U. S. Senate Speeches and Remarks of Carl Schurz/Admission of Georgia

by Carl Schurz

ADMISSION OF GEORGIA

Mr. SCHURZ. Mr. President, I confess that when this bill came first to my knowledge I asked myself, just as the Senator from Nevada did, why we should impose upon the State of Georgia conditions which we had not imposed upon the States of Virginia and Mississippi, and why we should not strike out that extraordinary provision which requires them to hold an election next fall? The diversity of opinion which arose upon that point led me to inquire into the history and the legal aspect of the case; and I may say that I have done so earnestly, conscientiously, and even anxiously, and withal with a very strong bias in favor of conceding all that our friends in Georgia asked of us. If I have reluctantly come to contrary conclusions, those conclusions are the result of careful investigation and a conscientious desire to do that which is right.

It appears that the issue at the present moment before the Senate is not whether the State of Georgia shall be admitted, for it seems we are all in favor of that; but it is whether the so-called Bingham amendment, prohibiting the State government to continue in office beyond this year, shall be preserved or stricken out from the bill. Before entering upon my argument I would ask the Senator from Indiana who has taken so prominent a part in this debate a question which, if convenient to him, he may answer. Will he, in case the Bingham amendment is stricken out, vote for the bill and preamble as it stands with his amendment attached to it?

Mr. MORTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHURZ. I hesitate a little to go again over that old story of the progress of reconstruction in Georgia; but a few words on that point will be sufficient for the purpose of completing my argument.

The first steps of legal reconstruction were taken by the people of Georgia in pursuance of the act of March 2, 1867. A constitutional convention was elected from the 29th of October to the 2d of November of that year. The convention met on the 4th of December, 1867, and it adjourned the 11th of March, 1868. The constitution was ratified by the people of Georgia at an election held from the 20th to the 23d of April, 1868. By the act of June 25, 1868, Congress provided that certain States should be admitted upon their compliance with certain fundamental conditions precedent to their admission. As to Georgia three conditions were imposed: first, the ratification of the fourteenth amendment; second, the expurgation of certain articles from her constitution, which I need not name in detail here; and third, the exclusion from office of those who were disqualified by the third section of the fourteenth amendment.

The first two of these fundamental conditions were faithfully complied with; the fourteenth amendment was ratified, and the constitution of Georgia was expurgated by the Legislature in July, 1868. But the third of those conditions was evaded. Those who were disqualified by the third section of the fourteenth amendment were not ejected from the Legislature; but, on the contrary, loyal men were expelled and others were admitted who had received only a minority of the votes. However, before this took place their State government was inaugurated in pursuance of the act of June 25, 1868. Military rule was withdrawn on the 22d of July, 1868, and in consequence certain members elected in Georgia were admitted by the lower House of Congress to seats in that body. But the Legislature of Georgia having not complied with the third condition imposed on them, the ejection of members disqualified by the fourteenth amendment, but having, on the contrary, ejected loyal men from their body, the Senate of the United States refused admission to their Senators. The reconstruction of the State of Georgia was therefore incomplete.

In consequence of this congress passed the act of December 22, 1869. The Legislature of Georgia, having committed a revolutionary act, had to be reorganized. The act of the 22d of December, 1869, was remarkable and important for two circumstances: first, for what it did provide, and secondly, for what it did not provide. It provided for compliance with the third condition precedent to admission; that is to say, that the Legislature of Georgia should expel the members who had no right to sit there in pursuance of the third section of the fourteenth constitutional amendment, and it provided for the admission of those who had been illegally expelled; but it did not provide for the reënactment of those acts by which the first two fundamental conditions had been complied with; that is to say, it did not provide for a re-ratification of the fourteenth amendment and for a reëxpurgation of the objectionable provisions of the constitution of Georgia.

