United States Statutes at Large/Volume 5/24th Congress/2nd Session/Chapter 22

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United States Statutes at Large, Volume 5
United States Congress

Public Acts of the Twenty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Chapter 22

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3661113United States Statutes at Large, Volume 5 — Public Acts of the Twenty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Chapter 22United States Congress

March 2, 1837.

[Obsolete.]

Chap. XXII.—An Act concerning Pilots.^[1]

Upon waters which are the boundary of two States, pilots licensed by either may be employed.Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall and may be lawful for the master or commander of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon waters, which are the boundary between two States, to employ any pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of either of the States bounded on the said waters, to pilot said vessel to or from said port; any law, usage, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Approved, March 2, 1837.

↑ Cases decided in the courts of the United States, as to Pilots and Pilotage.
What a pilot does beyond the limits of his duty, as such, may be the foundation of a claim for salvage; but not such acts as were within his duties. Hand v. The Elvira, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 65.
Where a steamboat was hired for the purpose of towing a vessel, to which she was fastened, and both were under the direction of a licensed pilot, the owner of the steamboat is not entitled to damages on account of injury sustained in the course of navigation, and not caused by negligence of the pilot. Reeves et al. v. The Ship Constitution, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 579.
Assisting vessels in distress, beyond what the mere duty of pilot requires, entitles pilots to compensation. Delany, a Pilot v. The Sloop Peragio, Bee’s Adm. Rep. 212.
The brig Hope, with a valuable cargo, had been conducted, in the evening, by a pilot inside of Mobile point, where pilots of the outer harbor usually leave vessels which they pilot inside of that bar. The pilot was discharged, and the Hope proceeded up the bay of Mobile. The wind soon after changed, blew a violent gale from the northwest, both anchors parted, and the Hope was driven on a shoal outside of the point, among the east breakers. The gale increased to a hurricane, and forced the vessel on her beam ends, and her masts and bowspit were cut away. The master and crew deserted her to save their lives. After various fruitless efforts to save her, the libellants, all pilots of the outer harbor of Mobile, two days after she was stranded, and while yet in great peril, succeeded: and she was brought up to the city of Mobile by them, towed by their pilot boat, assisted by a steamboat employed by them. On a libel for salvage, the district court of the United States for the district of Alabama allowed, as salvage, one-third of 15,299 dollars and 58 cents, the appraised value of the bring and cargo. The owners of the brig and cargo appealed to the supreme court. By the Court—A pilot, while acting within the strict line of his duty, however he may entitle himself to extraordinary pilotage compensation for extraordinary services, as contradistinguished from ordinary pilotage for ordinary services, cannot be entitled to claim salvage. In this respect he is not distinguished from any other officer, public or private, acting within the appropriate sphere of his duty. But a pilot, as such, is not disabled, in virtue of his office, from becoming a salvor. On the contrary, whenever he performs salvage services beyond the line of his appropriate duties, or under circumstances to which those duties do not justly attach, he stands in the same relation to the property as any other salvor: that is, with a title to compensation to the extend of the merit of his services, viewed in the light of a liberal public policy. Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Peters, 108.
Seamen, in the ordinary course of things, in the performance of their duties, are not allowed to become salvors, whatever may have been the perils, or hardships, or gallantry of their services, in saving the ship and cargo. Extraordinary events may occur, in which their connexion with the ship may be dissolved, de facto, or by expression of law; or they may exceed their proper duty, in which cases they may be permitted to claim as salvors. Ibid.
It is not within the scope of the positive duties of a pilot to go to the rescue of a wrecked vessel, and employ himself in saving her, or her cargo, when she was wholly unnavigable. That is a duty entirely distinct in its nature, and no more belonging to a pilot than it would be to supply such a vessel with masts or sails, or to employ lighters to discharge her cargo in order to float her. It is properly a salvage service, involving duties and responsibilities, for which his employment may peculiarly fit him; but yet in no sense included in the duty of navigating the ship. Ibid.
This was a case where the libellants acted as salvors, and not as pilots. They had, at the time, no particular relation to the distressed ship. They proffered useful services as volunteers, without any existing covenant that connected them with the duty of employing themselves for her preservation. The duties they undertook were far beyond any belonging to pilots; and precisely those belonging to salvors. Ibid.
Suits for pilotage on the high seas, and on waters navigable from sea, as far as the tide ebbs and flows, are within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The service is strictly maritime, and falls within the principles already established by the supreme court in the case of the Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheaton’s Rep. 428, and Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters’ Rep. 324. Ibid.

