United States v. Johnson (390 U.S. 563)/Dissent Stewart
United States Supreme Court
United States v. Johnson (390 U.S. 563)
Argued: March 14, 1968. --- Decided: April 8, 1968
Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice HARLAN join, dissenting.
I regret that I cannot join the opinion of the Court. There is, of course, no question of the reprehensibility of the appellees' alleged conduct. But the issue is whether Congress has subjected this conduct to federal criminal prosecution.
Section 201 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, secures the right to equal enjoyment of places of public accommodation. Section 203 prohibits interference with that right in any of three ways:
'No person shall(a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege sucured by section 201 or 202.'
Section 204 authorizes private injunctive actions against violations of § 203. Section 206 provides for injunctive actions by the Attorney General against patterns or practices of resistance to enjoyment of Title II rights. Finally § 207(b) states:
'The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title * * *.' [1]
The plain language of the exclusive remedies clause of § 207 thus clearly precludes a criminal prosecution for interfering with rights secured by Title II. [2] And the very legislative history cited by the Court leaves no doubt that a specific purpose of that clause was to prevent criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 241. It was upon that understanding that Congress enacted the legislation.
The Court's effort to distinguish between refusal of service by a proprietor and violent interference by third parties is not only without any support in the language of § 207 but also is belied by § 203 of the Title, quoted above. That section clearly prohibits intimidation and coercion by third persons as well as refusal of service by a proprietor. Congress, therefore, was explicitly aware of the kind of conduct alleged in this case when it enacted Title II, and Congress provided in § 207 that the exclusive remedy to prohibit such conduct must be by injunction.
The exclusive remedies provided by Congress to protect the rights secured by Title II of the 1964 Act are undoubtedly ineffective in a case like this. But I cannot, for that reason, join in rewriting the law that Congress so clearly enacted.
I respectfully dissent.
Notes
[edit]- ↑ Section 207 contains a proviso; but the United States, which brought this prosecution, is conspicuously absent from the list of those to whom the proviso applies: '(N)othing in this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.' (Emphasis added.)
- ↑ The indictment did not allege injury to any rights other than those established by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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