The act of 22d December, 1869, therefore, neither directly nor by implication questioned the validity of the ratification of the fourteenth amendment or of the expurgation of the constitution of Georgia, both of which acts had been performed in July, 1868. It may be well assumed that therefore the act of December 22, 1869, confirmed the validity of these acts, in the opinion at least of the Congress of the United States. Will it be hazardous to assume that in confirming the validity of the acts performed by the Legislature of 1868 the legality of the existence of that Legislature was recognized likewise? The act of the 22d December, 1869, imposed a new fundamental condition upon Georgia. That was the ratification of the fifteenth amendment. This fundamental condition, too, has been complied with. And now look at the attitude in which that State stands before us.

All obligations-precedent imposed upon Georgia by the Congress of the United States have been satisfactorily discharged. First, the fourteenth amendment was ratified; secondly, the constitution of Georgia was expurgated, and both these acts were performed in July, 1868; thirdly, the loyal members who had been expelled were readmitted, and members disqualified by the third section of the fourteenth constitutional amendment were expelled; and fourthly, the fifteenth constitutional amendment has been ratified. Both these latter acts were performed in February, 1870. Now this State stands before us claiming admission on account of these conditions-precedent complied with by their Legislature, partly in July, 1868, and partly in February, 1870; and so this bill for which the Senator from Indiana says he is going to vote affirms. It says:

Whereas the people of Georgia have framed and adopted a constitution of State government which is republican; and whereas the Legislature of Georgia elected under said constitution has ratified the fourteenth —

Which was done in July, 1868 —

and the fifteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and whereas the performance of these several acts in good faith is a condition-precedent to the representation of the State in Congress; Therefore, &c.

If we admit Georgia on that ground, as the preamble to this bill recites, then we emphatically admit also the validity of the acts in consequence of which we are to admit Georgia.

Mr. MORTON. Will the Senator allow me to state to him a fact?

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly.

Mr. MORTON. I think my friend overlooks the fact that this Legislature, on the same day that it ratified the fifteenth amendment, ratified the fourteenth amendment also, as if it had never been acted on by the pretended Legislature of 1868. That is the fact.

Mr. SCHURZ. I think I shall be able to show that the ratification of the fifteenth amendment falls under the same head with the ratification of the fourteenth amendment; and I would at the same time ask the Senator, inasmuch as we insisted upon the expurgation of the constitution of Georgia, which act was performed in 1868 and not reperformed now, are we going to admit the State without its having fulfilled that fundamental condition? Are we going to be satisfied with that? But if we are satisfied with that we are satisfied with an act performed in 1868 and not repeated since. Therefore, if we accept that condition as satisfactorily complied with, I do not see how there is any ground to stand on but that we must necessarily recognize the Legislature which performed the act complying with that condition.

The State Legislature of Georgia is, as I assume it necessarily must be, the creature of the State constitution of Georgia. I never heard of a State Legislature that was not existing by virtue of a State constitution. To be sure, it is said by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Pomeroy] that elections for that Legislature were not held under the constitution; but I think we have shown him conclusively that the elections were ordained and were held under ordinances of the convention, and that those ordinances had been validated by the constitution pro tanto, so that in fact those ordinances formed, for all practical purposes, part and parcel of the State constitution. It may be said, therefore, that the Legislature was elected, and all that was done by it was done by virtue and under the sanction of a State constitution, and not otherwise. That State constitution defined the term of life of the Legislature, making it two years for the house of representatives and four years for the senators, one half to be elected biennially. I repeat, the State Legislature as such could find no condition of existence at all outside of the State constitution, for without the State constitution it certainly would not have been a State Legislature. The Legislature commenced in 1868, and, according to the constitution, providing for biennial elections, it must necessarily end — at first sight at least we should conclude so — in 1870.

Now, it is claimed that the State Legislature may continue its official existence and authority for another term of two years. On what ground is this claimed? The Senator from Indiana takes the very broadest ground. He asserts that its existence as a State Legislature will commence only with the admission of Georgia as a State of the Union; that is to say, the State Legislature will commence its legitimate and legal life on the very day when we here in Congress pass an act admitting the State of Georgia. Now, sir, if so, how can its previous acts, not only those which were performed in 1868, but also those which have been performed in February, 1870, be considered legal, if, as will not be denied, they could be performed only by a State Legislature?

Mr. MORTON. Will the Senator allow me to answer him?

