included information on the ROK Army (ROKA), the (South) Korean National Police (KNP), and captured North Korean People's Army (NKPA) materials. The U.S. Review Team also examined the archived records of organizations within the Department of Defense, documents of agencies outside the Department of Defense such as the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency, and contemporaneous accounts reported in major U.S. newspapers and periodicals.

V. Organization and General Conduct of the Review

The Office of the Secretary of Defense established a Steering Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), to coordinate the review (the Under Secretary later became the Deputy Secretary and continued to serve as Chairman of the Steering Group). The Secretary of Defense also invited eight Outside Experts not affiliated with the Department of Defense to advise on the conduct of the review. These Outside Experts represent a wide spectrum of experience and relevant expertise, coming from backgrounds in academia, journalism, foreign and military affairs, the Korean War, and ROK-U.S. relations. A number of these distinguished citizens are also highly decorated Korean War veterans. The membership of the U.S. Review Organization is at Enclosure 5.

The Inspector General organized the U.S. Review Team into two separate teams, Research and Interview. Team Organization is at Enclosure 6. The Research Team consisted of Department of the Army military and civilian members, augmented by a USAF research team, an imagery analyst, professional researchers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and a Korean linguist. An Army historian led this effort. The researchers' focus was a review of records at the National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland. Records were also reviewed at the National Personnel Records Center and several Federal Records Centers, including the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, the MacArthur Library, the Harry S. Truman Library, and the Military History Institute (see Appendix A for details). The researchers examined over one million documents and approximately 45,000 containers of USAF reconnaissance film.

The Interview Team's focus was to locate former soldiers assigned to the major combat units that passed through the Yongdong-Hwanggan area in mid-to-late July 1950 (see Chapter 4 for details). This effort involved a potential pool of three U.S. divisions and several higher-level units as well. The Interview Team compiled a list of potential interviewees from a wide variety of data sources, including the use of a HQDA Internet site and toll-free number. Additionally, the Interview Team received numerous additional names of possible contacts from many of the interviewees, adding to the pool of possible sources. The interview process started on December 29, 1999. Early in the process, the Interview Team received training in interview techniques. This training consisted of interview techniques from experienced interviewers and a psychiatrist who discussed conducting interviews with traumatized witnesses. The Air Force researchers reviewed the Fifth Air Force officer roster and other records that list the names of pilots and staff officers. The Air Force attached a trained interviewer to the U.S. Review Team to contact and interview as many of these men as possible. While every effort was made to make this a comprehensive sample, the U.S. Review Team had no power to compel a witness to grant an interview and no authority to issue subpoenas. In fact, eleven veterans contacted by the U.S. Review Team declined to be interviewed. However, the U.S. Review Team did review the published accounts of witnesses who declined to be interviewed by the Team (see Chapter 4).

VI. U.S. and ROK Cooperation

The Army and the Department of Defense worked in close cooperation with the government of the ROK (see Appendix E for details). There were a number of bi-lateral information exchanges and country visits. Selected members of the U.S. Review Team visited the ROK on five occasions, including one visit with Secretary of the Army and the U.S. Outside Experts in January 2000. On three of the five visits, members of the U.S. Review Team held meetings with members of the survivor groups. Additionally, survivors met with Department of Defense officials in the United States in November of 1999. During the January 2000 visit, the Secretary of the Army met with several high-level ROK government officials, including President Kim and Minister of National Defense Cho, and heard the personal accounts of six No Gun Ri survivors. The ROK Investigation Team (ROK Review Team) visited the Inspector General Review Team six times, including a visit in May 2000 with the ROK Outside Experts.

The U.S. Review Team provided the ROK Review Team with copies of all relevant documents and other information discovered in the course of the Review in support of its parallel investigation. On two occasions, the U.S. Review Team supported working visits by a ROK Review Team researcher to the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. The U.S. Review Team provided full access to, and funded reproduction costs of, any research materials that had already been gathered by the U.S. researchers. No information was withheld.

