United States v. Smith (342 U.S. 225)/Concurrence Clark

by Tom C. Clark

United States Supreme Court

342 U.S. 225

United States  v.  Smith (342 U.S. 225)

 Argued: Dec. 4, 1951. --- Decided: Jan 7, 1952

Mr. Justice CLARK, concurring.

I join in the opinion and judgment of the Court. Soon after the beginning of World War II, Congress realized that it would be impossible for the Department of Justice currently to investigate and prosecute the large number of offenses arising out of the war effort. Therefore Congress suspended the running of the statute of limitations as to frauds against the Government, first until June 30, 1945, and subsequently until three years after the termination of hostilities. It is clear that Congress intended to give the Department more time to apprehend, investigate, and prosecute offenses occurring 'under the stress of present-day events' of the war 'even after the termination of the present conflict.' H.R.Rep.No. 2051, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2; S.Rep.No. 1544, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2; see United States v. Gottfried, 2 Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 360. V-E Day was May 8, 1945, and V-J Day was September 2, 1945. Immediately after V-J Day all war procurement stopped, contracts were canceled, and renegotiation was speeded up. The President did not proclaim the cessation of hostilities until December 31, 1946, sixteen months after the fighting ceased. During this period, the pressing problems of demobilization and reconversion-problems likely to cause the continued perpetration of frauds on the Government-were for the most part brought to an end.

The present cases had nothing to do with the war or the reconversion thereafter, Smith being charged with forgery of a Government check for $90 dated June 30, 1947, and Dailey being indicted for having made a false statement on March 14, 1947, to the Department of Agriculture as to value of his farm, cows, poultry, etc., in connection with an application for the services of the Farmers Home Administration. Both of the offenses occurred long after the fighting war was over and after 'the intensive preoccupation of both participants and witnesses with the war effort' had ceased, if ever those persons were so employed.

These cases clearly illustrate that the suspension statute was not intended to and should not embrace offenses committed subsequent to December 31, 1946. It applies only to offenses committed between August 25, 1939, and December 31, 1946. For those offenses which occurred between the date of the 1942 Act and the cessation of hostilities, Congress' intention was to give the Department of Justice six years from the latter date to investigate and prosecute. For those offenses which occurred before the date of the 1942 Act, Congress' intention was to give the Department three years after the cessation of hostilities plus whatever portion of the regular three-year limitations' period had not yet run when the 1942 Act was passed.

Mr. Justice MINTON, with whom Mr. Justice REED, Mr. Justice JACKSON and Mr. Justice BURTON join, dissenting.

Notes