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly.

Mr. MORTON. Upon the theory in all cases received where a new State is formed out of a Territory, never a State before, that when the State is finally admitted the act relates back in legal effect to sanction those things that were done with a view to admission and as conditions of admission.

Mr. CARPENTER. Office holding as well as everything else?

Mr. MORTON. No, sir. I am not speaking of that.

Mr. SCHURZ. I was just going to come to that.

Mr. MORTON. The Senator from Missouri will allow me to say that I am speaking of those things that are required by an act of Congress authorizing a Territory to form a State as the conditions, the preliminary conditions of admission, and I say that the act of admission relates back and makes those things good as if done on the very day of admission. That is the theory always received.

Mr. SCHURZ. I am very glad to have that statement from the Senator's own lips. Yes, sir, it is on the ground of the so-called doctrine of relation that we consider those acts which were performed by a Legislature elected as a State Legislature in a Territory, before that Territory was admitted as a State, legal, inasmuch as the admission of the Territory as a State relates back and validates all those acts which were performed under the sanction of the State constitution before. That is what I understand the Senator from Indiana to say. Am I correct?

Mr. MORTON. Certainly.

Mr. SCHURZ. Yes, the act of admission does relate back, and validates that which was done before it; but if it validates the acts performed by a Legislature I should like to know whether it does not validate that Legislature itself. If it validates the acts performed by the Legislature, does it not validate and legalize also the body which performed the acts at the time when the acts were performed? If the expurgation of the constitution of Georgia was a legal proceeding, and we certainly recognized it as a legal compliance with a fundamental condition imposed by Congress to be validated by the act of admission, I would ask the Senator from Indiana whether it can possibly be assumed that the Legislature, when it performed that act, had no legal existence?

Mr. MORTON. Will the Senator allow me to ask a question?

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly.

Mr. MORTON. I will take the State of Nebraska, where a condition was imposed, and the condition was agreed to be the Legislature before the act of admission. Afterward Nebraska came in. She dates as a State from the date of her admission by act of Congress. She does not date as a State from the time that condition was performed by the Legislature. In other words, she was not a State before she was a State.

Mr. SCHURZ. No, sir, that is true; she was not a State before she was a State; but I would ask the Senator whether the Legislature which complied with that fundamental condition was not afterward by the act of admission relating back to the act of the Legislature recognized as a Legislature, which only as a State Legislature could perform such an act?

Mr. MORTON. After it fully came in, of course it was.

Mr. SCHURZ. That is the very point I am coming to.

Mr. MORTON. Then we agree.

Mr. SCHURZ. I repeat, sir, if we admit that the act of admission relates back to the acts of the Legislature and validates them, then it must necessarily relate back to the body that performed the acts at the time when those acts were performed. I think it never was pretended that the term of a Legislature elected in a Territory as an inchoate State Legislature and legalized afterward by the act of admission of that Terrtitory as a State commenced only after the act of admission; but if I remember correctly it has been always held that the act of admission validating the acts of the Legislature, validated at the same time the existence of the Legislature at the time when those acts were performed. Has not this always been held? And was it ever pretended, I ask the Senator from Indiana, when Congress admitted the other reconstructed States, that the term of their Legislatures commenced on the very day when the act of readmission was passed? I have not heard of a single case where such a thing was done or pretended.

But, sir, if we should accept the doctrine which it seems is held now by the Senator from Indiana that the Legislature was not a legal State Legislature, and that the act of admission does not legalize its existence at the time it performed these acts complying with the conditions-precedent, what would be the consequence? The whole system of reconstruction which we have been so laboriously building up, will be tumbling down; all the constitutional amendments fall to the ground; and I see, to use an old figure of speech, the Senator from Indiana, like a blind Samson, shaking the only pillar on which the validity of these constitutional amendments can rest.