A list of key events and milestones in the conduct of the Review is at Enclosure 7.

VII. Organization of the Report

The report consists of an Executive Summary, five chapters, and five appendices. The Executive Summary contains the background, methodology, and key issues and findings found in detail elsewhere in the report. Chapter 1 (Introduction) outlines the purpose of, and the background behind, the conduct of the review and provides a general description of the contents of the report. Chapter 2 (Background and History) describes the ground events unfolding on the Korean peninsula in July 1950. This contextual tapestry, while broad in scope, provides important historical context. This picture is critical to a full understanding of the events leading up to what occurred in late July 1950 in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (several period photographs are inserted between Chapters 2 and 3). Chapter 3 (Combat Operations in July 1950) brings the events into sharper focus. This chapter derives from the U.S. Review Team's extensive archival research.

Chapter 3 opens with an examination of the state of U.S. intelligence and U.S. ground forces in July 1950. There follows a day-by-day account of the tactical operations of the 1st Cavalry Division in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during that last week of July 1950. This chapter includes research on U.S. and allied air operations in the Yongdong-Hwanggan area for the same time period. Chapter 4 (Analysis of Interview Data) discusses the analysis of both American and Korean witnesses' interview data. The review of witness statements identifies areas of consensus between statements and outlines possible sequences of events. Finally, Chapter 5 (Key Issue Analysis and Findings) synthesizes the analysis of documentary research and witness interviews (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) into a fact-based analysis.

The appendices supplement the material in the main body of the report. Appendix A (Research Methodology) documents in detail the methodology used in the research of the historical records. Appendix B (Forensic Evidence) provides the analysis of the forensic evidence collected at the No Gun Ri site. This appendix contains a forensic pathology analysis of the USAF reconnaissance photograph taken of the No Gun Ri area on August 6, 1950. This appendix also includes the assessments of the Korean analysis of the ballistic evidence conducted by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Appendix C (Imagery Analysis) contains the analysis of the August 6, 1950, USAF reconnaissance photograph performed by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). This appendix includes the NIMA response to the ROK Investigation Team's questions concerning this analysis. Appendix D (Joint Cooperation) discusses the actions taken to ensure a cooperative and coordinated effort between the ROK and U.S. Review Teams, including joint meetings and the exchange of documents and other information. Appendix E (Supporting Documents) contains a U.S. Air Force mission summary diagram and the tactical maps.

In this report, the terms "civilians" and "refugees" are used. For the purpose of this report, refugee is defined as a person who is fleeing to a place of safety; implied within that definition is that a refugee is an innocent person. During the Korean War, NKPA soldiers infiltrated refugee columns, and collaborators or persons assisting the NKPA were also in refugee parties. The NKPA collaborators and soldiers dressed in civilian clothing so that they could pass as refugees traveling through U.S. forces' lines. Therefore, the term civilian is used if it could not be determined that the civilians being described were "refugees" as defined above. If the sentence or paragraph is a quotation, a reference to a witness statement, or a document that used the word refugee, the word refugee is used.

The U.S. Review Team conducted this review fully aware of the political, military, and emotional significance of the allegations. This report describes events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun RI in July 1950, and places them in their historical context. The report is not a point-by-point refutation of the media and Korean accounts. Earlier efforts notwithstanding, this review and report started from a clean slate. It presents an independent assessment of the facts derived directly from the exhaustive review of primary textual sources, the testimony of U.S. veterans, the statements of Korean witnesses, ballistic analysis, and forensic and imagery analysis of overhead reconnaissance photographs.

VIII. Key Issues

The U.S. Review Team, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Group, U.S. Outside Experts, and our counterparts from the Republic of Korea, identified the following key issues during the review. The report provided a response to each issue.

