United States v. Boecker/Dissent Bradley

by Joseph P. Bradley

United States Supreme Court

88 U.S. 652

United States  v.  Boecker

Mr. Justice BRADLEY (with whom concurred Justices CLIFFORD, DAVIS, and STRONG), dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion of the court in this case. It seems to me that it has a tendency to cast every burden on the government and to unduly relieve the sureties of the distiller from responsibility for his acts. By the sixth section of the act of July 20th, 1868, every person intending to be engaged in the business of a distiller is to give notice in writing to the assessor of the district within which such business is to be carried on, stating his name and place of residence, and the place where said business is to be carried on; and if in a city, the residence and place of business is to be indicated by the name and number of the street. He is then, by the seventh section, to execute a bond with at least two sureties, to be approved by the assessor. Such a notice and such a bond were given in this case. The bond recited, in the preamble to the condition, the fact that the distiller intended to be engaged in the business of a distiller within the second collection district of the State of Maryland, to wit, at the corner of Hudson Street and East Avenue, situate in the town of Canton, county of Baltimore. Then followed the terms of the condition, namely, that the distiller should in all respects faithfully comply with all the provisions of law, &c., and not suffer the lot on which the distillery stood to be incumbered, &c. Now the sureties contend that if the distillery is actually established on a different lot from that suggested in the recital, though only across the street, or even the adjoining lot on the same side, they are not bound. It seems to me that it is for them, and not for the government, to see that the distiller pursues his business on the lot which he gives notice to the assessor that he will use for that purpose. They are the guarantors of his conduct to the government, and not the government to them. If after starting his distillery he changes its location, or after giving notice of the location he changes his mind and commences business on another lot, the sureties ought to be bound for the regularity of his conduct. If he should not carry on business in the designated district, but in a different one, subject to the jurisdiction of another assessor, to whom the bond was not given, the result might be different. But if he establishes it in the same district, the sureties ought to be liable. The condition is not that he shall comply with the law only on that particular lot. That can only be claimed as an inference of law. But does such an inference arise in this case? The fact that the distiller intended to pursue his business on that lot is mentioned, it is true, in accordance with his notice. But this is no part of the substance of the condition; the substance is that he was going to engage in the business of a distiller in that district, and the sureties guaranteed his compliance with the law. Where a sheriff or marshal is elected or appointed for a particular term, a bond given for the faithful discharge of his duties relates by implication of law to that term alone; and the sureties are not bound for a subsequent term in case of his re-election or reappointment. This is so, whether the condition recites the term of office for which the appointment was made or not. This is the reasonable inference from the whole transaction. But, in the case under consideration, the implication of law and the reasonable inference is that the sureties are bound for the conduct of their principal, though he should change the location of his distillery to any other place within the district. Otherwise the government is liable to be subjected to great frauds. It is the duty of the sureties, rather than that of the government officials, to see that no change is made without the distiller's pursuing the formalities required by the law. If it is made without those formalities, there would be stronger reason for holding that fact of itself as constituting a violation of the bond, than for holding that it discharges the sureties from all obligation whatever.