But, sir, we are estopped from accepting any such doctrine. We are estopped by the very act of December 22, 1869, which, by not providing for the reperformance of the conditions-precedent, recognized the validity of the legislative acts by which they had been performed. We are estopped by the very preamble to this bill, for if we accept this doctrine, then the fifteenth just as well as the fourteenth amendment will have to be ratified again by the Legislature of Georgia after Georgia is admitted as a State; for such acts being of that class which can only by legally performed by State Legislatures must necessarily fall to the ground as soon as we assume that the bodies which did ratify them were not State Legislatures.

It seems to me that no case in the world can be clearer. This Legislature exists as a State Legislature by virtue of the State constitution of Georgia. That State constitution of Georgia knows no other but biennial Legislatures. This Legislature commenced in 1868, and it must, therefore, according to the constitution, end in 1870. If this Legislature does not exist by virtue of the State constitution, then it had no constitutional authority whatever to ratify constitutional amendments. These acts are validated by the act of admission; and if we recognize their validity we must necessarily recognize the legality of the body which performed the acts at the time when it performed them.

Now, sir, the advocates of the continuation of the Legislature of Georgia for another term of two years — I beg their pardon when I say so — feeling the weakness of their argument, resort to the expedient of interpreting into that constitution the power of the Legislature to perpetuate its authority. The third article of section one of that constitution, which is relied on for this purpose, reads thus, speaking of the Legislature of Georgia:

“The members of the senate shall be elected for four years, except that the members elected at the first election from the twenty-two senatorial districts numbered in the constitution with odd numbers shall only hold their office for two years.

“The members of the house of representatives shall be elected for two years.

“The election for members of the General Assembly shall begin on Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every second year” —

Mark what I read —

“shall begin on Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every second year, except the first election, which shall be within sixty days after the adjournment of this convention; but the General Assembly may by law change the time of election, and the members shall hold until their successors are elected and qualified.”

“Change the time.” We are triumphantly asked if they can only change the day why did not the convention say “the day;” why did they say “the time?” For the simple reason that the constitution of Georgia provides for elections to be held, not on one day, but on several consecutive days; and the expression “change the time” means simply that the Legislature shall have power by legislative act to change the number of days during which an election may be held, and perhaps the day on which it shall begin. It seems to me that nothing can be plainer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will the Senator allow me to ask a question?

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly.

Mr. CARPENTER. If it were not designed to give the Legislature power to change the election to a day subsequent to the termination of the then existing term, why was it necessary to add the last clause, that they should hold until their successors are elected and qualified?

Mr. SCHURZ. I shall come to that presently, and I think I shall answer the Senator from Wisconsin. The argument is based upon the sentence to which the Senator from Wisconsin has just called my attention, that the members shall hold until their successors are elected and qualified. The same provision we find in the constitution of Georgia with reference to the Governor, and we find it again in that ordinance which makes rules for the first election. How is that to be interpreted? I, for my part, know only one rule of construction which can be applied to such cases in this country, and that is the rule in accordance, in entire consistency with the accepted principles of republican government. If we found such a sentence as that in the constitution of a European kingdom, acting upon monarchical principles, then, to be sure, it might mean just that which is contended on the other side; but finding such a provision in the republican constitution of a republican State, I think we are bound to interpret it according to republican principles. Now, what can it mean? The Senator from Indiana tells us.:

“If the election is to be held within the first two years absolutely, as argued by the Senator from Illinois, [Mr. Trumbull,] why was it necessary to say that they should hold office until their successors are elected and qualified? That was put in for the very purpose of meeting the case where the election was postponed beyond the two years. It does not mean that it does not mean anything, and there is no sense in it.”

Let us see whether there is really no sense in it otherwise. In entire consistency with the principles of republican government it seems to me that this clause can have only one meaning; and it is this: if by unavoidable accident a regular election or the qualification of members and officers becomes impossible, then, in order to prevent the interruption of the necessary succession — then, and only then, the incumbents shall hold until their successors are elected and qualified. But what it cannot, under our generally accepted principles of republican government mean, is this: that the Legislature and the State officers should have the power arbitrarily by their own act to prevent their successors from being elected and qualified, and thus to continue themselves in office at their own pleasure. I maintain that, whatever the clause may mean, this, certainly, in a republican country it cannot mean.