Condition of U.S. forces in July 1950

U.S. and ROK Refugee Control Policies

Tactical Situation July 22-29, 1950

Assembly and Movement of Villagers

Air Strikes in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri

Ground Fire in the Vicinity of No Gun Ri

Issuance of Orders to Fire on Refugees

Number of Korean Deaths and Injuries

These key issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Key Issue Analysis and Findings.

Enclosure 1

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC 20301

SEP 30 1999

The Honorable Louis Caldera
101 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-101

Secretary Caldera,

I would like you to lead a review on behalf of the Department of Defense to determine the full scope of the facts surrounding press reports of civilian deaths near Nokuen-Ri (No Gun Ri) Korea in 1950, early in the Korean conflict. This review is important to the active and refined members of our armed forces, the confidence of the American people in the finest armed forces in the world, and our relationship with the people of the Republic of Korea. I ask you to devote whatever resources are appropriate to accomplish this review as thoroughly and as quickly as possible. You are to work with the other Military Services and Governmental Agencies as necessary to determine the facts behind these reports.

A personal signature appears here

Enclosure 2

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 15 1999

The Honorable Louis Caldera
101 Anny Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-101

Secretary Caldera:

In my phone call Tuesday morning with Minister of National Defense Cho, he made clear that the allegations of civilian deaths at No Gun Ri have enormous historical, political and emotional importance for his government and the people of the Republic of Kora (ROK). President Kim himself has chartered a group to investigate the allegations and report to the ROK Government. | reiterated to Minister Cho the two principles guiding our work: to find the truth no matter where it leads, and to work cooperatively with the ROK Government. We need to ensure that no relevant information is overlooked and that the ROK Government has complete confidence that the whole story has been told. | assured Minister Cho that we will work closely and cooperatively with the Korean team and will share information al regular intervals.

In light of the seriousness of the No Gun Ri allegations, the complexity of the issue, and the importance of the strong bilateral security relationship between the Untied States and the Republic of Korea, | am writing to clarify the scope and nature of the U.S. review.

As indicated in my memorandum to you of 30 September, the Army is responsible for determining the full scope of the facts, including review of the documentation, conduct of interviews, any additional research necessary to provide a full and comprehensive review of the facts, and the preparation of a report.

In addition, | am asking the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to chair a Department of Defense-level Steering Group. The Steering Group will coordinate the work of the review and ensure that the full resources of the entire Department are brought to bear on the complex issues raised by the No Gun Ri allegations. | will ask the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, the General Counsel, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs to participate in the Steering Group along with other officials to be determined. The Steering Group will also lead the Department's interaction with the rest of the U.S. Government and coordinate the Department's work with that of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

As you and | have discussed, | am also inviting from outside the Department of Defense several distinguished Americans with relevant expertise in provide their professional advice to us on the conduct of the review and on the Army's report. These individuals will have an opportunity to consult with, and receive updates from, the Army and the Steering Group as the review progresses and provide us their thoughts on the process. This will enable us to receive a variety of perspectives and insights on this particularly sensitive and important matter.

This review should be conducted as expeditiously possible though | do not want to set an artificial deadline that might present an obstacle bo a full presentation of the facts to the public.

A personal signature appears here

Enclosure 3

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON October 25, 199

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Review of Nokuen-Ri Allegations

 

You are directed to conduct a full and comprehensive review of the allegations recently made public in the media that U.S. military personnel killed hundreds of civilians near Nokuen-Ri, Republic of Korea. in 1950. early in the Korean conflict, and other pertinent matters as | may direct in accordance with the enclosed concept plan, your task is to ensure that the review is thorough and pursues every reasonable lead to enable us to determine the facts as quickly and accurately as possible in accordance with the guidance from the Secretary of Defense on September 30 and October 15, 1999 (also enclosed). You will provide a report of your findings through the Chief of Staff, Army to me.

