United States v. Jones (59 U.S. 92)/Opinion of the Court

by Robert Cooper Grier

United States Supreme Court

59 U.S. 92

United States  v.  Jones

The action in this case is for money had and received by the defendant, Jones. It was entered amicably, and submitted on a case stated.

The defendant is a lieutenant in the navy of the United States. In December, 1851, he was in Paris, on leave of absence, and was severely and dangerously wounded by accident, during the emeute or revolutionary outbreak in that month. In July, 1852, he was placed by the secretary of the navy on special duty, for the collection of information relative to the steam navy of France. Afterwards, in August, 1852, the sum of one thousand dollars was transmitted to him by the secretary of the navy, with orders to apply it 'to discharge the expenses attending the injuries received by him in Paris.' It is admitted that this money was disbursed according to the orders of the secretary. The accounting officers of the treasury have charged the amount so disbursed by the defendant against him on his pay account, 'and have refused to recognize the authority of the secretary of the navy in the premises.'

The reason alleged for this refusal by the accounting officer is, that by his construction of the second section of the act of 3d of March, 1835, c. 27, the secretary of the navy had no authority to make such appropriation of the funds of the government in his hands. The act, so far as it is material, is in these words: 'That the yearly allowance provided in this act is all the pay, compensation, and allowance which shall be received under any circumstances whatever by any such officer, &c.'

Notwithstanding an opinion of a late attorney-general to the contrary, the accounting officer 'entertains no doubt' that the expenses attending the medical treatment of a sick and disabled officer or seaman are among the 'allowances' prohibited by this act, and has consequently felt bound to repudiate the secretary's construction of the law, and his opinion as to the powers and duties of his department.

For the purposes of this case, however, it will not be necessary for the court to decide between these discordant opinions as to what things come within the category of 'allowances,' according to the true intent and meaning of the act of congress.

It is the peculiar province and duty of the navy department to provide medical stores and attendance for the officers and seamen attached to that service. It may truly be said, also, to enter into the contract of the government with persons so employed by them. For this purpose, a bureau of medicine is attached to this department, and numerous medical officers appointed. The law, moreover, exacts from every officer and seaman a monthly contribution from their wages to make provision for the sick and disabled. These contributions are applied, under the supervision of the President, to the erection and maintenance of marine hospitals, and similar institutions for the benefit of seamen.

The exigencies of the service often require the employment of soldiers and sailors at a distance from public hospitals, and when the attendance of the medical officers cannot be obtained; or, consequently, in fulfilment of the humane policy of the government, it frequently becomes necessary to employ temporarily physicians not regularly commissioned. For in this way alone can the department perform the duty assumed by the government of providing the necessary medical attendance for those who become sick or disabled in its service. The executive department of the government, to which is intrusted the control of the subject-matter, must necessarily determine all questions appertaining to the employment and payment of such temporary agents, and the exigency which demands their employment. The secretary of the navy represents the President, and exercises his power on the subject confided to his department. He is responsible to the people and the law for any abuse of the powers intrusted to him. His acts and decisions, on subjects submitted to his jurisdiction and control by the constitution and laws, do not require the approval of any officer of another department to make them valid and conclusive. The accounting officers of the treasury have not the burden of responsibility cast upon them of revising the judgments, correcting the supposed mistakes, or annulling the orders of the heads of departments.

In the case before us, the defendant has not come before the accounting officers of the treasury, claiming from the government an 'allowance' for medical attendance while on leave of absence, and submitting to these officers the propriety and legality of such 'allowance.' On the contrary, the agreed case shows, that a sum of money had been transmitted to the defendant by the secretary of the navy to be disbursed, and that he had disbursed it according to his orders; and whether it was for paying for services acknowledged by the secretary to have been rendered to the government for medical attendance on the defendant himself, or on another, could make no difference. The liability of the defendant to refund this money to the government is founded on the act of the accounting officer charging him with it, because, in his opinion, the secretary of the navy had mistaken the law or abused his discretion.

We are of opinion that he was not bound to assume this responsibility.

The propriety of detaching the defendant on special duty in France, of furnishing him with medical attendance while so employed, and of adopting and ratifying his act in the employment of such physician, under all the circumstances, are all subjects peculiarly within the jurisdiction and discretion of the head of the navy department, and not subject to revision or correction by the officers of any other department.

The judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.

Mr. Justice CATRON, and Mr. Justice DANIEL, dissented.

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