Mr. HOWE. Allow me to suggest to my friend, the Senator from Missouri, that he assumes a point which I for one do not concede. The question with me is whether this is a republican constitution or not; and he assuming that it is a republican constitution asserts that this clause must be interpreted so and so.

Mr. SCHURZ. I must confess that I do not consider the point of the Senator from Wisconsin very well taken. It has been doubted whether this is a republican constitution, and why? Because an anti-republican construction was given to this very provision. I never heard a doubt expressed as to the republican character of any other clause contained in this constitution; none except with regard to this very point, and except from the assumption that this point means just this, and nothing else. Is not that so?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Mr. SCHURZ. Is it not so that in regard to this, and only this, it has been asserted by some that this constitution is not republican?

Mr. HOWE. Yes, sir. I assert that it is not republican.

Mr. SCHURZ. If such a construction be given to this clause that it invests the Legislature and the State government of Georgia with the authority at their own pleasure, by their own arbitrary act, to continue themselves in office, then I myself say that this would not be a republican constitution. But I deny the possibility of such a construction.

Mr. HOWE. And now, precisely there, the honorable Senator says that if he met with that language in the constitution of a European Government, in that quarter of the world where republican institutions are not fashionable, he would say that it means just what I think it does.

Mr. SCHURZ. No, sir; I said it could mean that; but in a republican country I say boldly it cannot have such a meaning.

Mr. HOWE. Then it still precipitates us on that question whether Georgia is a republican country or not.

Mr. SCHURZ. Ah! not so. I was just going to say that admitting, as I believe most Senators will do, that this on the whole is a republican country, taking the United States as a whole, and accustomed to republican institutions, then in construing public documents which pretend at least to be of a republican character we are bound to follow republican rules of construction. I say that to my mind I find it absolutely impossible to construe this clause in a way which would make this constitution the most anti-republican constitution that ever existed in any State pretending to republicanism; for if there is anything that is destructive of republicanism it is just the circumstance that the legislative as well as the executive branch of the government could have the arbitrary power to continue themselves in authority by their own act at their own pleasure.

Mr. HOWE. That is so.

Mr. SCHURZ. Then, sir, I say if this clause were to be thus construed we, as the Congress of the United States, would have not only the right, but it would be our solemn and sworn duty not to receive this State into the Union at all until the constitution be expurgated in this very particular point.

Mr. HOWE. That is true.

Mr. SCHURZ. Then, Mr. President ---

Mr. Carpenter. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. SCHURZ. Certainly.

Mr. CARPENTER. I understand the Senator to claim that that provision of the constitution of Georgia would authorize the Legislature, in case from any accident the election should not be held on the day fixed by law, to fix it at some day beyond the term, and therefore it was proper to provide that in that case the members should hold beyond the term, and until successors are elected and qualified. Now, suppose it should happen that in the opinion of that Legislature it was impolitic, imprudent, unsafe to hold an election at the proper time, speaking as a mere matter of constitutional power, is there anything in that constitution which would allow them to do that thing upon that ground, and not upon the other?

Mr. SCHURZ. I think I am right in assuming it would be held that the Legislature had no right to exercise this power unless it was absolutely forced by extraneous circumstances to exercise it.

Mr. STEWART. I should like to ask one question. Suppose that in this very case a state of rebellion exists that makes it unsafe to have an election, which I maintain does exist, has not the very case arisen which the Senator regards as exceptional?

Mr. SCHURZ. Well, sir, as to the construction of such clauses there must necessarily be some latitude. But it would be held by a court of justice, I presume, if the Legislature, at its own pleasure, by its own act, without any evident, clear, and manifest necessity, perpetrated any such act as this, the Legislature had not the constitutional power to do so; but I have not forgotten the contingency spoken of by the Senator from Nevada, and I shall refer to that presently.

From whatever point of the compass I may look at this question, I can come to no other conclusion but that the continuation of the Legislature by its own act, the continuation of its authority beyond its term of two years, in violation of the fundamental law of the State of Georgia, would be an act of gross, palpable, and flagrant usurpation.