You may task any Army organization or element that you deem appropriate and coordinate directly with any person or entity outside the Army, You may seek further tasking authority through me to the Department of Defense Steering Group if that would be helpful in providing a full accounting of the historical facts. Be prepared to provide periodic updates on your progress to the Steering Group and me, as well as to the distinguished Americans invited from outside the Department of Defense to advise us on the review and on the report.

l am designating the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) as my senior representative to oversee this effort on my behalf and to serve as my senior representative to the Steering Group. He is authorized to task my Administrative Assistant to provide you and others involved in this effort the necessary funding and additional resources. My Special Assistant and Counselor will assist me in coordinating all matters pertaining to this review.

A personal signature appears here

Louis Caldera

Enclosures

CF:
Chief of Staff, Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Administrative Assistant bo the Secretary of the Army
Special Assistant and Counselor to the Secretary of the Army

Enclosure 4

Concept Plan

1. Phase I―Preparation.

a. Task organize the Inspections Division into two teams: a Research Team to conduct historical research and collect documentary data and an Interview Team to identify, interview, and obtain statements from witnesses. Supplement teams with other experts as required.

b. Meet with ROK counterparts to coordinate the effort.

c. Determine resources required for both personnel and funding.

d. Coordinate with agencies to review classified and unclassified records from all appropriate military and civilian archival repositories, to include veterans organizations, prior claims, and media accounts.

e. Conduct necessary training about Korean history and culture.

f. Develop a reference library and database to capture information pertaining to personnel and events for cross-referencing and analysis.

g. Establish a website and toll-free number.

2. Phase II―Research and Interviews.

a. Collect personnel rosters, unit operational logs and maps, and other relevant documents from all appropriate military and civilian archival repositories. Build upon existing research by Center of Military History and the Associated Press.

b. Identify, locate, and contact witnesses. Conduct initial telephonic interviews to assess the relevance of the information. Conduct face-to-face interviews with witnesses following this initial screening as appropriate.

c. Follow leads to other persons / sources identified as the result of public outreach efforts and during the course of research / interviews.

3. Phase III―Review and Analysis.

a. Provide a comprehensive laydown of the operational and tactical situations and the detailed disposition and composition of units in and around No Gun Ri in July 1950.

b. Provide In Progress Reviews (IPR) as required to the OSD Steering Group and the invited Outside Experts.

c. Draft a fair and objective analysis of the historical facts.

d. Exchange information with Republic of Korea (ROK) counterparts.

4. Phase IV―Produce Final Report. Produce a written report for public release that reflects a complete and comprehensive account, as best as can be determined, of what occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

Enclosure 5

U.S. Review Organization

Office of the Secretary of Defense No Gun Ri Review Steering Group

Honorable Rudy de Leon, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Office of the Secretary of Defense No Gun Ri Review Steering Group - former USD (P&R)

Honorable Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) / Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Honorable James M. Bodner, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas A. Dworkin, Acting Department of Defense General Counsel

Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Honorable Patrick T. Henry (Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower & Reserve Affairs)

Honorable Charles Blanchard, Army General Counsel

U.S. Outside Experts

Ambassador Donald Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and Chairman of the Board of the Korea Society

Honorable Paul ("Pete") McCloskey, Jr., former member of Congress from California and Korean War veteran (United States Marine Corps)

Honorable Michael O'Callaghan, former governor of the State of Nevada and Korean War veteran (United States Army)

Robert W. Riscassi, General, United States Army, Retired, former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, former Commander in Chief, United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

B.E. Trainor, Lieutenant General, United States Marine Corps, Retired, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council of Foreign Relations, Associate, Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School and Korean War veteran

Young Oak Kim, Colonel, United States Army, Retired, served as a junior officer with the Japanese-American 442nd Regimental Combat Team during World War II and commanded the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, during the Korean War.