[p189-1] Cases decided in the courts of the United States, as to Pilots and Pilotage.
What a pilot does beyond the limits of his duty, as such, may be the foundation of a claim for salvage; but not such acts as were within his duties. Hand v. The Elvira, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 65.
Where a steamboat was hired for the purpose of towing a vessel, to which she was fastened, and both were under the direction of a licensed pilot, the owner of the steamboat is not entitled to damages on account of injury sustained in the course of navigation, and not caused by negligence of the pilot. Reeves et al. v. The Ship Constitution, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 579.
Assisting vessels in distress, beyond what the mere duty of pilot requires, entitles pilots to compensation. Delany, a Pilot v. The Sloop Peragio, Bee’s Adm. Rep. 212.
The brig Hope, with a valuable cargo, had been conducted, in the evening, by a pilot inside of Mobile point, where pilots of the outer harbor usually leave vessels which they pilot inside of that bar. The pilot was discharged, and the Hope proceeded up the bay of Mobile. The wind soon after changed, blew a violent gale from the northwest, both anchors parted, and the Hope was driven on a shoal outside of the point, among the east breakers. The gale increased to a hurricane, and forced the vessel on her beam ends, and her masts and bowspit were cut away. The master and crew deserted her to save their lives. After various fruitless efforts to save her, the libellants, all pilots of the outer harbor of Mobile, two days after she was stranded, and while yet in great peril, succeeded: and she was brought up to the city of Mobile by them, towed by their pilot boat, assisted by a steamboat employed by them. On a libel for salvage, the district court of the United States for the district of Alabama allowed, as salvage, one-third of 15,299 dollars and 58 cents, the appraised value of the bring and cargo. The owners of the brig and cargo appealed to the supreme court. By the Court—A pilot, while acting within the strict line of his duty, however he may entitle himself to extraordinary pilotage compensation for extraordinary services, as contradistinguished from ordinary pilotage for ordinary services, cannot be entitled to claim salvage. In this respect he is not distinguished from any other officer, public or private, acting within the appropriate sphere of his duty. But a pilot, as such, is not disabled, in virtue of his office, from becoming a salvor. On the contrary, whenever he performs salvage services beyond the line of his appropriate duties, or under circumstances to which those duties do not justly attach, he stands in the same relation to the property as any other salvor: that is, with a title to compensation to the extend of the merit of his services, viewed in the light of a liberal public policy. Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Peters, 108.
Seamen, in the ordinary course of things, in the performance of their duties, are not allowed to become salvors, whatever may have been the perils, or hardships, or gallantry of their services, in saving the ship and cargo. Extraordinary events may occur, in which their connexion with the ship may be dissolved, de facto, or by expression of law; or they may exceed their proper duty, in which cases they may be permitted to claim as salvors. Ibid.
It is not within the scope of the positive duties of a pilot to go to the rescue of a wrecked vessel, and employ himself in saving her, or her cargo, when she was wholly unnavigable. That is a duty entirely distinct in its nature, and no more belonging to a pilot than it would be to supply such a vessel with masts or sails, or to employ lighters to discharge her cargo in order to float her. It is properly a salvage service, involving duties and responsibilities, for which his employment may peculiarly fit him; but yet in no sense included in the duty of navigating the ship. Ibid.
This was a case where the libellants acted as salvors, and not as pilots. They had, at the time, no particular relation to the distressed ship. They proffered useful services as volunteers, without any existing covenant that connected them with the duty of employing themselves for her preservation. The duties they undertook were far beyond any belonging to pilots; and precisely those belonging to salvors. Ibid.
Suits for pilotage on the high seas, and on waters navigable from sea, as far as the tide ebbs and flows, are within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The service is strictly maritime, and falls within the principles already established by the supreme court in the case of the Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheaton’s Rep. 428, and Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters’ Rep. 324. Ibid.

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