Mr. STEWART. Suppose a state of revolution should exist next fall. Can we presume affirmatively that no state of revolution, such as would authorize the Legislature to postpone the election, can exist next fall? Is there anything in the state of the case to justify the presumption that we shall now act so as to say that at that particular time they shall not exercise the power to postpone the election, because we do not believe it possible for a state of revolution to exist at that time with the facts before us?

Mr. SCHURZ. If we should entertain any apprehension that next fall the skies will fall in, then we had better all buy umbrellas. [Laughter.] I say that from whatever point of the compass I can look at it I can find no other construction of this constitution, I can come to no other conclusion but that if the Legislature continues its own power by its own act, at its arbitrary pleasure, it will be a flagrant act of usurpation. I go further. I say that if the Congress of the United States countenances such an act, authorizes it, or encourages it, or winks at it with a full knowledge of the facts, the issue clearly presented to us, we being able to overlook the consequences of what we do, then the Congress of the United States will make itself responsible for that act of usurpation.

Mr. STEWART. I do not like to interrupt the Senator; but I would ask him if he does not think there is a greater probability of violence and revolutionary movements in Georgia in November next than there is of the falling in of the skies?

Mr. SCHURZ. Yes, there may be; but I do not think we can contemplate in the interpretation of a constitution all sorts of probabilities. If the exigency should actually arise, then I think it will be time to provide for it, and we have other means than this.

Mr. STEWART. Allow me to interrupt the Senator again. How can we beforehand presume conclusively, as this proviso does, that no such state of things will exist? I say they may exist because they have existed.

Mr. SCHURZ. We have a right to presume it may be so, and we have a right to presume it may not be so; but that has nothing to do with the construction of a constitutional provision.

Mr. STEWART. You presume by this amendment that it will not be so, and you say they shall hold an election this fall, whether there is war or pestilence or famine. You fix a time absolutely when the election shall be held; you say it shall be held next fall, no matter what the condition of things, such a state of violence that the Legislature would have power to postpone the election. Now, you presume beforehand that that condition of things will not exist next fall, and presume it conclusively and act upon it, when the presumptions are all the other way that it will exist.

Mr. SCHURZ. No, sir; I do not presume that at all. I did not say any such thing. For all I know, revolutionary circumstances may arise before next fall in the State of Georgia.

Mr. STEWART. Does not the amendment presume that, when it takes away the power? Now, as I understand the Senator's position, it is this: that this power may be exercised in extreme emergencies; that is there was revolution, if it was impossible to hold an election, the Legislature might exercise its discretion and fix the election at some other time. Now, when we take away this power which the Legislature has for extraordinary emergencies and say that the election shall be held upon a particular day, do we not presume in advance, conclusively, that that condition of things will not arise at that time?

Mr. SCHURZ. Inasmuch as the Senator from Nevada has not occupied any time yet to lay his views on this subject before the Senate, [laughter,] I am very glad that he takes part of my time for the purpose of doing so. But I will tell him that this provision in the bill does not rest upon any presumption at all. This provision in the bill is based upon a view of constitutional principles, and upon nothing else.

Mr. STEWART. Does it not say that the election shall occur next fall, rain or shine, war, pestilence, or famine to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mr. SCHURZ. It does not say anything about war or pestilence; it has nothing whatever to do with it.

Mr. STEWART. The Bingham amendment says expressly that the election shall be held next fall, whether it rains or shines, whether there be a revolution or not, and that takes away the power of the Legislature to change the time of election when there is revolution.

Mr. SCHURZ. To repeat what I have already stated, it says exactly what the constitution of Georgia says, nothing more and nothing less; and it has nothing whatever to do with presumptions. If the Senator from Nevada wishes to make any further argument upon that point I hope he will do so after I am through. To what he has said I shall reply in the course of my remarks.

It has struck me in the course of the debate that Senators advocating the continuation in power of the State government in Georgia, when the question was straightforwardly put to them, were rather inclined to squirm and equivocate in their answers whether it was really contemplated that the State government should be continued in power for another two years. I must confess, knowing as we do that the act of usurpation is contemplated, openly avowed, and never denied, I should have considered it a far more manly, straightforward course to say, as the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Wilson] has done, “law or no law, we want to keep this State government in power,” as I am ready to say here straight-forwardly and boldly, inasmuch as my views of the law are as I have stated them. I am opposed to the illegal continuation of that Legislature by any act of ours.

