United States v. Texas (2023)
Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 22–58. Argued November 29, 2022—Decided June 23, 2023
In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigration-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) that prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guidelines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the arrest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U. S. C. §1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)). The District Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the States had standing to sue based on those costs. On the merits, the District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Held: Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. Pp. 3–14.
(a) Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. This bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of powers. So the threshold question here is whether the States have standing to maintain this suit. Based on this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.
(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. For one, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. Moreover, such lawsuits run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___. The principle of Executive Branch enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context. Courts also generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs. That is why this Court has recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. Pp. 6–9.
(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. First, the Court has adjudicated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution. Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress elevates de facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court. Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both arrest or prosecution priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. Fifth, policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. But this case presents none of those scenarios. Pp. 9–12.
606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.
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