United States v. United States Gypsum Company (333 U.S. 364)/Concurrence Frankfurter
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.
In Part II of the opinion the Court confessedly deals with an issue that "need not be decided to dispose of this case." Deliberate dicta, I had supposed, should be deliberately avoided. Especially should we avoid passing gratuitously on an important issue of public law where due consideration of it has been crowded out by complicated and elaborate issues that have to be decided. Accordingly, I join in the Court's opinion, except Part II.
The Court is agreed that the arrangements challenged by the Government as violative of the Sherman Law cannot find shelter under the patent law, howsoever valid the patents of the defendants may be. In short, we have found that the validity of the patents in the suit is irrelevant to the invalidity of the arrangements based upon them. While fully recognizing this, the Court needlessly considers the question whether the Government may, in view of United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224, attack the validity of the patents in the present proceeding.
It does so because "it seems inadvisable to leave . . . as a precedent" the decision of the trial court that "the government was estopped to attack the validity of the patents in the present proceeding." But, surely, it is easy [p403] enough to sterilize the trial court's decision by the explicit declaration that the issue need not be decided.
I shall not follow the Court's lead and indulge in dicta on the question whether, in a suit like this, the issue of patentability can be contested by the Government. But, as bearing upon the undesirability of announcing dicta on this issue, it is pertinent to point out that the cases on which the Court relies for its pronouncement hardly dispose of the problem. They are cases in which a licensee resisted claims for royalties on what purported to be valid patents. Royalties were refused because there were no patents on which they were owed. Such was the issue involved in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173; Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394; MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421, 424. Different considerations come into play when the Government seeks a declaration of invalidity. See United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., supra. I am not remotely intimating that the differences are decisive. I am merely suggesting that a due weighing of the differences, in the light of the Bell Telephone case, should await the duty of adjudication. It should not be the undesirable product of deliberate dicta.
The Court refers to Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 240, as reason for passing on an issue that "need not be decided to dispose of this case," because "it seems inadvisable to leave the [trial court's] decision as a precedent." As to our problem, Hurn v. Oursler was exactly the opposite from this case. The issue on which this Court pronounced in Hurn v. Oursler was inescapably the issue that had to be decided to dispose of the case.
The issue in Hurn v. Oursler was this: where a suit for infringement of a copyrighted play was brought in a federal court and with it was joined a non-federal cause of action based on unfair competition in regard to that play, has the federal court jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the claim of unfair competition after the court [p404] had rejected the federally-based suit of infringement? The trial court held not, and dismissed the non-federal claim for want of jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim on the merits. When the case came here this Court could not possibly sustain the trial court (which had been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals) without necessarily affirming the trial court's ruling on the issue of jurisdiction. This Court reversed the trial court on that issue and held that the district court had jurisdiction. It found, however, that the cause of action should have been dismissed but on the merits. Accordingly, this Court modified the decree so that the dismissal was on the merits and not for want of jurisdiction. This Court could not have reached the merits without first determining whether there ws jurisdiction to reach them. In short, in Hurn v. Oursler the precedent of the district court had to be set aside in order to decide the case. Here, the "precedent" of the district court is upon an issue which is essentially irrelevant, and therefore we should not follow the error of the district court in pronouncing upon an issue which "need not be decided to dispose of this case."