It is said that our refusal to perpetuate the Legislature of Georgia will throw that State into the hands of the enemies of the loyal men. If the Senator from Nevada will now give me his attention, I think I shall touch the point he has been with so much anxiety and urgency pressing upon me. I will admit that that is a question of very great importance; but I ask the Senator, have we, in providing against that contingency, no Constitution to respect, have we no laws to observe? Shall we violate both before inquiring for any other means of redress? Let us look this matter straight in the face. If it is true that in Georgia to-day the laws cannot be enforced, that the life and the property of citizens cannot be protected, that the power of the Government is successfully set at naught, there is a very simple remedy. Then it is our right and it is our duty to declare that State in a state of insurrection, and without circumlocution hand it over to military rule.

If after the admission of that State a similar condition of things should arise, is not the remedy equally simple? There is Governor Bullock, there is his Legislature, and according to the Constitution of the United States they have a perfect right to call upon the President of the United States for military interference; and I am sure there would not be one single Republican on this floor who would stay the hand of our national Chief Executive. If it is apprehended that the election will be controlled by the rebel element, will be interfered with by force or by intimidation, well, then, is the State government in Georgia paralyzed? Is there no Governor there and no Legislature? They are asking for time. The election is to come off next November and to-day is the 18th of March. They may hold a session of the Legislature in April. They have months upon months to pass the necessary laws, and the Governor has months upon months to make the necessary preparations for their enforcement. Is he an imbecile, that he should not be able to do that in months which is done by others in great emergencies in as many days?

And, after all, is Congress powerless? Is the constitutional authority which was put in our hands by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to provide for their enforcement by appropriate legislation — is that nothing? Do we doubt our power, or is there any reason to doubt our willingness to promptly pass all the laws necessary for that purpose? Is not the power of the national Government, wielded by a President such as we have, amply sufficient and strong enough to execute the laws with vigor and decision? Does that answer the Senator from Nevada? I ask you, are we indeed reduced to that pitiable extremity of declaring that we can protect the citizens of the United States in their rights, only by a violation of the Constitution and the laws, instead of their enforcement? Heaven forbid that we should condescend to make so degrading, so fatal an acknowledgment! Let Republican Senators advocating that course of policy well pause and consider. They speak of party interest.

Sir, the conscience of the American people willingly accepted many a stretch of power as long as the life of the nation was in danger. But let no man deceive himself. The conscience of the American people has by no means become insensible to a wanton disregard of the laws. You mean to preserve by this act party ascendency in one single State of this Union. Why, Senators, if you have read the history of this country with profit you will have learned that it is by just such acts that party ascendency is lost in the nation. Such acts are very rarely performed with impunity; and when you come at last to strike the balance, having jeopardized your ascendency in the nation for a local success, I ask you what will be your profit in proportion to your loss?

But I am not speaking of party ascendency alone. We are all willing, we all are anxious to protect the loyalists and the freedmen of the South. I must confess that I listened the other day to the honorable Senator from Mississippi, [Mr. Revels,] when he spoke of the past and present condition of his race, with a profound interest. I honor him for his solicitude. I do not pretend to have been one of the most efficient advocates of the liberation of his race; but I may say that I certainly was not the least zealous and the least sincere; and now in advocating the course of policy I have laid before the Senate to-day, it is not in disregard of their interests, but what I say is a plea for their own welfare.