Dr. Ernest R. May, Charles Warren Professor of American History, Kennedy School, Harvard University

Mr. Don Oberdorfer, Nitze School of Advanced and International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Army veteran with service in the Republic of Korea

Page:US Department of the Army No Gun Ri Review.pdf/38 Enclosure 7

Key Events

Sep 29, 99:	Associated Press releases initial article on alleged incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
Sep 30, 99:	Secretary of Defense tasks Secretary of the Army to lead a review for Department of Defense to determine the full scope of the facts surrounding press reports of civilian deaths near No Gun Ri
Oct 15, 99:	Secretary of Defense directs the establishment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Committee and the consultations with Outside Experts
Oct 25, 99:	Secretary of the Army directs The Inspector General to conduct a full and comprehensive review of the facts concerning the No Gun Ri Bridge incident; Designates the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) (ASA (M&RA)) to oversee effort as the senior Army representative to the Steering Group
Oct 27, 99:	United States Corps of Engineers' Ordnance & Technical Services Branch begins research at National Personnel Records Center (St. Louis)
Oct 29, 99:	U.S. Review Team visits ROK: bilateral discussions; site visit; and meets the survivors
Nov 2, 99:	Steering Group meeting; Luncheon with Steering Group and Outside Experts
Nov 3, 99:	Began research at National Archives
Nov 8, 99:	Secretary of Army In Process Review
Nov 12, 99:	Survivors visit U.S. and meet with Department of Defense officials
Nov 16, 99:	Brief to Senate Armed Services Committee
Nov 19, 99:	Brief to House Veterans Affairs Committee & House Armed Services Committee
Nov 22, 99:	The Inspector General brief to Veterans Organizations
Nov 23, 99:	The Inspector General brief to U.S. / ROK Security Consultative Meeting
Dec 14, 99:	2nd U.S. Review Team visit to ROK: bilateral discussions
Jan 10–14, 00:	Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Group, Outside Experts visit ROK: meet with survivors
Feb 3, 00:	Department of Defense brief to House and Senate Armed Services Committees
Feb 23, 00:	ROK / U.S. Bilateral Coordination Group Meeting
Feb 28, 00:	The Inspector General brief to Veterans Organizations
Feb 28, 00:	Began Category I interviews
Mar 21, 00:	The Inspector General brief to U.S. Outside Experts
Apr 16–20, 00:	U.S. Review Team trip to ROK: bilateral discussions, information exchange, site visit, meet with survivors
May 2–3, 00:	ROK / U.S. Outside Experts' Bilateral Meetings, Washington, D.C.
Jun 30, 00:	Completed Textual Research
Jul 31–Aug 4, 00	ROK-U.S. Working Group meeting in ROK
Sep 27–29, 00	ROK and U.S. Review Team meeting in Washington, D.C.
Oct 17, 00	U.S. Outside Experts briefing in Washington, D.C.
Nov 3 and 6, 00	ROK-U.S. Review Team Working Group meeting in Washington, D.C.
Nov 6, 00	Bilateral Coordinating Group meeting in Washington, D.C.
Nov 28, 00	U.S. Outside Experts meet with Steering Group
Dec 6 and 7, 00	Steering Group Meeting in ROK

Endnotes

1. In keeping with more common usage, the term "Korean War" will be used throughout this report instead of the term "Korean Conflict."
2. Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1999 page 79.
3. Sang-Hun Choe, Charles Hanley, and Martha Mendoza, "Bridge at No Gun Ri," Associated Press Special Report September 29, 1999.
4. Won Ki Hong, letter ("Petition") to President Clinton, October 27, 1999.
5. Histories, archival records, and media reports record other incidents in which civilians were killed during the Korean Conflict. Witnesses in this review also referenced incidents that did not occur in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team was directed to review the events that allegedly occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. In spite of this fact that the focus of this review is the No Gun Ri incident, the Review Team noted other incidents revealed during the review process.
6. United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea, letter to Chongju District Compensation Committee, October 6, 1997.
7. United States Army Center of Military History, Memo February 17, 1999 "Allegations Concerning Deaths of Innocent Villagers During the Korean War."
8. ROK National Defense Military Research Institute (War History Department), dated 13 July 1994, subject: Nogun-ri Accident Review (Report).