Have Senators considered in what condition they are about to place the very persons for whose safety they mean to provide? Have they considered the consequences of imposing a set of usurpers upon the neck of an unruly people under circumstances like these? Have they considered not only how many enemies they are going to exasperate, but how many friends they are going to disgust and turn into enemies by such a policy? Have they considered what authority a State government is likely to wield the legality of whose power is rightfully denied by its enemies, and most seriously doubted, nay, more than doubted, even by its friends? Have they considered what it means to put into the hands of those who to-day are still under the ban of public opinion as rebels the formidable weapon of a cause which by ninety-nine hundredths of the American people will be admitted to be the cause of just constitutional principles? Have they considered what it will lead to if they enable those from whose turbulent and lawless spirit there is so much to fear to clothe their very acts of sedition into the color of a justifiable resistance to a usurpation of government? Have they considered that the very means by which they intend to curb the spirit of violence which is abroad in the South is more than anything else calculated to vitalize and to envenom and to inflame that spirit? Have they considered that the very performance of such an act will be like a bugle-blast for the Kuklux Klan in the South, and will call recruits for the work of evil out of every neighborhood there? Have they considered, finally, what kind of a precedent they are about to set, and how they by such acts despoil us of the most potent means by which we can avert the consequences of such a precedent — I mean our moral power over the people? I repeat, sir, Senators would do well to stop and consider calmly before they venture upon so ruinous and short-sighted a policy.

We have had time enough to study the condition of things in the South. We ought now at last to be prepared to abandon all our old delusions and to understand its philosophy.

There is nothing particularly strange in what we see in the late rebel States. Every rebellion from the beginning of history to the present day has had its epilogue, and those epilogues have certain characteristic features which are almost invariably the same, or similar at least under similar circumstances. When a rebellion is defeated some of those who took part in it will, as soon as their first discouragement is overcome, try by any means within their reach to regain something of what they have lost. To this end, impelled by vague illusions and false hopes, they will indulge in foolish, reckless, adventurous, oftentimes criminal attempts. They will try again and again, until it becomes evident that all the means at their disposal are absolutely insufficient to upset and overturn a new order of things well secured. Then the more reasonable of them will stop, and those who have great material interests at stake will join the law and order party, for the purpose of suppressing those who still disquiet and disturb society by repeating excesses which are reckless, criminal, and at the same time useless for their ends and dangerous to all. So it always has been under similar circumstances, and so it is now at the South.

It will not surprise me at all if most of the southern States should have to pass through a process of second fermentation. You cannot prevent that altogether, neither by legislative enactment nor by executive measures. It is one of those processes which will work themselves out, just like fevers, which have to pass through a crisis before they can be finally cured. You may aggravate that process by an interference too violent; and you may also facilitate and accelerate it by methods that are adapted to the pathological character of the case. I know well that this process appears grievously slow to us, and it appears much more so to those in the South who have to suffer under it. But if we are wise we shall at last make up our minds to the fact that the real evil there does not consist in this man's or that man's possessing political power, but that it there consists in the inveterate habits, opinions, and ways of thinking of southern society. The true and the only cure is in the reformation of those habits and opinions; and that reformation will be “a plant of slow growth” under any circumstances, whatever you may do. Let us not deceive ourselves about that. So it is, and it cannot be otherwise.

Certainly we want to repress disorder, we want to punish crime, we want to protect the rights and liberties of every human being there; and we stand ready to employ our constitutional power to its utmost extent for that purpose. But those who think they can accomplish this end and contribute to the reformation of the habits and opinions of southern society by the class of means here advocated by acts of palpable usurpation will find themselves most terribly mistaken. What can they accomplish? They may, perhaps, indeed avoid a Democratic success at the election next fall; but one thing they have it not in their power to prevent — on the contrary, by this act they will provoke it — I mean a reaction far fiercer, far more dangerous and disastrous than any chances to which a Democratic success at the election next fall might expose our friends in that quarter of the country.

It is true, sir, we possess very great power; but that power will be barren of good as soon as we remove it from the moral ground upon which alone it can bear fruit. You want to maintain order and protect the rights of manhood at the South. Well, sir, the Constitution provides ample means for that purpose, and we stand ready to use them; but I entreat the Senate let us not descend to small tricks and cunning devices in the execution of which our very hands will tremble and be palsied by the reproaches of our own consciences. You mean to fulfill your higher mission of reforming the habits and opinions of southern society, and of making our late enemies law-abiding citizens? Then, sir, above all things, we must convince them that we ourselves respect the laws which we want them to obey.